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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An entrepreneurial spirit has gripped academia. The debate presented in 
this book is about what that means and portends for researchers, espe-
cially those engaged in literary studies.  
Organisations or individuals are considered to be entrepreneurial 
when they single-mindedly pursue profits from whatever productive activ-
ity they are concerned with. That is the sense in which ‘entrepreneurial’ is 
used in the following debate. This definition overlooks some of the con-
ventional nuances of the term, some of its heroic flavour and upbeat 
charge, the social contribution and creative edge it commonly suggests. 
This book does not go along with such normative associations uncritically.  
 The adjective ‘entrepreneurial’ has followed the noun ‘entrepreneur’ 
through several connotative shifts since its appearance in English in nine-
teenth-century political economy. In his textbook An Introduction to Political 
Economy (1891), Richard T. Ely had paused on what was then still a rela-
tively new term in English:    
      
The one who manages business for himself was formerly called an under-
taker or an adventurer, but the first word has been appropriated by a small 
class of business men and the latter has acquired a new meaning, carrying 
with it the implication of rashness and even of dishonesty. We have conse-
quently been obliged to resort to the French language for a word to desig-
nate the person who organizes and directs the productive factors, and we call 
such a one an entrepreneur. (170) 
 
The shift from ‘undertaker’ and ‘adventurer’ to ‘entrepreneur’ to describe 
certain self-motivated business functions was evidently led by normative 
considerations. The idea was to distance those functions from funereal 
associations and ‘the implication of rashness and even of dishonesty.’ Ely 
was keen to give these functions a more celebratory cast, and proceeded as 
follows:  
 
The function of the entrepreneur has become one of the most important in 
modern economic society. He has been well called a captain of industry, for 
he commands the industrial forces, and upon him more than any one else 
rests the responsibility for success or failure. […] The prosperity of an entire 
town has sometimes been observed to depend upon half a dozen shrewd 
captains of industry. It may be said, then, that the large reward these often 
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receive is only a legitimate return for splendid social services. Such is the 
case, provided this reward is gained honestly and without oppression. (170) 
 
Ely’s celebratory tone, however, came with a tinge of defensiveness. He 
protested a bit too emphatically in favour of large rewards for entre-
preneurs, and he seemed to be exhorting entrepreneurs to be honest and 
considerate. There were slight misgivings underneath his general approba-
tion of the entrepreneur’s function. He felt that this function was a neces-
sary component of his liberal progressive politics. And yet, though far 
from being a socialist Ely was not unsympathetic to the labour movement, 
and he was critical enough of laissez-faire liberalism to be regarded as 
almost a socialist – he was to leave his position in Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity in 1892 as a result. In his textbook introduction to the ‘entrepreneur,’ 
Ely quietly gestured towards the undesirable potential of that role while 
endorsing it firmly.  
 Ely’s idea of the entrepreneur was of an individual who performs self-
motivated business functions, and his slight ambiguity about the entrepre-
neur seems to leave this individual with moral choices: the good entrepre-
neur would choose to be honest and considerate, would be possessed of a 
social conscience. At the same time, given Ely’s statist approach to liberal 
political economics, he felt that this choice needs to be encouraged in a 
progressive direction by legal or rational boundary setting and a regime of 
regulation. The idea of the entrepreneur as an individual with authority 
and moral choices continues to have a hold in the popular imagination (a 
point that is examined in Part 1, Chapter 16 below; such cross references 
will appear hereafter in the form I.16). However, in the passage from   
industrial to post-industrial capitalism – or from classical liberalism to  
neoliberalism – the entrepreneur has largely ceased to be an individual 
person, in practice and in principle. The entrepreneur’s functions are now 
more meaningfully attributed to collectives, to organisations or corpora-
tions, which operate as individual entrepreneurs in legal terms – as collec-
tive legal persons (also a point picked up in I.16). Naturally those func-
tions are realised by individual persons on behalf of organisations or 
corporations, but these individuals are no longer conceived of as free-
wheeling entrepreneurs. Rather, they hold greater or lesser positions of 
authority as functionaries in the collective entrepreneurial body, and they 
are more aptly thought of now as ‘executives.’ There is usually a chief   
executive at the pinnacle of an organisation or corporation, and this 
person too is always subject to the separate entrepreneurial interest of the 
organisation or corporation as legal person. Even in ordinary language 
‘entrepreneur’ and ‘executive’ do not ring as synonyms, and the individual 
entrepreneur is now a rare creature, while there are executives galore.   
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 The influence of individual entrepreneurs in the economy has, then, 
largely been absorbed into entrepreneurial organisations, with entrepre-
neur functions therein being portioned to employed executives. Insofar as 
individuals are foregrounded in the political economic sphere now, that is 
more as being ‘entrepreneurial’ (adjective) in synch with their entrepre-
neurial organisations and corporations rather than as being autonomous 
‘entrepreneurs’ (noun) performing self-motivated business functions. In a 
way, a screen has appeared between the noun and the adjective, so that the 
noun-form seems to recede into the background and the liberated 
adjective-form can be attached to various other nouns. Being ‘entre-
preneurial’ has acquired rather a different inflection from being an 
‘entrepreneur’: where the latter consists in performing functions, the 
former now appears more as an inclination or attitude of the mind. The 
positive norms associated with ‘entrepreneurial’ seem to have been 
extracted from the activities that defined the ‘entrepreneur,’ and dispersed 
somewhat vaguely towards characterising a state of mind. This is the sense 
in which the term ‘entrepreneurial’ is attached to organisations and their 
functionaries now.  
The debate below takes place with reference to contexts – which are 
gradually proliferating across the globe – where the adjective is attached to 
the higher education and research sector. In such contexts, speaking of the 
‘entrepreneurial university’ and the entrepreneurialism of its managerial, 
academic and other functionaries is becoming habitual. It does not seem 
to matter much whether the institutions in question are public or private 
organisations; it is considered that all such institutions should ideally be 
profit making. In the dominant discourses of the present, the entre-
preneurialism of functionaries in the university, any university, is 
considered to be an attitude or inclination which realises and concretises 
the ‘entrepreneurial university.’ Their entrepreneurialism has an upbeat 
psychological dimension and is grounded in the naturalisation of neolib-
eral language in academia. Entrepreneurialism thus becomes imbued in the 
very language through which the university functions and presents itself 
(Holborow 2015 discusses these moves, with a particular focus on the 
university in Chs.5 and 6).  
 These introductory remarks on the term ‘entrepreneurial’ lead into the 
debate below, which has a concordantly wide remit. It is relevant to the 
present-day university in general and current practices of research in a 
broad way. However, the debate is anchored to a specific interest in lit-
erary research throughout, i.e. the sort of research that is undertaken as a 
profession in literature departments within universities and other insti-
tutions of higher studies. This anchoring in literary research is more to 
appoint a bottom line for matters of large import than to focus narrowly 
on the discipline. Literary research is often regarded as particularly 
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resistant to entrepreneurial considerations, and sometimes even consid-
ered a repository of anti-entrepreneurial convictions. If the less applied 
areas of academic scholarship, and the humanities in general, seem to be 
increasingly awkwardly positioned in the ‘entrepreneurial university,’ lit-
erary research is on the frontline of vulnerability. If entrepreneurial 
expectations can be shown to have a bearing on literary research, then they 
are highly likely to have a bearing on other research areas in other 
disciplines to at least that extent.  
 The debate is presented below in the form of a dialogue, but without 
pleasantries and asides. The register of the dialogue is not conversational 
but argumentative; its language is broadly but not heavily academic, and 
does not depend particularly upon discipline-specific terminology. Argu-
ments are laid out in reasonable detail in every instance, and are consid-
ered in a sustained fashion. The dialogue form allows for a small number 
of debaters to explore specific arguments from contrary positions, with 
each holding a consistent line. The debate is led throughout by Alexander 
Search, who considers himself a neoliberal thinker with investments in 
literary scholarship. He is aware that admitting to being neoliberal will be 
received with opprobrium and incredulity in some academic circles. He 
wishes to engage in debate with precisely those who belong to these 
circles. Search is also keen for his arguments to be considered in their 
ratiocinative terms and not as the expression of a peculiar personality or 
temperament. He begins his argument with the statement: ‘All literary 
research is or should be conducted with the ultimate purpose of gene-
rating profits for some enterprising sector of the economy; that is, through 
some corporate or governmental organisation.’ This is more than an 
offhand provocation; it turns out to be the serious opening gambit for an 
argument which Search develops throughout the debate. Suman Gupta 
and Fabio Akcelrud Durão take issue with Search’s arguments, responding 
to them at each step – and Search in turn responds to their responses and 
objections. In political terms, Gupta and Durão think of themselves as 
within the spectrum of democratic socialism, and both are university-
affiliated professionals (professors in the broad sense) with research inter-
ests in literary theory. They are both convinced that academic research 
generally, and literary research particularly, should be disinterested – that 
is, disinterested in an economic sense, untrammelled by profit-making 
impetuses. Gupta’s and Durão’s perspectives on literature and literary 
research differ in significant ways which will become apparent as the 
debate proceeds.  Dismal Scientist also makes occasional but important 
contributions to the debate, as a professional mainstream economist who 
is sympathetic to Search’s position and ponders the plausibility of his 
arguments. Here, Dismal Scientist is the nom de guerre of Terrence 
McDonough, who is a professor of economics but not at all a subscriber 
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to the dominant economic ideology of the present, quite the contrary. It 
would be a mistake to identify Dismal Scientist with McDonough; Dismal 
Scientist is a persona assumed by McDonough in this debate. There are 
also a couple of thoughtful interventions by Leandro Pasini, a scholar of 
literary theory and history.      
 The dialogue is presented in four parts, each with a number of short 
chapters. A chapter is usually by one debater and lays out a particular 
argument; occasionally one debater takes up a series of chapters; at times a 
chapter consists in shorter exchanges between two or three debaters. 
Arguments and counterarguments alternate through the chapters. The first 
part (‘Panoptic’) works through the core terms and basic principles in 
question, and clarifies the debaters’ positions relative to each other. The 
lengthier second part (‘Knowledge Production: The University’) considers 
the institutional dimensions of knowledge production at present, and 
details the implications for literary research specifically. The third part 
(‘Scholarly Publishing: The Monograph’) addresses the current condition 
of academic publishing, with a particular focus on the future of the 
research monograph. The changing parameters of the relationship 
between authors and publishers, and the implications of open-access 
publishing are explored. The short fourth and final part (‘Leadership’) 
speculates on the possible contribution of literary research to thinking 
about leadership and leadership education – that is, the role of executives 
as outlined above.  
 Debates do not necessarily lead to firm conclusions and prescriptions; 
they could end with unresolved differences. This debate ends without 
differences being resolved, but with, perhaps, some light being thrown on 
questions and demands which are now pressing upon academic work with 
intensifying urgency.     
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1. All literary research is … 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alexander Search 
 
All literary research is or should be conducted with the ultimate purpose 
of generating profits for some enterprising sector of the economy; that is, 
through some corporate or governmental organisation. I do not mean that 
literature itself should necessarily be commercial – that fiction, drama, 
poetry, etc. should be understood in terms of how well they perform in 
the book market. The commerce of literary (book) production and 
consumption is not the focal point of my argument, it is an ancillary 
matter. The focal point is literary research: that is, the sorts of activities that 
are considered research in Literature Departments in universities and other 
such institutions. Literary research is work that various persons are 
employed to do in academies: students, especially graduate; and professors 
at various grades (in the broad sense of professing a discipline and being 
professionals in the academy). This work could invariably be profit gener-
ating, in tractable financial terms, and usually already is so – despite a 
prevailing reluctance to regard it as such.  
I will make this argument here from two directions: first, by explaining 
why this is a worthy and necessary way of engaging with literary research; 
second, by detailing how profit-making works (or could be made to work) 
for specific areas and methodologies of literary research. Admittedly, it is 
extremely rare for literary researchers to consider their work as purposively 
for financial profit, and I have not come across any who admit to working 
for that end. In fact, the impulse of profit-making is usually regarded with 
suspicion by literary researchers, and talking in favour of it is considered 
not quite done; talking against it is de rigueur.   
That a salient, not to speak of ultimate, purpose of literary research 
should be profit-making is likely to be a sticking point for many of my 
scholarly readers. Literary scholarship seemingly subscribes to various 
kinds of higher calling, more exalted than the dry business of making 
money. These scholarly approaches include some combination or variant 
of the following:   
 
 The study of literature develops our understanding of cultural 
specificities (such as, of specific language spheres or of nationalities) 
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and of the universal dimensions of human culture. The cultivation of 
such study encourages social advancement by carefully tracking hist-
ories of particular and general cultural expressions. This could be 
considered a philological view of literary scholarship.  
 Research into literature enables the development of self-understand-
ing, much in the way Hegel articulated ‘self-consciousness’ (especially 
1977 [1807], Ch.4). Since literary texts reflect or construct various 
aspects of human existence, the critical contemplation thereof clarifies 
personal, and therefore collective, aspirations – broadly the aspiration 
of knowledge itself. We may think of this as an idealistic approach to 
literary research.  
 Literary research hones the critical and therefore the moral faculties 
and helps readers to be good citizens. Literary texts are case studies in 
facets of human experience and the nuances of human expression; 
the study thereof clarifies the responsibilities of each and all, and 
enables appropriate conduct and mutual regard. This is often regarded 
as a liberal-humanist approach to literary scholarship. 
 Literary texts – like any cultural form – contain, convey and mould 
the political (ideological) convictions of a given society at particular 
historical junctures. Researchers use them as vehicles for under-
standing the history and present condition of polities. More 
importantly, such research can then make useful – critical and 
progressive – political interventions by discussing literary texts care-
fully. I think of this as politically conscientious literary scholarship. Much 
contemporary research is of this sort.  
 Possibly the most widely held view is of literary research as a second-
ary activity, devoted to accentuating and appreciating the insights that 
are found in the primary literary texts (works of fiction, poetry and so 
on). Those insights are often too complex to be immediately grasped; 
literary researchers tease out and crystallise those insights without 
altering them. They illuminate and celebrate (and sometimes 
obfuscate and denigrate) the experience, wisdom, pleasure of literary 
texts. Research then is a kind of prolonged contemplation of the 
qualities of literary texts: literary research is a secondary process of 
appreciation.  
 
In sum, the purposes of literary research are: for the philological view of liter-
ary scholarship, discernment of cultural specificities and universalities; for 
the idealistic approach to literary research, the development of social and 
individual self-consciousness as knowledge; for a liberal-humanist approach to 
literary scholarship, moral improvement; for politically conscientious literary schol-
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arship, critical and progressive political intervention; for literary research as a 
secondary process of appreciation, (affirmative) contemplation of the insights 
found in primary literary texts. Obviously, these approaches and purposes 
are phrased here in an excessively summary fashion and overlap in prac-
tice. The careers of each strand are complex and incorporate a great 
number of publications, too numerous to list meaningfully.  
If, as I think, politically conscientious literary scholarship is currently 
dominant in academic circles that is because it casts doubt on the probity 
of other perspectives. Politically conscientious scholarship is itself a heter-
ogeneous formation, usually characterised by some aspiration to egalitari-
anism or championing some just cause on behalf of the marginalised (e.g. 
on the basis of gender, ethnicity, class and so on). Politically searching 
examination of philological, idealist, liberal-humanist and appreciative 
literary scholarship has often found that however high-minded and seem-
ingly all-embracing their precepts, in practice and implicitly these perpetu-
ate dominant interests and prejudices and are designed to maintain inequi-
ties of various sorts. A somewhat defensive argument that can be made in 
favour of profit-making literary scholarship is that it is no more compro-
mised and compromising than most of the above-named approaches now 
appear to be. It aligns research practices to a key driver of capitalist econ-
omies (profit making). That makes literary research as just or unjust as the 
currently dominant economic environment it works within, and has the 
merit of being upfront and clear about its place therein. It offers no 
subterfuge of righteousness to distract from the realities of its social 
grounding. Glib moralistic denunciations of profit-making in itself (in 
favour of altruism, selflessness and so on) are usually no more than 
shallow religious sentiments, which have no place in scholarly work.  
My more serious argument in favour of profit-making literary research 
is somewhat different. Of the above approaches to literary scholarship, the 
philological and especially the politically conscientious have occasionally 
registered the commercial dimensions of literature. That has usually 
involved analysing literary production, circulation and reception and their 
history in terms of material culture, print culture, commodity culture, mass 
versus niche markets and readerships, intellectual property regimes and so 
on. Thereby literary texts are interpreted as variously encoding (more or 
less covertly) the relevant cultural mores, and as materializing and being 
valued in commodity form (books, serial publications, e-publications, etc.). 
Cultural and real capital are thus seen as invested in literature – the object 
of study – in complex, context-specific and ideologically determinate rela-
tionships. However, the economic perspective that occasionally attaches to 
literary texts as objects of study do not extend to the conditions of study 
itself, to the economic and institutional structures of literary research. All 
the dominant approaches to literary research briefly outlined above seem 
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to be designed to elide the economic conditions and infrastructure of their 
own production; each of them appears as a selfless encounter of pure 
critical intellection, untouched by finance or enterprise, invisible to tract-
able investment and returns, mediating between social world and literary 
texts. Literary research seems to emanate as indifferent to or irrespective of the 
economic structure of the academy, the conditions of the researcher’s 
work, the means of publication and publicity, the account book of 
academic production and its commercial underpinnings. A moral high 
ground attaches to literary research being professed as if it were not a 
profession in the ordinary sense, as if it were uneconomical moral or social 
or cultural service, a sort of altruistic vocation. 
But literary research is – and has been for as long as there have been 
universities or patronage – a profession: subject to wages, contracts, infra-
structure, work hours, institutional settings, and tied in with state and 
corporate investment, and webbed into a range of commercial sectors. 
Literary research is overwhelmingly the work of students (apprentices) and 
professors in institutions. It seems impossible that the conditions and re-
sourcing of this work would not impinge upon what that work produces. 
If that work is regarded as intellectual, it would be disingenuous to deny 
the influences of conditions and resources on intellection – that would be 
a kind of distortion of research. Within literary research, however, the 
denial of the conditions of research production seems almost absolute. 
The work that literary academics do in real terms, in their spaces of 
employment, as professionals, has been conceptualised within literary 
research very indifferently. For such research in English Studies, with 
which I have a slight familiarity, only two references come to mind: 
Richard Ohmann’s English in America (1976) devoted some space to 
examining what professors in English departments actually do (backed up 
by analyses of administrative documents); in a more sustained fashion, 
Evan Watkins’s Work Time (1989) discussed the relationship between disci-
plinary knowledge and disciplinary work.  
If appropriate professional conditions and resources are needed for 
literary research to develop and maintain its integrity, then, of course, it is 
incumbent on literary researchers to factor those considerations into what 
they do and what they produce. If those conditions and resources need to 
be generated through literary research, and justified by literary research, 
then it becomes necessary for literary research to both consider its 
relationship with entrepreneurial strategies and to become entrepreneurial. 
It is arguable that, to some degree, that has been the case for long (it is just 
a matter of reconsidering literary history accordingly); it seems evident that 
that is more than ever the case now (in the present condition of academia 
globally). It is, in fact, more than probable that literary research is already 
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largely an entrepreneurial activity – but reluctant to say so, hiding its entre-
preneurialism behind approaches such as those bullet-pointed above. 
Those approaches, and the careful elision of their economic under-
pinnings, might well be established entrepreneurial strategies themselves.                  
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2. Counterarguments  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suman Gupta 
 
Alexander uses a curious ploy above which I am suspicious of. He slips in 
‘politically conscientious scholarship’ as a fourth bullet point among other 
approaches. It appears as if substantially at a similar level as the others, as 
if more or less equally valid or considerable. In his argument that means 
‘equally dismissible.’ And yet, he then suggests that the other approaches 
have been undermined by it. In fact, his ‘weaker argument’ in favour of 
entrepreneurial scholarship is that such scholarship is no more culpable 
than the others as far as the politically conscientious approach goes. There 
he seems to be pleading particularly with politically conscientious scholars. 
This is an interesting conundrum: he dismisses the political verve of 
scholarship and yet accords it extra recognition.  
In fact, his way of phrasing the political verve of scholarship is itself 
laden with dismissal: dubbing it a matter of ‘conscience’ sounds vaguely 
normative, whereas much politically informed literary scholarship is a 
matter of reason, evidence and living in the material world.  
So, I suspect that Alexander is going through these manoeuvers to de-
politicise his own approach, to present it as pragmatic and somehow so 
obvious as to be unavoidable and unquestionable. He places his arguments 
outside political critique, immunised by having politics put away into a 
pigeon-hole. That is obvious when his ultimate argument turns out to be: 
we must become entrepreneurial scholars because that is the way the 
world is, that is especially the way academia is now. Alexander’s position 
calls for unquestioning acceptance of the given status quo (in academia, in 
the world now), which is not to be challenged or changed. And this posi-
tion, which appears to put the status quo outside question, is obviously 
Alexander’s all too political position, which he knows and is yet so careful 
to conceal the political character of.  
 
Fabio Akcelrud Durão 
 
Amongst the justifications for working with or on literature that Alexander 
gives, one is missing: namely, pleasure. Doing things with good texts (and 
we can think of them as good retroactively, if they generate nice discus-
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sions) is joyful. That could work as a justification in its own right. Alexan-
der might say: ‘But these are weak grounds; society would never fund liter-
ary studies on this basis.’ If in the midst of so much wealth, society cannot 
afford that, there is something wrong with it and it must be changed. 
Then, the political justification which Alexander tries to debunk becomes 
legitimate.  
The claim that literature is just any other kind of business undermines 
its right to exist. Without any appeal, however ideological it may be, to 
some kind of intrinsic being (and I do not say anything about ‘value,’ 
which is an unproductive word), literary objects become devoid of mean-
ing because they are useless. How can one justify reading a novel when 
one could be improving oneself by reading self-help books? And if one 
grants that humans are not machines and need time to relax, why waste 
one’s brain with a sonnet if one can watch a movie? For Alexander’s posi-
tion, since he would not go so far as decreeing the end of literary studies 
(he is no philistine), I think it would be better to concede literature’s claim 
of not being useful, so that it does not need to be incorporated in entre-
preneurial discourse. 
As for the claim that universities should be just like other institutions 
surrounding them, there are two possible rebuttals. First, universities are 
culturally residual in Raymond Williams’s sense, containing elements of 
past social formations which cannot be contained within the dominant 
formation of the present: ‘no mode of production and therefore no domi-
nant social order and therefore no dominant culture ever in reality includes 
or exhausts all human practice, human energy, and human intention’ 
(Williams 1977: 125). Literary Studies in Brazil is still very much connected 
to nation building, the impetus of an earlier phase (cf. Readings 1997). 
This lagging behind could in itself become a kind of resistance that under-
girds social criticism. Second, we could try to imagine what would happen 
if culture were totally commodified. It would become something else rather 
than cease to be.  
 
Alexander Search 
 
I do not understand much of Suman’s and Fabio’s counterarguments.  
Suman’s demand that I announce a political position, his implicit way 
of pushing me into one, seems very much like pigeon-holing to me. I am 
not aware of having a stable and clear and singular political position 
(especially irrespective of literary research), though I am aware of having 
political interests, and am even aware of being unaware of some of the 
political interests I am subject to.  
Fabio’s idea that pleasure in reading a good novel is above or anterior 
to social and economic considerations appears to me a curious mystifica-
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tion. Pleasure in reading is often produced by, and the goodness of literary 
texts identified through, entrepreneurial initiatives and commodification 
processes. Pleasure is generated in and enhanced by being captured in 
some productive process, within socio-political and economic structures. I 
do not share Fabio’s contempt for reading self-help books or watching 
films relative to his reverence for reading good literature. I do not have 
that kind of faith in the integrity of the latter. Fabio’s talk of ‘rights’ leaves 
me baffled: ‘joy as a justification in its own right,’ ‘the claim that literature 
is just any other kind of business undermines its right to exist’ – who is 
according these ‘rights’? The notion that there is some kind of literary 
quality and pleasure which is a priori seems suspect to me. In fact, I doubt 
that literature can be said to exist prior to a literary industry.    
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3. The Tricky Anteriority of Literature 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alexander Search 
 
The most effective trick that is pulled off by the literary establishment – 
authors, educationists, researchers, publishers, publicists, programmers 
and film/theatre producers, culture ministers/bureaucrats, etc. – is in 
pretending that something cohesive called ‘literature’ is already out there 
awaiting the attention and encouragement of the literary establishment. In 
brief, the literary establishment seems to draw its raison d’être from the 
precedent presence of literature.   
Thus, literary researchers usually go along with the assumption that 
‘literature’ is the object (sometimes ‘area,’ which is within what I call 
‘object’ here) of their study, constantly appearing first and awaiting their 
critical attention. They then describe literature as such. Various ways of 
describing this object in-itself are accordingly enlisted: 
 
 Literature can be described in terms of its component parts, such as 
‘genres’ or ‘forms.’ 
 Literature can be described by breaking it down according to 
incidental circumstances, like the ‘nation’ it appears within or the 
language/period in which written or the themes addressed.   
 Literature can be described by differentiating it qualitatively from 
other objects of study which resemble it in being mainly constituted 
through texts/performances. So, its textual content is differentiated 
from other objects (like historical records, political documents, philo-
sophical/theological treatises, news reports) in nebulous qualitative 
terms like ‘creativity’ and ‘stylistics’ – which convey the impression 
that a boundary has been put around the object ‘literature.’ 
 Boundaries can be suggested around literature by selecting the most 
(politically or aesthetically) representative or worthy from a textual-
ized plethora, and holding that selection up as the object ‘literature’ – 
placed within a ‘literary canon,’ or as identified in a ‘literature curric-
ulum.’ Usually, the object thus demarcated is then named as ‘litera-
ture’ with some conditional adjective: fracturing into ‘English,’ 
‘Brazilian,’ ‘working-class,’ ‘seventeenth-century,’ ‘feminist,’ and so 
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on, or coagulating into World or Global. ‘Comparative’ is unusual as a 
conditional adjective in highlighting method rather than content: it 
assumes that literature as object is already disposed in bounded bits 
which can be compared with each other.   
 
Each of these object-like descriptions of ‘literature’ seeps into the others 
in ways that reiterate, so to speak, literature’s objectness. Thus, bids to 
expand the ‘literary canon’ or interrogate the contents of the ‘literature 
curriculum’ turn out to be ways of reifying the practices of selectiveness 
and representativeness to maintain literature as object. Wondering whether 
the study of literature should not extend to bestsellers, genre fiction, 
children’s stories, biographies (‘life writing’ now the preferred term), films 
and e-texts, oral recordings and even philosophical treatises and historical 
narratives and so on comes with anxieties about loosening the boundaries 
of literature or satisfaction in redefining those boundaries. The objectness 
of literature, fluidly cohesive and variously bounded, for searching 
(researching) attention persists as a preconceived notion.  
With the preconceived objectness of literature preceding it, literary 
research can then accordingly describe itself as having an after-the-fact 
integrity. Such integrity is describable as scholarly methods and principles, 
occasionally as a self-reflexive (self-interrogative) pursuit, along the lines of 
the bullet-pointed approaches in I.1 above (“All literary research is…”). A 
consensual critical language (discourse) naturalises this relationship 
between the object ‘literature’ and the vocation ‘literary research’. It works 
rather like Alvin Gouldner’s neutralised Culture of Critical Discourse 
(CCD), as: ‘an historically evolved set of rules, a grammar of discourse, 
which (1) is concerned to justify its assertions, but (2) whose mode of 
justification does not proceed by invoking authorities, and (3) prefers to 
elicit the voluntary consent of those addressed solely on the basis of 
arguments adduced’ (Gouldner 1979: 28).   
This preconceived way of understanding ‘literature’ as object of study, 
and literary research as consequently attending to that object through 
various principled approaches, misses something obvious. It fails to regis-
ter that economic, and particularly commercial, imperatives constantly 
delineate the remits of both what is considered to be ‘literature’ and what 
is pursued as ‘literary research’ – in increasingly tractable ways, clearly 
tractable now. In fact, the above assumption of literature’s anteriority may 
be designed to evade that circumstance, to studiedly disregard it. With that 
assumption, literature and the study thereof always seem to be driven by 
self-contained aesthetic and ethical imperatives (including ethical in a 
political sense – but is there any other sense?), as matters of changing 
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tastes and human progress, as determined choices made by litterateurs who 
know better or best. The economic imperatives are elided.  
A more plausible way of considering this business might be: all literature 
is produced by the literary establishment, in terms of the latter’s authoritative and 
authorizing power structure and corresponding economic arrangements. Literature is 
posterior to the literary establishment. Let me be clear about what I mean 
by ‘literary establishment.’ This does not designate the establishment that 
appears because literature exists, but because it makes literature exist as 
such. The establishment causes literature to be manufactured and con-
sumed and studied as such. I might as well say: ‘a prevailing political and 
economic establishment’ wherein literature appears; but here I am 
interested in that only insofar as it bears directly upon the production of 
literature, hence ‘literary establishment.’ In this sense, the ‘literary estab 
lishment’ precedes that which is thought of as ‘literature.’ Simplistically 
then, everything that describes ‘literature’ arguably follows according to 
the entrepreneurialism of a pre-existing literary establishment: e.g. the 
canon is that establishment’s branding device; claims of moral 
improvement or social progress or cultural achievement its publicity 
strategy; specialist interpretive practices are ways of maintaining market-
distinctions between owners, workers, consumers; resistant or radical 
literary ideas are symptomatic of new and competitive entrepreneurial 
entities.    
There might have been some original point in history (literary history) 
when literature simply appeared in pristine valuable-in-itself form for the 
attention and management of the literary establishment – but I doubt it. I 
am unable to think of any such moment, supported by evidence. Every 
case of the emergence of something designable as ‘literature,’ or as some 
kind of literary text, seems likely to be conditional to the establishment 
wherein it became visible to a social (not to speak of critical) gaze. The 
modus of any kind of collective visibility is the structure of the establish-
ment, a passage paved through a prevailing rationale of power and its 
economic arrangements, embedded in institutions. Leisure and resistance 
are defined by these arrangements too. I say this tentatively and sweep-
ingly for a long view of history; of course it needs to be tested out with 
specific junctures of literary history in view.   
For the short view of history that informs the current literary estab-
lishment, I feel more confident of this asseveration. In the present … in 
steps gradually since the eighteenth century as the structure of the modern 
university, the modern intellectual property regime, the modern technolo-
gies of text (cultural) production and dissemination, the parameters of 
nation-state ideologies and supranational conventions, the convergence on 
capitalist economic organisation were firmed up … the entrepreneurial 
impetus which drives the literary establishment to produce literature and 
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then stretch or contract its purchase – always tractably for profit – seems 
to me a demonstrable business. In fact, I hope this discussion will gradu-
ally pull such demonstration together.  
Literary research is now very largely undertaken by professionals 
(broadly, professors) in the institutional setting of the academy, a part of 
the literary establishment. The professionalisation of this part of the estab-
lishment, and of a discipline of ‘literary research,’ since the eighteenth 
century has been prolifically investigated (with a wide scope and recently, 
for instance, in Turner 2014). Literary research plays a key role in produc-
ing and modifying what is designated as ‘literature’ by its entrepreneurial 
calculations, to generate profits for some sector of the economy and to 
sustain itself. Literature is produced and understood and examined 
accordingly. Literary researchers do not play an exclusive role in this; 
authors, educationists, publishers, publicists, programmers and film/ 
theatre producers, culture ministers/bureaucrats etc. have their parts too.  
Literary research is unusual among entrepreneurial activities in stud-
iedly hiding its entrepreneurialism, in being vehement about denying it and 
hostile to the suggestion that it is entrepreneurial. The presumed anterior-
ity of literature outlined above is a strategy to disinvest from its entrepre-
neurial character while being entrepreneurial. Paradoxically, literary re-
search also has, as a knowledge formation, the mechanics of revealing its 
entrepreneurialism and embracing it proactively for the greater good of 
present-day economies.  
That is my thesis. Demonstration of this and capitalisation on this 
involve less evasive and self-denying literary research, and more attention 
to economic considerations.  
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4. What is the Literary Product? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Leandro Pasini 
  
Curiously, Alexander does not describe the product with which profits 
should be generated in putting literature as posterior to the literary estab-
lishment. If one is to generate profit with literature and literary research, 
how is one supposed to present this product – profitable literature – to the 
market? The fact is that the literary market already has its profitable lit-
erary ‘objects’ or texts, is it not? What should the professor do? Should 
she transform the object of study in order to make it similar to what is 
already considered profitable literature (turn Joseph Conrad into Stephenie 
Meyer, for example)? Should she turn it into a new product, more profit-
able than its market contenders? It seems to me that to absorb literature 
thoroughly in the logic of exchange value, the literary researcher needs to 
say something meaningful about the literary texts. Alexander’s argument 
really generates more problems than resolutions for profit-making 
purposes. Reading a difficult text (of the literary canon, for instance) may 
push the researcher (and the consumer) from the logic of profit to the 
logic of literariness. Alexander ought to assume that a literary text does 
have a rationale of its own, as literary, and that this rationale is not wholly 
congenial to markets and profits.  
Therefore, the challenge is: to be a product, a text must be read. Then, 
the second challenge is: once read, would all the texts produce the same 
effect? If these challenges are worth considering, you might agree that the 
concreteness of a literary text is not the same as the abstract concept of 
‘literature.’ Perhaps it is easier to think of generating profits with the 
abstract idea of ‘literature’ than to do so by considering people who actua-
lly read texts.  
 
Alexander Search 
 
Leandro: products seldom appear in the market before the industry that 
produces them.  
I understand that you are arguing for the anteriority (precedence, 
primacy, beforeness) of literature in terms of ‘reading texts.’ Everything 
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must stem, you are saying, from reading texts; any professional scholar-
ship, enterprise, profit-making can only follow from that.  
I am reminded a bit of that debate between Wolfgang Iser and Stanley 
Fish about the mechanics of reading in the 1980s (Fish 1989, Iser 1989). 
There was Iser saying (through the 1970s), always with reference to 
soundly canonical literary texts, that the mechanics of reading can be 
understood in terms of what happens within the texts, what is encoun-
tered by the reader therein: what gaps are left, what blanks need to be 
filled in, what associations are possible and so on. Fish argued instead that 
actually quite a lot has to happen before a reader can encounter a text in a 
meaningfully readerly manner: some consensual reading strategies need to 
exist before a text can be read in a way that makes communicable sense. 
And when it comes to the professional business of criticism (literary inter-
pretation), which is all about making communicable sense of texts, this is 
particularly clear. What happens in literary criticism is the deployment of 
interpretative strategies which are sort of pre-agreed (through socialisation 
and education) by an ‘interpretive community’ (which thereby affirms its 
academic-community character) before texts are encountered.   
I find myself a bit in a Fish-position (and indeed Fish was exemplary in 
contemplating professional practices, the pitfalls and responsibilities of 
professional correctness). I am also pointing to the pre-agreements (before 
reading texts, being producing literature) of an ‘interpretive community,’ 
but with some further nuances. This interpretive community does not 
exist in a vacuum. It exists amidst an economic and political context. Its 
pre-agreements and self-constitution are designed to enable its survival in 
that context. It therefore works so as to, and collaborates with other 
communities so as to, ensure its security and growth. This means that its 
communal and public activities, even its very encounter with texts, have to 
be such as can function within given economic conditions.  
 
Fabio Akcelrud Durão 
 
As a good neoliberal, Alexander is right to insist that the idea of literature 
lacks substance. Not long ago, many felt that this position is one of 
resistance. Literature is an agent of repression; it is part of a baleful ideol-
ogy that endorses the worldview of the dominant elite: male, heterosexual 
whites. Those advocating this position saw it as their mission to demon-
strate that literature is simply a convention, not at all incompatible with 
Fish and his interpretative communities. Literature should represent the 
new voices of neglected groups; precisely because literature has no a priori 
import, these new voices deserve a place of their own. There are two main 
problems with this position: (a) it involves a regressive, pre-aesthetic 
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stance, whereby the empirical author is identified with the narrator of the 
work; and (b) it disregards any objectivity that may arise from the literary 
form, from the principles of composition.  
A further problem is that of proportionality: what groups should be 
represented and how regularly? From this perspective, the professionals of 
literature should be demographers with competence in statistics. They 
should be able to propose algorithms that could translate all social groups 
into perfect narrative equations. We can see from this how easily, once 
literature becomes a free-floating signifier, it turns into nothing but a 
commodity. Thus, my first claim: divesting literature of an intrinsic mean-
ing, far from being a challenging gesture, is a precondition for it to 
become a properly sellable object.  
One does not need a monolithic definition of literature to work with 
and upon it. There is no problem if the concept changes – if a given text is 
considered literary at a certain time, and not 50 years thereafter. Literature 
may be seen as that which produces certain effects which can be presented 
in effective arguments. Ultimately, Alexander confuses judgment with 
substantiality. It does not follow that for one to distinguish texts, one has 
to appeal to absolute empirical foundations. Judgment may conceive of 
itself with differing degrees of contingency and accept its provisional 
character. At the very least it will have to see itself as valid as long as 
another, more binding, argument does not appear. As in other fields, such 
as international trade, Alexander’s argument for the absolute equality of 
texts is just an excuse to camouflage existing inequalities. The levelling out 
of texts is an effective means for promoting those which are economically 
stronger, supported by a more powerful advertisement apparatus. 
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5. Are These Serious Arguments? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suman Gupta 
 
After some hesitation, I decided to take Alexander’s arguments seriously, 
though I regard his leading claim in I.1 (“All literary research is…”) to be 
absurd. Two considerations weigh in for me. 
One is that his arguments present a curious performative contradiction. 
In writing these he is not being entrepreneurial, at least not insofar as I am 
able to discern yet. His argument does not seem to be motivated by a 
desire to advance himself or serve some employing organisation. He 
appears to be championing the conceptual principles of entrepreneur-
ship in literary studies in a disinterested public-spirited manner, simply for 
rational clarification. In my experience, this sort of thing is usually a covert 
operation precisely for some quite specific profit-making interest, and I am 
waiting to see whether and when that becomes apparent. 
The other consideration is a broader one. Alexander is right insofar as 
he observes that in the present-day university, in Britain (where I am 
employed) and elsewhere (according to report), business enterprise is the 
guiding principle of governance in largely untheorised practice. This has been 
prolifically examined in critical accounts of the neo-managerialism, finan-
cialisation, neoliberal practices that are being systematically embedded in 
the administrative order and academic life of universities. Entrepreneurs 
have taken over universities and are converting (or coercing) compliant 
souls therein into entrepreneurial functionaries and morphing universities 
into corporations – all without bothering to explain their view of the 
world themselves. It is left to their hapless, and largely uncomprehending, 
victims to try and infer that worldview from their strategies and policies, 
or to simply go along with their shallow pronouncements. Alexander’s 
arguments seem to offer an unusually studied explanation for recent 
changes in academia from a neoliberal point of view. The prevailing direc-
tion of the neoliberal university has been particularly troubling for literary 
researchers, undermining their – my – core convictions as academics, and 
trapping them into impossible (and increasingly trivial) demands and 
insecurities. In the entrepreneurial university, literary research is regarded 
as particularly unproductive, particularly unprofitable. And yet such 
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research continues to be pursued, in a manner of speaking. Perhaps thin-
king as Alexander does will throw some light on this. 
Having said that, let me reiterate that Alexander’s arguments trouble 
me already, and that irrespective of their half-baked appearance so far (I 
daresay they will be baked better as he continues) and the scepticism I 
bring to them. There are two reasons for that too. 
 First, as noted already in my response to Alexander’s opening gambit 
(“All literary research is…”): I am concerned about his denial of a political 
position, his subtle dismissal of political commitments, while nevertheless 
according politics a clearly dominant analytical function. Someone who 
sees political processes ubiquitously at work in all except his own asser-
tions, and who seems to speak an apolitical truth, has a political agenda 
which surreptitiously seeks power (or seeks surreptitious profits) – 
especially someone as deliberative as Alexander. That does sound like a 
neoliberal tactic, an entrepreneurial strategy. He says he has political inter-
ests rather than a position, and admits to interests which are unspoken (he 
says he is not aware of some of them). I find the use of ‘interest’ there of 
interest. There is double-speak there: he might be interested as in having an 
enquiring attitude, or he might be interested as in having an agenda that 
serves his own ends. 
More worrying – and here is the second reason – is Alexander’s pen-
chant for making totalizing statements. These appear constantly. There is a 
quiet totalitarian tendency at work in Alexander’s language. It is always all 
or nothing: all literature is thus and has always been so, he says; not only is 
literature already thus it should be so, he says; literature is completely produced 
by the literary establishment, it has no intrinsic value whatever. Alexander 
speaks in uncompromising absolutes. There is no middle ground, no ‘bit 
of this’ as well as ‘bit of that’ and maybe ‘something else too.’ And he has 
no problems with being prescriptive. The strings of absolute statements 
leave a diminishing line between prescription and diktat. 
There are, however, a couple of common starting points for social 
reasoning which Alexander and I seem to share. I am at one with his 
suggestion that reasoned arguments (and political commitments) should 
not be premised on articles of faith. The rebuttal of an article of faith is 
simply a contrary article of faith, there is no negotiating between their 
contrary assertions as articles of faith. Reasonable and persuasive argu-
ments need more than this or that faith. And I also agree with Alexander’s 
assumption (though very much less totalistically) that economic arrange-
ments and corresponding structures of power underpin what is socially 
and culturally visible and collectively acknowledged.  
If Alexander says profit making is all, then he is not saying anything. 
Profit making has behind it a process of realisation and before it the mechanics of 
distribution. When he gets to articulating those clearly, with concrete 
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examples before him, his glib reasoning will, I am convinced, run into 
insuperable contradictions. This unravelling I am looking forward to. 
 
Alexander Search 
 
One of Suman’s observations calls for an immediate response: the sugges-
tion that I have a totalitarian mode of thinking. That is a serious worry. 
Suman makes this charge with damning glibness, and I worry about that 
glibness (maybe that is totalitarian?). I feel it is worth thinking through the 
difference between a ‘generalisation’ and a ‘totalistic statement.’ Those of 
my statements that Suman points to as ‘totalistic’ are more appropriately 
‘generalisations.’ A generalisation is inferred from various observations, 
and taken as plausible till falsified convincingly – that is, it has the charac-
ter of a working hypothesis till properly undermined or further confirmed. 
I do not think I have stated anything without leaving it open to further 
consideration, whether in the direction of being falsified or confirmed. By 
Suman’s account, any attempt at generalisation is totalitarian, which, if 
taken seriously, would make philosophy or sociology or most kinds of 
rigorous thinking impossible.  
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6. Research for the Public Good 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alexander Search 
 
The upshot of my argument in I.3 (“The Tricky Anteriority of Literature”) 
is: our understanding of ‘literature’ as researchers is not determined by an 
object of study that precedes studious attention. It is constantly produced, 
shaped and modified according to the imperatives of a prevailing political 
and economic order, operating through state and corporate institutions 
within which literary researchers work and study takes place. However, 
literary researchers prefer to conduct their work as if ‘literature’ is an 
object that precedes them.    
The question that arises is: why do literary researchers and their insti-
tutions maintain this consensual subterfuge (or false conviction)?  
Here I will lead up to that question from a tangent. Getting to it 
involves covering some general ground, germane to the idea of being an 
entrepreneurial researcher. I start with one big assumption: as a collective 
professional undertaking, academic research serves a greater good (or 
interest) than that of any specific researcher or group – let us call this the 
‘public good’ (or public interest). Let me immediately say here that my 
understanding of the public good is as delineated below and differs from 
those offered by other literary researchers (such as, Rylance 2016, which is 
discussed here in IV.2, “The Invisible Literary Researcher”).  
There are two aspects to the public good of academic research. The 
obvious one is that it gives rise to (or should give rise to) various benefits, 
which are in principle available to or distributable to everyone. Benefits 
may include such intangible ones as happiness, virtue, confidence, security, 
understanding, etc., and tangible ones such as welfare provision, shared 
infrastructure, free access to education and knowledge, codes of social 
justice, etc. Of course, the tangible and the intangible benefits are difficult 
to extricate from each other – the point is, benefits are available to or 
distributable to all in principle.  
The other aspect of the public good of academic research is that it 
participates in or encourages the generation of profits at various levels of 
and for various parties to commercial enterprise. In other words, academic 
research contributes to keeping capital in circulation, in the direction of 
growing wealth for society in general, through a cycle of generating profits 
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and spurring investment. That is the main way in which capitalist societies 
become affluent. The accumulation of wealth for society in general 
through the generation of profits by enterprise does not mean that profits 
are available to and distributable to everyone (as profits). In fact, profits 
need to be unevenly available at every juncture, concentrated in some 
hands and nodes, moving from some niches to others, to keep capital 
circulation flowing well and therefore capital growing. This is like a law of 
physics. In this respect, profits are unlike benefits; and it may seem that 
though their generation does increase the wealth of society in a general 
way, their uneven distribution means that profits should not be regarded 
as an aspect of the public good.  
Nevertheless, profits are an aspect of the public good because benefits 
depend upon them. That is, benefits depend upon the general wealth of 
society. If society is affluent in a general way, then redistribution of some 
of that wealth to maximise benefits becomes possible (or could be 
arranged). Otherwise benefits would be reduced. This redistribution to 
enable more benefits may happen to some degree spontaneously, through 
market processes; or, it could be effected through political will – through 
taxation proportional to income, public-private partnerships, encouraging 
social ethics and altruism for private enterprise, etc. So, unless those 
profits are generated for the general affluence of society, albeit unevenly 
distributed, it is unlikely for benefits to be secured for all. For the pleasure, 
virtue, knowledge, etc. that literary research brings, through the access to 
education, archives, publishing, etc. that literary research works with, 
money is needed. Such money can be generated through enterprise that 
literary research could and should contribute to. The question is whether 
literary research does so already, and how could literary research do more 
of it in a tractable manner?  
At any rate, both benefits and profits are mutually dependent aspects 
of the public good, and insofar as academic research contributes to the 
public good it contributes to both (or should). To maximise benefits, 
academic research must also strive to maximise profits in an ongoing 
manner.  
There is another question worth posing there. Insofar as academic 
research leads to benefits, those are in principle for all; but insofar as 
research therefore and correlatively also works for profits, those are not 
for all (they are in the first instance unevenly accrued) but for some 
enterprising sector. What sector should the profit making of academic 
research serve? The obvious answer is: the enterprising sectors that 
support and invest in academic research, the governmental and corporate 
institutions that it takes place within and works through. With literary 
research in view, those are the university, the publishing firm, the media 
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corporation, the heritage industry, any relevant and promising start-up, any 
relevant and established information and entertainment business or public 
body, etc.    
I am aware that some of my scholarly readers, the professional profes-
sors, such as Fabio and Suman, would have radical disagreements with 
much of the above reasoning already. They would say that they do not 
accept the relationship between benefits and profits. And they would 
particularly argue against the statement that the general wealth of society 
depends upon an uneven generation of profits. They will have sophisti-
cated arguments to show that instead of an increase in general wealth, the 
system of profit generation in capital circulation produces deprivation and 
diminishment of benefits – and that, moreover, they have worked out 
better ways of increasing the general wealth of society and maximising 
benefits. They may well have very good arguments and evidence for the 
first half of the preceding sentence; I hope they will also have arguments 
for the latter part of that sentence (I am keen to see those).  
In anticipation of such scholarly objectors, let me say the obvious 
though: the above rationale of benefits and profits as aspects of the public 
good, and their relation to academic research outlined above, is the 
rationale of the current global economic and political dispensation. It is 
embedded in the institutions and corporations of most (dare I say, all?) 
political states and their institutions. The latter include the academic insti-
tutions where research takes place and the organisations which support 
and promote research. I am not sure whether it has been otherwise in the 
past (probably not); it is definitely so now. This rationale underpins the 
very existence of the professors as professors even when they do not 
accept the rationale of capital circulation. If these radical professors – 
professional researchers – are polishing their curricula vitarum and meeting 
their performance targets and honing their profiles and raising external 
income and so on by carrying the brands of their employers and funders, 
they are already functionally within that rationale. If they nevertheless profess 
radical disagreement with that rationale, they are in a condition of existen-
tial ‘bad faith,’ as Sartre (1958 [1943], p.49, see also I.12 below) might have 
put it. They will say they have no choice, they need bread and butter – I 
can only say, quite so.     
There are, of course, functionaries other than professors and research-
ers appointed in the institutions which nurture academic research for the 
public good by generating profits and enabling benefits. There are bureau-
crats and executives who are trained up and employed to ensure that the 
above rationale of academic research is not lost sight of and adhered to. I 
understand that the term for them, at present, is academic leaders. States and 
corporations, as the main actors of the current economic order, very 
understandably try to ensure that the public good is never lost sight of via 
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these functionaries. Academic leaders are appointed as visionary people 
who ensure that the public good is served through academic research, if 
necessary irrespective of what professors profess. For academic research-
ers (including the literary) to not merely recognise but proactively embrace 
both the benefit-dispersal and the profit-generation aspects of their work 
is for them to take possession of their work and be less gratingly imprisoned 
in bad faith.   
With those observations in view, I return to the question with which I 
started this chapter: why do literary researchers and their institutions 
consensually maintain the notion that literature is a precedent object of 
study when that is not the case? That can be understood in terms of the 
rationale outlined above. 
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7. Joycean Lessons: Applied and Basic 
Research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alexander Search 
 
Putting literature as anterior to the literary establishment (in the sense out-
lined in I.3, “The Tricky Anteriority of Literature”) suggests that the 
object ‘literature’ has a self-generated validity. Its benefits are pre-
established and acknowledged as a public good. Then the task of literary 
research and its institutions, as part of the literary establishment, is simply 
to enhance and perpetuate those already available benefits, as a disinter-
ested public service, irrespective of profits. Putting literature as posterior to 
the literary establishment, as produced by the literary establishment and its 
institutions, does not annul the possibility of benefits but complicates the 
benefits by foregrounding the interests of that establishment. Insofar as 
the literary establishment embeds economic arrangements, that means 
foregrounding profits for some parts of that establishment alongside the 
generally available benefits. It is easier to appear to subscribe to the former 
rather than to acknowledge the latter.  
Here is a simplistic illustration of the two approaches. The first 
approach involves, for instance, maintaining that James Joyce’s Ulysses 
(1922) came to be recognised collectively as a literary work because its 
unusual textual and stylistic qualities hit a chord with readers of the time 
(they benefitted from reading it), which was then picked up by literary 
researchers. Literary researchers thereafter altruistically clarified those 
benefits further, and enhanced them by relating Ulysses to other similarly 
resonant texts which they collectively dubbed ‘modern.’   
The second approach entails maintaining that there were powerful 
entrepreneurial drives within the literary establishment (against its domi-
nant interests) around the time of Ulysses’s many-phased appearances. 
These incorporated adventurous elements within the literary establishment 
who were determined to come out dominant. These entrepreneurial drives 
had financial backing from elite patrons or discerning investors (some 
providing for Joyce and family), indefatigable publicists and agents and 
editors (like Ezra Pound, Virginia and Leonard Woolf, T.S. Eliot), critics 
and culture columnists with inroads into established publishing and media 
firms and academia, and the ability to set up economically viable means of 
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literary production (magazines like Egoist, Little Review, Contact, Criterion, 
Transatlantic Review, transition, etc., and publishing houses like Hogarth 
Press, Faber & Faber, Knopf, Random House, etc.). They were all already 
building a powerful joint-venture brand of being ‘modern’ and courting 
very marketable controversies (thumbs up for court cases brought by the 
moral brigade). Entrepreneurial academics building their careers and lining 
the purses of their institutional employers were involved in this process 
and urged it on. [However, literary critics then did not necessarily come 
with university affiliations; the profession of research was embedded in 
somewhat different economic arrangements from those current now.] 
These entrepreneurial forces converged on Ulysses, aligned it with their 
economic and ideological interests, and ensured that it came to be visible, 
available, disseminated, discussed and recognised as a literary text – 
alongside and in relation to other texts (for a more detailed discussion of 
some of the contexts of Ulysses, see II.31, “Profitable Literary 
Interpretation”).   
However, none of the agents of those entrepreneurial forces which 
produced Ulysses as literature actually admitted to their entrepreneurialism 
– quite the contrary. And the critical industry that has thrived on Ulysses 
and Joyce since has been careful to conceal its business interests while 
being otherwise voluble about Ulysses. Actually, all the concerned entre-
preneurs were cautiously tight-lipped about their economic calculations for 
all the literature they had successfully produced and branded ‘modern.’ On 
the contrary, they were very firm that it was merely dedication to the 
benefits of literature itself – its service to culture, society, the world – that 
drove them. They only admitted to the first approach above, and gave it all 
the backing of their significant social authority and financial power. Hand 
in hand with them, literary researchers not only echoed them but also tried 
to make sure that it would never be regarded otherwise.  
It seems likely that these entrepreneurial calculations must have 
factored in the business advantage of the first approach. The business 
interests in question must have been enhanced by pretending that those 
interests do not exist. Literary researchers found that doing so in an 
ongoing way served themselves and their institutions well in terms of both 
(and relatedly) real and cultural capital.  
I can almost visualise censorious Joyceans turning on me at this point. 
They will say, and rightly, that the material-production career of few liter-
ary texts has been subjected to as searching scrutiny as Ulysses’s. From 
various obscenity trials and bannings to Samuel Roth’s unauthorised 
edition of 1927 to the passionate debates about editing principles follow-
ing the Hans Gabler et al synoptic edition of 1984 to news of the record 
auction prices of first editions into the 2000s – the commercial considera-
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tions and economic regimes underpinning the production of literature 
have been starkly exposed and critically considered apropos of Ulysses. 
Several theses and monographs on the academic industry that thrives 
around Ulysses are available, carefully unpacking its reception history and 
institutionalisation in different countries; these variously expose the 
workings of economic and political power within the academy, and in the 
literary publishing and media industry. This is all true. However, I do not 
think too many Joyceans will deny that all these things have seemed note-
worthy because Ulysses is in itself a great text, that Joyce was its authoring 
genius and producer, and that the self-evident quality of Ulysses would be 
recognised irrespective of all the above – all that is after the fact. It is some 
such pre-agreement that glues the communal cohesion of certain profess-
ors as ‘Joyceans.’ This pre-agreement was produced by the literary estab-
lishment as it produced Ulysses and ‘modern literature’ according to its 
entrepreneurial drives. If that is so even for an interpretive community (to 
use Stanley Fish’s phrase) like Joyceans, which is as self-aware of its own 
economic underpinnings and interests, then that is so for (dare I say) all 
literary interpretive communities. One could say the same for Shakespear-
eans and Romanticists and Harry Pottereans and electronic literature 
aficionados …  
In brief, the literary establishment and especially the professors have 
carefully maintained the impression that benefits are comprehensively 
delinked from profits in producing literature, and have then talked mainly 
about the benefits and largely elided the profits (or put them as a collateral 
effect), because that served their entrepreneurial activity – that helped 
generate profits. How and why?    
To this question I can only offer in the first instance a brief speculative 
answer, much in need of testing. It involves going back to thinking about 
academic research generally and its commitment to generating benefits 
and profits for the public good (see I.6, “Research for the Public Good”). 
More specifically, it involves suggesting a distinction between two kinds of 
academic research: applied research and basic research. Tentative defini-
tions follow. 
Applied research is where the benefits are so obviously experienced by 
consumers, and so clearly inferable from the entrepreneurial impetus of 
their profit-making sources, that large numbers of consumers are prepared 
to invest in the profit-making sources in the hope of further enhancing 
benefits. Here then, both the profit-making mechanism and the benefit-
generating result are correlatedly marketable to significant numbers of 
consumers and investors.  
Basic research is where the benefits are widely but indirectly experienced 
by consumers, and not clearly inferable from the functioning of their 
profit-making sources. Therefore, most consumers are unlikely to invest in 
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the profit-making sources even while being happy to partake of the bene-
fits, usually in a habitualised and subliminal way. So, here, research entre-
preneurs play up the benefits at the expense of profits to create an amena-
ble environment for ever-greater consumption which some discerning 
investors can then capitalise on.  
Literary research is basic research. That is why it is necessary for the 
entrepreneurial interests of such research, and for the institutions and 
investors which nurture it, to delink benefits from profits and to focus on 
the benefits. Literary research is but one of many areas of basic research, 
so such delinking occurs in various kinds of basic research – we just 
happen to be addressing literary research here. Quite possibly, the way of 
delinking benefits from profits that literary research does is different and 
distinct from the ways in which that is achieved for other kinds of basic 
research; equally, there might be significant similarities. 
But these speculations leave me in a conundrum: is my attempt to 
foreground the entrepreneurial responsibilities of all literary research 
actually working against the entrepreneurial interests of literary research – 
the profit making of which is better served by being left as it is? No, of 
course not. Something has happened that makes it expedient now for 
literary research to not just embrace but also announce its comprehen-
sively entrepreneurial character. The current context for literary research 
needs careful consideration.   
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8. Missteps 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dismal Scientist 
 
I fear Alexander has made a bit of a misstep in relation to basic and 
applied research. He speculates that most literary research corresponds to 
basic as opposed to applied research. I think the opposite is the case. Most 
literary research is applied. Some literary research can be characterised as 
basic research as Alexander contends. Looking at Alexander’s example of 
the Joycean literary machine, the initial work of excavating Joyce’s novel as 
a paradigmatic example of an emerging body of ‘modern’ literature can be 
seen as a kind of basic research. Prior to this literary activity, the text of 
Ulysses existed as the literary equivalent of undifferentiated matter. It takes 
a job of literary work to transform this text into raw material which can be 
subsequently worked up into something useful. A social process is neces-
sary to transform matter in nature into a natural resource which can be 
subsumed to further transformation in the service of human purposes. ‘An 
object’ becomes ‘the object’ of an essentially social process. It is this form 
of initial literary research which can be seen as equivalent to basic 
research.  
Subsequent literary activity is then needed to create something useful 
from this raw material. Alexander, in his first posting (I.1, “All literary 
research is…”), identifies a range of possible uses, including insights into 
culture, self, society and the nature of good citizenship. The secondary 
appropriation of the hedonic benefits of literature also falls into this list. 
This is applied research in being directed at creating specific use values, 
and the vast bulk of the output of the Joycean industry falls into this 
category. These are all aspects of literary production which can be directly 
consumed by individual consumers, government agencies, NGOs, corpo-
rate entities, literary researchers themselves, etc. As consumed goods, 
using resources that could have been directed to other uses, these produc-
tions are concretely preferred to alternative consumption possibilities and 
thus acquire a concrete value relative to these other possibilities. As these 
products have a demonstrable relative economic value, this opens the 
possibility that they can be exchanged and contracted for. 
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Alexander Search 
 
Dismal Scientist is right; I have overstated the ‘basic research’ character of 
literary research. It is a matter of degree (I suppose it must be so for all 
research); literary research could be regarded as substantially more 
‘applied’ than ‘basic,’ and the point is where the emphasis is laid.  
In terms of emphasis, though, the drift of my argument does not 
change particularly by this misstep. Let me put it this way: literary research 
has to be considered and thought of as ‘basic’ before – and so that – its 
‘applied’ possibilities are released: so it is expedient to focalise its benefit-
giving and underplay its profit-making impetus. Some kinds of research 
(like construction engineering) can be presented as ‘applied’ straightaway 
(in fact, even in a way that elides its dependence on ‘basic’ research), since 
that enhances its further profit-making prospects. That means that its 
benefit-giving and profit-making character can be promoted coterminously.  
 
Fabio Akcelrud Durão 
 
Alexander has a specific way of arguing which is difficult to engage with. 
He takes a partial truth that could lead to a critical stance, and then gener-
alises it. In order to refute what he says, one is forced to deny that truth 
and thereby fall into a conformist position. The existence of a Ulysses 
industry is a fact; as such, it should be analysed as an interesting symptom 
of the industrialisation of the university, which has become ever more 
similar to a business corporation. The main reason for so many scholarly 
publications on Ulysses, as on so many other literary works, is that in the 
Anglophone world one has to publish a book to get a job, and one has to 
have publications to get tenure, funding, etc. What Alexander does is take 
this symptom and generalise it, as if it corresponded to the whole. The 
Joyce industry is not all there is about Joyce. Whatever there may be of 
opportunism in academia, it is not the whole of academia. In sum, the way 
the arguments are framed invites one to the weak, apologetic rejoinder: 
‘things are not exactly the way you say they are.’ The critical challenge, I 
think, in dealing with Alexander’s claims is to recognise their partial truth, 
change their valence (he believes they are good, whereas I think they are 
pernicious) and turn them into objects of interpretation.  
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9. A Way of Arguing 
 
 
 
 
 
Suman Gupta 
 
Fabio usefully draws attention to Alexander’s way of arguing. The force of 
Alexander’s arguments derives from a method, and to a great extent the 
substance of what he argues follows from his method. He seizes the initia-
tive in offering definitions, so that the response then has to either go along 
with them or appear in their terms in some way. He puts the normative 
adjective in categorically, so that then one is left with either accepting it or 
defending against it. Alexander’s method is to take a deaf initiative and 
then await the response rather than hearing what is relevant and then 
reaching for a way forward. Alexander is likely to take a unilateral decision 
and then say, ‘Having consulted widely and heard you all it is evident to 
me that my decision is the best one, with some minor adjustments in view 
of what you have said.’ Alexander’s way of arguing is to set the agenda and 
then make everything conditional to it. He is ‘leadership’ material. 
One may say that much academic argument in practice does the same 
thing. Much scholarly reasoning consists in generalisations from what 
Fabio call ‘partial truths.’ Generalisations from ‘partial truths’ hold, as 
Alexander knows well, unless you can prove that ‘partial truths’ are also 
and at the self-same moment ‘partial lies,’ which is often not the case (not 
easily done). A ‘partial truth’ is not necessarily also a ‘partial lie’; it may 
possibly be a partial apprehension of the ‘whole truth.’  
This is worth considering carefully. Alexander’s way of arguing is eerily 
familiar to me where I am employed, in government and bureaucratic 
practice. Every consultation document and process, institutional decision-
making method, every policy implementation works through something 
like this way of arguing. If we want to argue against it, we need to seize the 
agenda and set it – but also, to make our agenda stronger than Alexan-
der’s, to show at the same time and clearly and indisputably why his 
agenda is composed of ‘partial lies.’  
 
Fabio Akcelrud Durão 
 
Alexander’s way of arguing is similar to that of university administrations 
in my experience too. I see two ways of dealing with it. The first one, as 
Suman says, is to propose a stronger agenda than Alexander’s; the second 
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would be to proceed as we are doing here, that is, considering his 
arguments and showing their shortcomings.  
This leads me to reconsider, against the grain of Alexander’s way of 
arguing, the division of research into basic and applied. At first, it did not 
make much sense to me, for I can think of only one way of dealing with 
literature or any kind of cultural artefact. If you are writing about a novel, 
you read it unhurriedly, more than once, and reflect upon it. Normally an 
idea emerges. You then examine it, think about it and, if the idea seems 
solid, you go ahead and read what has already been written on the novel. 
From the encounter of your idea with the field of research generally a new, 
reconfigured idea appears. It may very well happen that you realise that 
your idea now does not make much sense, in which case you look for 
another one or abandon the project altogether. It is always useful to 
remember that failure is a plausible option and one is not obliged to 
produce something if employed as a researcher. I am unable to discern 
where the basic research begins and ends in this process, and at what point 
the applied research appears.  
It seems to me that the division of basic and applied research owes a 
lot to the rise and institutionalisation of Literary Theory in the 1970s/ 
1980s (see II.28, “Purpose in Literary Research,” and II.36, “Literary and 
Commercial Value,” on this), for it was Theory that emphatically 
foregrounded the process of concept formation in literary studies. Once 
concepts start to become disengaged from the material they should 
conceptualise, a split is established which severs basic (concept formation) 
from applied research (the application of these concepts to particular 
literary and cultural objects). A productivist chain of metaphors becomes 
possible: cultural manifestations are like raw materials, criticism produces 
consumption goods, literary theory produces durable ones, and Theory 
generates capital goods. Notably, literary works become inert within this 
framework, for they are rendered passive – just receiving concepts, not 
generating them. Significant too is how the international division of labour 
also works here. Scholars in Brazil, for instance, seem almost never to 
produce concepts, but to constantly acquire them ready-made, adapting 
them to native contents. Is Theory perhaps a privileged vehicle for literary 
entrepreneurism? 
In considering this question, I am reminded of the following from 
Vincent B. Leitch’s Living with Theory (2008):  
 
Anyone who has looked into ‘futures’ on today’s financial markets realizes 
not only that they are highly risky instruments, but that they focus on short-
term performance, on year or less. You put up a little money (a small margin) 
and open a future position, choosing either to speculate on an increasing 
market or to hedge on a declining market for, say, oil, coffee, sugar, or some 
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other asset. On any day during the term of the brief contract, you can 
estimate that fair value of your futures asset. […] If you choose, you can 
close out your position at any time. In our current neoliberal capitalist milieu, 
an era of fast turnovers and casino sensibilities, ‘futures’ signify quick gains 
made off growth or decline. No matter which. […] Not surprisingly, there is 
an academic futures market in theory, including the history of theory. 
The theory futures market is more volatile than the markets, for instance, 
in Renaissance of Enlightenment research and scholarship. Academics, 
whether theorists or not, but especially up-and-coming young scholars, will 
calculate on any given day how the market looks for new historicism, femi-
nist theory, poststructuralism, cultural studies, Marxism, new formalism, 
postcolonial theory, etc. Intellectuals today operate in a world of markets. 
You can close out or open a position on any theory at any moment. 
Personally, I am regularly asked by students, faculty and others about theory 
and culture studies: whether to buy, sell, or hold and in just those terms. 
People want to know very badly what is the latest thing. Without being coy, I 
remain wary of my role as futures advisor for potential theory investors, 
including bemused professional onlookers. In the latter category I have in 
mind higher education journalists, humanities deans, book publishers, and 
journal editors. I work for them, too. My closing point: there is a future in 
theory futures. (Leitch 2008: 30-1) 
 
It took me a while to realise that the semantic field of stock market busi-
ness is not used here critically, not even ironically, but neutrally. 
 
Alexander Search 
 
Fabio talks of Theory as rising in the 1970s/1980s, of the institutionalisa-
tion of something called ‘literary theory’ as an independent dimension of 
scholarly production and teaching curricula. This seems to be a common 
way of talking about Theory in literary circles. However, I do not think 
there was ever a pre-theoretical literary land of research, where the 
researcher could conduct such a leisurely and introspective exercise as 
Fabio suggests above. It is evidently the institutionalisation of Theory in 
universities, by publishers, in the media, etc. that interests Fabio, not really 
the content of literary theory, the concepts mentioned. The distinction of 
basic and applied research obviously has something to do with institution-
alisation, which always comes before concepts and is inevitably structured 
by economic considerations.  
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10. Changes and Futures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alexander Search 
 
Over the last five decades (at a rough estimate), changes have occurred in 
universities and research institutes which render it necessary for all 
academic researchers to not merely embrace but actively promote their 
entrepreneurial character. That includes literary researchers (especially such 
researchers), whose activities are widely perceived as being non- or even 
anti-entrepreneurial though they are actually comprehensively entrepre-
neurial.  
I came across a useful and encouragingly brief account of these 
changes by Suman (see Appendix at the end of this book; also Allen and 
Gupta 2016, Ch.5). He presents these changes as discernible in the work-
ing conditions of academics – in both research and teaching – and identi-
fies several phases. Though Suman’s tone in presenting these is apocalyp-
tic, the substance of his account seems sound. Their thrust involves, in 
brief: (1) developing robust methods for measuring benefits arising from 
research and teaching, and accordingly setting performance targets for 
researchers and teachers (academic workers); and (2) dividing the work-
force in the university between broadly two areas of complementary 
expertise, i.e. those (academic workers) who predominantly focus on doing 
the academic work for maximising benefits, and those (academic leaders) 
who particularly ensure that the profit-making aspects of academic work 
are fully exploited so that the university remains sustainable (preferably 
grows) and therefore publicly beneficial. Despite Suman’s tone then, the 
changes seem to be designed to maximise the public good of research and 
teaching in the university. These changes have occurred or are occurring 
widely, indeed globally, and chart a path necessitated by the growing scale 
and complexity of the university, due to the democratisation of the univer-
sity. Suman shows, despite himself, that these changes have been devel-
oped in logical and evidenced ways, with the support of academic workers, 
and with the public interest firmly in view – indeed, with public consulta-
tions and involvement. Needless to say, the division of expertise in (2) is 
too schematically stated; there are some overlaps, but increasingly fewer 
overlaps in practice than was conventional in, say, the 1960s university.  
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I was unable to understand why Suman makes his clear exposition of 
necessary changes the vehicle for pessimistic conclusions. In particular, he 
takes recourse (scholars can seldom speak without appeals to authority) to 
Michel Foucault’s (2004) 1979 Collège de France lectures, to pronounce 
doom and gloom on behalf of all academics:  
 
The lectures referred to a much broader field, which Foucault dubbed 
‘biopolitics’, wherein such cost-benefit accounting practices have become a 
naturalised and pervasive grounding for liberal ‘governmentality’ […]. Under 
the sway of liberal governmentality, Foucault observed, individuals become 
‘entrepreneurs of the self,’ constantly realizing themselves and advancing 
their interests and confirming their existence through cost-benefit account-
ing. […For academics this] is riven with anxiety because the academic self that 
academic workers seek to realize, promote, sustain and confirm is slipping 
away – is ceasing to be recognized, seems to be falling unnoticed into a black 
hole. (see Appendix: 259) 
 
So, I had a look at what Foucault said in those lectures and found that 
Suman was being simplistic. Foucault was concerned with a new conception 
of homo æconomicus and subjectivity rather than suggesting anything relevant 
to actual persons and their working experience (the conditions of work). 
And that is all I have to say of Foucault’s (2004: 226) ‘entrepreneur of 
himself.’ By way of an aside: this reference to Foucault does pique my 
interest though; it reminds me of the agonised debate on whether these 
lectures prove that Foucault was sympathetic to neoliberalism rather than 
perhaps tendentiously Marxist (Vogelmann’s 2016 review essay gives a 
good account of several publications on this; the point is also discussed in 
Mirowski 2013). The scholarly tendency to take the implied author of 
academic texts as an integral person says something about how the great-
authority brand works and is constantly co-opted to entrepreneurial ends. 
That involves two obvious and preconceived missteps: (a) seeking rigid 
ideological consistency from author-personae across their oeuvres (incon-
sistency and contradiction have to be denounced as morally suspect); and 
(b) suggesting that an author-persona’s articulation of a system of ideas is 
tantamount to expressing ethical commitment to those ideas – that 
describing is the same as announcing conviction, and even that citing is 
equivalent to accepting. Apparently, Mikhail Bakhtin’s demonstrations of 
polyphony and the dialogic imagination in texts were in vain, or rather, 
those are okay for ‘literary’ texts but inapplicable to ‘scholarly’ texts.  
Suman’s surprising descent into despair after a clear exposition of 
necessary and understandable changes in the university seems to me a 
common sort of attitude problem among academics, many of whom 
prefer whinging pessimism to positive thinking. With a positive attitude, 
the necessary changes that have taken place in the university do present 
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occasional problems but call for no gloom. The problems simply need to 
be resolved in the direction of optimising the public good of research.  
One of these problems, which Suman’s account addresses, concerns 
the increasingly impervious (though desirable, in my view) division of 
university functions between academic leaders and academic workers. 
Since these two functions are actually mutually dependent – the profits 
and benefits of research are tied in with each other – it is critically 
important that academic leaders and academic workers (researchers) 
should talk to each other. It is necessary for academic leaders to under-
stand the entrepreneurial potential of all academic research, and for 
academic workers to clarify the entrepreneurial underpinnings of all 
academic research – especially where that potential is not immediately 
evident. This is especially the case for literary research, where the profit-
making impetuses are often concealed so as to activate them, and where 
consequently benefit generation is exclusively foregrounded. Without a 
proper understanding between academic workers and leaders, the latter 
may short-sightedly support only the applied dimensions of research, 
where the relation between profit making and benefit distribution are 
obvious; similarly, thereby academic workers who feel neglected may 
resentfully deny the less obvious (even deliberately concealed) but 
enormously productive entrepreneurial impetus of their research and 
mistakenly oppose benefits to profit-making.  
In the less complex and small-scale university, academic leadership and 
academic work could be considered coincident functions and leaders-cum-
workers could simply know how the relationship between benefits and 
profits work in academic research. In the more complex and democratised 
university of today, where academic leaders and academic workers are 
usefully divided in terms of complementary expertise, the leaders needs to 
be constantly persuaded of that relationship by workers. That is, as noted 
already, especially critical for areas like literary research. Under current 
circumstances it is necessary for literary researchers to reveal the compre-
hensively entrepreneurial underpinnings of their work to academic leaders.  
In fact, the long-term vision of the university’s role in optimising the 
public good by generating profits and benefits needs now to be considered 
first and foremost and most systematically from the academic leadership 
perspective (more on this in IV.55 and IV.56). Let us not simply speak as 
academic researcher-workers; let us all think as academic leaders are 
required to. Their job is to make activities like literary research pay without 
necessarily being researchers of any sort, and they therefore have to be 
made to understand the entrepreneurial underpinnings of such research. If 
academic leaders can grasp (despite the odds) the entrepreneurial under-
pinnings of literary research, then they should be able to grasp the 
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entrepreneurial potential of all research – to whatever degree applied and 
basic, to whatever extent the emphasis is put on one or another. Literary 
research presents a bottom line of non-obvious but proven entrepreneuri-
alism.  
The optimal scenario that should be contemplated now is of the 
Totally Entrepreneurial University (more on the ‘entrepreneurial univer-
sity’ in I.15 below), where, insofar as research is concerned, profits and 
benefits are co-relatedly realised to the maximum extent through the 
concerted effort of every human and non-human resource at its 
command. By way of briefly stating choices that come to mind immedi-
ately from a leadership perspective, there are two obvious pathways 
towards the Totally Entrepreneurial University:  
 
 Either, a pathway whereby academic leaders and academic workers 
will work with complete mutual understanding, harmoniously 
fulfilling their respective functions in mutually respectful accord, and 
at their well-defined levels, for the emergence of the organic Totally 
Entrepreneurial University.  
 Or, by a pathway of developing the leadership skills of academic 
workers and the academic comprehension of academic leaders 
towards convergence (training programmes will be involved to these 
ends), so that gradually the universalisation of academic leadership in the 
university could take place and thus the Totally Entrepreneurial 
University obtained.  
 
These are very perfunctory observations from a leadership perspective. 
They are mentioned here simply so as to gesture towards the horizons 
within which debates such as this can be undertaken. My business here is 
really literary research rather than the university at large; my concern is 
with what the researcher does rather than what the leader does.   
 
Fabio Akcelrud Durão 
 
If the final aim of the university is to generate profits, then the research 
model Alexander seems to be outlining is not optimal. Then there is 
actually no need to make space for research at all. Research may at most 
be useful for elite universities, which are in a minority and governed by 
their own peculiarities, more the exceptions than the rule. It is useless to 
try to neo-liberalise them because they have so much money that they can 
squander it in the most non-utilitarian ways – by supporting, for instance, 
programs in Greek and Latin for a handful of students. When we think 
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about the mass university, as we should in the twenty-first century, we 
realise that research is largely unnecessary. 
  Take, for instance, the sudden burgeoning of private universities in 
Brazil, which has till recently been dominated by a relatively small number 
of public universities. This is, I am sure, far from being an unknown phe-
nomenon in many countries. In most of these new for-profit universities, 
the great majority of professors are paid by the hour, and contents to be 
transmitted are provided by the university itself in the form of hand-outs 
and booklets, not actual books. This kind of streamlined, conveyor-belt 
teaching gives students a sense of security, because they can feel that 
something is being taught, something they can grasp and take home. This 
approach to knowledge strongly contrasts with one which accommodates 
actual research and its uncertainties: the precariousness of hypotheses 
(which may be proven wrong), the dialectic of subject and object in 
literature, the role of the presentation in the constitution of the object, 
etc….  In the mass university, the only need for research is to update 
didactic materials, which generate profits.  
I am obviously being overly cynical, but that is only because Alexander 
is being wildly materialistic.  
But the elephant in the room is disappearing, which is itself an inter-
esting phenomenon. The simple idea that would reduce all Alexander’s 
arguments to naught is that the State should fund the university system 
and let academics do as they please. The Pavlovian-reflex rebuttal that ‘this 
is a dream world, resources are limited’ contains the misery it projects. 
Society is immensely rich; in fact, one of its major problems is what to do 
with so much wealth. It is just that it is ill-distributed: the top 1% of the 
world has as much as the other 99%. We should think more about how 
this absolutely transparent truth seems to disappear from the horizon of 
thought. 
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11. Disinterestedness and Academic Freedom 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suman Gupta 
 
The weak point in Alexander’s definitions of basic research and applied 
research, picked up in Dismal Scientist’s comment, is revealing (see I.7, 
“Joycean Lessons,” above). The weakness extends into fissures across 
Alexander’s arguments.  
In his bid to make out that all (literary) research is entrepreneurial, 
Alexander defines both basic research and applied research as being 
directed towards benefits and profits, but in distinct ways. He says basic 
research conceals its profit-making potential by foregrounding its benefit-
generating thrust, while applied research makes explicit the relationship 
between profit making and benefit generation. Thus, Alexander seems to 
hold basic research and applied research apart as different kinds of 
research – parallel modes – which are found, he then asserts, in greater or 
lesser measures in specific disciplines such as literary studies. Dismal 
Scientist rightly points out the obvious: that such a clear separation is 
misconceived, that Alexander appears to have forgotten what the relation-
ship between basic research and applied research consists in. Basic research 
makes applied research possible; basic research has to precede applied research. In 
Dismal Scientist’s words, basic literary research consists in the ‘literary 
work to transform this text into raw material which can be subsequently 
worked up into something useful,’ and applied literary research consists in 
the ‘subsequent literary activity [that] is then needed to create something 
useful from this raw material.’ Alexander tries to wriggle out of this objec-
tion by saying it is a matter of emphasis in presenting the thrust of disciplinary 
activity – literary research here. This makes the whole business of basic 
and applied research appear as a rhetorical matter; they seem to be the 
same thing (thus more than related), only distinguishable by how they are 
talked about. That is, however, simply wrong: they are not simply consti-
tuted differently in talk, they are different and related practices of research 
– and the basic precedes and makes possible the applied.  
  Thus, Alexander sets us up to be receptive to his misconceived way of 
defining basic and applied research by first offering definitions of profits 
and benefits as inextricably related, and dubbing them both as the ‘public 
good’ that research is for (I.6, “Research for the Public Good”). He tacitly 
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invites us to think about basic and applied research accordingly in terms of 
the already defined benefits and profits and public good. He surrepti-
tiously urges us to convert our critical terminology so that the use value of 
research becomes a pre-condition of doing research.   
Few would disagree with the sentiment that in a general way ‘research 
is for the public good.’ The manner in which Alexander defines benefits 
and profits is broadly acceptable. We can also go along with the observa-
tion that in the capitalist order benefits and profits are inevitably mutually 
dependent. But none of that means that both basic research and applied 
research should be equally and comprehensively understood as directed 
towards benefits and profits, i.e. as directed towards generating use value. 
Rather, the case is: applied research is definitively devoted towards realis-
ing both benefits and profits from research to varying degrees according 
to area; basic research is not undertaken to definitively realise either. The 
task of basic research is to produce a mass of, so to speak, fundamental 
information and principles of intellection (say, raw knowledge material), 
which may or may not have immediate use value – but without which it 
would be impossible for applied research to develop towards realising 
benefits and profits.  
By way of a materialistic conceit to clarify this: basic research is in-
volved in knowing about and understanding the properties of materials in 
the earth, and applied research then is about extracting and purifying those 
materials from the earth and using them to make swords and chains and 
locks and the like. The latter (applied research) offers obvious benefits and 
profits, but it is utterly dependent on finding out about materials and 
investigating their properties first (basic research). Basic research into 
materials in the earth does not need to have the objectives of applied 
research, the production of useful things, in mind. In fact, it is best if the 
basic researchers into materials are not asked to think about swords and 
chains and locks and so on, because that might actually impede and limit 
their work – and therefore limit the work of the applied researchers who 
do need to think about swords and chains and locks and so on. If the 
relationship between basic and applied research is wiped out by exhorting 
all researchers to think about how to make useful things, then the 
possibility that the basic researchers will produce raw knowledge which 
may unpredictably and unexpectedly become useful to applied researchers 
is substantially reduced. That may lead to getting stuck with making 
swords and chains and locks and so on and never quite getting to nuclear 
weapons and plastic straps and encryption systems. Academic research 
would stultify. 
What goes for materials in the earth also goes for texts in the world.  
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To repeat: the benefits and profits that can be obtained through app-
lied research are given more scope – can be maximised – only if the area 
of basic research is not limited by considerations of benefits and profits. It 
is best to think of basic research as devoted to a less user-specific purpose, 
such as understanding or clarifying the world, irrespective of the benefits 
and profits that may thereby become possible. Then basic researchers are 
able to produce knowledge that could be drawn upon by applied re-
searchers, in ways that they might not have anticipated and whenever the 
time is ripe and the conditions permit, to generate profits and benefits for 
the public good. Which basic-research finding will become useful and 
applicable and when is impossible to predict; unless that knowledge exists 
already, the applied researcher cannot see where it might be useful and 
brought to generate profits and benefits.  
Basic research is undertaken irrespective of foreseeable benefits and 
profits – to, so to speak, understand and clarify the natural and social and 
textual world – and is in that sense disinterested. Only if that sort of research 
is cultivated would it be possible for applied research to innovate and 
develop progressively effective ways of serving profit-making and benefit-
giving interests for the private and public good. In that sense, applied 
research is interested. The interests in capital circuits are best served by keep-
ing basic research disinterested.  
Understood in this manner, basic research falls outside the scope of 
Alexander’s entrepreneurial calculations. It is outside the gauging of both 
benefits and profits, yet it also bears upon and enables both. That is 
another way of saying that the disinterestedness of basic research is essen-
tial for the public good to be served through applied research. The public 
good of academic research in Alexander’s terms is served effectively by the 
interestedness of applied research only because of foundations laid by the 
disinterestedness of basic research. Since the disinterestedness of basic 
research is outside Alexander’s ken, he is unable to comprehend it, unable 
to grasp what it means. So, he is unable to understand the critical 
importance of academic freedom (among all the high-flown ethical termi-
nology, ‘freedom’ has no purchase in Alexander’s thinking). Academic 
freedom is enjoined in arrangements for research work that allow basic researchers to 
pursue any line of enquiry pertinent to the natural or social or textual world for the sake 
of understanding and clarifying it, irrespective of considerations of benefits and profits, 
indifferently to the purposive calls of the public good.    
 Because Alexander is unable to grasp this, his sort of thinking endan-
gers all kinds of academic research. Alexander’s argument seeks to make 
all research applied, and confine what is pursued at present as disinterested 
basic research to the gauging and purposiveness of applied research. This 
is clear when he disarmingly says: ‘a path necessitated by the growing scale 
and complexity of the university, due to the democratisation of the 
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university […] has entailed: developing robust methods for measuring 
benefits arising from research and teaching, and accordingly setting 
performance targets for researchers and teachers (academic workers)’ 
(I.10, “Changes and Futures”). He makes this observation on the back of 
something I had written (see Appendix) only, I suspect, to provoke; he 
must know that he was deliberately misreading that argument – but I will 
not attempt to defend or clarify what I have published already. At any rate, 
it is clear that setting performance targets according to measurements of 
benefits on basic research is to kill off basic research and make all research 
applied. This single step, so cheerfully endorsed by Alexander, destroys dis-
interestedness and academic freedom which are the core underpinning 
conditions of basic research. In the same step Alexander also undermines 
what he is arguing for: the potential for applied research to generate 
benefits and profits, which depends on the freedom of basic research.  
 If even a little space is left for the disinterestedness and freedom that 
allow basic research to be basic, and to blossom, then a little space is left 
for the raison d’être of entrepreneurialism to be questioned.   
 On a distinct but related note: much of Alexander’s argument is carried 
by upbeat terminology rather than consistent adherence to reasonable 
principles and understandable inferences. Aggressive value-laden terms 
forestall the attitude with which his proposals should be received: ‘democra-
tisation of the university,’ ‘robust methods,’ ‘proactive,’ ‘innovative,’ and so on. 
Alexander’s proposals are thus presented with coercive affirmativeness so 
that even a neutral reception of them seems pessimistic. Aggressive up-
beatness could be an ‘attitude problem,’ in Alexander’s terms; to me it 
seems like a hard-sell strategy because the idea being sold is shaky. More-
over, Alexander’s argument is pushed with the aid of intralingual trans-
lations. The tenets of disinterested basic research and academic freedom 
that I have outlined are, by and large, obvious and consensually accepted 
by academic researchers. But Alexander tries to throw academic research-
ers off-balance, to make them stumble out of the consensus, by unex-
pected and persuasive translations of terms. Thus, the public good of 
research is quickly translated into a discourse of benefits and profits in a 
way that may catch the researcher off-balance; the principles of basic and 
applied research are then also translated into the discourse of benefits and 
profits so that the inattentive researcher might simply gloss over them to 
find herself trapped; and so forth. Alexander’s enterprise of entre-
preneurialising all research consists significantly in translating academic 
concepts into entrepreneurial terms which come weighted with a 
purposive logic and drift. To this extent Alexander’s is a rhetorical 
enterprise.  
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 Alexander Search 
 
Suman’s conceit above comes to a shuddering and abrupt halt with: ‘What 
goes for materials in the earth also goes for texts in the world.’ I assume 
he means social world. It would be conceited to think that all will fall for 
this conceit. He seems to be saying that basic research is mainly in the 
region of discovery (making sense of what is there) while applied research 
is broadly in the region of invention (making new things and making anew 
and remaking). Materials in the earth are there already to be discovered, 
but texts in the social world have to first be invented – be made and 
remade. In that sense texts are products of a socio-economic process before 
they can be found (discovered) and studied, while minerals or metals are 
found before they can become products and then used in products. The 
literary researcher concerned with texts cannot but factor in the process of 
production that is concretised in texts. By Suman’s argument, then, literary 
research in particular cannot really be disinterested basic research at any 
stage. It is interested to begin with, or, in my terms, entrepreneurial.  
 I prefer my way of defining ‘basic’ and ‘applied’ research.  
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12. In Bad Faith 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Suman Gupta 
 
Despite Alexander’s misleading manoeuvers, on a couple of occasions his 
arguments teeter on the brink of their own destruction. That is to say, his 
bid to render all literary research entrepreneurial courts the possibility of 
de-entrepreneurialising all literary research – and possibly the academy it-
self. Perhaps Alexander gestures that way inadvertently or unwittingly. The 
first occasion makes me think that it is possibly inadvertent; the second 
makes me suspect that his project is not what it seems (to justify the ways 
of business to literary researchers). 
The first appears above in I.6, “Research for the Public Good.” Here 
Alexander says that professors who express radical opposition to the 
capitalist order wherein the university is embedded, and champion dis-
interested oppositional research as their professional function, are in a 
condition of Sartrean bad faith. Since their continuing employment calls 
for constant adherence to and advancement of entrepreneurial processes 
in the university, there is a contradiction between their professional lives 
and their professionally espoused convictions – they know this and yet 
maintain this false position, so bad faith. They function supportively in a 
system of benefits via profits as the public good while pronouncing, prob-
ably sincerely and often justifiably, that this system diminishes benefits to 
enhance profits and undermines the public good. To overcome this 
contradiction, Alexander recommends that all such professors should 
overtly embrace the entrepreneurial rationale and work for the public good 
in its terms.  
 So I am reminded of Jean-Paul Sartre’s account of bad faith: 
 
To be sure, the one who practices bad faith is hiding a displeasing truth or 
presenting as truth a pleasing untruth. Bad faith then has in appearance the 
structure of falsehood. Only what changes everything is the fact that in bad 
faith it is from myself that I am hiding the truth. Thus the duality of the 
deceiver and the deceived does not exist here. […] It follows first that the 
one to whom the lie is told and the one who lies are one and the same 
person, which knows that I must know in my capacity as deceiver the truth 
which is hidden from me in my capacity as the one deceived. Better yet I 
must know the truth very exactly in order to conceal it more carefully – and 
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this not at two different moments, which at a pinch would allow us to re-
establish a semblance of duality – but in the unitary structure of a single 
project. How then can the lie subsist if the duality which conditions it is 
suppressed? (Sartre 1958 [1943]: 49) 
 
If we limit the existentialist predicates that universalise bad faith and its 
contradiction in Sartre’s reflections, and focus on the social conditions 
that are relevant here, Alexander’s call for active compromise and happy 
co-optation seems suspect. Even in Sartre’s illustrations of bad faith – the 
prospective lover, the waiter in the café, the closet homosexual – bad faith 
is a mutually maintained position of self and others, not a moral choice. Bad 
faith can be comforting or discomfiting and is part of a structure of being 
in society (in the world, more broadly). It should not be treated as an ill-
advised moral decision made by individuals which needs a remedy; it is, in 
this context, an aspect of social consciousness. 
This suggests that the consciousness of bad faith can lead in exactly the 
opposite direction from the one Alexander recommends. If such con-
sciousness is of an unpleasant truth rather than a pleasant untruth, if it 
grates constantly and the wound inflames and festers, and moreover, if it 
becomes persuasively expressible and collectively assumed, then the 
consequence could be exactly the opposite of Alexander’s recommen-
dation. Then a moral choice might appear: to deal collectively with the disease 
because many are suffering from it, or not to. 
All this sounds a bit abstract and ethereal. Let us suppose that a large 
number of professors (always in the broad sense of academic workers of 
all sorts) are conscious that their grating and painful bad faith is both 
engendered within their universities, and backed by outward spirals of 
power structures and economic arrangements – into the rungs of states 
and corporations and their global collaboration. Moreover, suppose that 
these professors find an effective way of expressing this consciousness 
collectively, to each other and for other publics. Then they may refuse to 
countenance their compliant professional functioning because they are 
within the profession, and use their professional functions to work against 
the coercion brought upon them through their professions – from within 
and because they are within. Among other means, to that end they could 
take possession of the production, circulation and reception of texts that 
they have a foot in because of their profession. These suppositions are far 
from implausible because, as even Alexander acknowledges, it is apparent 
now that the balance of benefits and profits are not unambiguously a 
public good, that profits may be encouraged to severely limit if not kill off 
benefits, that the production and management of escalating inequality and 
disaffection may become the normalised function of the university – and 
of the politico-economic system that the university is a cog within.  
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That still sounds fuzzily abstract, but I will leave that possibility there 
for the moment. Perhaps it is a condition of the present that articulation 
of these possibilities other than in the abstract seems a challenge.      
The other rather remarkable occasion on which Alexander reaches 
towards a potential undermining of his position is in I.10, “Changes and 
Futures,” above. One has to ask whether he is being serious when he, in 
the latter part there, assumes the view of academic leaders working 
towards the Totally Entrepreneurial University as the final scenario – an 
ideal of entrepreneurial academia that puts a management perspective on 
the present. Perhaps this was an ironic passage, but can the entrepreneurial 
ideologue be ironic? Thus, Sartre: ‘In irony a man annihilates what he 
posits within one and the same act; he leads us to believe in order not to 
be believed; he affirms to deny and denies to affirm; he creates a positive 
object but it has no being other than its nothingness’ (Sartre 1958 [1943]: 
47). At any rate, here Alexander performs a kind of reductio ad absurdum of 
the entrepreneurial academic rationale against itself. To convince us of the 
inevitability of this rationale he derives an absurd extreme from that 
rationale so as to effectively undermine it – and, moreover, undermine it 
in two ways. Here are the two pathways towards the Totally Entrepreneurial 
University that Alexander’s academic leader contemplates: 
 
 Either, a pathway whereby academic leaders and academic workers 
will work with complete mutual understanding, harmoniously 
fulfilling their respective functions in mutually respectful accord, and 
at their well-defined levels, for the emergence of the organic Totally 
Entrepreneurial University.  
 Or, by a pathway of developing the leadership skills of academic 
workers and the academic comprehension of academic leaders 
towards convergence (training programmes will be involved to these 
ends), so that gradually the universalisation of academic leadership in the 
university could take place and thus the Totally Entrepreneurial 
University obtained.  
 
The first is evidently a vision of the university as a fascist syndicalist insti-
tution embedded within and at the service of the neoliberal capitalist 
order. Preposterous as such visions have repeatedly proved, this may well 
be the logical horizon that academic leaders are now working towards – 
that is, when they are not simply lining their and their bosses’ pockets and 
being entrepreneurial for the ‘public good’ of the moment. The second is 
weirdly a complete flip of the current rationale of entrepreneurial aca-
demia, a direct act of violence against it, though it seems to appear from 
within that rationale. The universalisation of academic leadership in the 
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university is a concept to conjure with. It both follows from the hier-
archical practices of the entrepreneurial university, and utterly undermines 
it. Though Alexander presents it in his characteristically optimistic vein as 
a scenario for strategic management to play with, its implications leave 
strategic management as an empty signifier.  
It may be a moment of (witting?) irony from Alexander, but it could be 
taken seriously within the present-day university, at least insofar as I know 
it. Outside expensive and exclusive academic leadership training courses, 
the fact that ‘academic leadership’ implies ‘academic followership’ is care-
fully concealed – by generally not speaking about followership. Rather, the 
distribution of leaderly titles to followers on a tight leash (Dean-of-that, 
Director-of-such-and-such, Head-of-this-department, etc.), with a pay-rise, 
promises of promotion and prestige, and a confidentiality-and-obedience 
contract, is a well-known ploy of strategic management. Many professors 
feel they are outside the strict containment of university hierarchies, since 
the benefits their researches reap are uncontainable even if the profits are 
extracted by the university. It is difficult to tell where academic leadership 
begins and ends, just as it is not quite done to rub in the duties of obedient 
followership. Proposing a universalisation of academic leadership seems 
meaningful under these circumstances.  
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13. Literature Can Criticise Research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fabio Akcelrud Durão 
 
I would like to call attention to a point that seems particularly important to 
me. The horizon of this debate is the idea of research. The condition for 
the university to harbour literature is that it is a vehicle for the production 
of knowledge, hence the notion of research as a practice that is able to 
extract knowledge from literary texts. But to identify literature with know-
ledge production is reductive, for it ignores other aspects of literary 
experience – such as, the pleasure literary works yield, the potential they 
have for creating intersubjective bonds, their relationship to people’s 
memories, etc. Of course, all those can be turned into objects of research, 
but literature consists in something more and offers more than just 
knowledge. Evidently, I am not arguing for a realm of authenticity beyond 
research. My point is rather that in the lexicon of literary studies, ‘criticism’ 
stands higher than ‘research’: literature can criticise research as such, 
showing what is lacking in it. Literature ends up having the upper hand, 
providing a sort of knowledge – or at least a cognisance, an apprehension 
– of that which research cannot provide, and of research in terms which it 
cannot incorporate. Literature can act as the bad conscience of research. 
Literature is able to criticise research when it fails to give what is 
expected of it in terms of knowledge. My point is that the extraction of 
knowledge is just part of what is at stake in dealing with literature. When 
you memorise a poem, that cannot count as research, and yet a good 
recitation is already an interpretation. This could be thought of as litera-
ture’s affinity to music. Or it could be considered literature’s resistance to 
strict meaningfulness. Of course, Alexander will say that such resistance in 
literature, everything that is aconceptual about literature, including the 
sheer pleasure it gives, can be turned into research material — which, of 
course, is true. But then his sense of research begins to resemble a steam-
roller that flattens down everything. It becomes that which has no holes, 
no internal tension or inherent insufficiency. As pure transparency, 
research is unquestionable. In this regard research becomes equivalent in 
capitalism to the entrepreneurial spirit, which subsumes whatever is at 
hand to a money-making logic, of necessity never questioning itself. 
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Alexander Search 
 
I do not have a clue what you mean by ‘literature could criticise research.’ 
It seems to me that such a notion can only come from a literary re-
searcher, and will therefore be another intervention, based on research, by 
a researcher (or critic). I do not think ‘literature’ does any criticising on its 
own behalf, as an articulable position, even if we turn ‘literature’ into an 
allegorical persona. 
Your desire to rescue an unsullied literature from researchers in the 
service of enterprise is evident, but, as you recognise, there is not much 
beyond your desire to go with in this argument. It is simply patently untrue 
that the conception of research and entrepreneurialism I have outlined is 
without an account of pleasure: the commodity form and processes of 
consumption account largely for pleasure. Nor is it the case that entrepre-
neurial literary research cannot take account of any ‘resistance to meaning’: 
dialogic relationships with markets and the public good are involved, 
necessitating constant negotiation with resistances and conflicting 
demands. And I do not know what you mean by ‘pure transparency’: the 
institutions and politico-economic arrangements in question are ‘transpar-
ent’ only in the sense of being publicly accountable. They are far from 
invisible.  
You have an interesting trick in using ‘literature’ as if it is a person 
making decisions and doing things (personified), which is meaningless. No 
doubt this is a nice rhetorical turn, but where rhetorical turns replace 
syntactical logic and comprehensible references there is nothing to argue 
with. Research does not resemble a ‘steamroller.’ That is a simile which, 
while poetically suggestive, does not quite extend an argument, and is no 
more than another rhetorical trick. Research is something that some 
people do. 
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14. What Literary Researchers Actually Do: 
Clarifying Terms  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alexander Search 
 
So this is how this debate has been going. I propose a definition and make 
inferences; Suman and Fabio say: no, the definition should actually be 
such and leads to contrary inferences. I say this is the public good of    
research, and they say the public good of research is actually that; I suggest 
this is how basic and applied research could be understood, and they say 
those should actually be understood in that different way. In this ping 
pong of arguments and counter arguments none of us are really going by 
careful evidence and accounting of research practices. We are all depend-
ing on a shared strategy, a common way of appealing to readers: we are 
expecting readers to recognise the strength or weakness of arguments  
according to their own experiences and preconceptions. We are expecting 
our arguments to be carried by readers being able to say, with their own 
experience in view, that ‘this observation sounds plausible, indeed more 
plausible than that observation.’  
For all of us this strategy in presenting arguments has served to distract 
attention from the actual practices of research, from the things that 
researchers actually do. We have not been talking about what researchers 
actually do. Instead, we have simply been assuming that readers know all 
that already and will therefore go along with our arguments. But I am not 
wedded to this assumption. My interest is really in what specifically literary 
researchers actually do. If we go through those practices carefully, it will 
turn out that my definitions and central contention (as stated in I.1, “All 
literary research is…”) are unavoidable. Suman and Fabio are evidently 
more in their element when they do not have to talk about the actual 
practices of research – especially the nitty-gritty of literary research. They 
are happier taking it for granted that literary research is incommensurable 
with entrepreneurial activity, and the latter demeans literary research. But 
even under that rubric, they are unwilling to talk about the things that 
literary researchers actually do to make their points, and prefer instead to 
speak in broad abstractions (Suman says as much in I.12, “In Bad Faith”). 
They prefer to talk about larger concepts which are difficult to ground in 
actual research work.  
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And they are not alone. It seems to be widely taken for granted that 
research work such as the literary is being undermined, indeed erased, by 
the entrepreneurial university (the ‘entrepreneurial university’ is the catch-
phrase of the moment – Foss and Gibson eds. 2015 gives a useful cross-
contextual and case-study-based account, with admittedly little attention to 
literary research). Given that, champions of literary research then seek to 
defend it from the entrepreneurial university. But they do not do so in 
terms of the actual disciplinary practices of such research; they prefer   
instead the larger idealistic abstraction of ‘the Humanities’ or ‘Liberal 
Education,’ and then speak nostalgically of ‘the University’ as the idealistic 
space where the Humanities have to be accommodated as an idealistic 
project. And their purchase on reality is always limited: so, Louis Menand 
(2010) champions the Humanities in terms of curricula; Martha Nussbaum 
(2010) defends the Humanities in terms of high-minded liberal principles 
which are indifferent to political economies; Stefan Collini (2012) defends 
the ideals of the Humanities and the University against higher education 
government policies of late; and variously the presumed incommensura-
bility of the Humanities and enterprise in the University are articulated in 
Jonathan Bates ed. (2011), Michael Bérube and Jennifer Ruth (2015), a tiny 
bit sceptically in Helen Small (2013), and other such. Amidst this sweep of 
abstractions of the Humanities and the University, those who are con-
cerned about ground-level research and academic work, the doing of 
research, appear as apologists after accepting the general incommensura-
bility of Humanities research and entrepreneurial considerations. They 
seem timid and practical and their tone a bit wry, trying to stick adhesive 
bandages to cover up gaping wounds in the ideals of the Humanities and 
the University for beleaguered survival in real life (e.g. Coleman and 
Kamboureli eds. 2011; Zepeda and Mayock eds. 2014; Semenza and 
Sullivan, Jr. eds. 2015; Hutner and Mohamed eds. 2016; Hazelkorn, 
Benneworth and Gulbrandsen 2016). 
For my argument, the kinds of publications cited are beside the point, 
and their idealism is misdirected. My argument is: literary research already 
is and could become more entrepreneurial. Not only do I not presume 
that literary research is incommensurable with entrepreneurial considera-
tions, I maintain that all literary research is already or could become more 
entrepreneurial. No defence against the entrepreneurial university is called 
for. This seems evident to me not in terms of preconceived abstractions 
like the Humanities or the (liberal) University, but in terms of what literary 
researchers actually do, in disciplinary practice, in the work of reading, 
writing, investigating, interpreting, archiving, publicising, lecturing, de-
bating, collaborating, etc.          
Evidently, for my purpose then, the terms of this debate have to be 
sharpened at this stage. The debate needs to be focused squarely on what 
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literary researchers actually do on the disciplinary cliff face. The cliff face 
of literary research is institutionally structured. Two broad institutional 
formations bear upon it: I shall call them, the University and the Ministry. The 
University is my shorthand way of referring to any organisation that 
employs researchers and produces research, and includes higher education 
institutions, specialist research institutes, advanced studies centres, and the 
like. The Ministry, as far as my argument goes, designates public offices 
and agencies under relevant government ministries (those could be for 
education, human resource, innovation and skills, research and develop-
ment, knowledge and culture … whatever the going term is) which deter-
mine policy at state level and disburse public or not-for-profit funding for 
research. The Ministry, in brief, determines the regime at state level and 
sometimes across states (at international level) for the undertaking of 
research; and the University grounds that undertaking at an institutional 
level within that regime. There are other institutional formations which 
have a bearing on research, such as Corporate Research Providers and Scholarly 
Publishers. I will define those when arguments relevant to them are taken 
up.  
Literary studies, we have been assuming, form a discipline and literary 
research is pursued within that discipline. In the spirit of clarifying my use 
of terms here, I understand discipline as primarily an institutional designa-
tion. So, disciplines in general signify in the following ways.  
First, in the University, a discipline is used to identify a responsible unit 
of collectivity: e.g. a department or school or faculty of literature. This unit 
can be charged with being collectively responsible for its costs by 
accounting the benefits it generates for the public and the profits it gener-
ates for the University – therefore, held responsible for its contribution to 
the public good. In this sense the discipline-defined department can be 
made accountable for a devolved budget to some definable degree. That 
also means that all discipline-defined departments in the University need 
to then compete for budgetary allocations. Such competition is articulated 
in terms of the particular benefits and profits that disciplinary (discipline-
specific) activity can generate.   
Second, beyond or across the University, within the regime for 
research regulated by the Ministry, funding (public or private) can also be 
accountably disbursed according to disciplinary areas. For this kind of 
accounting, the competition for funding is also articulated in disciplinary 
terms – but, in this instance, articulations are offered directly by the 
University, or by disciplinary representatives from the University, and also 
by users of disciplinarily defined products (entrepreneurs and benefici-
aries), and other stakeholders in research. 
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Third, at a general social level, disciplines enable loose professional 
solidarities irrespective of institutional affiliations or funding mechanisms.    
That is expressed in two different ways. On the one hand, disciplinary 
solidarity may give rise to (be nudged towards) cross-departmental or 
cross- or trans-University initiatives with entrepreneurial promise. That is 
properly where interdisciplinarity is located: the prefix inter obviously 
presumes the precedence of disciplines as organising units, and any activity 
that can be conceived across those units can then be undertaken as after-
the-fact, without presenting any threat to institutional organisation. On the 
other hand, those loose professional solidarities can be garnered for 
quality checks and peer reviews which seem to confer validity to discipli-
nary enterprise as if not interfered with by institutional interests. Thus, 
benefits seem to be foregrounded rather than profits in disciplinary 
research.  
Fourth, also at the general social level, and perhaps most importantly, 
disciplines enable a mechanism for being recognised or identified in 
particular ways, as bearing a certain kind of authority or a specific sort of 
reliability for consumers of disciplinarily branded products. Insofar as 
researchers are often the primary consumers of products by other 
researchers, the loose professional solidarity of disciplines also makes for 
identifiable market niches. Insofar as disciplinary products may have a 
larger than academic market, their disciplinary identification offers a way 
of profiling consumption patterns and targeting the larger market accord-
ingly. These patterns are found in concrete form in publishers’ and 
booksellers’ catalogues, library shelves and indexes, performances of 
expertise in the mass media, prizes and awards, etc.  
Insofar as research takes place in a discipline of literary studies, these 
significations of disciplinarity are often elided in favour of characteristic 
themes and practices, such as close reading, literary interpretation, analyti-
cal bibliography, literary history and so on. These seem then to constitute 
literary research, and define the work that literary researchers actually do. 
These materialise as the substantive work of research – as reading, writing, 
investigating, interpreting, archiving, publicising, lecturing, debating, coll-
aborating, etc. Though these practices and themes and activities define 
literary research as literary, none of them can actually be understood as 
indifferent to or separated from the institutional conditions of literary 
studies as a discipline, i.e. in terms of the four ways of signifying disciplines 
above. Literary research is undertaken at the confluence of that which 
describes literary activity as literary and that which describes literary 
studies as a discipline. Disciplinarity and literariness merge inextricably in 
literary research.  
With the entrepreneurial basis of literary research in mind, I will 
consider literary research as described here, in terms of what it actually 
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consists in within the conditions it is actually undertaken in. I will consider 
literary research thus under three broad headings below: as knowledge 
production, particularly in the University; in terms of scholarly publishing, 
with a special interest in the research monograph (often considered the 
mainstay of literary research); and with regard to leadership, or, specifi-
cally, leadership education.  
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15. Disciplining Research  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suman Gupta 
 
Alexander is right (in I.14, “What Literary Researchers Actually Do”) to 
take this debate towards the on-the-ground practices and activities of 
researchers. He assumes that the kinds of things literary researchers 
actually do – ‘the work of reading, writing, interpreting, investigating, 
archiving, publicising, lecturing, debating, collaborating, etc.’ – occurs at a 
disciplinary level, on the ‘disciplinary cliff face,’ as he puts it. He then gives 
an account of how disciplinarity should be understood (in four points), 
and it is evident from this that, for Alexander, what literary researchers 
actually do has little basis in the intellectual necessity of disciplines. In fact, 
those activities are mostly powerfully subjected to institutional 
prerogatives exercised in the name of disciplines. Given that Alexander’s 
perspective is grounded in the profession and how professors (academic 
workers) generate profits for institutions, it makes sense that he insists that 
disciplinarity be defined in institutional terms.  
In fact, Alexander’s arguments seem plausible insofar as we accept that 
institutionally defined disciplines are the structuring ground for research 
work. And yet, he is wrong in thinking that research is undertaken 
according to this view of disciplinarity, that researchers actually engage with 
research accordingly.  
There is no doubt that once put into institutional accounting, research 
acquires and invests in a disciplinary identity and evolves some shared 
terminology and foci for reifying disciplinarity. Researchers become disci-
plined for organisational and professional purposes, or perhaps for entre-
preneurial purposes. But I am yet to come across a research work – a 
scholarly text – that is identified as being literary research, written by 
persons affiliated to literature departments, which is in any understandable 
sense purely literary. Every such text addresses questions which are also 
addressed by researchers in other departments: linguistics, philosophy, 
history, sociology, politics, jurisprudence, anthropology, technology, bio-
logy, and so on. The actual work of research is always close to a sense of 
knowledge that precedes disciplinarity, a kind of continuum of knowledge. 
The institutional conditions offered for research work, and packaging of 
products from that work, impose a grid of disciplines on the continuum of 
ENTREPRENEURIAL LITERARY THEORY 
 
60 
 
knowledge. Disciplines are meaningful after-the-fact for the actual practice 
of research.  
So, a somewhat different understanding of disciplinarity from Alexan-
der’s is needed to grasp what researchers actually do, how a continuum of 
knowledge and institutionally defined disciplines are mutually negotiated. 
The University and its discipline-based segments did not appear ready-
made so that research could be undertaken accordingly. There was a 
process involved, a historical process, which has left its trace in what 
researchers do now – still do – in the University. A few sketchy notes on 
this process follow; a proper reckoning with it would take up many 
volumes.     
Most early reckonings with disciplines and with their institutional 
grounding were explicitly presented as after the fact of a continuum of 
knowledge – at least in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the 
modern University was an evolving institutional space. Numerous refer-
ences could be cited; a few suffice to make the point briefly. Lawyer and 
logician Zachary Coke’s The Art of Logick (1654) was written from outside 
the University (as the dedication to Oliver Cromwell says) and presented 
an early mapping of ‘disciplines’ in English, cohering with its current 
sense:  
 
Objective Disciplines: Objective disciplines be such as handle things which are 
in Nature as Objects of our understanding, which are principally four. […] 
1. Divinity, called by the Greeks Theologie, which is the knowledge of 
God, and things Supernatural, as they are Supernatural, & c. 
2. Jurisprudence, or Law which takes in beside the special Laws of God 
and Nature, the Canon, Civil Laws, the Law of Nations, our Laws Common, 
Statute and Municipal, & c. 
3. Medicine or Physick, both the Speculative and the Practique. 
4. Philosophy, which comprehends Metaphysics, which considereth things 
as they are such, & c. Also, Physiques, or natural Science; next of all Mathe-
maticks, which contains Arithmetick, Geometry, Astronomy, Musick, 
Opticks, and last of all Ethicks, or Morals, containing Oeconomicks and 
Politicks, under which again (beside History) is comprised Strategicks, called 
Martial Discipline. 
Directive disciplines: Directive Disciplines be such as handle not the things 
themselves to be known, nor do they inform or perfect the understanding of 
man in those things, but they prepare only some operation of man, and with 
framed Rules and Instruments do guide and direct it.  (Coke 1654: 2) 
 
In mapping knowledge thus, Coke’s idea was not to find a space amongst 
disciplines, within some discipline or the other, but to carve out a funda-
mental area which is implicated in all of them. This consists in the 
‘cogitations of things’ and the ‘signification of cogitations of things,’ which 
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he then elaborates as ‘logick.’ Eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
attempts to map knowledge in a panoptic manner through disciplinary 
divisions follow roughly the same pattern: Giambattista Vico’s Principi di 
Scienza Nuova (1725; abridged in English 2002) attempted a reconciliation 
between philosophy and philology; Denis Diderot and Jean-Baptiste 
D’Alembert’s attempt to systematise all knowledge in all disciplinary 
branches in the Encyclopédie (1751-1772; in English, see University of 
Michigan translation project) and Jakob Bielfeld’s attempt to summarise 
the same for popular consumption in Les premiers traits de l’Erudition 
Universelle (1767, in English 1770) were designed to foreground ‘reason’ as 
the episteme underpinning disciplines; August Comte’s Cours de philosophie 
positive (1830-1842; in English 1896) traversed disciplines to posit positiv-
istic science as the episteme. Disciplinarity was then presented fairly 
consistently as after the fact and built upon some sort of underlying 
continuum of knowledge, whether conceived as logic, reason or science. 
Let us call this scholarly view of disciplines knowledge-disciplines. Through 
historical passages the practice of research is powerfully, through num-
erous conventions and norms of rigour and integrity, based on this 
understanding of knowledge-disciplines.    
That the politico-economic organisation of the University according to 
disciplines (let us call this institutional-disciplines) could be at odds with the 
scholarly sense of disciplines (knowledge-disciplines) was the point of 
Immanuel Kant’s Der Streit der Fakultäten or The Conflict of the Faculties 
(1798; in English 1992) – written at the cusp of the appearance of profes-
sional academia as we know it. Kant found that what he ironically called 
the ‘higher faculties’ (institutional units for the study of Law and Theology 
particularly, but he threw in Medicine too) were interfering with – 
censoring – the extension of reason (Kant’s essential episteme) from their 
domain in the ‘lower faculty,’ Philosophy. In brief, Law and Theology 
were formations of the state and accordingly exerted power in the Univer-
sity as institutional-disciplines. Philosophy felt entitled to extend itself to 
all domains in a knowledge-discipline manner; but whenever that bid 
threatened the purposes of the state embedded in the faculties of Law and 
Theology, it was exhorted to confine itself to its lower institutional-
discipline status and make itself subservient to the higher institutional-
disciplinary status of Law and Theology. The purpose of the University at 
the behest of the state, rather than a conception of knowledge, was 
activated through the organisational place and identification of disciplines.  
Jumping around 200 years ahead, when Jacques Derrida looked back to 
Kant’s The Conflict – “Mochlos; or, The Conflict of the Faculties” (1992 
[1980]) – he found it difficult to grasp the salience of the University in the 
way Kant could. This was not so much because he was unable to share 
Kant’s conviction in the episteme of reason, but because he could barely 
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recognise the University as Kant knew it. Derrida found that the state now 
does not need the University to produce knowledge that sustains its 
authority, preferring to outsource that sort of knowledge production 
instead. Consequently, the state does not need to invest in any faculty or 
discipline particularly, certainly not to the extent of troubling to notice a 
conflict between higher and lower faculties. Moreover, a force outside 
Kant’s University had taken charge of managing knowledge production, 
both outside and critically inside the University:  
 
a class so defined of businessmen or technicians of knowledge […]. They are 
every responsible figure in the public or private administration of the univer-
sity, every ‘decision-maker’ in matters of budgets and the allocation or distri-
bution of resources (bureaucrats in a ministry, ‘trustees’ etc.), every adminis-
trator of publications and archivization, every editor, journalist, etc. (Kant 
1992 [1980]: 9)   
 
In other words, this is a class of academic leaders. Whether one feels any 
conviction in the knowledge-discipline approach to scholarship is immate-
rial now, it does not matter; there are only institutional-disciplines, appre-
hensible only in the manner presented by Alexander in the four points 
above (in I.14, “What Literary Researchers Actually Do”). Disciplines exist 
to serve profits and benefits as defined for the entrepreneurial University 
by academic leaders.  
But in the practice and pursuit of researchers, in what academic 
researchers actually do, the conception of a continuum of knowledge that 
precedes disciplines is constantly apparent. It is apparent through histori-
cal drift; through manoeuvers around conventions, norms and paradigms; 
through subscriptions to scholarly integrity and rigour; and within the 
features of the very discourse that is recognised as academic. There might 
not be a consensual episteme for what academic researchers actually do, 
but there is a consistency of practice which constantly suggests a conti-
nuum of knowledge – before it is disguised as discipline-specific for 
institutional neatness, or before rediscovering it as interdisciplinary.  
Most long views of the development of the academic profession, of the 
professionalisation of academia and the emergence of the University as we 
have it now, recognise disciplines as institutional interference and tools for 
disciplining researchers. As a case in point, James Turner’s Philology (2014) 
(mentioned by Alexander in I.3, “The Tricky Anteriority of Literature”) 
concludes a wide-ranging account of the division of academic disciplines 
away from a philological scholarly tradition with a passionate denunciation 
of disciplinarity as that is understood now: 
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The past does not prophecy the future. But perhaps some day humanistic 
scholarship will, once again, inhabit more wide-ranging academic divisions 
than it does today. If so, erudition will command a higher premium: more 
extensive knowledge, multiple languages will be required, to broaden the 
monoglot, narrowly focused scholarship increasingly common in the hum-
anities during the past half century. […] At any rate, when the time for 
change comes – whatever form that takes – it will help to remember that the 
humanities amount to more than a set of disciplines, each marooned on its 
own island. (386)   
 
Alexander Search  
  
Suman’s laborious attempt to liberate ‘a continuum of knowledge’ from 
institutionally-defined disciplines to inform what literary researchers 
actually do seems to me to have no connection to what literary researchers 
actually do. The strange anachronism of referring back to notions like 
‘pure reason’ and ‘positive science’ and ‘philology’ to make this argument 
speaks for itself. Researchers are mostly done with all that now, except as 
subjects of historical interest. It is impossible to think about what re-
searchers actually do without considering where they do it: that is, mainly 
in departments and schools and faculties according to disciplines in the 
University. Research practices and institutional spaces are umbilically tied 
to each other. What is the point of looking for some distinction by looking 
back nostalgically to the past, probably more a fantastic than an idealised 
past?  
 
Fabio Akcelrud Durão 
 
Alexander’s is before anything a bureaucrat’s perspective, and it is enlight-
ening to see how his supposedly purely economic approach leads him into 
a kind of rationality that is not unlike that of a state functionary filling out 
(or rather devising) a form. Anything that does not fit is immediately 
discarded; Alexander can only think through transparent separation. That 
is why he is incapable of identifying any tension in the relationship 
between literature and research, and why he calls Suman’s nice little gene-
alogy of disciplines an ‘anachronism.’ Then there is his visceral inability to 
allow the slightest space to experience. Alexander is allergic to all words 
that could take things out of their proper places: ‘tension,’ ‘negativity,’ 
‘non-identity,’ not to mention ‘dialectics.’ Anything that could join 
together subject and object (as pleasure, for instance, or the personifica-
tion of literature) is inconceivable to him. Because literature is very much 
constituted by mixture, it lets itself be shaped by Alexander orderliness, 
but at the price of becoming something so inane that it eventually loses 
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any claim to deserve being studied. I wonder if that is not Alexander’s aim 
after all. 
We should bring history into this debate. Literature is not an obvious 
object in the way plants or numbers are; in an important sense, it is what it 
has become. The past cannot be dissociated from the present. Not that 
long ago, the University was not literature’s decisive social space for its 
reproduction, and the greatest part of literary works was not written to be 
analysed (or researched). Mostly literature did not even see itself as litera-
ture in the way we do. Alexander’s position forces him to disengage origin 
from validity, Ursprung from Geltung. In order to have our representation of 
literature as a space of freedom of enunciation, an autonomous sphere 
where anything can be said – which was a fundamental achievement – its 
connection to unliterary practices had to be severed. To study a sermon as 
a literary artefact, its original context in belief has to be expunged as belief. 
In other words, the emergence of literature as an object, as a construction (to 
be researched) only takes place with the loss of something else, which 
should be taken into account. One can trace this logic to the very begin-
ning in the division of intellectual and manual labour. Literature thus 
appears as a space where freedom and guilt are intertwined. 
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16. Two Notes: Public Funding and the 
Entrepreneur 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alexander Search 
 
Looking back to the various interventions in this debate, and before mov-
ing on to the areas I mentioned in I.14 (“What Literary Researchers 
Actually Do”), it occurs to me that there are still a few terms which we are 
using at cross-purposes. More precisely, Suman and Fabio are thinking 
about and using these terms with implicit assumptions which I do not 
share. One is ‘public funding,’ which Fabio, for one, seems to consider 
free of entrepreneurial activity in his comment at the end of I.10 
(“Changes and Futures”). The other term is ‘entrepreneur,’ which seems to 
evoke an image of specific self-interested persons or agents. In this debate, 
I often seem to stand in for this preconceived greedy person, the butt of 
Suman’s and Fabio’s discontent.  Both terms could do with some clarify-
ing before proceeding to what literary researchers actually do.  
 Let me start with public funding.  
There are broadly two streams of investment into the capital circuit 
which entrepreneurial activity can capitalise on: private (individuals and 
small firms and large corporations) and public (government and govern-
ment-supported organisations). For academic research enterprise, espe-
cially in a literary vein, the latter is as significant as the former, and will, I 
suspect, crop up often as this debate proceeds. Public funding that may 
enter the capital circuit consists in all the monies that may be realised by 
state organisations (the government) through direct or indirect taxation, 
and from returns on existing investments after ensuring that the sectors 
invested in remain sustainable (bearing in mind also that some of this 
funding has to be maintained in reserve).  
Among champions of the Humanities and the liberal University – far 
from confined to Fabio and Suman – there is often some confusion about 
the purpose of public funds. This confusion is apparent in Fabio’s 
comment at the bottom of I.10 (“Changes and Futures”), when he says: 
‘The simple idea that would reduce all your arguments to naught is that the 
state should fund the university system and let academics do as they please 
with the money.’ Fabio simply misunderstands the purpose of public 
funds. Fabio seems to think that public funds are a bottomless pot that 
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could be used to generate benefits for all and be kept out of profit-making 
circulations. Given that the size of this pot depends on profitable capital 
circulations, this is naïve even when that pot seems to have a large surplus 
which could be put directly towards benefits for all. Perhaps Fabio is 
assuming that the state, as he puts it, has a monopoly on investments in 
the capital cycle – and even in those circumstances, the state would be a 
sorry fellow if the pot ran dry.   
It is true that some part of public funds could be put towards necessary 
and basic benefits for all in various sectors of social life. The principal 
purpose of public funding is, however, to be used as a guarantee for 
private investors to keep investing and consumers to keep consuming and 
thereby to enable a dynamic capital cycle. Thereby capital grows through 
continuous profit-making and consumption and re-investment.   
So public funding in the academic sector may be used to support some 
necessary blue-skies thinking and certain minority areas of investigation, 
and to ensure the basic sustainability of the sector. But public funding of 
the academic sector is principally for the purpose of:  
 
 developing infrastructures that encourage private funding of academia 
(i.e. making the academic sector profit making in itself);  
 encouraging entrepreneurial activity by providing appropriate know-
ledge towards product development, and skilled workers to ensure 
quality production;  
 channelling entrepreneurial tenets among communities and the public 
generally;  
 encouraging citizenship values and habits (being law abiding, ethically 
concerned, etc.) which, while not directly entrepreneurial, make for an 
amenable environment for secure investments; 
 clarifying, and sometimes moulding, the niches and characteristics of 
the market to facilitate all possible sectors of enterprise.  
  
Moving on to the idea of the entrepreneur: talk of entrepreneurial activities 
and interests in Humanities circles usually conjures the image of individu-
als undertaking those activities and owning those interests, persons out to 
make money for themselves through business. This association has settled 
in through the constant dissemination of stories featuring individual 
protagonists in the world of business and finance – heroes and villains, 
glamorous and seedy, successful and thwarted, real-life and fictional. Such 
individuals appear to have a direct and self-interested relationship with 
large politico-economic arrangements, and are often promoted as the heart 
of liberal capitalism. The image of the individual entrepreneur appears 
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with clearly visualised verve even though all know that it is principally 
organisations and institutions – let us call them corporations – that are 
entrepreneurial, that make investments and ground entrepreneurial activi-
ties, to which the profits of enterprise accrue. Suman and Fabio will no 
doubt observe that this makes little difference; corporations are fronts for 
entrepreneurial individuals to make money for themselves and become 
rich. That is true to some extent, but not entirely. Through the enterprise 
of corporations some individuals become rich, some make a living, and 
some survive. Insofar as the enterprise of corporations goes, all within 
their collective fold, irrespective of their returns, serve the entrepreneurial 
thrust. Some do so as shareholders and some as stakeholders, some as 
leaders and some as followers, and all partake of the profits of the corpo-
ration’s enterprise accordingly. The entrepreneurial drive is the corpora-
tion’s – hence, that of the entrepreneurial University, Ministry, publishing 
house, media firm and so on.  
To some degree, confusion prevails because in liberal jurisprudence 
there is a blurring of boundaries between enterprising individuals and 
enterprising corporations. In a legal sense, the latter are treated as in-
dividuals, with some provisions whereby their legal individuality can be 
represented by individual persons (usually the leaders). The historical evolu-
tion of this legal rationale was examined in F.W. Maitland’s (2003) essays 
“The Corporation Sole” (1900), “The Crown as Corporation” (1901), 
“Trust and Corporation” (1904); the rationale of contemporary liberal 
jurisprudence in this regard is laid out in Hans Kelsen’s General Theory of 
Law and State (2006 [1946]), Ch.9 – and, with some fine-tuning according 
to context, those rationalisations still hold. This confusion aids the 
constant reification of the specific entrepreneurial individual as a synecdo-
che for the entrepreneurial corporation. Such confusion feeds into 
Suman’s earlier observations on my ‘performative contradiction’ (I.5, “Are 
These Serious Arguments?”), wondering whether I could speak of entre-
preneurial literary research without a profit motive. Significantly, that 
confusion has been variously expanded by the popularity of Foucault’s 
phrase ‘entrepreneur of himself’ (see I.10, “Changes and Futures”).  
For a person to be entrepreneurial does not necessarily mean that she 
expects to make profits only for or even at all for herself; it means that she 
makes profits for some corporation she is associated with. That is clear 
enough from where I began: ‘All literary research is or should be 
conducted with the ultimate purpose of generating profits for some enterprising 
sector of the economy; that is, through some corporate or governmental organisation.’    
 
              
 
 68 
 
17. A Certain Kind of Pressure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fabio Akcelrud Durão  
 
About Alexander's language: for me, perhaps because I am a Brazilian, 
terms like ‘public good’ sound strangely aloof and cold. If you live in a 
country marked by so much social inequality, so much need and privation, 
expressions like ‘distribution of benefits’ seem devoid of meaning. 
Anything short of the suppression of hunger and the satisfaction of the 
population's basic needs sounds like ideological manipulation. Of course, 
in a situation like this, literary studies have to be justified. Antonio 
Candido argued in “O Direito à Literatura” (2011 [1988]), a famous text in 
Brazil, that literature should be classified as a basic, as opposed to a 
secondary, need, because it helps organise experience. This claim may be 
refuted, but I take it to be revealing of a certain kind of pressure that can 
be easily felt by professors feeling called upon to legitimise their work – a 
pressure that is often self-imposed. My point here is not that one should 
get rid of novels and go do social work (or go to the guerrilla front), but 
rather that such an intellectual climate forces one to relate to this issue. In 
short, then, it may be that it would be harder for a Brazilian Alexander to 
sustain his position on the basis of the English Alexander. I wonder if he 
would not be for the near suppression of research altogether, turning to 
language studies in the University as just a matter of instrumentally 
mastering the language and leaving writers alone to do their work (and 
starve) without the burden of criticism. 
 
Suman Gupta 
 
I daresay Alexander is not unacquainted with that pressure also. Strange as 
it may seem to Fabio, uncertain employment, unemployment, subsistence-
level living, scrambling for basic needs, homelessness, even starvation, are 
far from being unknown in Britain. All those are complicated by various 
levels of social stratifications, prejudice and scapegoating. The pressure 
that emanates from the constant exacerbation of these bears upon many in 
Britain, including professors in the broad sense, including in literary 
studies.  
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Those aspects of Alexander’s language (or the language of the entre-
preneurial scholar) that Fabio finds alienating seem to me characteristic of 
the staid language of bureaucracy and business – and academic research 
that supports those. The carefully defined and understated use of phrases 
such as ‘public good,’ ‘benefits,’ ‘opportunities,’ ‘redistribution,’ etc. form a 
kind of net across policy and consultation papers, mission statements, 
strategic priority memoranda, budget statements, and so on that circulate 
in various institutions, and in communiques and recommendations from 
independent think-tanks and consultancy firms and academic consultants. 
I think of it as the language that informs the functioning of liberal capitalism, 
perpetuated as a specialised form of what Alvin Gouldner (1979) called a 
Culture of Critical Discourse (CCD) – a liberal capitalist CCD (Alexander 
refers to Gouldner in I.3, “The Tricky Anteriority of Literature”). An 
entrepreneurial rationale is now the glue that sticks the various manifesta-
tions of this discourse together.  
I know that this language does not differ significantly in those kinds of 
sources, whether in Britain or in comparatively less affluent contexts, such 
as India. I have had the opportunity, for instance, to compare British and 
Indian higher education and language policy documents, and consult 
various reports from private, public and non-governmental bodies in both 
countries. I am constantly struck by the linguistic assonances, the common 
denominators of liberal capitalist CCD, found in such British and Indian 
texts. And they are also found in similar texts from numerous other 
countries, and from transnational bodies, that I happen to have come 
across. Charting the current common denominators of governmental and 
business discourse across the globe could be a very useful research project. 
Does Brazil differ in this respect?   
The certain pressure that Fabio speaks of, that Candido expressed 
tangentially and Fabio expresses directly here, is exerted through the 
language of public politics. I think of this as the affective language of 
political advocacy and exhortation. It is apt to appear in competitive 
moments within the liberal capitalist establishment (during elections, for 
instance), and in texts representing alignments that are marginalised or 
excluded from the liberal capitalist establishment (manifestos, investigative 
reports, etc., and, yes, radical or ‘politically conscientious’ academic publi-
cations). And here too, insofar as I am aware of the relevant texts, I am 
constantly struck by the similar language of radical or activist or social-
justice proponents in India and Britain. That too could be a terrific 
research project: charting the common linguistic denominators of political 
advocacy across the globe.  
I do not think the English Alexander and the Brazilian Alexander and 
the Indian Alexander will have any difficulty seeing eye to eye, any more 
than the Brazilian Candido and the English Candido and the Indian 
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Candido. It will be a matter of a few contextually nuanced translations and 
modifications of each-others’ utterances.  
Fabio’s question then is: is it not possible that entrepreneurial literary 
scholars may be so entrepreneurial under pressured economic circum-
stances that they will end up wiping out literary studies as we understand 
it? My own feeling is: yes, it is very possible. It depends on the pressure in 
material terms, and the pressure brought through public political advo-
cacy. There are possible deterrents. For instance, nationalism could make 
common ground with entrepreneurialism and then, to sustain itself, 
cultivate a certain kind of national literary studies despite the disadvantages 
thereof for enterprise. So, in India, while English literary studies are being 
gradually dispensed with in favour of functional English language teaching 
by a nationalist establishment, there has appeared a growing interest and 
investment in the literatures of various Indian languages – especially 
dominant Indian languages. Another possibility is that literary studies will 
not be dispensed with because, even amidst economically straitened cir-
cumstances, it will actually prove to be profitable and a productive area of 
entrepreneurial activity. I think that is the direction Alexander is heading 
for.       
 
Alexander Search 
  
Suman’s final point can be continued. He tends to take a pessimistic view 
of deterrents to the disappearance of literary studies. When Fabio says that 
a sort of pressure to act for the alleviation of poverty might do away with 
literary studies, he seems to forget that Brazil also has affluent people. So, 
by 2009 figures, around 25% of the population lived in poverty, but the 
rest did not; and the richest 20% earned about 15 times more than the 
poorest 20%, and the richest 10% around 31 times more than the poorest 
10%. So, while that concern about the poor might worry some researchers 
and some politicians, the affluent and rich (including those worried 
academics and politicians) would continue to consume according to their 
means – and they would be in the eye of academic entrepreneurs. These 
middle and upper classes would be eager to enhance their cultural capital 
and distinguish their success and lifestyles from those of the poor and 
cultivate ‘high culture.’ They can be depended upon to sustain literary 
studies as such. This class of consumers has to be catered to by the 
University and is good for enterprise, necessary for the growth of 
academia and general economic growth. They would be happy to pay for 
their high culture.  
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Leandro Pasini 
 
I think Suman is overstating the universality of the subjective, cultural and 
national experience by assuming hastily the interchangeability of Indian, 
English and Brazilian Candidos as well as Norwegian, Chinese, Argentine 
and Indonesian Alexanders. In my opinion, this equation demands a little 
more than ‘a few contextually-nuanced translations and modifications of 
each-others’ utterances,’ since the historical differences cannot be played 
as a superficial translation issue, as if the literary and critical languages did 
not reflect different positions in modern history and in the capitalist 
world-system. I have tried to visualise the ‘English Candido’ and came up 
with a mixture of Matthew Arnold and Raymond Williams, though Fabio 
did not agree with the comparison. I wonder what the other Candidos 
would be like. Similarly, I imagine the ‘Brazilian Alexander’ not as a 
neoliberal theoretician who thinks in terms of the public good, applied 
research and profit making, but as an academic leader who emphatically 
imports the latest theoretical fashions without taking pains to understand 
what she is doing. The ‘Brazilian Alexander’ may well import the ideas of 
‘English Alexander,’ by the way, with contextually destabilising and ham-
handed effect. This academic leader would rather commit herself to the 
global language of the entrepreneurial literary scholar, without much (if 
any) critical thinking. 
 
Fabio Akcelrud Durão 
 
The relationship between the language used to write about a literary object 
and the language of the literary object is an important one. A bureaucratic 
form of expression, which, shunning ambiguity and a personal style, 
defends full transparency and objectivity will get close to commodification 
even if it is against neoliberalism. I do not mean to say that critics should 
try to write like novelists or poets, but that an ideal of clarity present in 
natural science and very easily transposed on to ‘research’ in other areas 
could do violence to its object. By and large, I find that my undergraduate 
students’ representation of what literature is goes contrary to Alexander’s 
and is closer to my conception of literature. All the ideas that Alexander 
objects to in my conception resonate with my students: my alleged 
romanticism and idealism, my concern with ‘life,’ ‘experience,’ ‘pleasure,’ 
‘expression,’ and so forth. Many of those students go to literature as 
something that promises some form of otherness. ‘Research,’ as Alexander 
would have it, with all its affinity to engineering, may draw students away 
and weaken, and eventually kill, literary studies.  
Concerning Alexander’s argument that literature will always be there 
because it will always work as a means of distinction and prestige for the 
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upper classes, this will not necessarily be the case. Historically, literature 
only became a means of marking class superiority after the rise of the 
bourgeoisie. It may very well be that under new circumstances, the ultra-
rich will find other means of signifying their social position. Literature has 
the disadvantage of involving too much work and concentration. One can 
find super-expensive objects in the market that fulfil this role more 
competently. I do not have empirical data for this, but what I can see in 
Brazil in cultural terms is a de-stratification. The culture industry has 
become so powerful and so massively concentrated that certain cultural 
products pervade society vertically, being consumed by virtually all – 
which of course gives one a misleading sense of democracy. 
In relation to this, I always like to recall the prize that the Brazilian 
Academy of Letters awarded to soccer player Ronaldinho Gaucho and 
coach Wanderly Luxemburgo in April 2011 (Niskier 2011). By giving them 
the Machado de Assis Medal, its highest honour, the Academy (the most 
canonical of canonical institutions) was not conferring cultural capital on 
them. Rather, the Academy was trying to absorb such capital from the 
soccer team that both worked for at the time, Flamengo. In sum, literature 
is precarious in Brazil even as a way of endowing prestige. 
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18. Away From the Monopolistic University  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alexander Search 
 
When Suman mentioned (in I.15, “Disciplining Research”) Derrida’s essay 
“Mochlos; or, The Conflict of the Faculties” (1992 [1980]), I was re-
minded of an observation in it: 
 
Nowadays […] – and this is a first limit to the translation of the Kantian text 
in our politico-epistemological space – there can be very serious border-
crossings between non-university centres of knowledge and university facul-
ties claiming at once to be doing research and transmitting knowledge, to be 
producing and reproducing knowledge. […] In the days of Kant this ‘out-
side’ could be confined to the margin of the university. This is no longer so 
certain or simple. Today, in any case, the university is what has become the 
margin. […] The state no longer entrusts certain investigations to a 
university that cannot accept the structures or control the techno-political 
stakes. […] The state deprives it of the right to do research, reserved for 
academies without teachers. This arises most often from calculations of 
techno-political profitability as figured by the state, or by national (or inter-
national), state (or trans-state) capitalist powers, as one might imagine 
happening with the storage of information or the constitution of data banks, 
where the university member has to surrender any representation as a 
‘guardian’ or ‘trustee’ of knowledge. […] And since the university, either for 
reasons of structure or from its attachment to old representations, cannot 
avail itself of certain kinds of research, or operate within them, or transmit 
them, it feels menaced in certain places around its own body […]. (8)  
 
I recognise in this the curious idealistic notion of the University that Kant, 
Derrida and, more immediately, Fabio and Suman gesture towards nostal-
gically and seemingly want to defend or retrieve. This is the notion of the 
University as monopolistic producer of disinterested knowledge, without 
interference or competition from the state (the Ministry, in my terms), 
non-university centres of knowledge, and other entrepreneurial corpora-
tions – truly, the University as ivory tower. It is in the nature of nostalgia 
to reconstruct its ostensibly remembered object in desirable hues that the 
object never had, hues that simply reveal the fantasies of the nostalgia-
struck.   
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It seems self-evident to me as a principle that no person or organisa-
tion should have a monopoly on knowledge production if knowledge is to 
serve the public good. Knowledge is best used in the public interest if it 
can be used by whoever can maximise its benefits and potential for profit 
generation; conversely, whoever produces knowledge in this vein should 
be encouraged. In fact, it is best if whoever is in a position to produce 
knowledge in this vein could programmatically work in collaborative or 
complementary ways so that the public good is maximised. Fortunately, 
such nostalgic idealism has not held things back: academic leaders and 
followers in the University know that in practice knowledge production in 
the public interest is most effective if the University does not claim or 
pretend monopolistic prerogatives. Collaborative and, sometimes, strategi-
cally complementary efforts in knowledge production between the Univer-
sity, Ministry, non-university centres and other corporations are the 
understandable norm.   
However, Derrida does point to an important fact when he observes 
that the state – the Ministry – does not depend now (if ever it has) on the 
University for the research and knowledge needed for its entrepreneurial 
purposes and governance of the public good. It usually takes recourse to 
‘non-university centres of knowledge.’  This is certainly the case when the 
Ministry needs research to crystallise policy directions and strategic priori-
ties with effect on the University. In fact, the University also does not 
depend on itself (its faculties, schools, departments, centres and institutes) 
for the research and knowledge needed for its entrepreneurial purposes, 
and also takes recourse to ‘non-university centres of knowledge.’  
There are two kinds of research production that the University 
concerns itself with. One, the kind of research that informs the Univer-
sity’s functioning as a corporation with entrepreneurial interests and 
benefit-generation responsibilities. Let us call this Corporate Research. Two, 
the kind of research which the University can variously use as a commod-
ity, or offer as a service, to realise profits and extend benefits from 
research consumers – thereby meeting its mandate to serve the public 
good. Let us call this Academic Research.    
For Corporate Research, the University (and sometimes parts thereof) 
often commissions ‘non-university centres of knowledge,’ sometimes 
alongside conducting its own research, and sometimes without doing so. 
The Ministry also routinely commissions Corporate Research from ‘non-
university centres of knowledge,’ though sometimes it may also directly 
commission a proven expert from the University alongside. Academic 
Research is predominantly done by researchers employed in the Univer-
sity, embedded in the faculties, schools, departments, centres and institutes 
therein as professors (in the broad sense).  
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Insofar as this debate focuses particularly on literary researchers, and 
more generally on professors in any research area (whose profession is in 
the University), we are interested mainly in Academic Research. To grasp 
how that serves entrepreneurship, it is useful to first briefly take account 
of the Corporate Research which the University commissions from out-
side. After that it will be easier to articulate the specific entrepreneurial 
thrust of Academic Research as distinct from Corporate Research. To do 
this we need a sharper understanding of what Derrida called ‘non-
university centres of knowledge.’ There are various recognisable terms 
which are captured in that phrase: independent think-tanks, private 
consultancy firms, organisational research providers, autonomous enter-
prise research centres, higher education/academic service providers, etc. – 
and even not-for-profit foundations (wherein project-specific profits are 
accounted such that they do not accrue to the corporate body). Let us call 
these Corporate Research Providers.  
The main difference between the Corporate Research Provider and the 
University is not, as is often thought, that the former does not concern 
itself with benefits for all (is exclusively profit driven) or does not involve 
itself in pedagogy like the University, or has different funding mechanisms 
from the University’s. In fact, Corporate Research Providers often do 
undertake some benefit generation and offer well-defined and targeted 
education services, including direct teaching and learning programmes. 
Their funding mechanisms are not different from some sectors of the 
University, and could include significant public and not-for-profit funding, 
and they could have charitable (NGO) status. Also, the Corporate Re-
search Provider often contracts professors from the University as 
consultants to fulfil their commissions. The Corporate Research Provider 
frequently recruits professors from the University to be paid or honorary 
executive or advisory board members. Indeed, sometimes a Corporate 
Research Provider may choose to set up as a University (or have a subsidi-
ary operation as a University). But usually they choose not to, because 
their entrepreneurial interests are best served by maintaining their 
independence from the University and autonomy from the Ministry – by 
having a distinct identity as research provider. In other words, the Corpo-
rate Research Provider’s business interests are best served by maintaining a 
clear distinction between the Corporate Research which they provide and 
the Academic Research which is associated with the University.   
The main difference between the Corporate Research Provider and the 
University is in their legal status and public brands. The arrangements for 
public registration and financial accounting, and the processes of institu-
tional regulation and validation, follow different formal pathways. 
Consequently, the public appearance and expectations of them are quite 
different.  
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There is a small complexity there which should be noted: though the 
Corporate Research Provider is distinct from the University, and the 
former’s prerogative on providing Corporate Research is separate from 
the latter’s on providing Academic Research, the Corporate Research 
Provider might in a logistical and legal sense be both within the University 
as well as outside. Numerous University institutions house and own 
enterprise-research centres, institutes and consultancy organisations, which 
are effectively Corporate Research Providers for other academic and 
business corporations. These are generally made autonomous within the 
University with proprietorship (i.e. outside the regulations which govern 
Academic Research workers) and set up as self-funding units (i.e. they are 
separated from the accounts and budgets that attach to academic faculties 
of the University). Arguably, these nevertheless gain something from being 
covered by the University brand and make some contribution to Univer-
sity reserves. It is, in this sense, possible for Corporate Research Providers 
to be both inside and outside the University at the same time.      
Obviously, there are interpenetrations between the University and the 
Corporate Research Provider. This is both in terms of occasional organi-
sational overlaps and in terms of certain researchers who move between 
Academic Research and Corporate Research and are formally both profes-
sors in the University and consultants of the Corporate Research Provider.  
We may therefore wonder why the University needs to commission 
Corporate Research Providers at all. After all, it is possible for the Univer-
sity to directly ask appropriate employees who are Academic Researchers 
to simply turn their attention to particular Corporate Research issues 
according to need – in return for a bonus or some career incentive. Or the 
University could ask Academic Researchers from another University to do 
so, perhaps for a fee and also some profile boosting. Amongst other 
things, that would be more cost-effective than commissioning Corporate 
Research Providers. The market determined costs of commissioning 
Corporate Research Providers can be high. Academic Researchers who are 
employees and more than capable of doing Corporate Research cost much 
less (could be fairly selfless in this regard). 
Evidently there is some entrepreneurial advantage to the University (as 
to the Corporate Research Provider) in keeping Corporate Research and 
Academic Research distinct, and the agencies which ostensibly produce 
them identifiably different. Some attention to the specific practices sur-
rounding Corporate Research is called for, and that in turn is likely to 
throw a clarifying light on Academic Research.     
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19. The Corporate Research that Universities 
Commission  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alexander Search 
 
The kind of Corporate Research Provider that is commissioned by the 
University, as described in II.18 (“Away From the Monopolistic Univer-
sity”), usually includes firms which cater to a wide range of businesses and 
organisations apart from those in the academic sector. Considerations of 
confidentiality and market sensitivity often make it difficult to track 
commissions linking specific University institutions with specific Corpo-
rate Research Provider firms. However, the website publicity of Corporate 
Research Provider firms, together with a broad grasp of documents which 
circulate internally in firms and institutions, allows for a reasonable grasp 
of links. Here are a few examples of Corporate Research Provider firms 
with some of their publicised University sector clients (and in some 
instances their clients from the Ministry) – mainly focused on the UK, but 
also noting some in USA, Australia and New Zealand, in 2010-2015: 
 
 
 
Corporate Research Provider and 
brief description of services 
(see list of websites at the end of 
this chapter) 
 
 
University / Ministry  
B2B (‘business to business market 
research studies’) 
University of Manchester, 
Huddersfield University, Tufts 
University 
Deloitte (‘audit, consulting, financial 
advisory, risk management, tax, and 
related services’)  
University of New South Wales, 
London Metropolitan University, 
New Mexico State University 
Universities Australia, 
Universities New Zealand, The 
Engineering and Physical 
Sciences Research Council 
(EPSRC) UK 
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DJS Market Research (‘offers a range 
of services from identifying market 
research requirements, devising a 
suitable programme, through to 
project implementation and reporting 
findings’) 
 
Imperial College London, Open 
University Business School, 
Open University, Oxford 
Brookes University 
Universities Central Council on 
Admissions UK (UCAS), 
Research Councils UK (RCUK) 
Ipsos MORI (‘specialise in brand 
communication, advertising and media 
research, consumer, retail & shopper 
and healthcare research, customer and 
employee relationship management 
research, and social & political and 
reputation research […] also offer a 
range of solutions for online, 
telephone, face-to-face, mobile and 
omnibus fieldwork’) 
University of Oxford, Queen 
Mary University London, 
Harvard University, University of 
Leeds, Cardiff University 
Spencer du Bois (‘Brand positioning, 
key messaging, brand architecture, 
employee brand engagement, research, 
naming, identities, campaigns, visual 
systems, digital communications, 
literature, tone of voice...’) 
Imperial College Business 
School; National Union of 
Students; Royal Society of 
Chemistry; Cass Business School; 
Aston University; Monash 
Warwick University Alliance; 
University of Cambridge; 
University of Hull; University of 
the West of Scotland 
Viewforth Consulting (‘a range of 
research and consultancy relating to 
higher and further  education as well as 
providing advice and guidance on 
higher education policy issues at both 
sectoral and individual institutional 
level’)  
 
Dublin City University, 
University of Brighton, Leeds 
Trinity University, University of 
Kent, Canterbury Christ Church 
University, University College 
Dublin, Queen's University 
Belfast, Ulster University  
Universities UK 
Websites quoted are listed at the bottom of this chapter 
 
The kinds of Corporate Research that University institutions commission 
are usually to do with corporate governance (e.g. financial management, 
market engagement, recruitment, branding, policy response, product 
design, restructuring). These indicate the areas in which University leaders 
are reluctant to take recourse to Academic Researchers in their employ (or 
employed elsewhere in the University sector) irrespective of their fitness to 
the purpose of conducting Corporate Research.   
However, commissioning may also include supplementing or feeding 
Academic Research. Thus, to pick one among numerous examples, 
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commissions undertaken by Ipsos MORI for University institutions on 
‘Race, Faith and Cohesion’ in the area of Social Sciences around 2011, and 
detailed on its website, include the following (quotations are from the 
website listed at the bottom of this chapter):    
 
 University of Oxford – Managing ethnic diversity (2009-ongoing): ‘The 
aim of the overall project is to evaluate Robert Putnam’s predictions that 
areas with high levels of ethnic diversity manifest low levels of social trust.  
The study comprises a nationally representative survey supplemented by an 
ethnic minority boost survey, with 1600 interviews in total. Ipsos MORI 
contributed to the questionnaire design and carried out cognitive testing to 
refine the questions.’  
 Queen Mary University – Survey of Muslims (2011-2012): ‘Ipsos MORI 
conducted a survey of Muslims living in two locations in Britain, East 
London and Bradford, with the intention of understanding pre-radicalisation. 
Interviews comprised questions on religious beliefs, political views, sym-
pathies for violent and non-violent actions and to measure vulnerability 
amongst respondents.’  
 The Migration Observatory at Oxford University - Understanding 
public opinion on immigration (2011): ‘Ipsos MORI was commissioned 
by the Migration Observatory to conduct a nationally representative survey 
of British adults on their attitudes to immigration and perception of 
immigrants.’  
 University of Leeds – Living with Difference (2011): ‘The aim of this 
study is to measure levels of social prejudice with a representative sample of 
residents in two cities: Leeds in England and Warsaw in Poland.  We are 
conducting 1,500 face-to-face interviews in both cities. The questions cover 
the full range of equality strands plus additional characteristics or circum-
stances that could generate hostile attitudes; religion, is of course, one of the 
issues covered.’  
 Cardiff University – Survey of Muslims (2010): ‘Cardiff University 
commissioned Ipsos MORI to conduct a two-wave survey of Muslims living 
in Britain. The first wave was face-to-face with the follow-up interview by 
telephone. The principal objective of the survey was to examine contextual 
and psychological predictors of a sense of British identity, political participa-
tion and attitudes towards violent extremism among Muslims living in 
Britain. Ipsos MORI worked with the team at Cardiff on developing the 
questionnaire, which included a number of sensitive questions.’  
 Harvard University – Social attitudes survey (2008-2009): ‘Harvard 
University, with some additional funding from Manchester University and 
Notre Dame University (Paris), commissioned Ipsos MORI to conduct a 
random probability survey using a questionnaire based on the British Social 
Attitudes Survey. The survey was conducted amongst Muslims in Great 
Britain with a parallel survey amongst the general population in Northern 
KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION 
81 
 
Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, and Great Britain. The objective of the re-
search was to find out whether there are significant differences in social, 
political and religious attitudes between the groups surveyed and, if so, what 
these are.’   
 
Sifting through such examples of Academic Research commissioned from 
Corporate Research Providers could clarify where either the University 
lacks ability and infrastructure or receives project-funding which facilitates 
such commissioning. It is also possible that the research questions add-
ressed in these kinds of Academic Research projects have a particular 
relevance to governance, which may also justify recourse to Corporate 
Research Providers. I have been unable to find much reliable and citable 
information on the financial costs of such commissioning. Those are likely 
to account for not insignificant proportions of the University’s income, 
including public and not-for-profit funding, and reserves.   
 There are sound entrepreneurial reasons for the University and the 
Ministry to make this investment. They commission research from Corpo-
rate Research Providers, especially of the sort that bears upon University 
and academic governance, to ensure that such research is independent and 
secure: i.e. is not influenced by partisan or vested interests, and is 
controlled by the commissioning party. If such Corporate Research were 
obtained by a University institution from suitably experienced Academic 
Researchers employed in that institution, then the findings and recom-
mendations may be massaged by those researchers to secure or enhance 
their position in the institution, possibly at the expense of other stakehold-
ers (like academic leaders, administrators, non-researching tutors, students 
and other clients, end users). If such Corporate Research were obtained by 
a University institution from suitably qualified Academic Researchers from 
other University institutions (constituted like a peer-review panel), then 
those researchers may still massage the data in a general way to favour 
academic stakeholders at the expense of other stakeholders.  
Besides, since all University institutions are in competition with each 
other in the same market, the latter path could adversely affect the 
competitiveness of the University institution commissioning this research. 
The point of such commissions is to gain a competitive edge. The Univer-
sity institution would lose the competitive advantage it expects from its 
commissioned research if other institutions got hold to it. The Corporate 
Research Provider guarantees that the University which commissions it 
will have control of the relevant Corporate Research output. Actually, 
Academic Researchers generally tend to take security and confidentiality of 
research relatively lightly. They often have a strong conviction in making 
knowledge public to maximise benefits and forget that profit making 
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depends on security of some knowledge. Academic Researchers tend to be 
leaky.     
Against the claim of independence that the Corporate Research 
Provider offers for the commissioning University, it may be argued that 
this practice of commissioning also possibly skews research. Corporate 
Researchers may massage the commissioned research to favour University 
governance against the interests of academic workers. It is academic lead-
ers who do the commissioning, and they form a stakeholder body whose 
perspective of the University may not coincide with those of academic 
workers (researchers, non-research tutors, students). Their understanding 
of the profit-making function of the University may not coincide with the 
benefit-generation responsibility that Academic Researchers particularly 
feel the University has. It would be understandable for Corporate Re-
search Provider firms to skew research so as to suit the perspectives and 
interests of academic leaders who commission on behalf of their Univer-
sity institutions. That would help Corporate Research Providing firms to 
strengthen their service-provider-to-client relationships with University 
institutions. However, this argument does not hold. Academic leaders in 
the University are appointed to maximise the entrepreneurial interests of 
the University for all stakeholders and thus maintain the public good. 
Their own interests are aligned with the greater entrepreneurial purpose of 
the University in a way that no other stakeholder group’s is (more than any 
Academic-Researcher group can be). They can be depended upon to make 
the best use for all stakeholders of the truly independent information and 
advice that Corporate Research Provider firms offer.      
It may also be argued that the Corporate Research Provider’s 
independence from the University that commissions it comes with a 
handicap. Corporate Research thus misses out on the insider-knowledge 
and experience which Academic Researchers can bring to it on behalf of 
the University. That argument too is easily refuted. As observed in II.18 
(“Away From the Monopolistic University”), the interpenetration between 
the Corporate Research Provider and the University ensures that the 
advantages that Academic Researches could bring to Corporate Research 
are availed by Corporate Research Providers. The boundaries between the 
Corporate Research Provider and the University are porous. The legal and 
organisational differences, however, allow for boundaries between the 
Corporate Research Provider and the University to be policed so that 
Academic Researchers are unable to spring leaks in the ships of enterprise.    
Ultimately, the synergies and divergences between Corporate Research 
and Academic Research rest in the kind of knowledge they are concerned 
with and the forms in which that knowledge is produced. An examination 
of the typical form in which Corporate Research appears in outputs, and 
of the manner in and extent to which such research calls upon Academic 
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Research, can hone our understanding of the how the two kinds of re-
search work together. Such an examination would clarify how Academic 
Research already works and could work further with Corporate Research 
to maximise the entrepreneurial interests of the University and Ministry – 
including for literary research.  
 
 
Websites cited, checked in March 2017 
 
B2B  
https://www.b2binternational.com/experience/industries/education-
market-research/ 
 
Deloitte  
https://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/public-sector/articles/uk-
he-sector-observations-from-our-insights-research.html  
 
DJS Market Research 
http://www.djsresearch.co.uk/glossary/item/Higher-Education-
Market-Research 
 
Ipsos MORI 
https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchspecialisms/ 
 
Ipsos MORI, “Race, Faith and Cohesion” projets in Social Sciences:  
https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchspecialisms/socialresearch/ 
specareas/racefaithandcohesion/Our-experience.aspx 
 
Spencer du Bois  
http://spencerdubois.co.uk/work/ 
 
Viewforth Consulting: 
http://www.viewforthconsulting.co.uk/id11.html 
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20. Corporate Research and Academic 
Research  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alexander Search  
 
Corporate Research outputs are usually owned and, more importantly, 
controlled by those who commission the research, such as the University 
or Ministry, and to some extent by the Corporate Research Provider as 
producer. Academic Research is usually made available in the public 
domain to be capitalised by any party or to generate benefits for all, 
though sometimes the University or Ministry seek to control those parts 
of it which may be commercially exploited.  
Corporate Research outputs are usually directed towards the interests 
of the commissioning party, so directed towards corporation- or market-
specific purposes. The typical direction of investigation is from general 
and broad-ranging precepts or inferences to specific context and rele-
vance: e.g. to work out how a specific corporation should locate itself 
apropos of others or in a policy context, or how a specific product can 
reach the largest market. Academic Research is generally addressed to the 
broadest public interest, so reaches towards general and wide-ranging 
formulation. This is undertaken, where relevant, by inference or extrapo-
lation from a range of context-specific evidence: e.g. examining sectors of 
production and consumption in a broad way, or the dynamics of an exist-
ing social or natural condition, or the economic and ethical implications of 
policies and ideologies.   
Corporate Research is designed to answer specific questions set by the 
commissioning party. Typically, Corporate Research is limited by the 
research questions that it is set to answer. Posing research questions is 
central to determining the limits for and the structure of Corporate 
Research, which concludes when informed recommendations for and 
resolutions of the questions can be offered. Academic Research is largely 
self-determining, addressing issues which are of scholarly moment at a 
given point of knowledge development or perceivably of wide public 
interest and import. The parameters are generally set by Academic Re-
searchers themselves, and predetermined research questions are not 
considered as setting limits to investigation or even calling for necessary 
resolutions and recommendations. So, research questions that Academic 
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Research begin with may lead to others and then yet others, and end with 
observations which answer some but leave other questions open. The 
overall thrust of Academic Research is usually of exploring an issue or 
theme rather than answering questions posed to begin with (questions 
have a methodological rather than limiting and structuring function).   
There are numerous moves in both Corporate and Academic Research 
which disturb the neatness of the above generalised differentiations 
between the two. For instance, the commissioning party (University or 
Ministry) or the Corporate Research Provider may put the commissioned 
Corporate Research output in the public domain – in the way Academic 
Research outputs are. That does not necessarily mean that in this instance 
the difference between Corporate Research and Academic Research has 
been erased. If a commissioned Corporate Research output is put in the 
public domain that is because it serves the interests of the commissioning 
party to do so. It may have an overt or covert advocacy agenda. If the 
commissioning party is the University or Ministry, then that research 
output in the public domain usually serves the entrepreneurial interests of 
academic leaders in the University or bureaucrats in the Ministry who did 
the commissioning. They may even have put it as a parameter in their 
agreement with the Corporate Research Provider that the Corporate 
Research output in question should do so – for instance, should be 
designed to manage public attitudes regarding a management strategy. 
Information disclosure laws may play a complex part here. If the Corpo-
rate Research Provider puts a Corporate Research output in the public 
domain of its own accord, that too serves the entrepreneurial interests of 
the Corporate Research Provider, while collecting brownie points for 
generating benefits in the spirit of Academic Research. At the least, that 
works as publicity and demonstration of the Corporate Research Pro-
vider’s capabilities and encourages commissions.  
The main point of these observations is that Corporate Research needs 
Academic Research that is easily accessible in the public domain, and Academic 
Research can make good use of Corporate Research insofar as that can be accessed. To 
answer research questions relevant to a specific organisation or product/ 
service, the Corporate Researcher needs some direction in terms of 
general and broad-based precepts and evidence which Academic Research 
offers – even if the latter are seemingly not to entrepreneurial ends. 
Similarly, Corporate Research outputs can provide narrowly grounded 
evidence and observations from which Academic Research could make 
broader inferences and formulations – and those too may seemingly not 
be to entrepreneurial ends. But those can feed back into further Corporate 
Research.             
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One way of grasping the necessity of Academic Research for Corpo-
rate Research is to consider where the former may feature in a Corporate 
Research output.  
A typical Corporate Research output in text form is a Corporate 
Research Report. The production of this usually fulfils the commission, 
though some Corporate Research Providers may continue to be involved 
in the implementation of recommendations. While there is naturally 
considerable diversity in the Corporate Research Report, it does have an 
essential form which those who deal with such reports recognise. The 
Corporate Research Report generally follows a kind of template from 
which departures generate diversity, and the underpinning stability of 
which allows for transparent and consensual reading strategies between 
those who commission and those who fulfil commissions. The essential 
form of the Corporate Research Report consists in the following typical 
parts, wherein Academic Research outputs may feature as follows.  
 
 Research questions: These are set by the commissioning party, but they 
are usually fine-tuned or broken down in consultation with the 
Corporate Researcher. In such consultations the Corporate Re-
searcher naturally has in mind readily available resources and 
formulations which will enable the questions to be answered 
efficiently. The Corporate Researcher might have in mind existing 
Corporate Research outputs which could be brought to bear on this 
commission. Equally, the Corporate Researcher will also have in mind 
existing general formulations and broad expectations which allow the 
research questions to be designed and understood in consensual ways 
(because those are evidenced, because those are acknowledged by 
experts, etc.). The latter is very largely premised on the Corporate 
Researcher’s acquaintance with existing Academic Research, some-
times in areas which may not be seen to immediately bear upon the 
commission.  
 Describing the general context: If the research questions are grounded in a 
large policy or market or cultural or otherwise structured environment 
– are borne upon by regulatory, ethical, linguistic, judicial, financial 
regimes – then that environment or the relevant regime needs to be 
described in a way that clarifies its bearing on the research questions 
for the purposes of the commissioning party. This would entail 
analysing a great deal of existing data, documentation, case-studies 
and so on. Usually, Corporate Researchers depend on Academic 
Research to have already undertaken such analysis and to have made 
broad or general inferences, from which the Corporate Researcher 
can extract what is needed. 
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 Investigating the specific context: If the research questions are focused on a 
specific corporation or product/service (often directly within or 
immediately outside the reach of the commissioning party itself) then 
that needs to be investigated and analysed by the Corporate Re-
searcher. This is where direct research methods are employed by the 
Corporate Researcher, e.g. existing corporation-specific data analysis, 
generating data by undertaking scoping exercises and pilots, using 
structured interviews, questionnaire surveys, focus groups, ob-
servation and profiling sessions, etc. The robustness of each of these 
methods needs to be agreed and accepted by the commissioning party 
and the Corporate Researcher. At every step the robustness of such 
methods are first tested in Academic Research and then applied in 
Corporate Research (sometimes in formulaic ways).  
 Comparative analysis of alternative ways of answering the research questions: 
From all the above, it is likely that the Corporate Researcher may 
come up with several contrary ways of answering the questions for 
the commissioning party to can act upon. At this point the Corporate 
Researcher needs to identify the pros and cons of each potential way 
relative to others. In doing this the Corporate Researcher may refer to 
analogous existing Corporate Research or to matters of principle and 
experience documented in Academic Research.  
 Recommendations: From the comparative analysis the Corporate Re-
searcher generally chooses one pathway which seems to be most 
effectively and productively actionable for the commissioning party. 
The justifications for doing so would have appeared principally in the 
comparative analysis, but may be further undergirded by reference to 
(citations from) authoritative Academic Research. 
 The executive summary:  The entirety of the Corporate Research Report 
is condensed so that the research process, analysis and recommenda-
tions appear as a coherent and easily comprehended whole. Generally, 
at this point use of or reference to Academic Research is unnecessary. 
At this point, the secure production-ownership of the report by the 
Corporate Research Provider is announced and the secure utility-
ownership of the commissioning party is established. In terms of text 
placement, such ownership is usually announced and established at 
the beginning of the finished Corporate Research Report. The execu-
tive function of the summary is effectively a declaration of the hand-
over from the Corporate Research Provider to the executives of the 
commissioning party – such as, academic leaders of the University or 
bureaucratic leaders of the Ministry. 
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Thus, the necessity for Academic Research in Corporate Research is 
usually embedded in every step of the typical form of the Corporate 
Research Report, except in the executive summary.  
Evidently then, Academic Research already and continuously supports 
the entrepreneurial interests of the Corporate Research Provider, and 
thereby the entrepreneurial interests of corporations of all sorts, including 
the University and the Ministry. But, of course, that support can be vari-
ously enhanced. Both the existing support and the means for enhancing 
support emanate from every area and discipline of Academic Research and 
are engrained in the existing scholarly practices of all areas and disciplines.  
I will try to exemplify this with regard to the specific area that this 
debate is particularly interested in: literary research, produced by profes-
sors in the University. This is often considered to be the most remote 
from Corporate Research, including by literary researchers and the Univer-
sity and Ministry themselves (by their leaders). The discussion that follows 
would consider the role played in the above processes by even such 
conventional scholarly practices as close reading, literary interpretation, 
and literary evaluation.   
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21. Privatisation Notes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fabio Akcelrud Durão 
 
We are dealing here with the process of privatising the public University, 
its transformation from an institution that should follow the disinterested 
pursuit of knowledge to one that must generate profits, regardless of how 
these are distributed. The culminating point of this process is the research 
carried out within those giant firms we call multinational corporations, 
which lack transparency and are not accountable to anybody, at least in 
their scientific policies if not in their results. Monsanto could be an exam-
ple, and, interestingly enough, the dangers of this utter privatisation of 
knowledge and research has been functioning as one of the main plot 
motivations for science fiction. So, from one point of view, our whole 
discussion is already misplaced, because the University has been sup-
planted by companies as the place where knowledge is produced. But, 
looking at things more closely, it is possible to argue that the University 
cannot be simply done with, that for scientific breakthroughs to happen 
public money has to be invested in basic and long-term research. Private 
capital cannot venture to spend huge amounts of money in uncertain 
projects or projects whose returns lie too far ahead. Without NASA, there 
would be no serious space research. The fact that the University is at the 
same time dispensable and indispensable shows how we are in a cross-
roads situation. 
The level of abstraction that Alexander is using in these observations 
on Corporate and Academic Research, speaking of the University as a 
whole and from above, is one at which government policies are most 
directly discernible and thus most visible in the public arena. Here then, 
we are entering the field of broader politics. It would be interesting to see 
how this bears specifically upon literary research, for I suppose that the 
privatisation and commodification of knowledge does not leave too much 
space for literature. In a fully entrepreneurial University there is no way 
literary studies could compete with, say, TV series studies, which could be 
articulated with the making of such series themselves or at least with their 
marketing departments. 
Alexander’s observations on Corporate and Academic Research seem 
to me well reasoned out. But if their logic is close to flawless, this is 
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because their premises are problematic. Several ideas mentioned are 
assumptions that in differing degrees have gained currency in the ongoing 
debate on the role and mission of the University. Take, for instance, the 
notion that University institutions should be competing among them-
selves. This can only make sense if they are conceived as companies; from 
the inherent logic of research, it is counterproductive. That is not to 
mention the nice contradiction in entrepreneurial University institutions 
between an obsession with rankings and drives for collaboration. When 
given free play, competition knows no boundaries and one can easily 
imagine it taking hold of disputes among now opposing areas, depart-
ments, and professors in the same unit. Naturally, competition will also 
spill over into the student body, rendering academic life pretty much 
unbearable. The same holds for merchandise strategies, investment 
consulting, etc. In sum, like the morbid swelling of University manage-
ment, the issues addressed by Corporate Research are themselves ills of a 
corporate world. 
Needless to say, the more corporate the world becomes, the more 
Corporate Research will find room to act. It would not be hard to imagine 
a situation in which private firms are brought to collaborate with profes-
sors in fields in which the University acknowledges its weakness. The limit 
of such dynamics would be a hollowing out of the faculty, with a mini-
mum number of appointed professors and a multitude of private 
contractors. On second thoughts, that is what is already happening now 
with the decrease of tenured positions and the soaring number of adjunct 
instructors.  
Ultimately, neoliberal praise of private research as inherently beneficial 
normally fails to acknowledge that large-scale, risky endeavours are as a 
rule carried out by the government. The private sector does not dispose of 
the funds, nor is it capable of assuming the risks of research that, precisely 
because it may fail, can also open new horizons. In this sense, Academic 
Research is primary and Corporate Research secondary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 91 
 
22. Which History?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suman Gupta 
 
In a way, Alexander’s observations on Corporate Research Providers and 
the University are turning our understanding of the institutional and pro-
fessional practice of research on its head.  
By beginning with a quotation from Derrida’s essay on the conflict of 
faculties (in II.18, “Away From the Monopolistic University”), Alexander 
reminds us that our sense of research is firmly embedded in a historicist 
perspective of the University. That is what Derrida drew upon (and we 
normally draw upon): looking to the history of the University to delineate 
the present condition of the University – and so for the pursuit of research 
therein. Then Alexander makes an interesting move; he puts this glimpse 
of the history of the University firmly aside and focuses instead on a kind 
of research that happens outside the University and yet bears upon it, 
informs its functioning and life, as it were. And he calls it Corporate 
Research, separating it from the Academic Research which still happens 
mainly in the University. In Alexander’s account, the Corporate Research 
Provider has no history and Corporate Research no historical develop-
ment, these just synchronously are: they are set firmly in an institutional 
apparatus and textual form and entrepreneurial purpose that seemingly 
have no past worth evoking. Then Alexander makes a further interesting 
move: he approaches Academic Research through Corporate Research, as if 
they have a mutually describable relation. Or even, as if Academic 
Research should be understood in a conditional and similarly synchronous 
way after Corporate Research. In that move the history of the University 
and of research therein is wiped away, and with it our received notion of 
how to understand the institutional and professional practice of research. 
The University and the Corporate Research Provider are placed on a level 
playing field – an entrepreneurial arena unencumbered by history – and 
Corporate and Academic Research are complementarily and collabora-
tively pursued for the pure future of enterprise.  
How then can we engage with these moves given that we are suddenly 
being obliged to look at our universe from a lopsided perspective? Our 
historicist perspective of research in the University and Alexander’s 
ahistoricist focus on transactions between Academic Research and 
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Corporate Research (the University and the Corporate Research Provider) 
apparently have no meeting point, ever moving away along different axes.   
We could engage with Alexander’s perspective uncompromisingly; en-
gagement does not necessarily involve compromising. We could extend 
our historicist perspective to demonstrate where this ahistorical perspec-
tive is glossing over questionable ideological subscriptions, blurring social 
implications and inequities, shrouding ‘long-term’ management strategies, 
managing ethical qualms. The longer view of history clarifies the present in 
a way that purposive synchronic rationalisations cannot; causes and conse-
quences become apparent and are evidenced in historicising, often at odds 
with synchronic rationalisation. The historicist critique of ahistorical 
entrepreneurial reasoning is well-traversed ground. If Alexander’s kind of 
reasoning is now critically appraised as neoliberal in character, the critical 
verve in recognising neoliberalism – in naming ‘neoliberalism’ itself – has 
much to do with uncompromising historicisation of entrepreneurial 
politics, practices, calculations and language, from Foucault’s (2008 [2004]) 
1978 lectures and onwards (a constant attack of historical tracings). And 
that has often come with direct interrogation of the ahistoricism of 
neoliberal academia, or that part of academia which both constructs and 
serves neoliberalism without using the term ‘neoliberal.’ The term ‘neolib-
eral’ is always already recruited by critical historians or intellectuals 
informed of history, who doubt the claims they identify as ‘neoliberal’ – 
confer on what is named ‘neoliberal’ an expansive and coherent agenda, 
confirmed by a historicist perspective, which cannot but be condemned 
and opposed. I am reminded particularly of Philip Mirowski’s (2013) 
observations on ‘the exile of history and philosophy from any place within 
the contemporary academic economic orthodoxy’ (165-6) after the 1970s 
– a prevailing orthodoxy because such economics serves the dominance of 
neoliberalism or serves to make neoliberalism dominant. Mirowski’s own 
reading of neoliberalism, an uncompromisingly bitter one, starts with the 
wry observation that a ‘certain modicum of intellectual history is 
indispensable’ (37) and continues throughout in a historicist vein.                  
We could, then, engage with Alexander’s account of Corporate 
Research and the Corporate Research Provider by going against its 
synchronous grain, by historicising them as the University and research 
therein are inevitably historicised in our minds. Perhaps we could start 
with monastic orders and trade guilds making transactions of knowledge 
for patronage, protection or pecuniary advantages … investing in the 
establishment of University institutions and the equivalent in different 
periods of Corporate Research Provider firms … drawing a continuous 
historical trace from there towards, eventually, the current neoliberal 
knowledge system. I have not come across such a historical account yet.  
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However, I suspect that such an account would necessarily draw atten-
tion to some fissures in the conventions of historical accounting, and 
those would also need to be addressed simultaneously. History in principle 
addresses a continuum that is as complex as life, and the practice of 
historical research involves measures to deal with and focus the excess of 
what is addressed as historical. In saying this I am treading gingerly on the 
slippery ground of theories of history and historiography. That ground 
largely involves mediations between ‘history as something’ (history as 
philology, science, philosophy, sociology, etc.) and ‘history of something’ 
(history of nation-states, peoples, periods, ideas. commodities, continents, 
world … history of science, philosophy, economics, politics, etc. … 
history of whatever) and ‘some kind of history’ (political history, economic 
history, cultural history, etc.). The practice of historical research, however, 
continues through all these interstices and continues irrespective of irres-
olution in theory. It continues by making pragmatic choices of what to 
focus on and where to draw the boundary of evidence – at some geopo-
litical limit, according to some specified period, certain ranges of material, 
etc. Pragmatic delimitations can become conventional, so that, say, the 
early-modern cultural history of England becomes a conventionalised 
area-of-research which does not need to constantly justify its delimited 
boundaries. However, pragmatic delimitations, especially where conven-
tionalised, often turn out to be neither as pragmatic and nor as strength-
ened by convention as they might seem. A great deal of historicising has 
been devoted to questioning the implicit ideological implications of setting 
limits. Historians have often treated pragmatic limits as a kind of political 
unconscious or political mendacity, and redrawn the boundaries of histori-
cal research practice. Thus: working-class history, history from below, 
subaltern history, postcolonial history, women’s history, environmental 
history and so on.     
These obviously sketchy observations are offered merely to draw 
attention to some gaps in our historicist understanding when we turn 
critically upon Alexander’s kind of synchronous and ahistorical reasoning. 
Critical engagement with that ahistoricism entails critical engagement with 
the gaps in our historicism. It calls for analysis of the political unconscious 
(or mendacity) that underpins those gaps. Thus, to launch my historicist 
critique of the ahistorical entrepreneurial rationale I try to locate myself, as 
a literary researcher, amidst the existing histories I am aware of or should 
inform myself of. I think of relevant political, cultural and economic 
histories (within some boundary I am familiar with, say British or Euro-
pean); the history of the University; the history of an academic discipline 
(within some boundary I can focus on, say the institutional history of 
English literature); the kind of history that bears obviously upon my 
research experience (say, English literary history). The first of those bears 
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upon all the others to some degree, but in irregular ways; the history of the 
University impinges on the institutional history of English literature to 
some degree (to a remarkably limited degree); neither the history of the 
University nor the institutional history of English literature seem to feature 
particularly in what is considered English literary history at present.   
For my critique of the ahistoricist entrepreneurial rationale, which 
history provides a sound grounding? I can make some pragmatic choices. 
Are those pragmatic choices not led by ideological advocacy or expressive 
of a political unconscious, just as Alexander’s ahistoricist rationale is? Is 
my historicist rationale then stronger or weaker than Alexander’s ahistori-
cist rationale?   
For the last question: I am convinced it is stronger.       
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23. Neoliberal Temporality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fabio Akcelrud Durão 
 
The claim that neoliberal thinking is incompatible with historical thinking, 
with the becoming of things, seems to me to be structural. If things can 
change then there is room for imagining better conditions, which is exactly 
what neoliberalism has to block. Alexander’s is a peculiar position, for he 
wants to argue that a profit-motivated society is good for everyone 
(anyone who is not a boss will quickly smell diddling here), while most 
neoliberal measures, like austerity ones, can only be justified through the 
‘there is no other way’ argument. Neoliberal temporality is thus a curious 
one, for if it represses the past, it incessantly appeals to the future: ‘policies 
are tough now, but this is to get rid of anomalies and to put the economy 
in order; after this is carried out, prosperity will come to all.’ The curious 
logical knot is that, once prosperity has not come and misery just 
increased, neoliberals blame the remnants of that which has not been 
neoliberalised for the systemic failure more ferociously than before. An 
interesting thought experiment would be this: suppose that a given people 
realised how this failed logic has worked and sought to finally prove the 
neoliberals wrong. Such people would let the latter adapt the economy 
totally to neoliberal principles, deregulating up to the last crumb of social 
life. Then, after just a couple of decades, one perceives the aberration the 
world has become, where a handful of people are incredibly rich, while 
99% of the population are utterly impoverished. As one perceives that, 
one turns to the Neoliberal and says, ‘See, weren’t we right from the 
beginning; your theory doesn’t work.’ He replies, ‘But that’s how things 
are. Nobody believes in prosperity for all, your near-slavery is the natural 
state of things and there is nothing that you can do about it.’  
Concerning the University as a result of a historical process, I like to 
think of the emergence of the possibility in considering certain ideas, however 
unrealised they may seem, as historically decisive. The University as a 
really free and autonomous realm may never have existed, but the possi-
bility of imagining it was only available at certain junctures: it emerged at a 
particular historical point, and it may very well be in the process of 
disappearing. As long as one can have this representation, it can still work 
as a normative horizon. In sum, I take ideas to be, not fanciful or 
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whimsical entities that might as well be forgotten, but things that exist and 
could be actualised. 
 
Alexander Search 
  
I think the jury is still out on some of the points you are making about the 
harm done by entrepreneurialism (what you call ‘neoliberalism,’ as if it 
were an expletive). Your main concern is about growing inequality, the 
growing concentration of wealth at the top and uneven distribution. 
Thomas Piketty’s (2013) synthesis of a wide range of data, across both 
time and space, appears to support this. While inequality in itself might 
cause resentment and disaffection, that does not necessarily mean that 
liberal capitalism has not pushed economies for the greater good. The 
point to focus on is the bottom line. Putting aside impoverishment gener-
ated by violent conflict, natural disasters and authoritarian miscalculations, 
the question is: is the poorest stratum in a liberal capitalist context now as 
poor as the poorest stratum, say, at the beginning or middle of the 
twentieth century? If average indicators of basic protections and securities 
were considered, have those improved over those periods? In most 
instances where liberal capitalism has had more or less regulated play, the 
answers favour entrepreneurial systems in a stable political order. Many 
who would be offended if labelled neoliberals, like neo-Keynesian Paul 
Krugman, have often pointed this out. 
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24. The Entrepreneurial Literary Researcher  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alexander Search 
 
Literature makes money. This is demonstrated in various Corporate Re-
search Reports in the UK. Creative Blueprint’s The Literature Blueprint 
(2010) has been much cited in this regard, trademarked by the organisation 
Creative & Cultural Skills, which has various licenses from different bits of 
the UK Ministry and agreements with businesses to do good for skills 
development and creative industries. This and other such evidence of how 
literature makes money (and how much money) is usefully outlined by 
Rick Rylance in Literature and the Public Good (2016: 90-105). Rylance should 
know because he is an academic leader and literature professor, with much 
experience of being boss of some bits of the UK Ministry’s research 
funding agencies (see IV.2, “The Invisible Literary Researcher,” for some 
observations on Rylance’s book).  
The literary researcher who works for the public good by generating 
benefits and, relatedly, profits naturally needs to contribute to the various 
corporations and initiatives through which literature makes money. These 
corporations and initiatives work in sectors which are well known (detailed 
in the above-mentioned texts), largely captured under the umbrella term 
‘creative industries.’ Those include, obviously, literary publishing (fiction 
etc., not scholarly publishing, to which III below is devoted), heritage and 
tourism (e.g. museums, festivals), media and performance (e.g. theatre, 
audio-visual renderings), advertising and public relations. Apart from the 
‘cultural industries,’ there are corporate bodies in the education and skills-
training industry, a sector unto itself serving numerous other sectors – big 
business in which literature plays a significant and varied part.  
But how should the entrepreneurial literary researcher contribute to 
these?  
It might appear that the entrepreneurial literary researcher should 
direct what she does by way of Academic Research more obviously 
towards supporting Corporate Research. Perhaps she should even emulate 
the forms and discourses of Corporate Research, gradually nudging schol-
arly journal papers and research monographs towards the form of the 
Corporate Research Report. This has evidently proved an enticing idea, 
and a kind of seepage of entrepreneurial discourses, styles, and forms in 
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even scholarly literary monographs and papers is now frequently found. 
However, conversely, a conventional literary resistance to talking about 
money in anything other than denunciatory or ironic tones is still not 
uncommon. Rylance (2013) speaks of this attitude too, and argues that it is 
perfectly okay for litterateurs to be both opposed to entrepreneurialism and 
to be entrepreneurial at the same time – both serve the public good 
together, analogous to the inextricable relationship between benefits and 
profits.    
However, if nudging Academic Research towards supporting Corpo-
rate Research were to portend the gradual dilution and eventual disappear-
ance of Academic Research, that would definitely not do. Corporate 
Research would then suffer in the long run. As shown in II.20, “Corporate 
Research and Academic Research,” in various ways Corporate Research 
draws upon and depends on Academic Research. For Corporate Research 
to flourish and stoke profit making on behalf of Corporate Research 
Providers and the corporations which commission them, Academic 
Research needs to proliferate. It is necessary for a constant flow of 
Academic Research to be cheaply if not entirely freely – and preferably 
freely – available so as to maximise the profits from Corporate Research. 
And it needs to be stringently academic, narrowly consumed within schol-
arly circles even if freely available, so that the Corporate Research 
Provider’s mediations from Academic Research to Corporate Research 
stays necessary, sustainable and authoritative. Corporate Research Provid-
ers do not want Academic Researchers to produce Corporate Research 
outputs in the University. If they wanted some Academic Researcher to do 
that they could directly contract their services for a while themselves (as a 
consultant, as an advisor, etc.). Corporate Research and Academic Re-
search should maintain their identities as such, while drawing upon each 
other for generating profits (more for the former) and benefits (more by 
the latter).  
What goes for the Academic Researcher in general goes for the literary 
researcher specifically with regard to, for instance, the sectors of cultural 
industries and education/skills-training industries mentioned above.  
The best way for Corporate Researchers and Academic Researchers to 
work is cooperatively or collaboratively without losing their identities and 
the specific characteristics of their distinct kinds of research. Luckily 
academic leaders in the University and bureaucrats in the Ministry know 
this well, and have set up numerous mechanisms to enable business-
academic partnerships (such as, under the rubric of ‘knowledge transfer’ or 
‘knowledge exchange’ collaborations). These are largely operationalised 
through funding regimes for research. The argument here is a straightfor-
ward one: Corporate Research draws upon Academic Research to provide 
secure and independent, corporation- or sector-specific, easily consumable 
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knowledge for profit making; Academic Research feeds Corporate Re-
search by producing easily accessed, broad based, but specialist (difficult) 
knowledge which is expected to generate benefits. One of the benefits that 
the latter generates is for the former’s profit. What is really necessary is a 
mechanism for smooth and informed and effective translation of 
Academic Research into Corporate Research. That is best achieved by 
arranging functional collaborations between Corporate and Academic 
Researchers. Such collaborations are best conceived as temporary, so that 
Corporate and Academic Researchers do not lose their identities and can 
revert to their normal research practices once the translational function is 
served.  
Thus, the scholarly practices and conventions of Academic Research 
need to be maintained to enable the maximisation of Corporate Research. 
Insofar as that applies to literary research, practices and conventions 
which seem most resolutely remote from entrepreneurial considerations – 
from the thrust of Corporate Research – are, in fact, admirably useful for 
the kind of collaboration and translation outlined here. These literary 
scholarly practices and conventions help maintain the integrity of 
Academic Researchers, while remaining open to collaboration with the 
Corporate Researchers who are commissioned, particularly, by corpora-
tions in the above-named sectors.     
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25. Literary Close Reading 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alexander Search 
 
One of the defining features of a literary researcher is conviction in the 
practice of close reading. This conviction is variously useful in collabora-
tions between literary researchers and Corporate Researchers working for 
corporations which make profits from literature, such as the ‘creative 
industries’ named above. Close reading is far from being the only convic-
tion that defines the literary researcher as such, but it is a useful point to 
begin from before addressing other such convictions.  
There is something mystical and ahistorical about literary close reading. 
Close reading could be thought of as a method, a sort of preparatory step 
towards interpretation or interpretive analysis, and yet it is difficult to 
define. Loosely, it consists in unhurried and attentive reading, noting the 
relationship between expression and content, identifying received and 
unorthodox features (linguistic or textual), clarifying the relationship of 
each part of the text to other parts and to the whole text. Close reading 
does not necessarily yield an interpretation in itself but disposes the text 
towards being interpreted. It involves drawing upon precepts of stylistics 
and form and context so that a cohesive interpretation of the text, and 
often some sort of normative assessment, becomes possible. And yet, as a 
method the parameters of close reading are somewhat fluid. It is difficult 
to be prescriptive about how detailed the process of close reading should 
be, and precisely what precepts should be brought to bear. Moreover, it is 
not expected that close reading will lead to definitive or final interpreta-
tions; rather, it is largely accepted that each close reading and re-reading 
could yield different interpretations or modify the existing, and thus there 
is no final close reading or final interpretation for any text. The horizon of 
an exhaustive close reading was suggested between Roman Jakobson and 
Claude Lévi-Strauss’s detailed analysis of Baudelaire’s “Les Chats”, 1962 
(in Jakobson 1987), and Michael Riffaterre’s (1966) idea of a ‘super-reader’ 
in response, and in a limited way appears in computer-generated text-
corpus analysis of a given oeuvre – but literary scholars tend to be scepti-
cal of these.   
Close reading, then, does not lend itself to being conveyed as a text-
book method, as consisting in applying well-defined tools or engaging 
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with clearly prescribed processes. Close reading works as practice and is 
conveyed in practice. That is, close reading is inculcated by demonstration 
and exemplification, and is recognised in and tested through the doing of 
close reading. Instead of a methodological bridge that is crossed at some 
point of being trained in literary studies, it works as an initiation process 
which brings a student into literary studies and then continues to be exer-
cised (reconfirmed) through the literary researcher’s and teacher’s career. 
To announce one’s credentials as professing literature is to claim that one 
is able to do close reading and has done close reading of texts. It is regarded 
as so obvious a grounding for literary scholarship that it scarcely needs to 
be mentioned; anyone who professes literature as her scholarly discipline 
must already have close reading at her fingertips. Any scholarship of liter-
ature that is utterly divorced from close reading is considered not quite 
literary (perhaps in the area of ‘sociology of literature’ or ‘history of 
literature’ or something tangential like that).    
Occasionally, close reading has been conceived as having a purpose 
that is larger than simply understanding a given text or set of texts 
thoroughly, and even, at times, larger than strictly literary scholarship itself. 
In philological text analysis, for instance, particularly close attention to the 
grammatical nuances of language usage in relation to the ideational 
content of texts was expected to give insights into the essence of specific 
cultures (national or linguistic cultures) and culture in general (Suman 
discusses this in Gupta 2015). Structuralist and post-structuralist theorists 
have undertaken close reading to either demonstrate how fundamental 
semiological principles function or to demonstrate the fluid contruct-
edness (often ideologically laden) of social texts and discourses – including 
the literary, whether approached in formalist or historicist terms (see 
Lentricchia and Dubois eds. 2003). In more down-to-earth ways, the 
notion that close reading of texts would reveal an underpinning or 
submerged reality of some sort has a strong purchase, such as, revealing 
something about the author’s or reader’s psyche, the Zeitgeist a text derived 
from and expressed, the complexity of life-worlds from which a text 
surfaces, the essential textness of texts, the pleasure of reading, the fine 
points of taste or judgement. However, by and large, none of these 
purposes are specifically needed to justify or validate the practice of 
literary close reading. At various points, those who are convinced of close 
reading have disavowed each of those larger purposes. Conviction in close 
reading is seemingly self-sustaining; it is inculcated and perpetuated 
through the doing of close reading and maintained by a preconceived 
demand for close reading among literary researchers.  
Literary close reading is not really understood by differentiating it from 
other kinds of reading. There is no agreed answer to questions like: how 
close should close reading be?; is quick reading incompatible with close 
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reading?; can careful lay reading be close reading in a scholarly sense?; how 
should we differentiate between superficial and close reading?. These do 
not need agreed answers because the literary researcher already knows the 
answers. She can recognise close reading as such by being able to do it in 
practice.  
Occasionally (still rarely), literary close reading has been questioned in 
terms of other kinds of reading. Concepts of ‘distant reading,’ ‘sympto-
matic reading,’ ‘surface reading,’ reading amidst the everyday or reading 
casually seem to head in that direction (see Moretti 2013; Middleton 2006; 
several essays in Representations 108:1, Fall 2009, especially by Best and 
Marcus 2009) – but without quite leaving close reading behind. Such 
questioning of close reading is from the position of being first immersed 
in the practice, and then building upon or painfully articulating doubts 
about owned conviction. The impetus for such questioning seems to be 
pushed by pressures that can barely be borne and yet must be engaged at 
some level. Those include the pressure of having to reckon with the 
global/world scope of literature, and so losing conviction in comfortable 
pigeon-holing according to language and nation; the pressure of a digital 
environment where texts are implicitly unstable, provisional, cross-
connected, excessively produced (some e-literature authors deliberately put 
out multimodal literary texts which cannot be closely read because they 
change constantly).   
Questioning of literary close reading thus, at best, considers the limits 
of close reading by positing its opposite (distant, superficial, surface, casual, 
lay reading). The opposite is conceived from the self-evident normativeness 
of close reading. A more heretical possibility, from a literary researcher’s 
perspective, has seldom been carefully considered: that literary close read-
ing could be understood in terms of other kinds of close reading. Close 
reading is actually quite common amongst those who profess some disci-
pline outside the literary, and, more widely, some area outside academia (as 
professionals). So, lawyers read law-books and their briefs very closely, 
weighing each word; political journalists read speeches and transcripts 
carefully, looking for what is between the lines; managers and bureaucrats 
are attentive to the minute implications of policy reports; publicists are 
careful to note the fine details of market profiles. It seems possible that 
the method and practice of close reading involved in the latter are 
substantially the same as those brought by literary researchers to texts.  
Somewhat tentatively, it seems to me that there are two noteworthy 
differences between literary close reading and the other sorts of profes-
sional close reading mentioned above. First, by focusing on conviction in 
close reading as such, literary researchers render literary close reading 
opaque – a practice that draws attention to itself. Literary close reading 
thus seems relatively indifferent to a clearly articulated purpose or seems 
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able to accommodate a range of purposes according to pragmatics or taste. 
Other sorts of professional close reading do not dwell upon close reading 
in itself. Their close reading seems to be transparent, a practical pathway 
which is traversed in consensual steps or is routinized as the application of 
well-defined reading strategies. This kind of close reading then seems 
obviously purposive: for winning the legal case, or arousing the news-
consuming public, or manoeuvring corporate interests. Second, literary 
close reading selects the kind of text it engages with, putatively because the 
chosen text displays certain qualities. Perhaps the literariness of the text 
invites the close reading of the literary researcher, or possibly the literary 
researcher’s close reading brings out the literariness of the text – it is diffi-
cult to tell. Somewhere between the practice of close reading and the kind 
of text that is closely read the quality of literariness becomes manifest, 
always provisionally. Other professional close readers attend to whatever 
text can feed their extra-textual purpose, rather than select texts for their 
putatively ingrained qualities. The kind of texts they read is not described 
by textual features but by amenability to a professional purpose.     
Conviction in literary close reading as described above then allows for 
a convergence of mutually confirmatory propositions which, to a signifi-
cant extent, confirm the literariness of literary research and the profession 
of literary research. The literary researcher reads texts closely in a way that 
no lay reader does (lay readers read casually, superficially, in unanalytical 
ways, amidst everyday life). This particular and unusual practice of literary 
close reading confers a sort of professional (expert) authority and distinc-
tiveness on literary researchers. The literary researcher’s close attention to 
a text endows a quality of literariness on that text; at the same time, a text 
is closely read because it is seemingly already literary. The literary re-
searcher’s close reading is different from other kinds of professional close 
reading because it is a deliberate – deliberatively opaque – practice, and its 
extra-textual purpose is indeterminate. The literary researcher is such 
because she is initiated into close reading through practice and is 
recognised as a practitioner of close reading by other practitioners. To 
achieve this status the literary researcher does not need recourse to rig-
orous definitions and methodological prescriptions. Close reading both 
draws upon analytical precepts and opens the way to interpretive analysis. 
However, the practice of close reading does not lead to any final or 
confirmed interpretation of a text or fulfil any consensually pre-agreed 
purpose.     
This nexus of mutually confirmatory propositions, held together by 
conviction among literary researchers, is very useful from an entrepre-
neurial perspective.  
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26. Profitable Close Reading      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alexander Search 
 
Since literary close reading is grounded in practice, and conviction in close 
reading is maintained accordingly, the scholarly authority that is exercised 
by reading literary texts closely has a rather contained purchase. The 
purposes and benefits of close reading are not easily articulated for those 
who are not within literary studies. So, it might seem somewhat absurd to 
a Minister of Human Resources or to a plumber that a professor spent 30 
years doing research on Finnegans Wake, though it seems reasonable 
enough to any Joycean researcher. This circumstance means that the 
scholarly authority obtained through literary close reading needs institu-
tional or corporate backing to be publicly discernible, in the form of a 
University affiliation or a publication profile or media notice (preferably all 
of those together in mutually confirming ways). This is unlike the scholarly 
authority conferred by being adept in the well-defined methods of applied 
research (e.g. the methods for investigating Human Resourcing policies or 
water-works engineering technologies).  
In collaborations between literary researchers and corporations profit-
ing from literature (and their Corporate Researchers), the advantages of 
institutionally confirmed but somewhat opaque literary scholarly authority 
(say, based on close reading) is constantly found. It appears as expertise 
which is untrammelled by specific entrepreneurial interests because it 
works somewhat opaquely through practice. And yet it is believable schol-
arly authority because it is recognised by institutional status, confirmed in 
advance by the University, Ministry and corporations. Thus, there is a clear 
boundary drawn between Academic Research (disinterested) and Corpo-
rate Research (interested). At the same time, when needed the disinter-
ested expertise arising from such Academic Research can be used to 
variously endorse, promote, and support entrepreneurial activities and 
marketable products as being beneficial for everyone. Corporate Research 
Providers can then give advice on which authorising literary researcher is 
best placed to do this and how. The University and Ministry can 
wholeheartedly support this circle for their own entrepreneurial interests.  
At the most superficial level, this circle of enterprise, ultimately grou-
nded in scholarly practices such as literary close reading, is found when 
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literary researchers make public appearances as ‘specialists’ or ‘leading 
authorities’ or ‘experts’ (which have a different ring from ‘scholars’ or 
‘researchers’). Having spent 30 years closely reading Finnegans Wake, the 
Professor of Joyce Studies attached to some Prestigious University has a 
useful entrepreneurial function as a disinterested ‘leading authority.’ She 
can be called upon to assess new proposals and endorse new academic 
publications by scholarly publishers. Or, she could help prod readers’ 
interest in the latest edition of anything by Joyce, or anything canonically 
modernist put out by general-interest publishers. Some corporation offer-
ing a literary prize could justifiably put her on the jury. On Bloomsday a 
media firm may ask her to give an ‘expert’ comment for the latest news 
broadcast. She may also appear as a commentator for that corporation’s 
film productions. She could be put on a research funding body’s panel of 
experts. She may say a few words in the Irish Literature Festival, which 
cultured persons would pay to attend. She may even become the voice of 
literature itself or of culture itself – a celebrity intellectual – if she has good 
connections. Her Prestigious University will help her to cultivate those 
connections and entrepreneurial opportunities. The University will make 
sure she features on their ‘experts’ website so that Corporate Researchers 
of various sorts do not miss her when they need her.   
None of this has a particularly direct relationship with the close 
readings of Finnegans Wake which established her scholarly authority. And 
yet they all do have something to do with that.  
But, that is at a superficial level. In II.24, “The Entrepreneurial Literary 
Researcher,” I noted that Academic and Corporate Researchers work best 
in collaboration; and before that, in II.20, “Corporate Research and 
Academic Research,” I maintained that Corporate Research draws upon 
Academic Research in necessary and definite ways. These are not mutually 
exclusive kinds of research and nor can one replace the other, but they are 
still distinct. In II.25, “Literary Close Reading,” I also observed that 
literary close reading is not too different from other kinds of professional 
close reading (such as that done by lawyers, journalists, bureaucrats, etc.). 
The difference is mainly that the latter kind of close reading is obviously 
purposive (to win the case, to report effectively, to implement policy, etc.), 
whereas literary close reading is a comparatively opaque and self-sustaining 
practice. Put all that together and it is evident that collaboration between 
Corporate Researchers and Academic Researchers concerning literary 
enterprise could profitably be a matter of translating literary close reading 
towards the purposive ends of professional close reading. This kind of 
translating could mean extrapolating those insights of literary close reading 
which could be directed towards entrepreneurial ends. That also means 
neglecting those which cannot, but those might come in handy for some 
other enterprise. Collaboration could also involve crystallising rather than 
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selecting, obtaining a gist or thrust from literary close reading which could 
serve an entrepreneurial end. Whatever is muted in that process still carries 
the silent weight of scholarly authority within what is foregrounded, as 
‘confirmed by experts.’  
For instance, consider a Corporate Research Provider that is often 
commissioned by various cultural tourism firms in Ireland. To facilitate 
addressing this kind of commission, the Corporate Research Provider may 
partner with an Academic Research Group in the Prestigious University, 
headed perhaps by a Professor of Joyce Studies who has a thorough 
understanding of Finnegans Wake – with a team of close readers of, say, 
works by W.B. Yeats, Samuel Beckett and other canonical authors. The 
Corporate Research Provider and the Academic Research Group of the 
Prestigious University can then apply for a publicly funded ‘knowledge 
exchange’ or ‘academy-business partnership’ or ‘cultural enterprise’ grant 
offered by the Ministry. On successfully receiving this grant, the collabo-
ration could consist in the Corporate and Academic Researchers turning 
literary close readings of texts into site-maps of literary significance and 
heritage interest, and gauging typical or publicly resonant readings of Irish 
literary classics and evolving schemes for arousing public awareness of 
these texts. For the Academic Research Group of the Prestigious Univer-
sity this would lead to useful scholarly papers for the benefit of all, and 
also contribute to the ‘expert’ profiles of the Professor of Joyce Studies 
and her colleagues. For the Corporate Research Provider, those site-maps 
and readership data and public awareness schemes could be drawn upon 
to feed Corporate Research Reports. Most immediately, they could inform 
Corporate Research Reports for commissions from the usual cultural 
tourism firms. With some retargeting, that material could also inform Cor-
porate Research Reports for commissioning parties like publishers seeking 
market profiles, municipal councils considering city regeneration plans, 
galleries and museums contemplating widening their operations, publicity 
departments looking for branding innovations and the like. The Corporate 
Research Provider may even use that research to fulfil a commission from 
the Prestigious University it partnered with for the above project. Perhaps 
the Prestigious University would consider opening an Irish Literary 
Heritage Institute (with the Professor of Joyce Studies as Director) and 
would need some Corporate Research done into its commercial potential. 
At the base of this cycle lies that collaborative exercise mediating 
between literary close reading and professional close reading.  
The synergies that exist between literary and professional close reading 
actually gesture towards a deeper level of intimacy between them. They 
gesture towards the most directly profitable (at least the most commer-
cially exploitable) function of the University itself: teaching and learning, 
especially with employability and skills training in mind.   
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Close reading is a transferrable skill which can be used purposively in a 
large number of professional areas, but is not purposive in itself. It is one 
of the functions of Corporate Researchers to determine how precisely it 
could be made purposive for a particular venture or operation; and it is the 
one of the functions of literary scholars in the University to inculcate this 
skill in students through practice on literary texts. By focusing on literary 
texts, which are not evidently purposive in a professional sense, it is possi-
ble to inculcate the skill of close reading in terms of its general norms and 
principles. Once acquired through this practice, it becomes a skill that can 
be directed – through some additional sector-specific training – towards 
purposive employment in various corporations (towards employment for 
legal, administrative, publicity, etc. purposes). It is a key skill for a wide 
range of white-collar jobs, and the more the skill is mastered the more it 
enhances movement along career pathways. It lays the foundations of 
work for a wide swathe of the literate, technocratic and corporate political 
economy of the present.   
I have noted Suman’s and Fabio’s occasional misgivings about my 
alleged ahistroicism above. Here is a point where the historical back-
ground to what I am talking about is germane. The history of literary 
scholarship and the practice of close reading are rooted throughout in the 
cultivation of skills for purposive ends. The pedagogic practice of close 
reading in literary studies now is akin to and derives from the study of 
rhetoric, oratory and composition through different historical stages of 
higher education. Rhetoric, or knowledge of the skills of persuasion, was 
from its inception a purposive matter. It was designed for skills training of 
the main influencers of different periods of history. I am reminded of 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric as a pioneering systematising of the field. Its organisa-
tion of the study of rhetoric into three sorts (political, forensic and 
ceremonial oratory, Book 1, 3) clearly served the purpose of skills training 
for politicians, lawyers and judges, and other professionals of the time. 
Incidentally, Aristotle was perfectly clear that profits are good and based 
on private wealth, which ‘is “our own” … in our power to dispose of it or 
keep it’ – ‘Doing good refers either to the preservation of life and the 
means of life, or to wealth, or to some other of the good things which are 
hard to get…’ (Aristotle 2012, Book 1, 5:137). The use of Classical texts so 
that elite professionals-in-the-making could practice rhetoric, oratory and 
composition till the nineteenth century in Europe, and the gradual 
merging of those into modern literary studies and close reading to 
concordantly skills train increasingly literate populations amidst changing 
politico-economic arrangements worldwide, is intensively studied ground. 
This is especially cogently traced in histories of English literary study in 
the North American University, where foundational training in rhetoric, 
oratory and composition explicitly led into literary study and close reading 
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till very recently, and in some respects still does (e.g. Miller 2010, 
Winterowd 1998, Kitzhaber 1990, Berlin 1984). The current practice of 
close reading in literary pedagogy has the same skills-training function as 
rhetoric, oratory and composition had till the nineteenth century through 
the study of Classics – for the demography and politico-economic order of 
today.  
But how does the close reading of literary researchers contribute to such 
skills training in University pedagogic programmes? How does research 
contribute to entrepreneurial pedagogy in the University? The literary 
researcher’s job is to keep close reading constantly renewed, updated, and 
contextually relevant in ongoing practice. Thereby, pedagogic programmes 
for skills training in close reading can continue to be provided with 
renewed currency and authoritative scholarly backing. This sort of close 
reading has to be in practice and about practice, conveyed by being done, so 
that students and teachers of every generation would need to meet in the 
University – before those students proceed to becoming white-collar 
workers and perhaps future leaders. If the techniques and principles of this 
skill were articulated too clearly, were externalised in formulaic or 
prescriptive ways, then the commercial viability and efficacy of pedagogic 
literature programmes in the University would suffer. That would also 
make close reading itself less than it is and the skill itself would stultify 
quickly. Literary close reading works within the hands-on undertaking of 
research and pedagogy.  
 
Fabio Akcelrud Durão 
 
When Alexander says: ‘Other sorts of professional close reading do not 
dwell upon close reading in itself. Their close reading seems to be trans-
parent, a practical pathway which is traversed in consensual steps or is 
routinized as the application of well-defined reading strategies’ – he is 
absolutely right. Other professions use close reading as organically 
connected to concrete arguments. Reified literary close reading is a circular, 
tautological practice, because it is supported by the value of the text, which 
works as a ballast. Once it is agreed that a given literary artefact is worthy 
of reverence, any kind of coherence found in it adds to the multiplicity of 
the text (multiplicity itself has become a positive moral value). If the words 
used are abstract, that is because the poem is Platonic; if concrete, they 
express experience.  
When Alexander says: ‘The purposes and benefits of close reading are 
not easily articulated for those who are not within literary studies’ – this 
seems to me to be a narrow, utilitarian view, for close reading may aim at 
disclosing potentialities that are present in language at large. After discov-
ering them, the general reader may acquire a new awareness about 
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language’s density and more-than-communicative character. Also, close 
reading, when not an end in itself, may be the means for acquiring 
knowledge that is interesting in a broad way. Roberto Schwarz’s (2000 
[1977] and 2000 [1990]) reading of Machado de Assis is all based on close 
readings, but it yields a deep sociological and anthropological knowledge 
of Brazil that can easily be extrapolated in the reader’s experience.  
When Alexander says that close reading ‘works somewhat opaquely 
through practice’ – he points to what is interesting about close reading, the 
fact that there is no given set of procedures that will necessarily prove to 
be successful. The choice of the detail to be highlighted must be the 
critic’s responsibility, and a product of her imagination.  
But what most interested me is an idea that is implicit in Alexander’s 
argument: literature is only viable as an entrepreneurial object if it is 
supported by a positive representation of ‘Culture.’ All the examples 
Alexander offered about Joyce can only become believable if literature is 
considered Literature, if it is supposed that as a practice it is endowed with 
value – even if one does not specify what that value stands for. This seems 
to me to be a restrictive trait of literature as an object, that its sellable 
nature cannot appeal to any usefulness apart from this weak and problem-
atic one. 
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27. Blue-Skies Research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dismal Scientist 
  
I have been waiting patiently for Alexander to deal directly with the ques-
tion of what entrepreneurial motivation is found in basic literary research, 
and he seems to be heading in that direction now. I am using ‘basic’ here 
in the sense in which the physical sciences use it when distinguishing 
between basic and applied research (broadly along the lines of I.11, 
“Disinterestedness and Academic Freedom” by Suman). This distinction 
currently has life primarily in the anguished observation that basic research 
is not receiving its rightful share of government research monies as profit-
able applications of science have more appeal to politicians and bureau-
crats.  
Basic researchers in the sciences rightly point out that applications are 
impossible without the fundamental knowledge generated by basic 
research and therefore a concern for applied research should logically 
come with respect for the utility of basic research. But this argument is 
fatally flawed. Entrepreneurial application of basic knowledge can only 
emerge after the basic knowledge is established, and so entrepreneurialism 
cannot motivate basic research. This is why the colloquial term for basic 
research is ‘blue-sky research.’ It has no earthly motivation. Its logical 
precedence to applied research implies it should be somehow resourced, 
but establishes no reason for any specific entrepreneurial agency (public or 
private) to supply its funding. For this reason, the strangled cries for more 
basic research funding draw universal approbation accompanied by very 
little additional funding. 
In II.26 (“Profitable Close Reading”), Alexander initially argues that 
close reading can find entrepreneurial application, but as in the debate 
around basic science research, such arguments establish no reason why 
any specific (actual) entrepreneurial agent should support such blue-sky 
literary research.  
Later in this piece, Alexander argues that the skills developed in blue-
sky close reading are transferable to professional close reading and thus 
have professional application. This may be true, but does not establish the 
entrepreneurial case. One must establish that the learning of close reading 
for professional purposes is better taught with blue-sky objects for close 
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reading than with the more applied professional texts themselves. Further, 
one must establish that specifically new blue-sky close readings are neces-
sary and that existing blue-sky close readings are not sufficient for this 
purpose if they exist.  
In evoking classical education, Alexander argues that blue-sky close 
reading is the modern equivalent of rhetoric, which was regarded in its 
context as unarguably utilitarian in nature. Close reading is, however, more 
analytical than persuasive. It may be argued that blue-sky close reading 
cultivates cultural capital for an elite in the same way that rhetoric did in 
classical educational contexts. But the modern university is, with a few 
exceptions, addressing a mass market. Even existing elite institutions are 
coming to recognise that they cannot afford to continue to squander their 
reputational capital on such restricted elite markets. 
As a real professional economist, I harbour an ideological commitment 
that it is best to supply all good things through the market. I recognise, 
however, that there are a few fields of human endeavour where this has 
not yet been definitively established. That is why I hold such high hopes 
for Alexander and correspondingly wish to hold him to such high 
standards. 
 
Alexander Search 
 
I fear Dismal Scientist has taken the simplistic view that profits from basic 
research should be direct, should be realisable from its own commodity 
form. He is not to blame for this, of course, especially since he is a profes-
sional economist of integrity and does not want to see investment, 
production and returns in different account books – he understandably 
wants to see a calculable relationship between them. Academic and 
corporate leaders fortunately know the advantage of obscuring such 
relations by keeping separate account books, and have the bigger picture 
in view.  
Otherwise, may I refer Dismal Scientist to II.20, “Corporate Research 
and Academic Research”? The dependence of Corporate Research on 
Academic Research is the point, even with regard to a single forcefully 
extrapolated strand of basic research such as literary close reading. The 
investment is made through the work of such basic research by the literary 
researcher; with some purposive redirecting and formalising, the profits 
therefrom accrue to the Corporate Research Provider. They also accrue to 
the University when sieved through entrepreneurial pedagogy. Further, the 
Corporate Research Provider’s direct advice and the University’s skills 
training feed almost the entire gamut of corporate enterprise, and thereby 
close reading bears in some measure on all account books showing profits. 
It is the indirectness of the investment through the literary researcher’s 
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basic research and the realisation of the profits for the Corporate Research 
Provider (giving consultancy direction) and the University (preparing a 
skilled workforce), and thereby further enabling profits for all corpora-
tions, which needs to be kept in sight. That thoroughly clarifies the entre-
preneurial spirit that is found in basic research methods such as close 
reading.  
I fear I must differ with Dismal Scientist about ‘blue-skies research.’ 
Unlike much basic research, where easy collaboration with and adaptation 
into Corporate Research is possible, what is thought of as blue-skies 
research is such that the pathways to collaboration with and adaptation 
into corporate research are not immediately clear. This naturally makes it 
difficult to justify any kind of funding for that. If funding is given, it is to 
encourage the blue-skies researcher to work towards clarifying how 
collaboration and adaptation can be achieved.  
Literary close reading is but one instrument in the literary researcher’s 
toolbox. There are others, and the related consideration of a few more of 
those would further sharpen the comprehensive interlocking of basic and 
applied research apropos of what the literary researcher does.   
Finally, I am not sure that Dismal Scientist’s distinction between the 
objectives of rhetoric and close reading – as, respectively, persuasion and 
analysis – quite holds. They are actually not as distinct as they may appear 
on the surface. Going back to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, almost the first point he 
made was that there is a prevailing misunderstanding that rhetoric is about 
affect, whereas really it is about Enthymemes (essentially the syllogism). 
Analysis and persuasion are a continuum. Admittedly, however, consider-
ing literary close reading in itself does not give the complete picture and 
the place of literary interpretation following close reading needs to be 
considered also from an entrepreneurial perspective.   
 
Dismal Scientist 
 
Alexander is right about my naive emphasis on proper accounts, though I 
am emphatically not an accountant. 
For the sake of argument, I will accept Alexander’s distinction between 
applied, basic and blue-sky research, with basic research occupying an 
intermediate position wherein the benefits of the basic research for 
applied purposes are more easily evident than in the case of blue-sky 
research, where they are not. Alexander has convincingly argued that 
benefits can accrue to the entrepreneur from applied research and from 
basic research once risk is factored in. Adam Smith would hasten to add 
that these benefits contribute to the total of beneficence in society 
irrespective of the entrepreneur’s intentions. However, Alexander has only 
argued that blue-sky research could benefit the entrepreneur (and his 
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minion, the Corporate Researcher). But this benefit in the blue-sky case is 
uncertain (that is, cannot be accounted for through addition of a determi-
nant risk factor), occasional and usually unpaid for.  
The blue-sky literary researcher cannot be allowed to get away with 
arguing their research could benefit the entrepreneur, might benefit the 
entrepreneur and is, in any case, produced without direct payment. Such a 
foggy argument could be deployed to justify any but the most transpar-
ently useless activity. It is no wonder that this kind of literary researcher 
(are we talking about you, Suman and Fabio?) shies away from this kind of 
argument and seeks justification in an appeal to higher things. 
I read Alexander’s ultimate argument to contend that all literary re-
search should be entrepreneurial. It is not enough that it be useful to an 
entrepreneur. It is not even decisive that it be entrepreneurially motivated. 
This is sufficient but not necessary. It is possible that non-entrepre-
neurially motivated research can be submitted to the discipline of the 
market by the University and the Ministry. When Alexander has estab-
lished the propriety of this kind of discipline for allocating resources 
within the totality of the literary academic establishment for not only the 
applied and the basic researcher, but also the blue-sky researcher, his 
argument will have won home. He may also benefit the University and the 
Ministry by finally supplying an effective riposte to the blue-sky science 
apologists. 
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28. Purpose in Literary Interpretation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alexander Search 
 
Literary close reading is a preparatory step towards interpretation or inter-
pretive analysis and is understood through practice rather than formalised 
or prescriptive application (I had noted this in II.25, “Literary Close 
Reading”). In the main, literary interpretation of texts is also understood 
through practice or simply practiced by literary researchers, though, 
compared to close reading, there have been more sustained attempts to 
formalise principles and methods.  
In fact, one of the reasons why close reading appears mystical (has 
been indifferently theorised) is because it leads more or less seamlessly 
into interpretation. Attempts at formalising principles and methods of 
literary research, of what is involved in textual analysis and what is literary 
about texts, have largely focused on interpretation as a process and out-
come. It has been assumed that in the continuum of process and outcome, 
close reading features somewhere on the side of process (though fet-
ishized as an authority-conferring act unto itself), and so it does not need 
to be pulled out and explained separately. At some point in processing the 
text and reaching an interpretation of it, close reading morphs into 
interpretation. However, it could equally be argued that any interpretive 
possibility presupposes the drift of close reading in the first place. It is 
unclear where close reading and interpretation merge or separate: it 
happens in practice, in the doing, and is held together meaningfully by the 
experience of doing, somewhat differently in each critical effort. If inter-
pretation as process and outcome can be conceptually clarified, close 
reading would be covered somewhere in there.  
However, just as literary close reading in itself presents difficulties for 
conceptual formalisation because it is grounded in practice, so too does 
literary interpretation and for the same reason. That sustained attempts 
have been made to elucidate its principles and methods does not mean 
that they are in fact elucidated in a consensual manner. The area remains a 
blur that works in practice. In a constantly slipping way, it is often averred 
that close reading has to do with the text itself (what can be delineated of 
or inferred from it) and interpretation relatedly brings something more 
than the text itself to understanding it (something like context, cognition, 
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conventions, culture, life experience and so on). This is a functional but 
also immediately shaky foundation to build upon – shaky because it could 
persuasively be argued that the ‘literary text itself’ or simply ‘text itself’ is 
an impossible idealisation, a kind of Platonic form that cannot be pinned 
down.  
Attempts at the elucidation of literary interpretation from, so to speak, 
within literary research have usually sought delimiting conditions: i.e. 
conditions under which all literary researchers would be able to say, ‘this 
interpretive process and outcome is sound or unsound for such and such 
reasons’ (that is something like a working consensus). These could be 
thought of as boundary setting and validating exercises. Such attempts 
typically look to the history of literary interpretation, where it came from, 
and the degrees of consensus within which literary interpretation is prac-
ticed as a discipline, how it is done now. Such projects seem eminently 
doable but turn out to be less than satisfying when done. From, for 
instance, E.D. Hirsch’s Validity in Interpretation (1967) to, for instance, 
Umberto Eco’s Limits of Interpretation (1990) – a period of intensive think-
ing through of literary critical practice, of Literary Theory as an ascendant 
intellectual and institutional space – headway in conceptualising literary 
interpretation was limited. Each conceptual effort seemed to bring some 
clarity but always provisionally, so that it was never clear enough, and 
always in some respects muddier. In fact, both Hirsch and Eco struggled 
valiantly against their own sense of walking on very slippery ground. The 
boundary conditions they appointed or discovered so as to articulate liter-
ary interpretation (‘inner and outer horizons’ for Hirsch, ‘literal sense’ for 
Eco) seemed too minimal and yet not minimal enough to enable any kind 
of consensus. The nitty-gritty of what the literary interpreter does with the 
text, how it should be processed given those boundary conditions, was 
referred by both to historical extrapolations from scriptural hermeneutics 
and philosophical rationality. There was little there that was not laid out in 
great detail by those who did that extrapolating and updating earlier, from 
Friedrich Schleiermacher’s Hermeneutics and Criticism (1998 [1838]) to Hans-
Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method (1975 [1960]). What to do meaningfully 
and rigorously with texts could be matched to existing practices of literary 
interpretation, but that did not clarify why doing these constitute literary 
interpretation. Between Hirsch and Eco lay a spiralling anxiety about 
deconstructive analysis, which rendered notions of boundaries and validity 
themselves doubtful. 
Attempts at the elucidation of literary interpretation appear more 
productive when not undertaken from inside literary research. That does 
not mean that productive attempts have been made from a disciplinary 
outside, such as in ethnographic or sociological research into literary inter-
pretation, though there is much to be said for that. Rather, the idea is that 
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interpretation is best considered as a well-conceptualised general practice 
which applies to a wide range of – indeed all – knowledge pursuits, 
including the literary. If we can grasp what interpretation in this wider 
sense entails, we can then work out what literary interpretation specifically 
consists in. If we have a broad understanding of interpretation, then we 
can consider literary, sociological, philosophical, economic, scientific, etc. 
pursuits as parallel ways of engaging with interpretation. Given a broad 
concept of interpretation, considering these pursuits side by side clarifies 
each of their specific ways of interpreting by differentiation and linkage 
with each other.   
Scholars who have approached the matter thus, with an eye on the 
literary, have offered useful guidance for literary researchers. With law, 
psychoanalysis and literature in mind, Patrick Cohn Hogan (2008) pro-
posed that interpretation in a general way involves two parts: ‘the first 
concerns the object of interpretation – the meaning at which the interpre-
tation aims. The second concerns the manner of interpretation – the 
method by which the interpretation might seek to attain its object. One 
concerns the what of interpretation; the other concerns the how’ (3). 
Hogan’s point is that interpretation, wherever undertaken, is purposive 
(has an objective) and the interpretive method is exercised in terms of the 
objective: the objective defines the kind of pursuit. Accordingly he under-
stands legal, psychoanalytical and literary interpretation as following 
different objectives. This is obvious enough for the first two; Hogan’s 
answer to literary interpretation’s objective is really a cop out: ‘authorial 
aesthetic intent.’ But, that aside, Hogan’s understanding of interpretation 
in general is fairly convincing, and his way of trying to gauge it across 
several kinds of purpose may lead to better insights into literary 
interpretation. Thereby a more deliberative view of what the purpose of 
literary interpretation is might be obtained, given that interpretation is 
generally purposive. 
In fact, a seeming consanguinity in legal and literary interpretation – 
exercised case-by-case or text-by-text, a core practice in both – has often 
interested scholars trying to get to the bottom of interpretation (e.g. 
Levinson and Mailloux eds. 1988, Posner 1989, Fish 1989, West 1993, 
Ward 1995, Dolin 2007, Gurnham 2009), all against a backdrop of general 
hermeneutics and liberal political philosophy. Much of this interest has 
been occupied by the overlaps: law-as-literature, law-in-literature, how 
literary theory can extend to the legal and vice versa. But all that is consist-
ently based on a clear difference, which, when baldly stated, makes a 
succinct and notable point about literary interpretation. Here is Aharon 
Barak’s (2005) way of putting it – Posner stated it baldly too, but I prefer 
Barak’s phrasing: 
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No one claims that an interpretation given a literary text in the past is 
binding. In contrast, through the principle of stare decisis [doctrine of prece-
dent] the past interpretation of a legal text is binding in the future. In law, we 
cannot accept interpretive theories that give a reader the freedom to under-
stand the text according to his or her subjective perception. We cannot 
recognize the interpretive freedom of every judge. In order to maintain 
normal life in society, we must recognize binding interpretive rules and a 
normative hierarchy that orders them. (59) 
 
Putting Hogan’s general description of interpretation (and discounting 
his view of literary interpretive purpose) and Barak’s way of differentiating 
legal and literary interpretation together, we can come up with a plausible 
proposition. Let us call this Proposition 1: Literary interpretation is purposive but 
it is not purposive in a predefined way; the literary researcher can decide on the purpose 
according to her interests and commitments and then draw upon a varied toolbox of 
tested hermeneutic rules and methods to best lead towards fulfilling the chosen purpose 
for interpreting her chosen texts. One of the achievements of the intellectual 
efforts and institutionalisation of Literary Theory in the 1970s and 1980s 
was a kind of formalisation of possible purposes of literary interpretation 
(a matter of delineating choices and naming them): Liberal Humanist, 
Marxist, Feminist, Modernist and Postmodernist, Postcolonial, New 
Historicist, Queer, Environmentalist, etc. (i.e. politically and socially 
purposed); New Critical/Formalist, Structuralist and Post-Structuralist and 
Deconstructionist, etc. (i.e. linguistically and philosophically purposed). 
Thereby literary interpretation still retained its fluidity of and in practice, 
and yet seemed to have some consensually ascribed and purposive 
pathways.     
Proposition 1 is, nevertheless, too minimal a statement. What makes 
literary interpretation literary can be clarified further by comparing different 
pursuits of interpretation, but following a different tack. Consider, for 
instance, the kinds of choices for defining the purposes of literary inter-
pretation that were more or less formalised in 1970s and 1980s Literary 
Theory. These largely refer to purposes espoused in real-world interpreta-
tion – by which, I mean, interpretation that is not focused on texts as the 
field or objects of engagement, but interpretation that bears (intends to 
bear) directly upon persons and collectives and social orders in relation to 
fields and objects. Texts may inevitably be implicated in real-world inter-
pretation, but such interpretation does not focalise or fixate on texts. It is 
purposed for clarification and intervention beyond texts, registering and 
passing through texts instrumentally along the way. Real-world interpreta-
tion is purposed to bear upon the lives, experiences and interpersonal 
exchanges of persons; the functioning of society, however delineated; the 
organisation of material and immaterial transactions in large or small 
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groups of people; and so on. Each of the purposing choices for literary 
interpretation mentioned above is derived from areas of real-world inter-
pretations and then brought to texts, effectively focalising texts. What 
particular purpose is chosen and what specific texts are chosen depend on 
the interests and commitments of the literary interpreter – the literary 
researcher. 
Despite the emphasis on explicit conceptualisation and formalisation in 
Literary Theory, however, literary interpretation has continued to be 
grounded in practice, in the doing. Consequently the mechanics of literary 
interpretation continues to be obscure. Literary interpretation is simply 
recognised as being successfully or questionably done by the cognoscenti, 
rather than being gauged by well-articulated rules and methods, consensu-
ally accepted norms or principles. In fact, the rules and methods, norms 
and principles, relevant to literary interpretation are sometimes more 
clearly laid out by real-world researchers than literary researchers. This 
does not happen when real-world interpreters bring literature within their 
purview, as a discrete object or area of investigation, but when they refer 
to literature as woven into the real world they are investigating, enmeshed 
in real-world processes. The latter makes aspects of literary interpretation 
implicit in and coherent with real-world interpretive practice. Sociologists 
trying to conceptualise and explicitly formulate their real-world interpre-
tive systems do this often: it appears in methodological accounts of, for 
instance, Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils’s social action analysis, in 
Niklas Luhmann’s general social systems theory, Erving Goffman’s frame 
and performance analysis, Jürgen Habermas’s rational communicative 
action theory, Henri Lefebvre’s or Michel de Certeau’s studies of everyday 
life. Each of those methodological accounts is underpinned to some 
degree by hermeneutic methods which bring texts within their real-world 
vision. There literary interpretation and sociological real-world interpreta-
tion blur into each other at a methodological level, and the purposes of 
interpretation for both kinds of pursuit become mutually informing. The 
same could be said of real-world interpretive methods formulated for 
politics, linguistics, psychology, jurisprudence, economics … in fact, it is 
doubtful whether there are absolutely impervious boundaries between any 
area of real-world interpretation and literary interpretation.   
These considerations lead to a second plausible proposition about 
literary interpretation, Proposition 2: In choosing the purpose for her literary 
interpretations according to her interests and commitments, a literary researcher takes 
recourse to the repertoire of purposes found in various areas of real-world interpretations 
– and brings them to bear on her chosen texts, thus focalising the literary text. The 
hermeneutic tools then used by the literary researcher are often consonant with 
hermeneutic tools used in the real-world interpretations which enabled her chosen 
purposing of literary interpretation.         
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Wound up within that proposition is a third which is worth stating 
separately. ‘Literariness’ is thus loosely defined in how the literary inter-
pretation of chosen texts can be purposed in relation to some real-world 
area of interpretation. In other words, there is Proposition 3: Literary interpre-
tation assumes certain sorts of text-to-world and world-to-text relationships in its 
purposing (where ‘world’ is ‘real world’ in the sense used above). The literary researcher 
designates the texts she chooses to interpret thus as ‘literary.’ There are several kinds 
of text-to-world and world-to-text relations that may be assumed in 
dubbing a text ‘literary’: that the text is constituted by the world (mimes it, 
reflects it, represents it, simulates it, etc.); that the text constitutes the 
world (that reality can be apprehended through texts, that the world 
imitates the text); that the text does world-building (reveals the building 
blocks of the real world, undertakes the contrastive building of unreal 
worlds); that  the text is an instrument in the world which may be used to 
change it in some meaningful way. The point is that the text-to-world and 
the world-to-text relations direct the literary researcher’s interpreting 
preponderantly to literary texts and only conditionally to the real world. 
The literary researcher chooses texts and considers those texts ‘literary’ 
accordingly. In that respect literary interpretation differs from attention to 
texts that may occur incidentally in real-world interpretations. 
I have made, in Proposition 3, some glib argumentative leaps in 
suggesting several types of text-to-world and world-to-text relations. 
However, I do not need to illustrate them here: as experienced practi-
tioners of literary interpretation, for instance, Fabio and Suman already 
know what is meant and could put numerous footnotes for each type. 
The three plausible propositions give a sufficient account of literary 
interpretation, and its purposing practice, to consider how entrepreneurial 
considerations are either already embedded or should be inserted therein. 
As it happens, these entrepreneurial considerations are fairly close to those 
already described for close reading – only more integrated.    
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29. Professional Interpretation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alexander Search  
 
Purposing texts for a given objective is a key skill for many white-collar 
professions, at various leadership and followership grades, outside acad-
emia. This is especially so for professions in entrepreneurial organisations 
engaging directly with consumers and the public, as well as professions 
involved in governance structures encouraging and supporting enterprise.  
Most such professions deal with two kinds of texts with more or less 
emphasis on one or the other.  
First, there are texts which are straightforwardly predisposed to serve 
the objectives of the profession. For instance, legal practitioners have law 
books, records of judicial proceedings, etc.; corporate publicity managers 
have guidebooks on branding, marketing, etc. alongside relevant 
information on products; political journalists have media style guides, 
ethics codes, reference books on politics and political history and so on; 
psychiatric counsellors have their therapy guidebooks, basic psychology 
textbooks, case reports, etc. We could think of such texts as pre-purposed 
texts – some set the ground rules of the profession and some inform 
professional practice.   
Second, there are texts which may not seem to self-evidently bear upon 
professional practice, but which the professional can purpose for her 
objectives according to need or interest. It is not possible to characterise 
these texts as certain kinds of texts; any text may come to be purposed to a 
professional end if the professional can find a way to do so. This could be 
in cross-professional terms: e.g. a lawyer reading a pre-purposed political 
journalist’s text, a psychiatric counsellor reading a pre-purposed publicity 
manager’s text. Or, this could be done in terms of professionally purpos-
ing a not evidently pre-purposed text: e.g. lawyers, political journalists, 
publicity managers, psychiatric counsellors reading a fictional, historical, 
philosophical, geological, etc. text and finding it professionally useful in 
some way. We could think of these as open-to-purpose texts.  
These purposings are all underpinned by a more fundamental kind of 
textuality. Something more than engaging with available texts in the 
conventional sense is involved here (as a scripted or multimodal artefact, 
i.e. artificially produced). Such purposings involve professionals appre-
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hending and interpreting real-world situations as if these were texts – actual 
occurrences, performances, conversations, personalities, experiences, etc. 
are read as texts. All of these purposings involve interpretations in and as 
professional practice. According to the terminology of II.28, “Purpose in 
Literary interpretation,” the more fundamental kind of dealing with texts – 
which is actually textualising of the real-world – is the basis of real-world 
interpretation. In academic terms, real-world interpretation is the primary 
source of history, philosophy, linguistics, sociology, economics, etc. In 
terms of white-collar professional practice: first, real-world interpretation 
in an academic vein produces open-to-purpose texts; these open-to-
purpose texts then variously inform (are extrapolated from to produce) the 
pre-purposed texts which professionals refer to constantly, which define 
the profession as such. In a circular chain, the pre-purposed texts 
thereafter determine the professional’s own real-world interpreting to 
serve immediate professional ends – as when a lawyer reads a specific 
brief, a psychiatric counsellor meets a patient, a journalist encounters an 
unfolding political event, a publicity manager is given an innovative new 
product to push, etc.           
Text-to-world and world-to-text relations delineate the distinctive 
practice of literary interpretation, as argued in II.28, wherein textual qualities 
are foregrounded. In this sense, literary interpretation works amidst the 
interstices of all real-world interpretation, including the academic’s and the 
non-academic professional’s (of the sorts mentioned above). Apropos of 
the professional: since the text as artefact is foregrounded in literary inter-
pretation, it is primarily on the professional’s engagement with open-to-
purpose texts that literary interpretation has a bearing. That is, in this 
respect literary interpretation has a bearing within professional practice of the sorts 
mentioned above, irrespective of how invested in the real-world and uninterested in 
literary matters the profession in question might seem. Literary interpretation has a 
negligible contribution to the professional use of pre-purposed texts.  But 
it is inevitably implicated in the professional’s use of open-to-purpose 
texts for professional objectives.  
To fulfil her objectives, the professional’s real-world interpretations of 
specific circumstances – for a given case or event – involves, in the first 
instance, working out how the relevant pre-purposed texts inform them. 
This entails interpretation of pre-purposed texts so as to understand their 
import for the given case such that real-world interpretations follow which 
are to the immediate professional purpose. So, for instance, the lawyer 
interprets the real-world brief in terms of law books to be able to present 
arguments in court; the publicity manager interprets the specifications of a 
new product in terms of publicity strategy guidebooks to be able to market 
it. Though there is textual interpretation of the pre-purposed texts invo-
lved here, that seldom amounts to literary interpretation. Here, interpretive 
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methods are usually formalised in advance so that textual qualities only 
need to be registered in consensual and pre-agreed ways – to the extent 
that the specific case fits existing practice as laid out in the pre-purposed 
texts, or does not. The pre-purposed text is already purposed to be used 
thus: it is already disposed to be interpreted in professionally relevant 
ways.  
More importantly here, the professional’s real-world interpretations 
then often call upon or coalesce with purposing open-to-purpose texts to 
meet professional objectives. This is where the professional has to 
consider, however knowingly or unknowingly, the textual qualities of 
open-to-purpose texts and render them amenable to her purposing. 
Frequently, this happens in ways for which there is no formalised direction 
from pre-purposed texts. A publicity manager contemplating a marketing 
strategy for a new product might be inspired by lifestyle metaphors in a 
biography; a journalist may find a popular-science account on dark matter 
useful for grasping an unfolding political event, etc. – all such are uses of 
necessary interpretive skills for the dynamism and success of professional 
practice beyond the routinized. These are largely acts of literary interpreta-
tion by professionals which enhance their real-world interpretations. These 
involve deliberately purposing texts with attention to their text-to-world 
and world-to-text features according to the professional’s own objectives 
and interests. 
The easiest way for literary researchers to understand the professional 
purposing of open-to-purpose texts is by contemplating detective fiction. 
Detective fiction offers useful literary conceits for professional purposing 
of texts, involving the interplay of real-world and literary interpretation. 
From the inception of the genre, the plot purpose has been agreed in 
advance – to attribute culpability – and the protagonist whose task it is to 
fulfil that purpose by real-world interpretation is appointed accordingly – 
the investigator. Detective fiction constantly affirms the possibility of an 
investigator fulfilling the agreed purpose by real-world interpretation (that 
is, of course, the real world in fiction). The purpose is fulfilled when there 
is consensus on the attribution of culpability, both among the fictional 
protagonists and, in tandem, among readers of detective fiction. These are 
unwritten mutual agreements between detective fiction texts and their 
readers before the texts are read. The clarity of objective and outcome 
marks the role of the investigator as one of professional practice, or at 
least practice that can be professionalised. There has been some waffling 
about the status of ‘amateur’ and ‘professional’ detectives in fiction, but 
fictional investigators have usually been professionals from the beginnings 
of the genre in the sense of getting an income from their investigations – 
though not necessarily within a bureaucratic or corporate organisation. 
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The history of detective fiction has often been considered a history of the 
organisational professionalisation of investigators. 
From the first glimmerings of the genre, the investigator’s real-world 
purposive investigations have been routed through literary interpretations 
of a large variety of open-to-purpose texts. In Edgar Allen Poe’s "The 
Mystery of Marie Rogêt” (1842), Auguste Dupin read a series of news-
paper reports carefully, analysing their purposive appeals as news along the 
way, to solve the mystery of Marie’s murder. In Fyodor Dostoevsky’s 
Crime and Punishment (1866), Porfiry Petrovich found a clue to former law-
student Raskolnikov’s motive by reading (purposing) his academic paper 
“On Crime” as a psychological portrait. In Wilkie Collins’s The Moonstone 
(1868), Sergeant Cuff and Franklin Blake gradually aligned and fulfilled 
their objective by interpreting a series of conflicting witness statements, 
realigning their own narratives as they proceeded, to discover what 
happened when the jewel was stolen. Where real-world interpretation was 
most forensically penetrative of the real-world-as-text, as Sherlock 
Holmes’s was (in Arthur Conan Doyle’s stories, 1880-1914), the reader of 
detective fiction – who shares the investigator’s purpose – finds herself 
facing the unreliability of the putative author of investigative reports, Dr. 
Watson.     
But so much for literary conceits … I am concerned with the real 
world here. 
Purposing texts for a given objective is a key skill for many white-collar 
professions outside academia. Real-world and literary interpretation are 
variously interwoven in professional practice that calls upon pre-purposed 
and open-to-purpose texts. It is desirable that such professionals have a 
direct grasp of literary interpretation and suitable exposure to open-to-
purpose texts. To be realistic though, it is unlikely that many professionals 
will have time to consider what literary interpretation entails or to read too 
many open-to-purpose texts – which may possibly but not necessarily be 
purposable. So, entrepreneurial corporations employing professionals 
might then take recourse to Corporate Researchers to do some of that 
purposing of texts on behalf of employees … and then Corporate 
Researchers may call upon Academic Researchers for suggestions and 
directions ….   
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30. Interpretation and Object 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fabio Akcelrud Durão 
 
Alexander’s observations on interpretation would probably be deemed 
sound by most literary researchers today. For what is entrepreneurial in 
these comments is almost invisible and enjoys great currency today, 
namely the absolute disregard for the nature of the object to be inter-
preted. By this I mean more than the truism that different compositions 
will require different interpretative tools; the point, rather, is that inter-
pretation in a strong sense is justified by its object. The latter has to have 
something special about it, which interpretation brings to the fore, makes 
emerge, sometimes unexpectedly. Interpretation and object define them-
selves mutually as something exceptional. (This is the reason why it is 
legitimate to demand that critical essays be well written.) Words such as 
hermeneutics and exegesis originated in a religious context; their first 
horizon was the elucidation of the words of God. Something of it still 
lives in ‘work,’ an object with something in it, as opposed to ‘text’ as 
undifferentiated matter. The total dissociation between artefact to be read 
and reading instrument that is the presupposition of Alexander’s argument 
reminds one of a conveyor belt. This throws a negative light on Theory, 
which now starts to resemble a machine, production for production’s sake.  
In this regard, the fact that close reading cannot be coded a priori is a 
positive observation. It is only one aspect of interpretation. Discussing it 
in abstract is only helpful in contexts where it is blatantly absent, e.g. in 
applications of theories that disregard the work’s constitutive features. 
 
Alexander Search 
  
Fabio says: ‘interpretation in a strong sense is justified by its object. The 
latter has to have something special about it, which interpretation brings 
to the fore, makes emerge, sometimes unexpectedly. Interpretation and 
object define themselves mutually as something exceptional.’ I find this 
assertion intriguing, for it raises more questions than answers to my mind. 
Does this mean that some texts are more worth interpreting than others? 
By what criteria? Is it possible to have interpretation in the strong sense 
for something that seems unexceptional? Can interpretation make the 
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unexceptional exceptional and if so has the unexceptional then suddenly 
become transformed into exceptionalness?  
As before, I find the normative terms Fabio uses to be unclear: 'strong 
sense' by what measure?; 'exceptional' by what measure?; an object with 
what in it?  
I can see that in a way this takes us back to arguments made in I.2, 
“Counterarguments,” and I:3, “The Tricky Anteriority of Literature”: the 
intrinsic value of certain literary works which justifies and substantiates 
interpretive attention. And as there, I see, Fabio presents this as an article 
of faith rather than by demonstration. He even says as much: it is a 
remnant of the devotional conviction which brought hermeneutics out of 
scriptural study. I do not understand or possess the devotional drive, and 
find myself unable to apprehend mystical assertions. If what Fabio says 
cannot be articulated as more than an article of faith it cannot really be 
debated – others can simply claim contrary articles of faith with similarly 
unelaborated firmness, and I can simply refuse it with similarly unelabo-
rated firmness. But then literary research is no longer a matter of debates 
and arguments, it is simply a matter of claims that cannot be debated, each 
simply loudly announcing that she is holier than the other.  
 
Fabio Akcelrud Durão 
 
Here are some responses to Alexander’s questions and observations: 
 
1. ‘Does this mean that some texts are more worth interpreting than 
others?’: Yes. The lack of differentiation that Alexander defends makes it 
untenable to keep the word ‘literature’ for a distinctive kind of writing. 
 
2. ‘By what criteria?’: None. Validity here comes a posteriori. No cultural 
object is independent of what is written about it. 
 
3. ‘Is it possible to have interpretation in the strong sense for something 
that seems unexceptional?’: Yes, absolutely. But then that which was unex-
ceptional ceases to be so. Roberto Schwarz’s reading of José de Alencar’s 
Senhora (in Schwarz 2000 [1977]) is a good example. As a rule, whenever a 
defining cause can be found for a given insufficiency, something which 
shows its necessity, bad turns into good (or at least into interesting). 
 
4. ‘The intrinsic value of certain literary works … Fabio presents this as an 
article of faith’: It is not a matter of faith at all. My mention of the theo-
logical origins of exegesis was meant to point to the history of the term, a 
history that may not have been fully overcome. I do not see at all why the 
acknowledgement that there is something not reducible to arguments 
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should hinder debating. Alexander’s presupposition of total clarity – 
connected to the indistinct, homogenizing way he deals with objects – is 
incompatible with every single interesting kind of interpretation, be it 
Marxist, psychoanalytic, or postmodernist. 
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31. Profitable Literary Interpretation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alexander Search 
 
In II.26, “Profitable Close Reading,” I had outlined two ways in which 
literary close reading is or could further be aligned with entrepreneurial 
agendas. These are: (1) for the direct entrepreneurial purpose of the University – 
through advanced teaching and learning, especially with employability and 
skills training of future professionals in mind; and (2) for a wide range of 
entrepreneurial corporations – through collaboration between Corporate and 
Academic Researchers, where, for our purposes, literary researchers and 
literature-related products are concerned. 
Apropos of literary close reading in itself, the entrepreneurial uses are 
evident but a bit tangential. Pedagogic programmes in literature develop 
the useful skill of close reading through practice, but imaginative skills 
transfer is needed to bring close reading to professional enterprise. 
Similarly, Corporate-Academic Research collaboration underpinned by 
close reading is plausible, but calls for creative translation of expertise. 
However, for literary interpretation as outlined in II.28, “Purpose in 
Literary Interpretation,” and in II.29, “Professional Interpretation” – 
which includes close reading within its larger process – the bearing on 
professional entrepreneurial work is direct and straightforward. Let me 
consider this by turn for the two directions of entrepreneurial agendas 
mentioned above.  
 
(1) For the direct entrepreneurial purpose of the University: 
Numerous discipline-specific pedagogic programmes cultivate in students 
(future professionals) an information- and skills-base for using pre-purposed 
texts in specific sectors of employment. These skills are unarguably essen-
tial to keep entrepreneurial organisations functioning efficiently. Literary 
programmes are singularly useful for preparing students to purpose open-to-
purpose texts according to their interests and needs, which is a key skill for 
employment in a wide range of sectors. This skill is essential for keeping 
entrepreneurial organisations dynamic and innovative: indeed, it is the key 
skill which may give some organisation an edge over others when needed. 
The practice of literary interpretation in the University pedagogic 
programme is not specific to professional sectors; it is a practice which 
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cuts across sectors and is transferable between sectors. It is learned in the 
doing, in application, with regard to texts which offer the most diverse 
range of text-to-world and world-to-text relations (i.e. literary texts). 
Because of the constant interpenetration of real-world interpretation and 
literary interpretation, that skill can be employed flexibly to numerous 
pragmatic aspects of enterprise. Learning the practice of literary interpre-
tation does not give information on sector-specific purposes but gives an 
ability to interpretively purpose many kinds of texts for many sector-
specific objectives. It grounds the ability to do purposing rather than 
simply meet a given purpose.     
 In preparing students as future professionals, University pedagogic 
programmes need to both inform students of pre-purposed texts for 
sector-specific employment and enable students to purpose open-to-
purpose texts for whatever profession they might find employment in.  
 As for close reading, the teaching and learning of literary interpretation 
works primarily through doing, by application and practice, rather than 
through well-defined rules and prescriptions. So, literary researchers have a 
vital role in constantly validating and extending and updating the 
possibilities of literary interpretation. In this sense, pedagogic programmes 
for literary interpretation are symbiotically dependent on the continuous 
undertaking of literary interpretation by researchers. 
 In II.26, “Profitable Close Reading,” I had argued that close reading is 
the current counterpart of the study of rhetoric and oratory in the past, 
similarly purposive for the politico-economic regime of its time. In a 
related way, it is arguable that the shift of emphasis from philology 
towards literary interpretation has occurred in the University through a 
necessary historical momentum. A considerable body of scholarship traces 
the historical passage from philological scholarship to modern literary 
research which centres interpretation (in this regard, for English Literary 
Studies in the USA see Graff 1987, in the UK see Palmer 1965, in both see 
Turner 2014 and Gupta 2015). To me these suggest that literary interpre-
tation is implicitly to the purpose of modern and current economic orders, 
as philology had been for former economic orders. Literary interpretation 
is engrained in the emergence of modern entrepreneurial practices. That is 
arguably why the professionalisation of literary studies (as we understand it 
now, threaded around close reading and interpretation) took place in the 
University when it did, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
This is not the space to develop that argument; I leave it here as an open 
speculation.  
 
(2) For a wide range of entrepreneurial corporations:  
Literary researchers with a thorough grasp of purposing texts according to 
their interests and needs can collaborate with Corporate Researchers in 
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projects which do not necessarily have a literary or cultural dimension 
(such as those mentioned in II.26, “Profitable Close Reading”). They can 
usefully collaborate in any project involving purposing texts for consumers 
or the general public with an entrepreneurial objective.  
 By way of an illustration, consider a literary researcher who has worked 
extensively on critical interpretations of Joyce’s Ulysses in relation to 
branding and advertising practices. This has not only given her insights 
into Ulysses, but a wide ranging and complex grasp of branding practices, 
of a sort which more routinized marketing textbooks and training 
programmes are unlikely to convey. She has examined how literary 
modernism itself became a brand for a set of authors/artists/intellectuals 
between the wars (naturally Joyce in their midst) and how that has evolved 
since, in various contexts. She has detailed how authors and publishers 
pushed this brand and their own works for audiences at the time, and how 
they have been promoted as reading markets evolved. That Ulysses is 
particularly savvy about advertising cultures is of particular interest to her. 
She had conducted close readings of character portrayal amidst consumer 
culture: of Leopold Bloom’s sensibility as an advertisement canvasser; of 
how commercial products and logos feature in the construction of 
femininity and sexuality (Gerty McDowell in ‘Nausicaa,’ Molly Bloom in 
‘Penelope’). The manner in which words and phrases become culturally 
resonant and are historically grounded (especially in the ‘Oxen of the Sun’ 
episode) has occupied her, with psychoanalytical, linguistic and sociologi-
cal interpretive frames in mind. She has examined the purchase of neolo-
gisms and their suggestive strangeness vis-à-vis ordinary language usage 
(with the Revolution of the Word collocations in view, which appeared in 
transition as Joyce proceeded with Work in Progress). The relation of all these 
to evolving marketing practices and commodity culture in the later 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has occupied our Joyce scholar 
for long. Little relating to Ulysses and its receptions with a bearing on 
marketing, advertising, branding has escaped her attention; her purposing 
of Ulysses is coeval with a wide-ranging and thought-through expertise in 
those commercial processes. In fact, in a general way, little has escaped the 
attention of Joyceans in this regard – though it has appeared in piecemeal 
ways and within a forbiddingly scholarly register. The relationship of 
modernism and marketing, naturally always featuring Joyce, has received 
sustained attention (Wicke 1988, Dettmar and Watt eds. 1996, Jensen 
1996, Wexter 1997, Turner 2003, Mickalites 2012). In even greater detail, 
characterisation of commercial products and commodity culture in Ulysses 
and comparatively elsewhere, the roles of the author and publishers in 
promoting Ulysses, the textual play with language and stylistics informed of 
advertising and branding practices, etc. have been prolifically explored by 
literary researchers (to name a few: Moretti 1988, Ch.7; Herr 1986; 
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Leonard and Wicke eds. 1993; Leonard 1998; Patterson and Brown 2000; 
Petit 2010; Hye 2010; Loukopoulou 2013; Wicke 2012/2013; Nash ed. 
2013, Part II; Hayward 2015).  
 This kind of expertise in purposing texts and analysing branding could 
extend to entrepreneurial projects beyond those directly involving literary 
and cultural products. It could usefully inform any kind of branding exer-
cise. Perhaps more importantly, such expertise could assist organisations 
(corporations, University, Ministry) to embed a public brand conscious-
ness in strategic (and, if necessary, tacit) context-specific ways for ranges 
of products and services. After all, the use of carefully purposed texts is 
seminal to cultivating both specific brands and general brand awareness. 
However, the Joycean brand expert may well not be aware of all the ways 
in which her expertise could be brought to well-defined entrepreneurial 
objectives. Therefore, her contribution to entrepreneurial projects has to 
be a collaborative one, in conversation with Corporate Researchers and 
also with other kinds of Academic Researchers with complementary 
expertise. Such collaboration involves joint delving into the interfaces 
between open-to-purpose and pre-purposed texts, drawing upon the 
literary researcher’s grasp of the former and the Corporate Researcher’s 
(and other Academic Researchers’) of the latter. Thereby a broad range of 
entrepreneurial activity could be further facilitated, and an environment 
that is receptive to entrepreneurial activity could be further fostered.      
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32. Academic Responsibility and Profitable 
Convergence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Alexander Search 
 
Plausible as the above observations on the entrepreneurial potential of 
literary interpretation are, it must be admitted that to many literary 
researchers at present they sound fanciful if not objectionable. It is widely 
held that pedagogic programmes in the University are for a higher pur-
pose. They should, it is felt, cultivate something larger than simply pro-
ducing skilled employees for entrepreneurial organisations. They should 
enable students to become, it is expected, ‘critical thinkers’ or ‘active 
citizens’ or persons with ‘humane values’ (and, sometimes, ‘rational 
minds’). Being a skilled employee, it is maintained, is a kind of collateral 
advantage of this higher purpose. There are numerous accounts of what 
such higher purposes consist in, and they all foreground the generation of 
benefits for all – so that profits appear to be a secondary consideration, 
and sometimes an inconsiderable one. Similarly, literary researchers often 
consider their interpretations to have a similar higher and all-embracing 
beneficial purpose, and are apt to look down on cooperation with profit-
making projects. To be asked to do so appears as a dumbing down or 
trivialisation of their in-depth knowledge.  
Literary researchers are often hostile to notions of profit making and 
enterprise, to all matters financial; it is an attitude that is seemingly deeply 
embedded in their academic culture. Rick Rylance (2016) contemplates 
this at some length – though, oddly, he thinks of the attitude as being that 
of ‘literature’ itself rather than of literary scholars. Literary researchers 
correspondingly own to strong ethical investments in generating benefits 
for all, in a manner which is inimical to or indifferent to profit making. 
This misunderstanding of what the public good consists in (pure benefits 
without profits, see I.6, “Research for the Public Good”) could be 
variously explained. I will not dwell on explanations here, but, briefly, the 
following factors might have a role to play. (1) The attitude of indifference 
to profits and altruistic commitments could be a remnant of the elite class 
background of literary scholarship, initiated by persons who needed few 
other means than what was inherited or given as patronage. (2) The 
attitude might be an ideological residue from the historical phases through 
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which literary scholarship made its claims for public attention and author-
ity, such as, via religious norms or socialist critiques of capitalism. (3) Dis-
avowals of profit and strong ethical claims have served the entrepreneurial 
interests of academic scholars well at critical moments, especially in seek-
ing the security of public funding to undergird their enterprise. (4) This 
attitude served the entrepreneurial strategies of corporations, University 
and Ministry well, in that they could use the apparently disinterested 
authority thereby garnered by researchers while co-opting their outputs to 
pragmatic profitable ends.  
Be that as it may (each of those hypotheses could feed substantial 
research projects), the present situation calls for a different attitude from 
literary researchers. Privileges and ideologies of the past can be left where 
they belong. The intertwining of profit and benefit for the public good is 
the ruling ideology and order of the present (this bears upon how public 
funding works, see I.16, “Two Notes”). Most importantly, a growing 
intensification, diversification and scaling up of academic specialisations 
means that Corporate Researchers – and academic leaders of the Uni-
versity and bureaucrats of the Ministry – are increasingly unable to see 
clearly what can or should be co-opted. It is now incumbent on Academic 
Researchers to signal clearly what aspect of their work has entrepreneurial 
potential and thus actively support Corporate Researchers in their work, 
and thereby facilitate the profit making and benefit generation that corpo-
rations and the University and Ministry realise for the public good. It is, in 
brief, up to literary scholars to demonstrate unambiguously how their 
pedagogic programmes facilitate skills training and employment in enter-
prises. And it is up to literary researchers to undertake research which is 
explicitly oriented towards entrepreneurial use; to embed entrepreneurial 
innovations in their close readings and interpretations, and signal them for 
the advantage of Corporate Researchers.  
This seems to suggest that at present a convergence between Academic 
Research and Corporate Research is desirable. This is true to some degree, 
and the academic attitude which resists any degree of convergence does 
need to be eschewed. At the same time though, for all the reasons outlined 
earlier (especially in II.20, “Corporate Research and Academic Research”), 
it is necessary to maintain an institutional and legal distinction between 
Academic Research and Corporate Research, between University and 
Corporate Research Provider. Thereby, crucially, lines of independence 
and ownership are kept clear. It is best if they continue to work in 
complementary ways and do not lose their identities. So a drift towards 
convergence between and yet a clarity of distinction between Corporate 
Research and Academic Research needs to be achieved – needs, really, to 
be managed. There should be some degree of mutually supportive conver-
gence, but no merging. The onus is principally on Academic Researchers 
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to both enable convergence and yet keep their identity separate, but they 
cannot be depended upon to strike the right balance through their own 
diverse and dispersed initiatives.  
Fortunately academic leaders of the University, bureaucrats of the 
Ministry, and executives of Corporate Research Providers have a sound 
grasp of this situation. Consequently, in the UK, for instance, a host of 
policy measures and strategies to engineer a balance of convergence and 
distinction have been implemented since the 1990s, collaboratively bet-
ween University, Ministry and Corporate Research Providers. No doubt 
similar measures have been taken or are being unrolled in other countries 
too. These measures have been embraced and proactively implemented by 
forward-looking Academic Researchers. And even in quarters where a 
knee-jerk resistance to entrepreneurial calculations prevail – as amongst 
many literary researchers – there is evidence of a salutary change in mind 
set.  
With regard to the two areas highlighted above, in II.31, “Profitable 
Literary Interpretation,” some of the relevant moves made by the Univer-
sity and Ministry in the UK since the 1990s include the following.  
 
For pedagogic programmes in the University:  
 Clearly stated aims and objectives are required for all modules and 
programmes, which must include ‘transferable skills’;  
 Skills-development and employability are significant gauges in prog-
ramme validation processes by appointed public or private bodies;  
 Such validation criteria cover both content of programmes (curricula) 
and structural design of the student experience (pathways of study);  
 Measurements of employment of students after graduation (by an 
‘employability’ gauge) are factored into national and international 
rankings of programmes and universities;  
 Periodically accounted public funding of universities take account of 
students’ experience in and employment after programmes;  
 University governance structures at various levels routinely include 
employers (representatives of different sectors of employment) as 
stakeholders;  
 Requirements to incorporate student-profile building during the 
programme so as to facilitate future employment are in place;  
 Career advice services are available in University institutions and 
integrated with programmes;  
 Financial incentives are available for programmes which can arrange 
work experience and internships outside academia for students;  
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 The inclusion (employment) of practitioners irrespective of academic 
qualifications to deliver pedagogic programmes is encouraged;  
 Broadly articulated ‘employability’ agendas have been written into 
mission statements and periodic strategic plans of universities. 
 
For projects by Academic Researchers: 
 Requirements to articulate and measure the ‘impact’ of all publicly-
funded research projects at point of funding and in post-project 
reporting are in place – typically, that involves accounting exercises 
with an eye on ‘costed’ investment and ‘costable’ returns, and gauging 
‘value for money’; 
 Periodic comparative grading of universities, and research units 
therein, in terms of research production and performance also take in 
measurements of ‘impact’ as above;  
 Public funding schemes have been devised to facilitate broadly 
defined collaboration between Academic and Corporate Researchers 
(e.g., ‘knowledge transfer,’ ‘skills development,’ ‘public engagement’ 
schemes); 
 Funding schemes have been devised to enable strategically focused 
and theme-centred collaboration between academic and non-
academic organisations (popularly, under the rubric of ‘digital 
humanities,’ ‘innovation and creativity,’ ‘cultural industries,’ ‘leader-
ship development,’ ‘citizenship and identity’ – to name a few which 
literary researchers might turn to);  
 Accounting regimes have been instituted which reduce the autonomy 
of individual or groups of academic researchers and enable the 
University to maintain financial, and therefor administrative, control 
of projects (e.g. ‘full economic costing’ regimes);  
 Arrangements for legally binding agreements to govern collaboration 
across University institutions are now routinized, which also enable 
suitable management of academic researchers;  
 Similarly routinized now are legal contracts between University 
institutions and individual researchers to ensure that the brands of 
collaborating organisations are promoted, and any commercially ex-
ploitable outcome is protected from being capitalised by researchers; 
 Academic researchers who comply with and contribute to such 
research management structures, and cultivate viable partnerships 
with entrepreneurial organisations, have preferment in promotions 
and rewards (in career terms).  
KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION 
135 
 
 
These have all proved effective and necessary strategic measures.  
Consequently, even literary researchers in the UK (and elsewhere, I am 
sure) have taken great strides over the last two decades in making their 
close readings and interpretations profitable – in becoming more avowedly 
entrepreneurial rather than tacitly or surreptitiously so.    
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33. Positive and Negative Notes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fabio Akcelrud Durão 
 
There are times when a literary studies scholar feels uncertain about her 
job and her role in society. ‘Why so much effort, so many hours devoted 
to an object that has no practical use?’ she asks herself. In such instances, 
thinking that there is something about literary studies that makes it desira-
ble for various businesses is healthy. I remember receiving a letter from a 
Wall Street company sometime after finishing my PhD, enquiring if I 
would like to apply for a position there. They were looking for people with 
different ways of thinking to deal with the stock market. In principle, if 
not in fact, a deep knowledge of literature can be profitable for the whole 
of the culture industry. The historical depth, the variety of genres, the 
sheer intelligence present in so many works – they all help the reader to 
see through stereotypes and formulaic ways of organising narratives. All 
this is a result of literature’s disinterestedness, for it is only the lack of an 
immediate purpose that allows such a wide and heterogeneous group of 
texts to be assembled. The problem is that this use of literary knowledge is 
limited and indirect, as it were; once it is systematised, it contradicts itself 
by becoming instrumental. Moreover, the utility of literary researchers for 
the market is only significant for trendy niches, where more or less real 
novelty is tolerated. These are very restricted niches; for the greater part of 
the culture industry repetition of successful patterns is the rule. I just 
finished reading Theodor Adorno and Hanns Eisler’s Composing for the 
Films (1994 [1947]), and it was quite interesting to see how this problem 
played itself out there. Throughout the book the authors oscillate between 
a critical approach to film as the industry that it is and attempts to 
pragmatically improve the role of music in cinema (which includes 
suggestions and advice). 
There is something interestingly positive about Alexander’s observa-
tions on profitable close reading and literary interpretation. The argument 
for the utility – and a highly productive one at that – of literary studies for 
the corporate world sounds an optimist note where these are underdevel-
oped, or simply left to slowly disintegrate through lack of funding. Or, for 
that matter, where possibilities are left unexplored through lack of imagi-
nation. I am contemplating the specificity of Alexander’s outlook in 
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comparison to the corporate philistinism that I am more accustomed to. 
Alexander’s enlightened entrepreneurial stance could perhaps be viewed as 
sociologically abnormal. I can indeed imagine my colleagues copying and 
pasting Alexander’s arguments, with a bad conscience, to be sure, as a 
desperate attempt to fight precarization and convince authorities not to 
extinguish their line of work. But the problem with Alexander’s position is 
that it is too fanciful, for it fails to take into account market forces. Only a 
few top companies consider the ability ‘to interpretively purpose many 
kinds of texts for many sector-specific objectives’ an asset. Alexander 
overestimates the role of creativity and innovation in capitalism. Techno-
logical breakthroughs are most welcome, of course, but the costs of 
research are most eagerly shared with, if not appropriated from, the state – 
from public funding. As for the industry of culture, in sharp contrast with 
its self-representation, it is more static than dynamic, privileging old 
successful formulae so as to make investments safer. In sum, the space for 
convergence between business and literature is restricted to an elite rung 
of companies and professors. The same holds for purposing ‘open-to-
purpose texts for whatever profession they might find employment in’: the 
potential for that is too limited to justify considerable investment. 
As for the interpreter of Joyce, the process Alexander describes so well 
highlights the intrinsic tension between art and the market. If it is true that 
positing literature as a realm where the imagination reigns supreme can be 
criticised as idealist, the reduction of a literary work to strategies of 
symbolic capital accumulation à la Pierre Bourdieu (on this see II.39, 
“Modelling as Literary Research,” below) in the end leads to an absurd 
scene: since there is no concrete oeuvre at stake, valorisation happens in a 
void and all the pomp and circumstance attached to art becomes 
ludicrous. The behaviour Alexander ascribes to the Joycean scholar is 
cynical because the neutrality it has to assume goes against the underlying 
impulse of a novel like Ulysses, which is one of freedom. Ulysses allows 
itself to be constituted by its own internal laws. Turning Ulysses into a 
brand is to commit violence against it. The researcher who is able to 
witness this process without regret must either be indifferent to or simply 
inimical to literature. She must have suffered a lot in going through all that 
learning about Ulysses so as to merely contribute to its instrumentalisation. 
 
Alexander Search 
  
Insofar as the ability to interpretively purpose open-to-purpose texts goes, 
I think that is actually much sought after in corporate employment. It may 
be true that it is not necessarily sought after in itself, and that training in 
using pre-purposed texts is considered firmer qualification for more 
routinized work. But then these are not mutually exclusive abilities. In 
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most corporate sectors, employees now receive in-house training. The 
university education is a basic level upon which corporations construct 
their further human-resource training and development programmes suit-
able to their objectives. It is arguable that a grasp of interpretive purposing 
through university programmes promises ease of assimilation of pre-
purposed texts too. It is useful for maximising the advantages of in-house 
training.  
Also, though not all entrepreneurial sectors may seem immediately to 
be innovative, and may depend more on routinized work, it is also the case 
that almost all devote some resources to Corporate Research Providers to 
enable a supply of innovative applications. That is why I have stressed the 
importance of collaboration between Academic and Corporate Research. 
This is unlikely to change because, in a competitive capitalist environment, 
being able to differentiate products is critical to maintaining sustainable 
businesses and negotiating profit margins.  
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34. Skills and Knowledge  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suman Gupta 
 
Alexander’s thoughts about profitable close reading and interpretation 
make it clear that he is actually on the side of the angels who would save 
literary research – the humanities – from the onslaught of the entrepre-
neurial University and Ministry. It is widely anticipated that the humanities 
may be gradually pared down to nought if the current global neoliberal 
dispensation continues unabated. So, Alexander too is ultimately defend-
ing the humanities despite his dismissiveness about the liberal idealism of 
other such defenders (see I.14, “What Literary Researchers Actually Do”). 
Unlike those liberal utopians, and having no track with their bombast, 
Alexander does his defending by going temperately and optimistically 
along with the entrepreneurial leaders in the University and Ministry, by 
accepting their rationales and objectives. He argues that literary research 
does not need to be saved as a beneficial, even if uncertainly profitable, 
pursuit; it needs to be preserved because it is already profitable and could 
be made even more profitable – it can contribute to various kinds of 
enterprise, it could cooperate with Corporate Research skilled in pro-
ducing objective-led strategies, it could educate skilled professionals for 
businesses. Literary research, he argues, stands firmly within the profitable 
agendas of ‘knowledge exchange’ and ‘skills transfer.’ And, in fact, despite 
rhetorical differences, many of the utopian liberal defenders of the 
humanities whom Alexander blithely dismissed are much like Alexander 
really.  
But is Alexander’s championing of literary research likely to persuade 
entrepreneurial leaders in the University and Ministry?  
The general drift of Alexander’s vision is of humanistic (literary) 
knowledge turning into skills which employable souls will bring to profes-
sions devoted to realising the purposes of entrepreneurial organisations. 
There is a no-nonsense, business-like worldliness about this. In fact, the 
distinction between knowledge and skills is blurred; there appear instead 
fluid transactions – knowledge exchange and skills transfer – within a 
knowledge-skills continuum. That blur is the province which the entrepre-
neurial University occupies as an institution now, having colonised the 
vocational institute, the mechanics’ institute, the professional training 
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college, the polytechnic (or, maybe, the latter have colonised the former). 
Perhaps there is no significant difference between knowledge and skills? 
That is the ground on which Alexander’s notion of entrepreneurial literary 
research is erected: the ground of a knowledge-skills continuum. A small 
pause on the distinction between knowledge and skills, if there is any, 
might be worthwhile. The erasure or lack of such a distinction might have 
some implications which we are missing here, which are possibly germane 
to Alexander’s desire to persuade entrepreneurial leaders. 
I find myself interested then in the connotations of ‘skills’: knowledge 
of skills by way of getting to grips with knowledge and skills. And three 
points cross my floundering mind, each attached, as is my wont, to 
consecutive historical junctures. I shall consider them by turn.   
First: under pre-manufacturing conditions, perhaps skills is to know-
ledge as techne is to episteme in classical Greek philosophy; the functional 
and practical on the one side and the systematically thought-through on 
the other. The interplay between them rather than a theory-practice binary 
may have left an imprint on the present-day presumption of a knowledge-
skills continuum. The interplay in the Platonic version of techne and episteme 
seems to me most to the point here. For instance, to put it briefly, 
Socrates argues in The Republic (Plato 1993, Waterfield translation) that just 
as the skills of farming, pottery, driving chariots, using weapons, etc. are 
cultivated as definite areas of expertise, when it comes to seeking the 
meaning of ‘justice’ or ‘truth’ that too involves a definite area, that of 
philosophical knowledge. By cultivating philosophical knowledge the 
philosopher could become expert in these ideas and thereby become 
skilled in governing. In making this argument, Socrates refers to the 
precedent authority and validity of skilled work to claim the same kind of 
legitimacy for the philosopher’s knowledge; occasionally makes inferences 
from skilled work to derive persuasive philosophical principles; and then 
illustrates how the latter could inform the skilful practice of government. 
There is a toing and froing here, but the main point is that the usefulness 
of skills is self-evident and knowledge makes its usefulness evident by 
building upon and inferring from how skills work. This usefulness gives 
rise to the skill of government, but that does not involve the philosopher 
telling the farmer how to farm, the potter how to make pots, and so on.  
Second: amidst systems of manufacture and mechanisation, skills are 
understood more in contradistinction to lack of skills than to knowledge. 
Skills seem to be somewhere between lack of skills (being unskilled) and 
having knowledge (being knowledgeable). Being skilled is clearly seen as 
superior to being unskilled and somewhat vaguely understood as being 
partially or functionally knowledgeable. Some of the complexities of this 
view can be contemplated by considering Adam Smith’s characterisation 
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of ‘skilled labour’ in Wealth of Nations (1976 [1776]), with manufacture 
firmly in view and industrialisation within the perceptible prospect:  
 
When any expensive machine is erected, the extraordinary work to be per-
formed by it before it is worn out, it must be expected, will replace the 
capital laid out upon it, with at least the ordinary profits. A man educated at 
the expence of much labour and time to any of these employments which 
require extraordinary dexterity and skill, may be compared to one of those 
expensive machines. The work which he learns to perform, it must be 
expected, over and above the usual wages of common labour, will replace to 
him the whole expence of his education, with at least the ordinary profits of 
an equally visible capital. It must do this in a reasonable time, regard being 
had to the very uncertain duration of human life, in the same manner as to 
the more certain duration of the machine.  
The difference between the wages of skilled labour and those of common 
labour, is founded upon this principle. (118-9) 
 
Here, skills are exercised by persons who contribute passively to processes 
of production larger than themselves. Skills are mechanical functions with-
in those processes. Smith’s equation of skilled worker and expensive 
machine is noteworthy: the skilled worker does what a complex machine 
might, something mechanical (in action). And there is a threat there, and 
not an empty one: the skilled worker may be replaced by something 
mechanical (in fact), a machine, especially if it is less expensive than him. 
The larger process of production within which the skilled worker is 
inserted to do mechanical work – a process conceptualised as anterior to 
the skills needed for it to keep going – is where knowledge is located. This 
is the capitalist’s knowledge when he works out what the skills are for. 
Alternatively, it is the machine-maker’s knowledge, which can replace the 
worker with a relatively inexpensive machine. In the interim before that 
happens, the machine-maker’s knowledge informs the worker to the 
extent of being a mechanical stop-gap (skills him, extrapolates and hands 
over the functional bits of his knowledge). The skilled worker’s value can 
be understood only in terms of the unskilled worker’s (the common 
labourer), as a kind of bottom line of production. The unskilled worker is 
on the lowest threshold of the capitalist’s calculations, or is someone to 
whom the machine-maker’s knowledge is of no relevance (perhaps already 
more dispensable than a machine).   
Third: in industrial society, it occasionally seemed that there is more to 
skills than simply being a mechanical derivative of knowledge. Greater 
experience of industrial life and workers’ movements suggested that there 
is. I am reminded of an anecdote by Raymond Williams (1970 [first 
published 1968]), in the midst of pondering the purposes of higher educa-
tion, which, at that point, after fifteen years of teaching in adult education 
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and nine in the university, he felt well-placed to consider. He recalls 
meeting a miner as a tutor for a summer-school literature course on novels 
about working-class life, who suddenly observes: ‘I can’t explain to 
anybody what my work is’ (Williams 1970: 214). Williams wonders 
whether this was said by way of questioning the authenticity of the novels 
he was teaching, but the miner says that his observation was not about 
them, it is he who is unable to explain. Williams probes, suggests that he 
does have a sense of what the miner does, the miner asks him to demon-
strate by drawing it, Williams complies, the miner appears not dissatisfied 
with Williams’ effort, and simply makes some corrections to the drawing. 
Williams feels, ‘Some crucial point had been passed and the rest of the 
week went better’ (215). No further explanation of this exchange is 
offered. However, clearly an understanding is established here between 
Williams’s articulate knowledge and the miner’s practice of skilled work. It 
is established that each has something to learn from the other, and on a 
level playing field – this is not a master-student relationship, or, if it is, that 
is as both being master and student to the other by turn. There is 
knowledge in the worker’s acquired skills and skill in the tutor’s thinking 
about working-class narratives. 
But what of post-industrial society? In relation to skills and knowledge, 
it seems to me that the present social order involves the crystallisation of, 
so to speak, a third party to skills and knowledge. This third party is in fact 
involved in all the three historical junctures above, implicated in the three 
illustrations I have chosen to characterise those junctures. This third party 
develops gradually through those contexts, and acquires a ubiquitous 
integrity in our time. In each of those junctures, knowledge and skills work 
in a mutually regarding and intertwined manner; this third party appears 
sometimes as aligned to knowledge, sometimes as aligned to skills, and 
always as assuming a position of power with regard to both and, interest-
ingly, indifferently to both. It grows into the ruling entrepreneurial leader 
in the University and Ministry of our time. So, let me revisit those three 
historical junctures by turn again to trace how this third party appears and 
develops.  
First: a split appears between this third party and the philosopher in 
Plato’s dialogue Gorgias (1994, Waterfield translation). The third party 
seems to have something to do with rhetoric, and, for Socrates and his 
interlocutors, Gorgias’s rhetoric seems to have some apparent similarity to 
Socrates’s philosophy. But there is a slippage between the common 
convictions (doxa) that rhetoricians build upon and the skilled practice – 
techne – that Socrates occasionally appeals to and reaches for: rhetoric may 
or may not be just, may or may not be productive as techne is, may simply 
consist in the exercise of power as a game and irrespective of effects. It is, 
however, not rhetoric in itself (the rhetorician per se) that is the third party 
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whom Socrates as philosopher has to engage; it is a particular bent of self-
interested power. It appears embodied as Callicles in the third part of the 
Gorgias dialogue. Callicles knows his privileges and knows how to maintain 
them, and his engagement with Socrates is also active disengagement, 
imbued with a thorough-going cynicism. He goes along with Socrates’s 
arguments at times, gives in to careful rationalisations, mocks him 
throughout, humours him occasionally (when his more engaged rhetori-
cian companions plead with him), simply dismisses him at others. His 
contempt for Socrates’s arguments, which seem to him the occupation of 
the unworldly waster, a youthful indulgence which sits ill on an old man, 
cannot be dented: the more passionate and earnest Socrates’s arguments, 
the less Callicles hears them.    
Second: the third party in relation to Adam Smith’s characterisation of 
the skilled worker has a kind of conceptual heritage from and a less visible 
appearance than Callicles: it appears in the perspective, in the voice, with 
which Smith himself delineates the skilled worker. The third party is the 
person with capital who has to find a reasonable system for dispensing 
wages to maximise the profits from his productive enterprise. Above, I 
put this on the side of the precedent knowledge which instrumentalises 
(mechanises) the worker’s skills, alongside the machine-maker’s knowledge 
which may come to replace the skilled worker with a machine. But the 
capitalist’s knowledge here (the principles of which are laid out in Wealth of 
Nations) is quite different from the machine-maker’s, who has, really, only 
the merest presence in Smith’s reckonings – whom I have discovered by 
implication rather than encountered clearly in the quotation. The machine-
maker’s knowledge is academic (scientific, technical), and it shares some  
common ground with the skilled worker’s knowhow, even if it may take 
away the skilled worker’s livelihood. Both the machine-maker and the 
skilled worker are engaged with the process of production and are invested 
in the product, with honing the process and realising the product. The 
capitalist who dispenses wages to the skilled worker and may invest in the 
machine-maker’s projects is actually not interested in the process or prod-
uct themselves, only in the profit margins that may be realised from them. 
To the capitalist’s calculations it does not matter whether it is a skilled 
worker or a machine that does the work, and what the skills involved are 
and what the principles of the machine are. All he is interested in is using 
and controlling all those to the purpose of enhancing the profit margin in 
a sustainable manner. He does not need to hear either the skilled worker 
or the machine-maker, only use them both adroitly.  
Third: Williams’ anecdote appeared in an article, “The Teaching Rela-
tionship,” first in The Guardian in 1968, and then in a 1970 volume (Educa-
tion for Democracy, David Rubinstein and Colin Stoneman eds.) carrying 
articles concerned with – differing from – the Black Papers. The Black 
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Papers were a series of conservative critiques of progressive UK govern-
ment education policies (conservative and progressive here do not trans-
late straightforwardly into Tory and Labour party), in particular objecting 
to policies designed to democratise education and disperse its benefits 
more evenly. They argued that doing so will compromise ‘quality.’ These 
were published in the Critical Quarterly in 1969 in the first instance, organ-
ised by Brian Cox and A.E. Dyson, and Cox continued to publish further 
interventions till 1977. The conservative direction later merged with both 
Tory and Labour government education policies. Williams’s article was not 
a direct response to the Black Papers, but nevertheless spoke trenchantly 
against their drift. That was precisely because of the kind of equalising 
exchange of knowledge-skills, the fluidity of the student-master relation, 
captured in that anecdote; and further, because of similarly equalising 
views on how curricula should be set and assessment conducted in the 
university. Williams notes various problems of ‘internal control’ which his 
views could encounter; that is, internal to the relations between students 
and teachers, internal to the academic body. However, in this perspective 
of higher education, the common ground between skilled worker and 
scholar, student and teacher, is centred. And from this perspective 
Williams is able to articulate the perspective of the third party that bears 
upon both as an extrinsic force: 
 
The real difficulty comes when this process [of negotiations within the 
academic body] is short-cut by external administrative decision, as happened 
all too often in the bureaucratic structure of some modern adult education, 
and as happens very often in universities […]. The toughest issue is not the 
complication of internal control, which with effort, patience and of course a 
necessary militancy of demand, can be got right. It is a very complicated 
question of social demand, and hence social control, of a public educational 
system. There have been some ugly attempts recently to exert repressive 
controls; and in any case the sophisticated financial management, by which 
control is really exerted in Britain, is now very dangerous to universities, as it 
was constantly dangerous in the more exposed and poorer conditions of 
adult education. (Williams 1970: 219) 
 
The jump from there to the present condition of the University – the 
entrepreneurial University – is not too difficult to make. There is little that 
could be regarded as internal or external to the University now; there is 
instead the neuterness of the public good as a wedding of profits and 
benefits across all sectors, including the University. There is little to distin-
guish the public from the private educational system. No mutually-
regarding negotiations between skills and knowledge are possible, because 
there is a skills-knowledge continuum with fuzzy boundaries. There is no 
worker in the picture, only students and employers. But most importantly, 
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there is the universalisation of that sophisticated financial management 
whereby control is really exerted, not as a complication or a difficulty but 
as the celebrated path of progress itself, enunciating the public good in its 
own terms. However, it bears upon the University without a specific inter-
est in either knowledge or skills themselves, as the content of life, forged 
by and forging living processes and beings. It only registers those insofar 
as the outcome of profits and benefits for some putative public good can 
be put into account books. The third party does not stand on the side but 
reigns in the midst of knowledge and skills: with the attitude of Callicles, 
the rational capacity and limitation of Adam Smith’s wage-giving capitalist, 
claiming the endorsement of a social demand and doing sophisticated 
financial management. I think of this third party, embodied in the 
academic leader of the entrepreneurial University and the bureaucrat in the 
education Ministry, as a neo-Callicles.  
This neo-Callicles is short-sighted. He can see the usefulness of skills 
and can only hazily apprehend knowledge and is able to consider the rela-
tionship between them very dimly, if at all. So, he might try to get rid of 
knowledge and extrapolate skills, as if skills are free-floating faculties. In 
the process he may thereby stultify skills. That is, until the account books 
are out of kilter, when he will blindly restructure everything and wait for 
something to happen. The neo-Callicles does not really hear any kind of 
argument which looks more like knowledge (even if it bears upon skills) 
and less like purposive skills (even when knowledgeably presented) – 
neither from the skilled nor from the knowledgeable. He is accustomed to 
thinking that he knows better already and feels a kind of contempt about 
thought that is deeper than a puddle and does not serve entrepreneurial 
calculation.  
I very much doubt whether even Alexander’s obsequious appeal to the 
neo-Callicles on behalf of entrepreneurial literary studies can get through. 
It sounds much too neo-Socratic.  
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35. Targeted Cynicism and Parasitic Authority  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suman Gupta 
  
There is a curious deafness that insulates Alexander’s arguments through-
out from being argued with. Since these arguments coincide with the 
dominant entrepreneurial order of the present – championed by leaders of 
corporations, the University, the Ministry – this deafness is more a larger 
establishment attitude than an individual quirk of Alexander’s. If the liter-
ary researcher says, ‘We do close reading principally to understand the 
relation of text and world for the benefit of all’; Alexander says, ‘You may 
think so, but actually it is to serve profit-making interests in ways that you 
either don’t realise or don’t admit to.’ If the professor says, ‘Publicly 
funded research in the University is for generating benefits for all, and that 
shouldn’t be distorted by profit making’; Alexander says, ‘You may think 
so, but nevertheless what you do actually realises profits and that’s a good 
thing – in fact, your conviction to the contrary may itself be useful for 
profit making.’      
This kind of argument expresses no curiosity about the reasons that the 
literary researcher or the professor may offer, let alone engaging with 
them. Instead, the argument consists in systematically disbelieving and 
disregarding what the researcher or professor claims, based on the assum-
ption of a higher or truer insight and purpose (knowing better). I think of 
this as targeted cynicism. It typically takes the form of performing 
attentiveness to claims from ‘below’ while tacitly discounting them in 
advance – sometimes designedly co-opting from what was claimed from 
‘below’ so as to manoeuvre against it.  
I use the term ‘cynicism’ advisedly. Several histories of its connotations 
from the Greek Cynics to the present (Cutler 2005, Mazella 2007) consider 
the powerful opprobrium that ordinarily attaches to the term now after 
starting as a normatively ambiguous and even positive philosophical 
attitude. Now ‘cynicism’ appears to describe a general attitude of disen-
chantment with a large sphere (humanity in general, claims of veracity, a 
political order, an organisation, etc.), usually entertained by eccentric indi-
viduals or a more or less dissenting or alienated group or mass (workers, 
employees, citizenry, etc.). Two turns in analyses of the current resonances 
of cynicism are especially worth pausing on here.  
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One has a particular relevance to academic researchers, including liter-
ary researchers: the universalisation of cynicism as a prevailing condition 
of society, in the midst of pervasive media and spin cultures. ‘Postmodern 
cynicism’ seemed to consist in interrogating concepts of authenticity in 
such comprehensive and sophisticated ways that it effectively rendered all 
political commitment and engagement ineffective. Put otherwise, the 
assumption of political ineffectiveness became the cynical precondition for 
cogently articulating the universal capture of postmodernism. As it turned 
out, the most searching critiques of such postmodern cynicism came in 
terms of progressive political commitment and as an assertion of academic 
self-reflexivity – most cogently in Peter Sloterdijk’s Critique of Cynical Reason 
(1983 [1987 in English]), castigating such ‘enlightened false consciousness,’ 
and followed up severally thereafter (e.g. Bewes 1997). Such a studied 
universalisation of cynicism is also the spur to rearticulating progressive 
political commitment within academia, a commitment to working against 
and yet through cynicism.  
The other turn is in a smaller sphere: the corporate organisation. The 
understandable purpose of research on organisational cynicism has been 
to manage or deter its appearance amongst workers or employees so that 
the organisation remains productive. Here cynicism is considered, in 
keeping with its dominant normative connotations, as being unproductive 
or resistant to production or, worst, negating production. An unorthodox 
twist in this approach was offered in Ian Cutler’s influential article “The 
Cynical Manager” (2000). This tried to clarify the positive dimensions of 
cynicism by recovering some of its Classical philosophical thrust, and by, 
even more unusually, focusing on leaders rather than workers in corporate 
organisations. Cutler was modest about the prospects of the cynical 
manager though, but encouraging about the role this person could play as 
a middle-level leader: 
 
He or she is a member of a universal community and is not concerned with 
narrow, ‘patriotic’ preoccupations. […] The ‘cynical manager,’ in any case, 
regards most espoused knowledge as hearsay, being several times removed 
from the original source; and further, regards this knowledge as having been 
distorted and coded into models which have increasingly less relationship to 
any current reality.  
However, because the ‘cynical manager,’ as with all other cynics, is still 
treated with some wariness, he or she will always play a ‘marginal’ role in any 
given community or organization. This does not mean, however, that the 
‘cynical manager’ will have only marginal influence. Having the ability to 
remain clear minded and calm during times of chaos, maybe even causing 
chaos, the ‘cynical manager’ will ask embarrassing questions, engage others 
in debate, and speak the truth which nobody wants to hear. This role, an 
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adaptive and resourceful response to organizational repression and rigidity, 
has its effect in challenging the status quo […]. (Cutler 2000: 309) 
 
Cutler (2005) later found other positive roles for his version of cynicism, 
but this is the one of interest here. This characterisation of the cynical 
middle-level manager is a compromise position between leader and worker 
or employee, almost too bold already as a contribution to the journal 
Management Learning. It stops well short of considering the comprehensive 
targeted cynicism which makes upper-level managers upper-level. However, 
Cutler’s description of the cynical middle-level manager’s open-
mindedness does point tacitly towards the closed-mindedness of the 
upper-level manager’s targeted cynicism. Targeted cynicism is what the 
upper-level manager exercises exclusively towards workers and employees. 
This kind of cynicism is exercised from the vantage point of a completely 
uncynical faith in – a blinkered immersion in – the entrepreneurial purpose 
of the organisation. From that vantage point the upper-level manager finds 
it unnecessary to register arguments from ‘below’ which do not either 
already comply with his or which cannot be manoeuvered so as to be 
silenced. It is cynical about everything it perceives to be ‘beneath’ its self-
appointed ‘high’ position.  
By way of a quick demonstration of how targeted cynicism works from 
the leader’s perspcctive, consider this bit of advice for corporate leaders 
on how to deal with cynicism among employees – cynicism that ‘keep 
organizations from changing’:  
 
Cynicism: It is human nature to believe that planned change is doomed to 
failure, and we will naturally suspect anyone who is trying to change us […]. 
Cynicism is a common concern of change agents. They feel that leading 
change leaves the initiator open to criticism. One must learn not to be afraid 
of criticism. Rejection is just a sign of resistance to change and has nothing 
to do with the value of the idea. The only way to effectively counter cynicism 
is to strengthen those who believe in the change. Spending time trying to 
change a crisis is not valuable. What is valuable is reinforcing your position 
and those who support it, by overwhelming the opposition with the facts 
about the change. Critics change their tune quickly when faced with serious 
and focused opposition. It is often good to approach critics in an open 
forum with the facts. It is harder for them to resist the change is they openly 
must explain their resistance. This method is good if the change can be 
shown as positive, but one must make sure to have all the details in order to 
avoid falling victim to the cynic. A good cynic will have good and often 
logical reasons for their resistance and if one is not able to counter their 
response, it is not a good idea to challenge them openly. Cynicism can spread 
quickly if a group does not see the individual benefit. (Curlee and Gordon 
2011: 78) 
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The ‘one’ this quotation is companionably addressed to is the group 
manager or leader (in the corporation, University, Ministry). This leader 
knows in advance that his leaderly idea cannot be rejected from ‘below’ 
(by the group) because ‘Rejection is just a sign of resistance to change and 
has nothing to do with the value of the idea.’ It is a foregone conclusion 
that rejection cannot occur because the idea has no value – is stupid or 
ignorant, for instance. The rest follows: do not listen to critics; use the 
support of those who already agree with you; cynics in the group with 
logical arguments are best not engaged with; others in the group should be 
discouraged from hearing them. That is targeted cynicism from the lead-
erly perspective against the interrogative or alienated cynicism of workers 
and employees.  
Alexander’s mode of arguing has many features of such targeted 
cynicism. His arguments develop by appearing to hear but without quite 
hearing, or hearing only what can be turned against the speaker. It is the 
targeted cynicism of power.  
Is there any research exploring the relationship of the targeted cynicism 
of leaders to the interrogative or alienated cynicism of workers? Perhaps 
the former causes the latter? If this targeted cynicism of leaders is not 
noticed by the latter it effectively does not exist. 
This is where the situation in the entrepreneurial University and 
Ministry presents a conundrum. Researchers in the entrepreneurial Univer-
sity are sharp at spotting the workings of targeted cynicism because they 
have contemplated the postmodern universalisation of cynicism and are 
able to (self-reflexively) critique it – to recognise it and work against it 
through it. The targeted cynicism of power confronts the self-aware 
critique of postmodern cynicism in the entrepreneurial University, and it is 
inevitably an abrasive encounter.    
Despite deploying such targeted cynicism within his own arguments, 
Alexander also sharpens the abrasiveness of that encounter. This is 
because Alexander is seemingly driven by a need to explain more than is 
necessary, without a discernible entrepreneurial purpose. It seems as if 
Alexander is laying out the entrepreneurial rationale with its habitual 
targeted cynicism for the sake of doing so – perhaps for the pleasure of 
unravelling its intricacies, a kind of intellectual game. This peculiar project 
clarifies the workings of the targeted cynicism of power in the University 
and Ministry here in a different way. 
The necessary basis of the entrepreneurial leader’s targeted cynicism is 
his absolute conviction in the profit-making rationale itself, the raison d’être  
of such leadership. The entrepreneurial authority conferred by this con-
viction works coercively; it works by not listening, by its presumption of 
being pre-validated. In Alexander’s account, the manner in which such 
entrepreneurial authority works in the University – works with effect on 
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literary researchers particularly – is laid bare through the relationship bet-
ween Academic Research and Corporate Research (from II.20 onwards). 
His explanation of how a seemingly unbusinesslike practice like literary 
close reading, which confers literary scholarly authority, can be mediated 
(extrapolated from, condensed into gists) by Corporate Researchers to 
enable profit making by corporate and University and Ministry leaders 
puts an unflattering perspective on the latter. Alexander is, in fact, a bit 
cynical about the kind of scholarly authority that the literary researcher 
acquires through close reading. His account of it in II.25, “Literary Close 
Reading,” has a sarcastic edge: such scholarly authority is built on a 
circular and fuzzy logic, he suggests. But it does have the weight of having 
pursued and done something carefully and methodically. In contrast, by Alexander’s 
account, the kind of processing the Corporate Researcher does to render 
scholarly outputs profitable – to actuate “Profitable Close Reading” in 
II.26 – is little more than a derivative exercise. It is moreover a derivative 
exercise which is indifferent to the intergrity of what had been carefully 
and methodically done. The authority garnered through the derivation of 
Corporate Research from Academic Research and put at the service of 
entrepreneurial leaders in the University, Ministry, corporation is merely a 
kind of parasitic authority. It is based on bowdlerising the outputs of 
scholarly authority; that is, bowdlerising scholarly outputs so as to take 
credit for and profits from them.     
No one knows this better than the researchers who do the research 
that is thus bowdlerised. They can be browbeaten or bought out to be 
subservient to the entrepreneurial authority exercised variously in the 
University, Ministry, corporations, but they cannot really take it seriously. 
They cannot but suspect that enterpreneurial authority is lodged vampire-
like on the body of scholarly authority.      
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36. Literary and Commercial Value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alexander Search 
 
A common preconception that many literary researchers share is that 
literary value is attributed in ways that are indifferent to commercial value. 
The process through which literary researchers understand the (literary) 
value of, for instance, Joyce’s Ulysses as text is not affected by the process 
through which a publisher, book dealer, book buyer, collector puts a 
(monetary) value on the book Ulysses, or, for that matter, a heritage-
tourism firm or a publicity agent may estimate the value of the brands 
‘Joyce’ and ‘Ulysses.’ The latter may factor in the former, but the former is 
indifferent to the latter.  
Literary value suggests an estimation of the significance of the literary 
text Ulysses. That may be understood in terms of a general consensus 
among critics and discerning readers, the putatively intrinsic qualities of 
the text, or both. This significance can only be characterised in imprecise 
and relative normative terms (from a ‘boring story’ to a ‘work of shattering 
genius’), which need to be constantly reconsidered through updated inter-
pretations and analyses. Commercial value suggests a measurement of 
Ulysses as a marketable item (in a transferrable and exchangeable form, as a 
book or as a recognisable brand-device), determined by the costs of 
producing that item and/or the utility of that item. This measurement can 
be expressed in precise monetary terms for specific market conditions. 
With regard to the marketable item Ulysses, its commercial value may take 
account of the text Ulysses’s literary value insofar as the latter affects the 
marginal utility of the former. But that does not mean that commercial 
valuation pays attention to the mechanics of literary evaluation. The 
mechanics of literary evaluation has its contained circuit; the mechanics of 
commercial valuation merely takes account of a collateral effect of literary 
evaluation within its own contained circuit. The principles underpinning 
the processes of the two circuits are considered to be separate.  
There are, of course, areas of literary research where this distinction 
may appear to be obscured. In practice, however, it is seldom wiped out. 
Under the framings of ‘genre’/popular/commercial/mass-market fiction 
studies, or of popular/material/everyday culture studies, or of publishing 
studies, or book- and reading-history, literary researchers often investigate 
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the commercial aspects of literary works. On occasion, this has led into 
close readings and literary interpretations which seem to attribute literary 
value on the back of commercial value – or, rather, to conduct literary 
evaluation of texts because they have been extraordinarily commercially 
successful as books or brands. Thereby, literary critics may decide that an 
unusually commercially successful work is also significant in a literary 
sense, is worthy of being highly valued as literature. But, even then literary 
researchers are unlikely to assume that its commercial success and literary 
significance are coterminous, that the one is the same as the other. Rather, 
it is considered that such a text is commercially successful and also worthy 
literature (and possibly, commercially successful despite being worthy 
literature).  
More often, when literary researchers analyse texts because of extraor-
dinary commercial success, it is precisely the nature of commercial success 
rather than the literary qualities of the text that is in focus. Literary 
interpretation of the text is then purposed to throw light on the literary 
market and what clicks therein. Though the text is then estimated for its 
ability to tap into the market, its literary value might continue to seem 
doubtful or to be pegged as irrelevant for this purpose (‘it is not great 
literature but…’). Researchers pursuing this line of research might then 
begin to feel sceptical about literary evaluation, its snobbish disregard for 
the market and the common reader and economic pragmatics, its elitist 
preciousness. Around the late 1980s in the UK and USA, when the turn 
towards institutionalised Theory led to the emergence of Cultural Studies 
out of Literary Studies, often carving out spaces from Literature Dep-
artments, thrusting cultural theorists denounced the elitism of ‘literature’ 
and called for new estimations of textual value (e.g. Bennett 1990, 
Easthope 1991, Smithson and Ruff eds. 1994, Cain ed. 1996). It seems 
that where commercial (more broadly, economic) valuations are factored 
into textual study, literary value is either put aside or declared defunct.  
Most often, where commercial factors have not been factored into 
literary evaluations by researchers, they might come to feel that the work’s 
commercial career should also be considered. That is unlikely to change 
the literary value attached to the work, but could be pursued to clarify 
historical contexts so as to somehow further underline the literary evalua-
tion. This may be undertaken in a fact-finding spirit (‘I can’t think of 
anything interpretive to say about Ulysses which hasn’t been said already, so 
let me look at its production and market history’), or in the spirit of 
exploring a curious phenomenon (‘It is odd that a difficult text like Ulysses 
managed to not just find an immediate audience but has constantly stayed 
in print – let me explore how that happened’). Here research into the 
commercial value of a literary work is motivated by an estimation of 
literary value, as an afterthought, precisely because the two lines of value 
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are not expected to coincide. Nor, in such cases, is a straightforward 
relationship sought. Such research is generally premised on how two lines 
of valuation may have worked in detached and yet mutually regarding ways 
– at least, insofar as commercial value has factored literary value into the 
marginal utility of the marketable literary item.  
So, there is literary value and there is commercial value – different 
gauges. Literary researchers may attend to both but are careful not to mix 
them up, to be clear about the separate mechanics of valuations involved, 
the separate principles at work. Outside academic spheres things may 
seem confused. A reader with little interest in measured evaluation but apt 
to make quick, subjective judgments may say, ‘This Book has sold so well 
because it is a literary work of staggering genius,’ and others – especially 
entrepreneurs – would happily agree. But the literary researcher would 
demur. And so would the informed publisher, reviewer, reader, etc. The 
two lines may also seem to blur into each other because the language of 
literary commerce and that of literary research sometimes overlap. But the 
rigorous literary researcher does not fall for that seeming common ground. 
In this regard, Suman has recently argued that the use of the word ‘genre’ 
in the commercial discourse of ‘genre fiction’ and in the scholarly 
discourse on ‘literary genres’ traces an institutional competition for the 
control of ‘literature’ (see Gupta 2016).          
However, despite the powerful preconceptions and practices which 
ensure the separation of commercial and literary value, the connections 
between these kinds of valuation are increasingly of moment. There is a 
meaningful relationship. Even in their principles and dynamics, the two 
lines of valuation are more connected than the literary researcher usually 
suspects.  
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37. Measuring Values in the Cultural 
Industries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alexander Search 
 
The preconceived distance between literary and commercial value outlined 
above (in II.36) is, obviously, with regard to gauging literary works – as 
texts or as marketable items and brands. Here, instead of the term 
‘commercial value,’ I will use the more inclusive ‘economic value.’ The 
term ‘commercial value’ simply stresses a particular purposing of ‘eco-
nomic value,’ and otherwise has substantively the same meaning. 
The preconception in question is held by literary researchers, who 
usually regard themselves as significant arbitrators of literary valuation. It 
is also held by other litterateurs who play key roles in determining literary 
value – by authors, performers, producers, reviewers, reporters and other 
such discerning readers. But the preconception is also largely accepted by 
those who regard themselves as arbitrators of the economic value of 
literary works: owners and share-holders, leaders or managers in an 
enormous range of entrepreneurial sectors within which literary works are 
implicated – across the so-called ‘cultural industries.’ That includes 
enterprises to do with media and entertainment, publishing and retailing, 
tourism and heritage, publicity and advertisement, education and training 
(including the University and Ministry). That is: those aspects of these 
enterprises which are, at any level, informed by or deal with what they 
consider to be literary texts and marketable items are generally oper-
ationalised after accepting the difference between economic and literary 
values. Moreover, other kinds of cultural work with similar valuation 
practices (aesthetic or artistic value, ethical value) also understand their 
economic valuations with analogous preconceptions. Incidentally, ‘cultural 
industries’ should not be conflated with Frankfurt School characterisations 
of the ‘culture industry’ – a popular but vague phrase, redolent with 
moralistic high sentence but a bit obtuse with regard to entrepreneurial 
rationales and economic precepts.  
Unsurprisingly under these circumstances, little sustained investigation 
of the relationship between literary and economic values has been under-
taken. Their separation has seemed too obvious to be reconsidered 
carefully, and has usually been reiterated in practice. That is another way 
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of saying that those who should be most interested in reconsidering this 
relationship – literary researchers – are usually ill-equipped to do so. 
Literary pedagogy, like scholarship, is premised on being indifferent to 
economic value. Literary researchers are often too innumerate or lacking 
in technical capability to explore the relationship. The few recent and 
sustained studies that explore the interfaces of literature and economics, 
usually take the separate valuations as a first principle. They tend to focus 
on questions of representation, the processing of literary production in 
economic terms, and generally within a demarcated historical context (e.g. 
Pfaff 1989, Watts 1990, Woodmansee and Osteen eds. 1999, Gagnier 
2000, Lewis 2000, Clune 2010, Mack 2014, Hutter 2015). Fortunately, 
leaders in the University and bureaucrats in the Ministry have realised that 
it is necessary to reconsider such separated value systems. They have 
consequently devised strategies to encourage rethinking. Such strategies 
both encourage the development of entrepreneurial acumen (mainly 
through research funding and reviewing mechanisms) and foster greater 
numeracy and technological competence among researchers (beyond 
simply being software users, e.g. by focusing resources on ‘digital humani-
ties’).   
I turn, therefore, towards certain speculations for the further consider-
ation of literary researchers, as their entrepreneurial acumen and techno-
logical capabilities are developed by the University and Ministry. As 
observed above (in II.36), the separate ways in which the literary value (of 
literary texts) and economic value (of marketable literary items and brands) 
are conceived is grounded in different modes of expressing valuation.  
The literary value of a text is characterised in imprecise and relative 
normative terms (good/bad, complex/simple, original/clichéd, percep-
tive/shallow, captivating/dull, important/trivial, and so on), according to 
consensuses that emerge at different junctures of interpretive exchanges. 
These normative terms allow a notional gauging of the significance of 
literary texts. A necessary degree of subjectivity is accepted in such char-
acterisation: i.e. it is understood that no declaration of literary value repre-
sents a firm consensus, but may represent a strongly argued or dominant 
view. It is always possible to disagree with or reconsider any literary 
valuation.  
The economic value of literary items and brands is expressed in precise 
monetary terms in relation to specific market conditions, determined by 
the costs of producing that item and/or the utility of that item. Each 
element of the production costs is itself similarly calculated and expressed 
as economic values (of labour, material, infrastructure, etc.). The economic 
value of the literary item or brand therefore seems objective for the given 
market conditions, leaving little scope of disagreement.  
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The degree of subjectivity allowed in normatively expressing literary 
valuations admits the agency of the interpreter or reader in determining 
value (though often unwillingly admitted by dominant interpreters and 
reading majorities). The appearance of objectivity in economic value as 
expressed in monetary terms seems to imbue the marketable literary item 
or brand itself with value (in relation to the objective circumstances of the 
market). The expression of value in monetary terms draws on a precisely 
graded scale enabled by the money-form of measurement (i.e. in money-
units). So, understanding monetary terms is of some importance in 
contemplating the relationship of literary value and economic value with 
regard to a literary work.            
At this point, I am reminded of a conceptual step which seems to be 
relatively rarely pondered, though well known: all apprehension of value is in 
the first instance subjective, whether that is understood in terms of need or desire, grasped 
as aesthetic or ethical or functional, perceived in relation to things or experiences – and, 
in the first instance, is expressible in relative normative terms. The first step in 
conceiving any kind of value is subjective. This first step is most lucidly 
(though wordily formulated) in the Analytical Part of Georg Simmel’s The 
Philosophy of Money (1978 [1900]). Briefly, Simmel thought of the monetary 
expression of economic value as a method for rendering the subjective as 
objective. That move follows mainly two steps. First: there is the recogni-
tion that subjective valuations and claims conflict and compete with each 
other and therefore need to be surrendered or asserted. Second: that leads 
to setting up, where possible, exchange mechanisms – accepted and 
negotiable standards of economic value – to process different subjective 
apprehensions and claims with collective (objective) legitimacy. Thereby, 
value seems to be transferred to relationships between objects rather than 
between persons: ‘the subjective process, in which differentiation and the 
growing tension between function and content create the object as a 
“value,” changes to an objective, supra-personal relationship between 
objects’ (Simmel 1978: 79). Monetary measurement provides a method of 
expressing the supra-personal relationship between objects as those 
objects’ economic values; the system which enables and regulates transac-
tions and behaviours on the basis of monetary measurements is the market 
and, more broadly, the socio-political and economic world.  
Though Simmel’s first conceptual step remains plausible, most of his 
subsequent observations on the materiality and immateriality of money 
now seem anachronistic. Money is, it has turned out, immaterially material. 
And it has proved notoriously difficult throughout to characterise money 
in itself: attempts veer between nominal and commodity descriptions, and 
switch between thinking of money as measure, contract and property. 
Much of this difficulty, in my view, has resulted from trying to infer value 
after the fact of money and market, by taking the existence of money and 
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market for granted or by working backwards from their existing structure 
(‘given that money and market exist, we can say the following about 
value…’). Simmel’s is a relatively rare attempt to start by describing value 
as if prior to the existence of money and market. However, those fractious 
efforts to delineate money-in-itself are useful. They show that definite 
interim steps are needed to understand the value of whatever-is-at-stake 
(the functional, usable, desirable, etc. value of the thing, work, experience, 
etc.) as economic value in monetary terms – which is then thought of as 
the economic value of whatever-is-at-stake.  
The definite interim steps involve: (1) precise and graded measurement 
of the value of whatever-is-at-stake (such as, measurement in terms of 
labour-time, degree-of-usefulness, estimation-of-derivable-pleasure, grade-
of-significance, intensity-of-demand); and (2) a model of the market 
wherein whatever-is-at-stake is available (clarifying the market’s stability, 
predictability, security, equitability, culture, etc.). The model of the market 
is determined by and found within the model of the socio-political world 
where whatever-is-at-stake is manifested (the world described by its 
natural features, legal and governance regimes, cultures and languages, 
histories, etc.). In brief, the world-model secures the market-model within 
itself.  
Precise value-measurement and the given market-model can be jointly 
manoeuvred to confer relevance to each other. Together they can be 
mutually worked upon, in mathematically determinate ways, to negotiate 
the value of whatever-is-at-stake towards the realisation of its economic 
value in monetary terms. Thereby, functional transactions of whatever-is-
at-stake in the market are enabled. So, the precise measurement of the 
value of whatever-is-at-stake is not itself an economic value or a monetary 
expression. The precision of measurement of the value of whatever-is-at-
stake secures its objectivised presence in the world-model. It becomes 
potentially expressible in monetary terms according to the existing market-
model therein. In other words, graded and precise measurement extricates objective 
valuation from all or any kind of subjective evaluation. As and when needed, the 
precise and graded measurement of the value of whatever-is-at-stake 
renders it insertable in the market with some kind of mathematically 
definite calculation of economic value in monetary terms. Precision of 
measurement is the key to possibly realising economic value in monetary 
terms, and activating the market.    
The other aspect of Simmel’s reflections on money which now seems 
anachronistic has to do with his determination to hold certain kinds of 
value (such as aesthetic value) as inexpressible in monetary terms, incom-
prehensible as economic value. That is tantamount to saying that these 
kinds of values are only expressible in vague and relative normative terms 
and not comprehensible in precisely graded measurement – that is, these 
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values always retain their subjective quotient so as to override objectivisa-
tion. At the same time, the Synthetic Part of Simmel’s argument made 
unusually prescient observations on the degree to which monetary value 
penetrates into social and individual life.  
The great realisation of our time is that there is no kind of value-
perception which cannot be measured in a precise and graded way and 
thereby objectivised, however conventionally fuzzy and subjectively value-
bearing they might have seemed. A history of statistical and probability 
analysis lies behind this realisation. Happiness, pleasure, freedom, love, 
suffering, guilt, beauty, intelligence, legitimacy, doubt, prejudice, violence, 
oppression, trust, life (or loss of life), etc. can all be brought within some 
kind of index of measurement, expressed in precise degrees according to 
some standard or paradigm, or organised into some sort of tabular or 
tractable form. It is mainly a matter of finding the right kinds of gauges 
and analytical methods to do it. There is therefore very little that cannot be 
related to, and if necessary transferred into, economic value expressible in 
monetary terms, given a grasp of the world-model in question and the 
market-model within it.    
So, let me go back to where I started from here: literary researchers 
should not simply accept the separation of the literary and economic value 
of literary works as received dogma, and hide behind the ambivalence of 
subjective prerogatives in literary valuation. They should consider carefully 
whether there is in fact a relationship and what it is. This is not so much a 
choice as a responsibility insofar as research is for the public good, and 
needs to keep the interplay of profits and benefits in view.  
Literary researchers then need to do the following kind of research. 
They need, first, to investigate how far it is possible to release their inter-
pretive evaluations from vague relative normative terms and to express 
them in precise and graded measurements. Then they need to do the 
measurements and analyse their findings (the data thus elicited) carefully. 
This does not mean that they need to denormativise their thinking, but to 
metricise their norms; they should not abandon purposive interpretation 
of texts, but show the data-evidenced processes through which interpreta-
tions are reached, validated and rendered effective. There are numerous 
methods and tools out there to ground such investigation: the research is 
in how to use them to measure as precisely as possible the gradations 
within, for instance, binarisitic literary value-terms like complex/simple,  
good/bad, important/trivial, pleasing/disturbing, original/clichéd, percep-
tive/shallow, captivating/dull and so on – with specific texts and contexts 
in view. And then to conduct the measurements and analyse the data 
acquired in rationally robust ways to, as far as possible, come to grips with 
literary value.   
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Beyond that, it is also incumbent on literary researchers to consider 
what bearing such precisely graded measurements of literary value – and 
the measured insights that follow – might have on the existing (or given) 
world-model and the market-model it contains. That means considering 
whether there is any way in which, given these models, the measured 
insights might have a relation to economic value expressed in monetary 
terms. This however involves a strong grasp of modelling the socio-political 
world and the market so as to render these amenable to accommodating 
measured insights into literary value meaningfully. Only then can a 
sufficiently sound way of expressing the relationship of literary value to 
economic value in monetary terms become possible. Some even more 
speculative thoughts than the above on appropriate ways of modelling for 
literary researchers follow soon.  
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38. Doubts 
 
 
 
 
 
Dismal Scientist 
  
Alexander’s research programme as proposed here is straightforwardly 
realisable. There are three challenges. The first is to create indices of the 
various literary characteristics you want to investigate. This should not be 
beyond the ken of literary researchers. The website Metacritic (www. 
metacritic.com) comes to mind, which creates a numerical rating by 
scoring and averaging reviews. I am sure there are multiple other alterna-
tives. Secondly, the researcher would have to add up the returns to literary 
production – royalties, paid speaking engagements, academic positions, 
sponsorships, etc. This is challenging but is essentially a data-gathering 
exercise. Finally, one would need a sufficient number of observations 
properly selected in order to test the correlation between the expression of 
the literary characteristic and the financial returns.  
The researcher would probably want to run regressions which used 
several of the literary-characteristic indices simultaneously to judge their 
joint but separate contributions to financial returns. There are also tech-
nical matters like holding countries or eras constant and correcting for 
inflation and the purchasing power of different currencies, etc.  
There are only a few possible results in principle. The index and the 
returns may be uncorrelated or only weakly correlated. They may be 
positively correlated or negatively correlated.  
But has Alexander set a trap for himself? Are these results really inter-
esting? If literary quality and financial returns are positively correlated, he 
might see this as perhaps some support for his views. But what if they are 
negatively correlated – as quality goes up, returns go down. If it does not 
matter if the two are positively or negatively correlated for Alexander’s 
argument, why bother with expending so much effort? If they are 
uncorrelated, would this be fatal for Alexander’s argument? Of course, 
something is always better than nothing in occupying the researcher’s 
work time. 
 
Alexander Search 
  
Dismal Scientist has jumped ahead with the prospective project I was 
considering by: first, setting out a straightforwardly practical method for 
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potentially establishing a correlation between literary value and economic 
value; and, second, by speculating on the kinds of correlation that might or 
might not appear. I had carefully avoided going that far above (in II.37), 
especially speculating about the kinds of correlation – but I am glad he has 
jumped ahead, because that means I now have to be upfront about my 
thinking here.  
Let me go along with Dismal Scientist’s method in the first instance 
(before inserting some necessary complexity there), and say that he is right 
in thinking that the kind of correlation (positive or negative) does not 
matter. In fact, by assuming some kind of normative proportionality 
between literary and economic value (he uses ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ 
normatively, not neutrally as for, say, polarity in electromagnetics) he has 
already presumed that there are normative paradigms which work in the 
same way for literary and economic value. Every financial speculator 
knows that this is not the case, that such proportionality of normative 
correlation is irrelevant: profits can be made however that correlation is 
characterised, and benefits can thereby follow.  
Actually, I suspect that the outcome Dismal Scientist glosses over is 
the most likely: I would be very surprised if any firm correlation can be 
established from the data for graded literary value and economic value of 
literary works – I mean, firm in the sense of being able to express the 
correlation as ‘economic-value-is-a-function-of-literary-value’ for literary 
works. I think one would have to be very fortunate with the data to come 
up with this, given that it is social data, and such firmness would actually 
be troubling in various ways … but let us not go there.  
The lack of a firm correlation however does not mean that acquiring 
the two kinds of data and seeking correlations in the way Dismal Scientist 
outlines would not be useful. At the least, it will enable numerate corres-
pondences to be loosely suggested if not firmly calculable, and thereby 
justify an open research project for ongoing measuring and charting. This 
means that it will be possible to test whether the articulation of some 
loosely suggested correspondence at one point cannot, simply by articula-
tion, be brought to influence the relationship towards behaving more like 
a firm correlation at a later point. In brief, if we say loudly there is nearly 
robust objective evidence that literary value according to the index of 
‘complexity’ has a proportional relationship with economic value, then the 
loudness and seeming robustness of that observation may influence the 
relationship sufficiently to actually realise it, to bring about a firm correla-
tion. But I appreciate that what I am saying here sounds like using statis-
tics rhetorically rather than simply for descriptive analysis. That is 
intellectually unsatisfactory, though that is in fact one of the most practical 
aspects of how social statistics works.  
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The more intellectually satisfactory way forward is not merely to collect 
the two sorts of data as Dismal Scientist suggests and then do a series of 
regression analyses to seek a correlation, but to compute with the two 
sorts of data within some modelling boundaries. The modelling bounda-
ries essentially enable the introduction of a necessary number of direct and 
indirect variables according to specific market- and regime-features. Some 
of these variables are uncontrollable or only controllable to a very limited 
degree: Dismal Scientist mentions a few (inflation, exchange rate fluctua-
tions, political interference), these call for correction operations or for the 
appointment of provisional constants. Some of these variables could be 
controllable, and the model can test the effect of designedly modifying 
these variables, or, for that matter, introducing new variables. For instance, 
increasing or decreasing the numbers of producers, changing production 
technologies, introducing certain kinds of media and publicity coverage, 
making certain kinds of costing decisions, moving markers of status 
recognition, establishing links to other forms of cultural production, etc. – 
these are all controllable variables which can be factored into the model 
according to the existing situation or according to a prospective design. 
Predictive factor analyses and planned insertion/removal/manipulation of 
controllable variables in such management modelling could go a long way 
towards nudging firm correlations into existence even between value-sets 
which do not show a firm correlation initially at the descriptive modelling 
stage.  
Some speculations on how literary researchers should approach the 
business of modelling will come next.  
 
Fabio Akcelrud Durão 
 
I think Alexander has made some real progress here, but perhaps he does 
not realise the extent of the changes that would follow from his sugges-
tions – or perhaps he knows them quite well and is pretending not to, so 
as to better put forth his agenda. Be that as it may, the problem is that the 
reduction of literature to value eventually destroys the very idea of litera-
ture, whatever consistency it still may have. Traditionally, value has been in 
a tense relationship to truth. On the one hand, they are opposed to each 
other. Truth is one and is not relative; it is either convincing or it does not 
exist and is useless. Under a regime of truth, literary works are not an end 
in themselves, but rather vehicles for something that lies beyond them. It 
may be the case that they can express this ‘something’ (e.g. a truth about 
society or the psyche) in a more embodied, sensuously gratifying way than 
pure conceptual knowledge. In this sense, conceptual and literary know-
ledge would differ just in their mode, not essence. But it may also be that 
literature points to a kind of truth that would be unattainable otherwise, 
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thus making literary truth of a unique kind. On the other hand, however, 
value and truth are connected as a consequence of each other. Value must 
be, however minimally, grounded on arguments supported by aesthetic 
experience; such arguments have to be accepted as true to be able to 
justify value. Truth, as discovery, unveiling, etc. is something special, not 
an everyday occurrence, and thus is naturally seen as something valuable. 
Alexander’s proposal of total valuation of literature erases any trace of 
truth and with that there is nothing sustaining literature as a kind of 
specific, valuable discourse. Literature will expand to include almost any 
book, including, say, Harry Potter and Paulo Coelho. Moreover, in this 
context of enhanced quantification the literary researcher will have to 
increasingly rely on arguments of authority, naturally leading market 
experts to question his expertise. After all, if we are dealing with numbers 
here, why not just ask consumers directly about their taste? Why get 
someone to define what is valuable if we can just ask the people? In short, 
the road Alexander opens is a road that eventually undermines the exist-
ence of the literary professional (professor, critic or researcher) as a self-
determining agent. As I said, I do not know if Alexander is aware of this, 
or if this is actually his aim. 
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39. Modelling as Literary Research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alexander Search 
 
Thinking in terms of ‘modelling’ (verb) here, for social and economic 
contexts, involves both current senses of the noun ‘model’: as representing 
an existing system or structure, and as characterising a desirable system or 
structure. Modelling thus consists in a process whereby the first is 
achieved and, with that as the basis, the second is determined. Modelling 
also works amidst the process of moving from the current system/ 
structure towards the desired system/structure: by factoring in develop-
ments and new observations, making interim adjustments to the model, 
and, when necessary, modifying the outcome. Critically, in the process, 
modelling also has a predictive role – enabling strong predictions. That 
involves making inferences about the consequences of specific inter-
ventions in the current system/structure so as to gauge whether those 
impede or encourage movement towards the desired system/structure. 
Modelling thus includes simulating social processes and thereby informing 
real-world policies and strategies before they are implemented. Import-
antly, in modelling an existing system/structure, the more data obtained 
through precise and graded measurements of factors that modellers have 
the better the model would be, and the more robust its predictive 
capacities.   
The kind of modelling in question here consists in the following. First, 
preparing models of the existing systems/structures of Academic Research 
so as to understand what profits and benefits are relatedly derived for the 
public good at present. Second, thereby modelling systems/structures 
whereby the profits and benefits of Academic Research can be increased 
or maximised. And third, considering how precisely we may move from 
the first to the second model (via policy and strategy interventions). The 
literary researcher needs to engage with such modelling insofar as literary 
products (texts, items or brands) enable the generation of profits and 
benefits for the public good, and particularly insofar as literary pedagogy 
and scholarship have input therein. This seems to me an obviously neces-
sary project for literary researchers now.      
At present, literary scholarship is ill-equipped to make a meaningful 
contribution to any of those steps. Data drawn from precise and graded 
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measurements of literary value-norms are very indifferently developed, 
and the relationship thereof to the economic value of literary products 
barely understood. Even the indices and analytical methods for obtaining 
such data are little considered. The speculative project outlined in II.37, 
“Measuring Values in the Cultural Industries,” merely consists in iden-
tifying appropriate indices and methods for precise measurement, so as to 
start putting together databases. Those are necessary first steps to be able 
to even contemplate engaging with the three steps of modelling above.      
Arguably, however, that effort is unlikely to be undertaken unless there 
is some reasonable conception of what those databases will inform: social 
modelling. The three-step modelling project outlined above is seldom con-
templated in any detail by literary researchers. On the contrary, possible 
convergences between literary research and the underpinning concepts of 
social modelling have often been negotiated in such a way as to discourage 
that project. They have been negotiated so that precise measurements 
seem impossible, and the formation of usable databases appears un-
necessary. Two tendencies have played a particularly debilitating part: the 
disciplinary insularity of literary scholarship, and a preference for the most 
diffuse formulations of social and economic theories. Literary researchers 
have invested heavily in both. For literary researchers to engage with 
modelling projects as outlined above, it is necessary for them to first 
disinvest from both tendencies.   
Given the current condition of literary research, it is obviously very 
difficult to articulate what precise sorts of modelling projects literary 
researchers should engage in – we are as yet too far from being able to 
start. But it is possible to consider how literary researchers could disinvest 
from those two tendencies and thereby rethink social concepts so as to 
inform productive modelling projects. To that end, a few notes follow on 
two social concepts which have already informed literary scholarship to 
some degree: ‘social systems’ and ‘cultural capital.’ With some rethinking, I 
suggest, these could be turned towards productive modelling projects by 
literary researchers. I consider them by turn.    
 
Social Systems  
One of the few junctures at which literary researchers tried seriously to 
make common ground with social systems theory was when Niklas 
Luhmann’s particular take on it appeared, mainly in the 1980s and 1990s 
(especially with the publication of Social Systems 1984, in English 1995). 
Social systems theory in various guises were well established since at least 
the 1950s in sociology, economics, political science, management studies, 
social psychology, communication studies and so on. The manner in 
which literary researchers took Luhmann on board is revealing: it was 
either to characterise ‘literature’ as a social system in itself, with discrete 
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parameters, or to illustrate some Luhmannian formulation with reference 
to literary devices in texts. Robert Holub (1994) marked these trends in a 
useful summary of German literary researchers’ use of Luhmann. Holub 
felt that: ‘Unlike past and current attempts to revitalise or reform literary 
studies, systems theory has done little more than add a layer of technical 
vocabulary to phenomena that have been recognised and analysed for 
many decades’ (Holub 1994:150).  
That this technical vocabulary could be used to claim a distinctive 
space within the burgeoning and institutionalisation of Literary Theory at 
the time, especially apropos of Derridean deconstruction, was an incentive 
(in this vein Schwanitz’s early publications, especially 1987 and 1995, 
proved influential). More generally, for literary researchers the appeal of 
Luhmann’s version of social systems lay in his main contribution to it: the 
formulation of autopoietic systems. It seemed that the discreteness of a 
system could be accounted through a deontological and momentary app-
rehension of its elements. This promised the possibility of describing 
‘literature’ as a discrete system with perpetually received features, composed of 
cognitive, communicative and conventionalised elements. Luhmann’s Art 
as a Social System (1995, in English 2000), describing art as an autopoietic 
system (including literature, see Luhmann 1995: 25 and passim thereafter), 
gave authoritative backing for that promise. Only incidental comments on 
economic and political systems were offered, i.e. insofar as those appear 
amidst the intellection of texts.   
Little has happened since to dislodge the idea that literature should be 
described as a discrete social system, though nuances from cybernetic and 
scientific knowledge systems have occasionally been imported to that end 
(for overviews, see Fokkema and Ibsch 2000: Ch.6, and Clarke 2011). 
Such an approach seems to me to be obviously and implausibly limited. It 
appears to present literature and literary scholarship as purely manifested 
in texts and archives, composed of elements which operate within and via 
texts. It carefully elides the production and dissemination processes 
involved. It wipes away the economic calculations and institutional reck-
onings and political subscriptions (social systems all) which penetrate and 
suffuse literature without overt inscription within literature or literary 
scholarship. It also seems to remove literature and literary research from 
any possible access to the kind of modelling outlined above. By this 
account, it seems that literature and literary scholarship can only be 
modelled as a singularity – removed from economic, political, cultural, 
technological, etc. systems unless those are conceived within literature and 
are textualized accordingly.  
To enable the kind of modelling described above, it is expedient for 
literary researchers to disinvest from conceiving of literature and literary 
research as a discrete system. It is necessary instead to invest in thinking 
KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION 
167 
 
about literature and literary research as factors (or as sub-systems) within 
more complex and inclusive social system models. In such a model, liter-
ature is one among various factors which interpenetrate and modify each 
other continuously. In toto this model would approximate a socio-political 
world system, and necessarily contain a market system within it. Such 
complex systems models give little purchase for autopoietic conceptions 
of discrete areas at a received moment; they are more dynamic in charting 
interpenetrations, change and progressive production.  
To begin such a complex modelling project, some sort of focal point (a 
conceptual fulcrum) would be useful, such as could accommodate litera-
ture and literary scholarship as a significant (chartable) factor. Appointing 
a focal point in complex systems modelling does not mean confining 
research to discrete disciplines. It simply means starting with a system 
where boundaries are definable but porous and overlapping, from which 
input and output loops through other systems are tractable. The obvious 
focal point that suggests itself here is one where systems analysis has been 
most productive: the organisational unit with a management apparatus. 
For the purpose of literary researchers, for instance, the focal point could 
be the higher education and research organisation (the University and 
Ministry), with input and outputs loops stretching across various corp-
orate, governmental, legal, cultural and other organisations and sectors and 
regimes. To take a manageable path, literary researchers may usefully start 
with systems principles developed between, say, Talcott Parsons’ Social 
Systems (1951) and David Silverman’s Theory of Organizations (1971). They 
could then undertake modelling of the higher education and research 
organisation accordingly, and first locate the place of literature and literary 
scholarship therein. Data sets on the latter elicited by precise and graded 
measurement could then be fed into the model. Then further levels of 
methodological nuancing could be introduced according to developments 
in social systems thinking since.   
But I am jumping the gun. What data and models literary researchers 
can most productively work with will become apparent only if they disin-
vest from the notion that literature is a discrete, self-referential social 
system – and that is the point.  
 
Cultural Capital            
To place literature and literary research as a factor or sub-system within a 
complex social system, the concept of ‘cultural capital’ offers some 
obvious advantages. Literary researchers have taken recourse to it mostly 
when they wish to step outside the embrace of a discrete disciplinary field 
of ‘literature’ (composed of texts with literary value shining out of texts for 
the discerning and scholarly). As a factor within cultural capital, literature 
and literary scholarship appear amidst a network of relationships with 
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other factors bearing cultural capital (architecture, education, consumer 
goods, art, etc.). These all overlap with or are transferable to or are 
exchangeable with other kinds of capital (social, and, especially, economic 
capital). Altogether, a complex structure of systems constituted by organi-
sations (educational, legal, administrative, economic, etc.) and thereby 
socio-political world arrangements (with social stratifications, conventional 
values, habitats, environments, etc.) can be articulated.  
When literary researchers wish to place some aspect of literature as not 
predominantly emergent from texts but as constituted by markets, institu-
tions, political interests, etc. they find the concept of cultural capital to be  
helpful: for instance, to understand literary canon formation (e.g. Guillory 
1993) or the significance of literary prizes (e.g. English 2008). But these do 
not go as far as modelling literature within complex social systems in the 
above sense. These do not try to clarify the existing model so that it can be 
engineered towards maximising benefits and profits. They usually assume 
that there is a model out there, vaguely apprehensible, which is momen-
tarily put into relief by focusing on a literary issue. At present, if some kind 
of modelling in relation to literature is contemplated, it is considered to be 
the prerogative of sociologists of literature, or, more likely, sociologists of 
culture, or, even more likely, researchers of cultural industries. Somehow, 
it is not considered quite the task of the literary researcher.  
But it is, or should become, the task of the literary researcher.  
For this task, Pierre Bourdieu’s sense of cultural capital is of limited 
use, attractive as it is to literary researchers. That is useful for the literary 
researcher who contributes to modelling insofar as Bourdieu (1983, in 
English 1986) simplified it into several types and even considered their 
correlation to economic capital. But he did this so circumspectly that, in 
fact, correlating is discouraged:  
 
economic capital is at the root of all the other types of capital and […] these 
transformed, disguised forms of economic capital, never entirely reducible to 
that definition, produce their most specific effects only to the extent that 
they conceal (not least from their possessors) the fact that economic capital 
is at their root, in other words – but only in the last analysis – at the root of 
their effects. (Bourdieu 1986: 255)  
 
The reasons for this are best understood by contemplating the larger 
account of cultural capital in Bourdieu (1975, in English 1984), where it 
converges with the economic indirectly, by actively appearing separate. 
The appearance of separateness, he argued, enables the maintenance of 
class divisions and privileges. In this account, in fact, correlating is impos-
sible because the measurement of cultural capital is of a different order 
from economic capital. Where the latter works functionally only in precise 
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and graded measurement, the former is effective in implicitly vague 
normative terms. In the most habituated and internalised enunciations of 
cultural capital, which naturalises the class structure and its concomitant 
social order, it is vagueness more than precision which is necessary:  
 
All the agents in a given social formation share a set of basic perceptual 
schemes, which receive the beginnings of objectification in the pairs of 
antagonistic adjectives commonly used to classify and qualify persons or 
objects in the most varied areas of practice. The network of opposites 
between high (sublime, elevated, pure) and low (vulgar, low, modest), 
spiritual and material, fine (refined, elegant) and coarse (heavy, fat, crude, 
brutal), light (refined, lively, sharp, adroit) and heavy (slow, thick, blunt, labo-
rious, clumsy), free and forced, broad and narrow, or, in another dimension, 
between unique (rare, different, distinguished, exclusive, exceptional, singu-
lar, novel) and common (ordinary, banal, commonplace, trivial, routine), 
brilliant (intelligent) and dull (obscure, grey, mediocre), is the matrix of all 
the commonplaces which find such ready acceptance because behind them 
lies the whole social order. The network has its ultimate source in the 
opposition between the ‘élite’ of the dominant and the mass of the 
dominated, a contingent, disorganized multiplicity, interchangeable and 
innumerable, existing only statistically. (Bourdieu 1984: 468)   
   
The logic of the binaristic value-terms of literary evaluation noted in II.37, 
“Measuring Values in the Cultural Industries,” is given here as intrinsic to 
the very conception of cultural capital.     
Obviously, Bourdieu’s views in this respect are more ideologically 
driven than useful for the kind of modelling project outlined above. The 
literary researcher’s modelling draws upon precise measurements of 
literary value and other factors, including economic value, in substantial 
databases and focuses on organisations within complex social systems. 
This researcher can neither consider that the correlations between all 
factors are impossible and nor accept that cultural capital (which includes 
literary value) has to be grounded in vague normative binaries. On the 
contrary, the first step is to have precise and graded measurements of 
literary value – indeed, of cultural capital generally.  
Fortunately, the ground for this has been prepared by Academic 
Researchers who have adopted Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital 
without going with his ideological subscriptions, and have brought it to 
the fields of educational and organisation research. Precise and graded 
measurement of cultural capital for school students were offered on the 
back of Bourdieu’s formulation, even as it was being received and assimi-
lated, by Paul DiMaggio (1982). DiMaggio was careful in limiting the 
scope of his measurements with Bourdieu’s objections in mind (he had 
reviewed Bourdieu’s work and its limitations carefully, see DiMaggio 
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1979). In fact, measuring cultural capital and considering Bourdieu’s 
formulation are now quite different matters, and the former can be done 
in its own terms and without much fussing about Bourdieu. Direct corre-
lations between cultural, social and economic capital can be anticipated 
thereby. Along those lines, the measurements for all forms of capital, 
including the cultural, offered by James Spillane, Tim Hallett and John 
Diamond (2003) have an alluring directness about them. Their paper also 
has a salutary focus on the intersection of educational institutions 
(elementary schools) and organisation-systems more generally (focusing on 
leadership and followership).  
The above observations on social systems and cultural capital suggest, I 
hope, a way forward for literary researchers to engage with precise mea-
surement and modelling projects. Thereby the benefits and profits to be 
garnered from literary research would become considerably clearer and 
could be functionalised by the University and Ministry.     
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40. On Alexander’s Projects  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suman Gupta 
 
I find Alexander’s project outlines in II.37, “Measuring Values in the 
Cultural Industries,” and II.39, “Modelling as Literary Research,” to be 
unusually boring – especially the latter. Perhaps he needed to be long-
winded and dry to put across arguments which he felt literary researchers 
are not interested in and therefore not necessarily informed of. It might be 
possible to do precise measurements of literary value, build databases and 
do systems modelling as Alexander suggests. I do not want to have 
anything to do with it. That is not why I teach or do research on literary 
matters. Quite possibly, most literary researchers feel as I do in this regard. 
I suspect that is part of the point Alexander is quietly making here, or, 
if it is not, that is the main point I take from these observations any-
way. My lack of interest, probably shared by many in literary studies, does 
translate into ignorance of metrics and modelling. I realise that it is not 
literary researchers who are most likely to engage with the projects 
Alexander outlines (despite his insistence), and nor are they needed to. 
Exactly such projects, focused on literary value or cultural capital and the 
economic value of literary items and brands, can be undertaken by any 
quant in the accounting or computing unit of the University, Ministry, 
Corporate Research Provider – or, if a bit more rigour and imagination 
seems desirable, an economics or statistics or engineering Academic 
Researcher could be put to work on it. This project does not need literary 
researchers. What is needed from literary researchers can be obtained from 
them without involving them in the projects. They can simply be asked to 
contribute to a survey or two, fill in a questionnaire or two, record a few 
interviews and so on, for their input to be sufficiently elicited. 
I also realise that metrics and modelling can then be used by the Uni-
versity and Ministry to engineer literary research towards beneficial and 
profitable models of academic work for the entrepreneurial public good. 
When that happens, literary researchers will be ill-placed to interrogate 
those moves. They will be unable to argue with the rationale of metrics 
and models because they are too ignorant and uninterested in it. They will 
quickly lose possession of what they consider to be their discipline, their 
area of specialisation. 
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So, it is perhaps expedient for literary researchers to take possession of 
the projects Alexander describes so as to be able to keep possession of 
what they have. But these are boring projects. 
With those thoughts in mind, I have, with many stifled yawns, read 
Alexander’s proposals fairly carefully. Three thoughts crossed my mind. 
First: where the systems-based modelling project he describes does, in 
one sense, introduce a level of complexity, it also, in another sense, 
proceeds by constant reductions of complexity. For instance, appointing 
the Academic Organisation as a focal point for modelling, in terms of 
which other systems are located, courts the danger of reducing complexity. 
It could involve factoring out aspects of valuations and other processes 
which are germane to literature but not of tractable interest to the focal-
ised organisation. A similar reduction of complexity occurs where he 
mentions how Bourdieu’s understanding of cultural capital is disregarded 
by those who provide graded measurements of cultural capital. The latter 
exercise involves applications of precise gauges, practical mensuration 
tools, which effectively fail to capture the fuzzy dimensions of cultural 
capital. To make fuzziness clear is to disregard fuzziness as an existing and 
functioning feature. In fact, it seems to me that all the possibilities of 
converting vague normative evaluations into precise and graded valuation 
that Alexander mentions may involve reduction of complexity – may entail 
choosing one gauge for clarity from the many intricately interwoven 
gauges that could be relevant and work jointly. If databases are formed 
through reduction of complexity, then the modelling undertaken may well 
be skewed. In that case, by Alexander’s terms, the predictive capacity of 
models could be adversely affected. Bad predictions and consequently 
deleterious interventions may follow. 
Second: for the purposive modelling project Alexander envisages (from 
an existing to a desirable model) it is possible that modelling decisions may 
interfere in the reality which is modelled. The reality being modelled may 
adapt to modelling decisions, especially if they become known in the data 
collection phase and before the model is completed. For instance, if a 
book retailer comes across precise measurements of literary value, she 
might begin advertising books in their terms rather than the conventional 
norms (pronouncements by authorities). But the graded and precise 
measurements are in fact obtained to model literary transactions which in 
reality work through conventional norms. So, advertising with precise 
measurements may influence book consumption and reading habits and 
change the underlying reality that is being modelled. If that happens, then 
the model-in-progress becomes redundant before it becomes usable, 
before a desirable model can be envisaged from it. It then becomes 
impossible to say whether any desired model that can be inferred is valid. 
If policy interventions are made on an existing model which is out of 
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synch with the reality, then they may be detrimental to rather than 
productive of profits, benefits, and the public good. 
Third: Alexander’s projects seem to be designed to absolve leaders in 
the University and bureaucrats in the Ministry of responsibility for their 
entrepreneurial decisions, and indeed to disable political critique and 
action generally. This is an old argument against the systems-based think-
ing that Alexander takes for granted here (in line with Habermas’s 1987 
critique of Luhmann’s formulations, though Alexander has not quite gone 
along with Luhmann). Management responsibility and political agency 
seem irrelevant because all actions and consequences can be thought of as 
emerging from and returning to the internal dynamics of the models. 
Everything can be explained away as arising from the limitations of 
models, which can be constantly modified to putatively overcome revealed 
limitations. If some University boss consults a model to make disastrous 
interventions, causing losses and conflicts, then the boss can plead that it 
is the model that is responsible, not he (if a fall-guy is needed the data-
providers can be blamed, or, at a pinch, the researcher who did the 
modelling). And yet, if literary researchers warn this boss of disastrous 
consequences before he makes those interventions, he could overrule 
them by pointing to the robust predictive capacities of the model. The 
system-based model becomes the stand-in for agency and responsibility, 
which are then removed from the political sphere. 
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41. Disqualifications and Qualifications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fabio Akcelrud Durão 
 
I have just two comments on Alexander’s proposals in II.39, “Model-
ling as Literary Research.”  
Concerning models, I believe them to be unfeasible in this context, not 
because of their instruments of analysis or their methodology, but due to 
the nature of the object. In the way I see literature, it is impossible to talk 
about literary discourse. The adjective ‘literary’ cannot be given to any group 
of writings based on a set of determinate traits. The Russian Formalists 
debunked that in the 1920s already. The word ‘literary’ should be kept for 
successful works, for those which have something interesting about them, 
either because of their self-constitution, their principle of construction, or 
due to that which they enable us to see. In fact, both these dimensions of 
the ‘literary’ are closely connected. And to complicate things further, all 
these change historically, for time erodes layers of meaning in works and 
allows them to acquire new ones. Models, then, would be useless because 
they would: (1) either have to establish as their corpus some collection of 
strong literature, which is already difficult to determine, and in any case has 
to do with a very restricted set of texts which have a weak purchase in 
social effect; (2) or dissolve ‘literature’ in the mass of books produced by 
the culture industry at large. Here it would make more sense just to talk 
about texts, or perhaps better, ‘signifying practices.’ And again, to repeat 
something I said before, in this case there would be no need for a literary 
scholar to do the modelling, for any technician could do it on a statistical 
basis. And I wonder if the big industries do not do that already … 
Regarding cultural capital, I believe that there is no way of using the 
concept in a neutral way. It is interesting to note that concepts not only 
bring with them particular semantic fields and webs of association, but 
also suggest forms of use. ‘Cultural capital’ can only be adopted in a 
denunciatory way, as an indictment of society. As a neutral term is falls 
apart, for it cannot exist on its own, can never be presented as such, but 
over the back of greatness or any other positive term. If you say that 
Beethoven has cultural capital just because of a conscious agreement 
among a number of upper class listeners, it becomes unsustainable to 
value him. Once the act of choosing comes to the fore, one could always 
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question why Beethoven should be so valued instead of someone else. In 
short, cultural capital will always depend on a particular ideological game, 
which could be denounced to establish another game. 
 
Dismal Scientist 
 
Suman affects to be bored by Alexander’s latest, but then conducts a 
controlled jeremiad against modelling. I think Suman is worried.   
It is not a coincidence that Suman starts to worry just as Alexander is 
finally on the verge of making his point. I, for my part, was worried that 
Alexander’s attractive project might flounder on an inability to find the 
entrepreneurial return to the literary equivalent of blue-skies research (see 
II.27, “Blue-Skies Research”). But Alexander’s deployment of the concept 
of cultural capital may have solved this problem once and for all. Only one 
further qualification is necessary.  
There is indeed some difficulty in seeing why the University and the 
Ministry would subsidise the acquisition of cultural capital by the individ-
ual researcher, thus depriving this activity of a corresponding objective 
revenue stream. But if we think of the cultural capital as accruing primarily 
to the University and the Ministry (the organisation), not the individual, 
this problem is obviated. The individual researcher’s entrepreneurial 
generation of cultural capital will be financed by the University or the 
Ministry to the extent that this cultural capital redounds or accrues directly 
to them. 
How can the University or the Ministry measure this cultural capital? 
Actually, it does not matter very much. The University or the Ministry can 
delegate this judgment to one of its employees, or employ outside experts 
to make subjective judgments. The fact that a judgment is subjective will 
not disadvantage the academic researcher who can be relied upon to 
correctly identify the consistent elements of this judgment over a short 
time and respond accordingly, as long as the nature of the subjectivity 
does not change suddenly. Alternately, the University and/or the Ministry 
can identify this cultural capital with the production of quantitative 
measures, such as amount of media coverage, or citations in certain jour-
nals. These measures will be more or less adequate, but as the cultural 
capital is to benefit the University and the Ministry, any inadequacy in the 
measures will have to be absorbed by the entity in question. 
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42. The Shrinking Teacher and Pedagogical AI  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suman Gupta 
 
Much as I enjoy futuristic drama featuring intelligent robots, replicants, 
androids, synths, etc., I do not think of these as other than fantastic – 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) as fantasy quasi-human entities, either undiffer-
entiated from human beings or a superior species of faux humans, 
suddenly crossing some line into sentience. But I do take AI as process very 
seriously, and find proportions of AI beavering away everywhere. My way 
of understanding the relation between the human and AI, without trying 
to delineate either, is as a mutually defined process, and goes as follows. If 
at a given time ‘the human’ is understood (by human beings) as the sum 
total of all abilities that are specific to human beings, then the automatiza-
tion of any of those abilities is considered (by human beings) as a transfer 
to AI and a corresponding reduction of ‘the human.’ Thus, as AI grows 
the human shrinks; they have an inverse proportional relationship. It does 
not concern me particularly when only the human and no AI could be 
conceived, or when a point might come when the human might shrink out 
of existence – so that AI becomes indistinguishable from the human, 
perhaps superhuman. I am inclined to think of the correlation between the 
shrinking human and the growing AI as following an asymptotic curve. 
Consequently, impressively wide-ranging as recent reflections on the 
‘posthuman’ have been, they usually seem to me a bit too forward in 
annulling the conception of the human – though these have been of 
particular interest to literary researchers (N. Katherine Hayles, Bruce 
Clarke, Stefan Herbrechter, Manuela Rossini, Mads Rosendahl Thomsen, 
Matthew A. Taylor and others have made substantial contributions, and a 
Cambridge Companion to Literature and the Posthuman 2017 is available). I 
prefer to think in terms of the shrinking human and correspondingly 
growing AI. And I am saying all this here so as to consider one dimension 
of this equation: the shrinking (human) teacher and growing (pedagogical) 
AI.     
The notion crossed my mind as I was going through Alexander’s 
postings on knowledge production above. Let us put the literary re-
searcher aside for the moment (parenthetically noting that posthuman 
conditions of research, particularly research into pedagogy, are also being 
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thought through, see Adams and Thompson 2016, Taylor and Hughes 
eds. 2016, Snaza and Weaver eds. 2015). Let us pause instead on the impli-
cations of what Alexander has been arguing apropos of pedagogic 
programmes in the entrepreneurial University. Alexander’s arguments go 
in interestingly contrary directions from that perspective. With regard to 
teaching close reading and literary interpretation, he maintains that these 
are conveyed by practice and work in practice. If I understand that 
correctly, this means that these are best taught and learned by interaction 
and jointly working on texts – a kind of hands-on instruction between 
teachers and students and between students themselves. The emphasis on 
practice, especially for literary knowledge-skills, centres teaching with 
classroom and tutorial contacts, with direct exchanges and assessment. 
With regard to investigating literary values and their profitable dimensions 
(here teaching is not mentioned directly), Alexander says that precise 
measurement, data collection and system modelling are the way forward. 
Indirectly, that has significant implications for teaching – potentially for 
reducing the need for direct contact and hands-on instruction; in brief, the 
emphasis on practice is diluted. With precise measurements and seemingly 
workable models it inevitably becomes possible to automatize some 
proportion of teaching – to increase pedagogical AI’s contribution and 
shrink the teacher’s. 
This situation is very far from being peculiar to the University. 
Corporate Research Providers have been considering the ongoing and 
coming contribution of AI to all sectors of production with considerable 
enthusiasm. A McKinsey report (2017) offers the following estimate of 
AI’s coming progress, the economic advantages it offers, and the implica-
tions for education: 
 
Overall, we estimate that 49 percent of the activities that people are paid to 
do in the global economy have the potential to be automated by adapting 
currently demonstrated technology. While less than 5 percent of occupations 
can be fully automated, about 60 percent have at least 30 percent of activities 
that can technically be automated. (5) 
 
We estimate the productivity injection it could give to the global economy as 
being between 0.8 and 1.4 percent of global GDP annually, assuming that 
human labor replaced by automation would rejoin the workforce and be as 
productive as it was in 2014. Considering the labor substitution effect alone, 
we calculate that, by 2005, automation would potentially add productivity 
growth in the largest economies of the world (G19 plus Nigeria) that is the 
equivalent of an additional 1.1 billion to 2.3 billion full-time workers. (15) 
 
Education systems will need to evolve for a changed workplace, with policy 
makers working with education providers to improve basic skills in the 
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STEM fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, and put a 
new emphasis on creativity, as well as on critical and systems thinking. For 
all, developing agility, resilience, and flexibility will be important at a time 
when everybody’s job is likely to change to some degree.  
 Finally, automation will create an opportunity for those in work to make 
use of the innate human skills that machines have the hardest time replicat-
ing: logical thinking and problem solving, social and emotional capabilities, 
providing expertise, coaching and developing others, and creativity. […] As 
machines take on ever more of the predictable activities of the workday, 
these skills will be at a premium. Automation could make us all more human. 
(19) 
 
It is evident that leaders of all sorts are pretty safe from AI (insofar as 
considered), and workers of all sorts will have to fill the gaps which AI 
leaves – which is to say that human work will have to shrink to narrower 
precincts for the public good. In a way then, human work will become 
both ‘more human,’ as the McKinsey report puts it, and less human, 
shrunk to a complement of or facilitator for AI as determined by leaders 
(till …). The Corporate Research Provider’s interest in this area naturally 
extends to the entrepreneurial Ministry – all Ministries – too. So, for 
instance, anticipating some economic problems following the Brexit refer-
endum of 2016, the UK government had the following optimistic advice 
in a Deloitte report (2016) on the prospects: 
 
Data from Oxford academics Carl Frey and Michael Osborne, working with 
Deloitte, suggests that in the public sector administrative and operative roles 
are at high probability of automation over the next two decades while other 
public sector jobs – those in the frontline or requiring substantial levels of 
complex thinking – are highly resistant to complete automation but could be 
enhanced by such technologies. Around a quarter of public sector workers 
are employed in administrative or operative jobs which have a high chance 
of automation, based on Frey and Osborne’s estimates. Automation will not 
displace employees overnight – its impact is gradual – but it could see 
861,000 public sector jobs lost by 2030. That would deliver a saving of £17 
billion off the public sector paybill in 2030 compared to 2015. 
 Automation could also help the sector to release surplus real estate. While 
space might need to be adapted for the technology, it is likely a substantial 
proportion of office space currently occupied by the administrative or oper-
ative public sector could be released for sale. Disposing those surplus assets 
could reduce revenue expenditure and generate capital returns. (16) 
  
The growing AI and the shrinking human, as the McKinsey report 
notes, have definite implications for education from an entrepreneurial 
perspective. Those are being mulled and acted upon with considerable 
excitement and trepidation. At present, the sphere where AI’s relation to 
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the teacher in higher education, in University pedagogy programmes, can 
be most effectively developed appears to be online programmes delivered 
from a distance (or rather, without regard for location). Much of this dis-
cussion now revolves around Massive Open Online Courses or MOOCs 
(the debate can be traced from Noble 2002, Trends 2001, to, for instance, 
Rhoads 2015). The numerous celebratory University and Ministry policy 
papers and Corporate and Academic Research publications focused on 
MOOCs however cause some confusion. They give the impression that 
MOOCs are a distinct domain which does not modify that of the 
University and what conventionally happens there; that MOOCs work in a 
separate virtual space while the University remains a concrete institution; 
that MOOCs are the concern of a small specialist coterie in the University 
(particularly beloved of academic leaders) while the rest continue un-
touched. In a way, this is analogous to thinking of AI as entity rather than 
as a process with an inverse proportional relationship with the human. 
MOOCs are a part of the pedagogic AI which is aptly understood in an 
inverse proportional relation to the human teacher in the University (any 
teacher in any university). It is best to put aside the specificities of 
MOOCs as domain in the first instance, and simply consider the peda-
gogic AI and the human teacher in an economic relationship.  
So, here is how the teacher is located in the midst of entrepreneurial 
considerations.  
Two main kinds of costs are involved in a University educational 
programme: infrastructure (classrooms, labs, equipment, material, etc.) and 
employment (for teachers, laboratory technicians, librarians, secretaries, 
janitors, etc.). The returns, which have to include profits, are from some 
combination or all of the following: student fees; public funding (if any,  
possibly according to unit cost per student); sponsorship (e.g. corporate 
investment, charitable donations, bequests). The products of University 
education programmes are understood in terms of certain targets: e.g. of 
employability (which employers can confirm), student satisfaction (which 
does depend a bit on how well students perform in assessments) … is 
there anything else worth worrying about? The achievement of targets can 
be precisely measured by conducting performance and attitude surveys 
and gathering data on post-University careers and incomes. Those can be 
correlated to the costs and returns in straightforwardly monetary terms. 
The overall entrepreneurial direction that any leader in the University and 
bureaucrat in the Ministry would take involves: reducing costs and 
increasing returns while maintaining – and preferably enhancing – the 
achievement of targets (production).       
Let us break that down further for the specific role of the teacher. 
There are four factors to consider here: (1) the costs of the teacher’s time 
that the University has to pay for; (2) the costs of the space occupied by 
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the teacher (and students) that the University has to pay for; (3) the mate-
rials and administrative support that the teacher (and students) need which 
the University has to pay for; (4) the number of students that each teacher 
has to process (which is actually a function of the first three). It appears 
that the costs in each factor can be reduced by introducing AI to some 
degree in each, such that returns stay the same or increase and it seems 
that targets are achieved to the same standard or bettered.  Thus: 
 
(1) Teachers’ time: Time on curriculum setting can be reduced by central-
ising curriculum parameters and making their management automatic to 
a great degree, so that only minimum information on curriculum 
changes have to be fed to the automatic system when called for. Time 
on teaching contact can be reduced by making as many time-consuming 
elements as possible available through machine-managed systems: e.g. 
with pre-distributed online lectures and notes, preparatory online self-
training programmes for students, mechanical feedback where possible. 
Time on assessment can be reduced by introducing automatic grading 
for objective kinds of testing, by routinized assessment feedback, auto-
matic plagiarism checking, automatic grade adjustments across cohorts 
according to desirable performance targets, automatic record keeping 
and student profiling, etc.  
(2) Teachers’ space: Large lectures can be put and managed online, and 
periodically updated, so lecture halls become largely unnecessary (can be 
hired when needed). Tutorials can be organised in virtual classrooms, 
chatrooms and online forums. These measures reduce the need for 
teaching rooms, and enable cost-effective management of less space. 
Teachers’ need for office space is correspondingly minimised – much of 
the teaching can be put under flexible working from home.  
(3) Materials and administrative support for teachers:  Almost all administrative 
support can be automatized to the extent that no special administrative 
or secretarial staffing is needed: record keeping, liaising with students, 
management of registrations and awards, etc. What remains can be 
done by teachers themselves, by simply inputting into programmes 
according to automatic reminders and instructions. Libraries can be 
made largely virtual, and library staff accordingly reduced. Only labora-
tory support and technical services have to be maintained, but those too 
can be centralised and mechanised to some degree.  
(4) Student-Teacher ratio: All the above moves enable more students to be 
processed by fewer teachers. But a key point here is that students have 
to cooperate with this process, so that student satisfaction targets are 
met and optimism about employability prevails – so that the University 
continues to be profitably productive. To engage with automatized 
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learning effectively at the expense of human input, students merely 
need to be persuaded that some degree of machine-aided autodidacti-
cism is profitable, that independent or self-motivated learning are 
sought-after skills by employers. In this, metrics and models can be 
invaluable.  
 
In brief, the shrinking teacher is complemented by growing (and distrib-
uted and coordinated) AI capabilities in the University. Inevitably, the 
profit-making potential of the entrepreneurial University is accordingly 
enhanced, insofar as competition allows.  
What options are there for the literary teacher and researcher given 
these circumstances?  
The obvious options are presented rather well by Alexander through 
this part. On the one hand, literary teachers and researchers can strive to 
maintain a quotient of their work which is not transferrable to AI: such as, 
close reading and literary interpretation as practice, which can only be 
taught and learned through practice, by human contact and interaction. 
This means putting a limit to how far the literary teacher can shrink. On 
the other hand, literary teachers and researchers can try to take possession 
of the value-measurement, data-collection and modelling projects that 
Alexander recommends: in brief, become integrated within the process 
that produces the AI which might bear on literary production. Literary 
teachers can contribute the sources for these projects and literary re-
searchers (often the same person) can learn how to use these sources to 
produce appropriate models. This means contributing to shrinking the 
literary teacher, but in such a way that the literary teacher and researcher 
can control the path of shrinkage to some extent.  
Both these options play along with the inevitable shrinkage of the liter-
ary teacher and, in the long run, therefore the literary researcher – so that, 
if at all, only a minute place will be left for literary scholarship in the 
University as that is understood now. The McKinsey report (2017) offers 
little scope for much remaining of literary scholarship as AI advances and 
policy makers (in the Ministry) work with education providers (in the 
University) accordingly.    
There is a further option, but it is, at present, utterly beyond the reach 
of Alexander, of leaders in the entrepreneurial University and bureaucrats 
in the entrepreneurial Ministry, of Corporate Research Providers. It is 
simply beyond the small and frigid imagination of neoliberal thought. With 
growing AI in relation to the shrinking human, the current dominance of 
neoliberal thought reaches a kind of insurmountable wall. About the 
precincts beyond this, the neoliberal thinker and entrepreneurial actor can 
not only not speak but cannot even conceive so as to pass over in silence. 
But in a way, the path beyond is obvious. One of the conundrums that 
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cuts through all Alexander’s reflections, and through all the reports and 
ideas cited above, is that the inverse proportional relation of AI to the 
human does not mean that human beings are going to disappear. The 
shrinking human is not correlated to the quantity of human beings. The 
shrinking human apropos of AI only relates to what human beings can do 
insofar as that is economically productive, and not to the sheer presence of 
human beings in the world.   
Let me put this in the terms of our time. The obvious fallout of the 
McKinsey report’s (2017) or the Deloitte report’s (2016) observations is 
that the conventional correlation between employment and productivity is 
being broken by advanced automatization. Conventionally, the more 
people in employment the higher productivity was likely to be. These 
reports suggest that productivity will be high even if there is low employ-
ment, in fact, because there is low employment and high automatization. 
So, the segment of the human population which is unemployed and 
unproductive will grow. But the entrepreneurial vision, the neoliberal 
thinker, is unable to conceive of human beings as other than employed 
and productive. The reports cited go through peculiar contortions to 
redistribute human beings to other kinds of productive employment, or 
simply hurriedly gloss over their increasingly numerous but unproductive 
and unemployed presence. There is a kind of moralistic discomfort about 
facing this mass of unemployed and unproductive human beings to come, 
as if they are somehow tainted and morally culpable. After all, being 
productive and unemployed is considered a priori good. Thus, the entre-
preneurial University and Ministry are happy to produce unemployment 
and unproductive human beings by introducing AI in degrees, but some-
how feel that all human beings should still be productive and employed 
and are otherwise not quite human beings.  
Let us get rid of that neoliberal moral opprobrium. There is an older 
way of thinking about this, one that welcomes AI – an achievement of 
painstaking research – and considers that the unemployment and unpro-
ductiveness it will bring about releases human beings from bondage. That 
is, the bondage of being employed and productive within a demanding, 
burdensome, top-down politico-economic system. Instead of characteris-
ing the mass of unproductive and unemployed human beings to come as 
morally culpable, it is possible to consider them as freed human beings. To 
conceive the lives of freed human beings where production and distribution 
have largely been automatized always appears a step too far from the 
present – utterly grounded in entrepreneurial rationales as the present is, 
and from within which we are obliged to speak. But there have been some 
optimistic efforts in that direction. I find myself occasionally returning to 
Herbert Marcuse’s attempt to articulate the order of freed human beings 
in An Essay on Liberation (1969): 
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The new sensibility, which expresses the ascent of the life instincts over 
aggressiveness and guilt, would foster, on a social scale, the vital need for the 
abolition of injustice and misery and would shape the further evolution of 
the ‘standard of living.’ The life instincts would find rational expression 
(sublimation) in planning the distribution of the socially necessary labor time 
within and among the various branches of production, thus setting priorities 
of goals and choices: not only what to produce but also the ‘form’ of the 
product. The liberated consciousness would promote the development of a 
science and technology free to discover and realise the possibilities of things 
and men in the protection and gratification of life, playing with the potenti-
alities of form and matter for the attainment of this goal. Technique would 
then tend to become art, and art would tend to form reality: the opposition 
between imagination and reason, higher and lower faculties, poetic and 
scientific thought, would be invalidated. Emergence of a new Reality Princi-
ple: under which a new sensibility and a desublimated scientific intelligence 
would combine in the creation of an aesthetic ethos. (23-4) 
 
Perhaps literary teachers and researchers are well-placed to develop know-
ledge in terms of freed human beings. Perhaps they cannot be wholly 
subsumed into entrepreneurial rationales and projects.  
 
Fabio Akcelrud Durão 
 
Here is a thought that seems to be tangentially but strangely relevant at 
this point. The eight-hour working day was an important victory of the 
labour movement in the early twentieth century. Its underlying idea was 
that each 24-hour cycle should be equally divided into work, rest and free-
dom to do whatever one wants, including self-improvement as a human 
being. With the development of personal computers, the internet, social 
networking and the like, and with the intensification of the struggle of 
capital against time, this historical achievement has been eroded in several 
sectors of the economy, including some high-paying ones (see Crary 
2013).   
Theodor Adorno’s (1991 [1977]) observations on ‘free time’ relate to 
an earlier period, in which the colonisation of the period of not working 
was still new. What he pointed out was that time which was meant to 
belong to the labourer no longer does, because she had been transformed 
into a consumer. The daily hours not employed in work are used to 
consume goods, either material – to go shopping – or immaterial, by 
passively watching or listening to cultural products. Life became divided 
into physical or mental exertion with no pleasure, on the one side, and 
relaxation without thinking, on the other. Concentration and toil became 
synonymous. In this context, those who might enjoy their work are con-
sidered freaks, potentially disruptive figures. (This may explain the social 
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necessity for the image of the crazy scientist; for someone to be invested 
in her profession, she must be a loony.) Professors are in that class. Their 
work belongs to them and they do not feel alienated from it; that is why 
they could work so much, because the distinction of work-time versus 
leisure-time does not apply to them. That which was an image of 
resistance and dissent to begin with has now become an impulse to further 
exploitation.  
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43. Research Work and Scholarly Publishing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alexander Search 
 
There are a significant number of scholarly publications on scholarly pub-
lishing: over 350 directly relevant books in the British Library, and as 
many academic articles other than those in the journal devoted entirely to 
the business (Journal of Scholarly Publishing, University of Toronto). These 
offer plenty of informative background material. With regard to the 
economic rationale of the relationship between research work (academic 
authoring) and scholarly publishing, however, I am yet to find a book-
length discussion and only a few at paper-length are available (Greco 2015 
is particularly illuminating). Instead of recourse to received formulations 
then, it is best to start from scratch here. By way of a plausible approach 
to this rationale, two steps suggest themselves: first, setting out the 
economic rationale for the standard relationship between authoring and 
publishing in general; and second, using that as a base to consider the 
economic rationale of academic authoring and scholarly publishing. The 
second step should clarify the entrepreneurial impetuses that motivate 
academic researchers and scholarly publishers.  
Further, given our focus on literary research here, certain delimitations 
in focusing on academic authoring would be helpful. So, in the following 
observations on scholarly publishing I focus mainly on the Research 
Monograph, and lead up to it by considering the authored book in general 
first. The Research Monograph has a particular and conventionalised sig-
nificance in literary research, though not necessarily for other disciplines – 
the Journal Research Paper often takes precedence elsewhere, and I will 
consider that too in due course. The kind of Research Monograph I have 
in mind is one that is widely regarded as least profitable, least likely to 
generate significant profits for the publisher or author. As a rule of thumb, 
I have in mind the PhD dissertation that is converted into a Research 
Monograph and marketed as such by a publishing firm – the Scholarly 
Publisher. This sort of Research Monograph comes with a double signifi-
cance: explicit ratification of professional standards from the University in 
conferring a PhD, and acceptance of larger market possibilities from a 
Scholarly Publisher (in offering a publishing contract). Of course, there are 
some intermediate steps that researchers have to take to convert their PhD 
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dissertations into published monographs – let us put those aside. I have in 
mind the dissertation-to-book as a rule of thumb: that is to say, a great 
many Research Monographs are of this generic sort, irrespective of whe-
ther they began as PhD projects. Given my focus on this putatively less 
profitable form, other obviously profitable kinds of research publications 
are not considered here: such as, Research Monographs by celebrated 
(star) scholars; and ‘cash cows’ like textbooks and guidebooks, encyclopae-
dias and other reference books, and (of particular relevance to literary 
research) biographies and broad-ranging or popular histories. The kind of 
Research Monograph in focus here is considered a baseline of low profit-
ability; the relative high profitability of other kinds of research publications 
is self-evident by contrast.  
Let me get back to that first step, an outline of the economic rationale 
for the standard relationship between authoring and publishing in general. 
So as to have a simple template to depart from (a kind of ‘original 
contract’), let me elide some significant issues, such as, the differences 
between specific legal regimes (e.g. country-wise in relation to copyright, 
licensing, limits on expression). And let me reserve discussion of certain 
issues which have an enormous significance for scholarly authoring and 
publishing: digital and open-access publishing, subsidies for publication, 
self-publication. I will take those up in due course. The main points of the 
economic rationale for the standard relationship are embedded in a 
standard publishing Agreement between (to use the legal terms for parties 
involved) an Author and a Publisher in relation to the General Book. With 
an emphasis on the costable exchanges in such an Agreement, and without 
going into the nitty-gritty of legal regimes, the following points cover the 
general economic rationale. 
(1) The Agreement outlines conditions for the sharing of investments and proceeds 
(particularly profits) between Author and Publisher in producing and disseminating the 
General Book. For the purposes of the Agreement, the General Book exists 
only from the point at which it is spoken of between the two parties and 
especially from the point at which it is authored (as a proposal, as a work-
in-progress, or as a complete manuscript). For the sake of simplicity, let us 
consider that this Agreement is only from the point at which the General 
Book exists in material form as a whole. Nevertheless, it is understood 
that some costable prior factors bear upon the Agreement, even if in 
unstated ways, especially: the work expended on and therefore the owner-
ship of the pre-contracted General Book by the Author (usually covered 
by ‘originality’ clauses); the Publisher’s existing infrastructure for materially 
producing and disseminating the General Book. For both Author and 
Publisher the Agreement may further be inflected by somewhat intractable 
considerations of standing and reputation (status and brand).  
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(2) The Publisher’s investment – financial outlay – is principally in: enabling 
a public claim of the quality of the Book’s contents (e.g. through assess-
ments by readers and by market experts, by offering the confirmation of 
its own brand); the material production of the General Book (turning it 
out as a marketable and consumable item, e.g. printing costs); ensuring the 
quality of the General Book in the process of production (e.g. copy editing 
and proof reading, design); complying with legal regulations related to 
producing and marketing the General Book (e.g. various licensing and 
registration fees); the distribution of the General Book in the open market 
(e.g. through agencies and retailors or by its own outlets); publicity and 
customer liaison (various forms of advertising and raising public awareness 
of the General Book). ‘The open market’ is such mainly in principle; in 
practice the Publisher reserves the prerogative to profile and target the 
market as it sees fit, but it is considered that the Publisher’s and Author’s 
best interests are served by securing the largest realistic market for the 
General Book. That often means directing the General Book to the largest 
market that is, so to speak, pre-prepared for or pragmatically available to 
it.  
(3) The Author’s principal investment is implicit in the existence of the pre-
contracted General Book and her possession of it for the purposes of the 
Agreement. This can be thought of in various costable terms: the time and 
effort (the work) of writing it, the monies put into being informed enough 
to write it, etc. The value put on this investment is variable (negotiable) 
and does not feature explicitly in the Agreement, but it is recognised 
implicitly in the Agreement through clauses on sharing of proceeds. The 
Author’s further investments are stipulated in the Agreement and attach to 
relatively minor parts in the production process (also work), and consist 
mainly in responding to assessments of the content of the General Book, 
contributing to editing and proof reading, and (perhaps) contributing to 
some aspects of publicity.  
(4) The returns on investments by Author and Publisher are mainly determined in 
the Agreement by terms of payment: either an upfront payment (a fee) from Publisher to 
Author at time of Agreement, or a proportional distribution of proceeds from sales of 
the General Book between Author (in the form of royalties) and Publisher (all profits 
apart from royalties). To understand the rationale of the former, some sort of 
market standard for such upfront payments needs to be considered or 
consulted. The familiar latter, a royalty arrangement, is more the standard. 
The proportions of the profits that go to the Author (as royalty payments) 
and to the Publisher could be regarded as indicative of the weighting of 
their respective investments – and/or as a weighting according to the risks 
taken by each in making their investments. There are wide variations here, 
but the lion’s share is usually and understandably the Publisher’s by a wide 
margin. It is difficult to put an indicative figure here: if I said, 10-12% for 
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the Author, that will seem somewhat beneath average to some Authors 
and way above average to some Authors, but it gives an immediate sense 
of proportions. The scale of the proportion is not really material; more 
important is the fact that it is a proportion of profits – so, the Author’s 
return on investment can be understood as proportional to the General 
Book’s performance in the market. The Author’s return on investment is, 
so to speak, market-tested unless an upfront fee is received. The Pub-
lisher’s share of returns is always dependent upon the General Book’s 
performance in the market.  
(5) As far as the economic rationale of the relationship between authoring and 
publishing goes, the returns on investment for both Author and Publisher are the key 
factor to consider. All other factors – such as matters of reputation, cultural 
capital, public interest, etc. – are secondary considerations or outside the 
economic rationale.   
With this five-point account of the economic rationale for the standard 
relationship between authoring and publishing in general before us, it is 
possible to understand the economic rationale for scholarly authoring and 
publishing as departing from this standard.  
In an immediate way, we could say that the academic researcher’s work 
as author – the Academic Author’s work – is now more emphatically to 
the Scholarly Publisher’s advantage, and the Scholarly Publisher’s profits 
from such publishing are therefore more obviously secured, than in the 
standard and general relationship outlined. Two principal circumstances 
enable this: first, the Academic Author makes her investment without 
regard for financial returns (sometimes considerably more investment than 
authors in general); and second, there is a well-defined and largely closed 
market (though apparently open in principle or open to an opportunistic 
degree) available to Scholarly Publishers to secure predictable returns on 
investment.   
The Academic Author’s production of Research Monographs is, there-
fore, very amenable to the entrepreneurial calculations of the Scholarly 
Publisher, and both parties should be lauded for their entrepreneurial 
spirit. Of course, the two circumstances which distinguish the specific 
economic rationale of scholarly authoring and publishing from that of 
authoring and publishing in general need careful unpacking to clarify this 
area of entrepreneurial activity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 190 
 
44. The Financial Imprint of the Academic 
Author’s Work 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alexander Search  
 
As far as the Academic Author’s (researcher’s) work in authoring Research 
Monographs go, it is entrepreneurial because it eschews financial returns 
from its investment (to an almost unique degree) and becomes available 
with minimum cost implications for the profit making of the Scholarly 
Publisher. As observed above, the Academic Author’s investment is made 
without regard for financial returns. This underpins the entrepreneurial 
advantages of Scholarly Publishing corporations, and indeed other 
corporations. The latter include, importantly, the entrepreneurial Univer-
sity and Ministry. The Academic Author’s entrepreneurialism lies in 
generating profits for such organisations, but not for herself: we must 
remember that entrepreneurialism is exercised principally on behalf of 
organisations and not individuals (on this, see the note on ‘the entrepre-
neur’ in I.16, “Two Notes: Public Funding and the Entrepreneur”). 
Usually it is assumed that individuals are more likely to contribute to an 
organisation’s profit making if they themselves make profits individually 
by doing so. The Academic Author of Research Monographs, within the 
parameters described above, presents a contrary example of an individual 
who contributes to a range of organisations’ profit making by denying her 
own interests.  
A few remarks follow below on how the economic rationale of the 
Academic Author’s relation to the Scholarly Publisher’s enterprise works, 
noting along the way where the University and Ministry are implicated 
(noting but not immediately elaborating) – with the economic rationale 
apropos of the General Book delineated above in mind.    
The following circumstances enable the Academic Author’s work to 
maintain only a faint financial imprint in the Scholarly Publisher’s reckon-
ings.  
To being with, it is widely accepted by Academic Authors that signifi-
cant returns on their investment in scholarly publishing do not – and do 
not need to – come from the Scholarly Publisher. The returns are properly 
and more materially conferred by their professional employers, mainly the 
University as far as researchers go. That return could take the form of 
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simply leading to employment, or leading to a promotion or an increment, 
and generally feeding an upward career trajectory. In that sense, the 
University compensates the Academic Author financially in a more 
meaningful way than the Scholarly Publisher. This may also be encouraged 
by the Ministry with regard to the University under its jurisdiction. 
Further, many Academic Authors also consider that their investment is 
already substantially paid for by the University. Insofar as that work 
involved expenses in, for instance, a PhD programme, that is substantially 
recompensed already, before publication of the Research Monograph, by 
the conferment of a degree (as an accolade and professional qualification, 
so academic authoring to this extent is actually an act of consuming). 
Insofar as that involved costs of time, those may already be covered by 
University employment provisions for study leave and resources and 
infrastructures for research leading to the Research Monograph. So, again, 
the University compensates more meaningfully than the Scholarly Publish-
er, usually through means sanctioned by the Ministry.  
Many Academic Authors understand the returns on their investment in 
non-financial terms: in terms of ‘cultural capital,’ which sounds as good as 
real capital (see the section on ‘cultural capital’ in II.39, “Modelling as 
Literary Research”). Often, the returns in terms of reputation, regard and 
status – especially within the discourse circuits that criss-cross the Univer-
sity – are valued more than financial returns. The University and Ministry 
facilitate this by setting up rites of recognition which factor in publication, 
such as promotions, titles, indicators of esteem, high-profile consultation 
roles, etc. Moreover, as observed variously in Part I, “Panoptic,” in various 
disciplines Academic Authors have a powerful investment in the public 
good of research in terms of benefits and without regard for profits (the latter is 
left to academic leaders in the University). They wish to reach the widest 
possible readership; they usually do not think of readers as consumers but 
as the public which can be directly or indirectly improved by Research 
Monographs. The entrepreneurial University and Ministry accept and 
facilitate such a view by setting up quantitative and qualitative assessments 
of benefits from research outputs such as Monographs. 
Reasonable Academic Authors also recognise the Scholarly Publisher’s 
role as a service provider rather than simply that of an entrepreneurial 
corporation. They realise that, given the above circumtances, the Scholarly 
Publisher receives a great many more publishable Research Monographs 
than they can publish. The supply of their core product from Academic 
Authors significantly exceeds demand. They therefore understand that 
Scholarly Publishers are really providing Academic Authors a service more 
than offering a pathway to profits. This understanding is emphasised by 
the role of gate-keeper of academic quality – which benefits the public – 
that Scholarly Publishers incorporate in their selection processes from the 
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surfeit of publishable Research Monographs at their disposal. In fact, this 
means that Academic Authors then aid the Scholarly Publisher’s gate-
keeping role insofar as that involves other Academic Authors, by acting as 
peer reviewers for negligible financial rewards. Needless to say, as for any 
corporation, the Scholarly Publisher’s ability to capitalise on Academic 
Authors’ goodwill in this respect depends on cultivating something like an 
academic reputation for itself (by a market record, by being supported by 
the University or Ministry).  
These circumstances enable the Scholarly Publisher to modify the 
economic rationale of its relation with the Academic Author for the 
Research Monograph relative to that which pertains to the Publisher and 
Author for the General Book. Such modifications are embedded in the 
Scholarly Publication Agreement (across a limited range of differentials in 
such agreement), and can be discerned as departures from the standard 
publication Agreement described in III.43, “Research Work and Scholarly 
Publishing.” The peculiarities of the Scholarly Publication Agreement, 
thus seen, enable the profit-making interests of the Scholarly Publisher to 
be maximised and secured with the willing and eager contribution of 
Academic Authors. Academic Authors are thus (selflessly) entrepreneurial 
on behalf of Scholarly Publishers.   
  Those peculiarities of the Scholarly Publishing Agreement are outlined 
further below.  
Naturally, when the Academic Author turns into a Star Academic 
Author – or simply a Star Author – and especially when she acquires a 
professional agent most of the circumstances detailed above cease to be 
relevant. Explicit entrepreneurial calculations on the part of the individual 
Star Author and her agent are manifest then. Then the economic rationale 
favours the standard publishing Agreement.          
  
Fabio Akcelrud Durão 
 
It occurs to me that Alexander’s observations and arguments are strong 
because he is swimming with the current – or, perhaps in a better image, 
walking on those treadmills one finds in airports. Any step Alexander 
takes only adds momentum to the forces already in motion. So, all he 
needs to do is to select specific areas of academic life that are already 
rooted in entrepreneurial rationales, however incipiently, and go with their 
flow. By means of this strategy he not only glosses over determinate parts 
of literary experience which are not commodified, but also makes oppo-
sitional ideas sound idealist, because they appear too distant from the 
world he describes. Looking back on this debate so far, I realise that my 
efforts have been in trying, first, to call attention to the fact that the reality 
he depicts does not correspond (yet) to the way that literature and the 
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University exist, and, second, that an alternative vision is both possible and 
intellectually more rewarding. 
In dealing with the publishing industry, Alexander is completely at 
home because this region in the academy is closest to capitalism. However, 
Alexander now finds himself forced to admit that for many professors 
financial compensation from research is not the primary end. Could it not 
be that for these people their desire is elsewhere, not in money, but in the 
pleasure they derive from reading, writing, discussing and teaching? Also, 
could we not imagine publishers in the University presses as non-profit 
entities? Perhaps the University is not structured vertically but, rather, 
horizontally? In his Akademischer Kapitalismus, Richard Münch (2011) 
contrasts Alexander’s version of academic competition to an image of 
academic community, drawn from an earlier model where the principal 
dividing line is not between prestigious and non-prestigious professors, 
the stars and the academic rabble, but between those who are accepted 
within the University and those outside. Recognition here does not come 
from publishing a lot (often too much), but from the fact that, through the 
PhD, one has been accepted as a scholar among scholars. To be sure, 
there are problems with this model as well, but in the present situation 
these seem much less significant than the ones brought about by the 
commodification of the University. 
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45. The Scholarly Publishing Agreement (and 
what’s not in it) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alexander Search 
 
Carrying on where I left off … The Academic Author’s circumstances 
enables the Scholarly Publisher to make some very reasonable adjustments 
to the Scholarly Publishing Agreement for a Research Monograph relative 
to the standard Agreement between Author and Publisher for a General 
Book (described in III.43, “Research Work and Scholarly Publishing”). 
These adjustments are fully compliant with the corporate interests of the 
University and Ministry, and are designed to maximise entrepreneurial 
incentives for the Scholarly Publisher.  
To begin with, insofar as the Academic Author’s share of returns from 
investment relative to the Scholarly Publisher’s goes, that can be mini-
mised or nullified or even reversed (i.e. turned into more investment 
rather than returns). Depending on the ethos of the Scholarly Publisher, a 
low royalty rate has been conventional – if I say around 5%, that would 
seem a bit low to some Academic Authors and astronomical to many 
others if they have encountered a royalty arrangement at all (3%, 1% not 
unusual).  
There are further familiar ways of minimising the Academic Author’s 
returns from her investment in authoring (when not wholly eschewing the 
possibility of returns). The Scholarly Publishing Agreement may stipulate 
that royalties would only kick in after the sale of a fixed number of the 
Research Monograph (e.g. 500 copies): i.e. a number that would guarantee 
that the Scholarly Publisher realises its financial investment in publication 
before having to pay the royalty. The Scholarly Publishing Agreement may 
also simply not offer a royalty and only offer a fee. This fee could reason-
ably represent some calculation of a usual royalty payment on the average 
guaranteed sales of such Research Monographs in, say, the first year – this 
would typically be a small fee since the conventional royalties have been 
small anyway. This arrangement is a good incentive for the Scholarly 
Publisher; if, on the off-chance, a Research Monograph does perform 
extraordinarily well in the market (perhaps even becoming a bestseller) all 
the proceeds would go to the Scholarly Publisher and none to the 
Academic Author who has been paid off. (Among large Scholarly 
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Publishing corporations, Palgrave-Macmillan, or Springer Nature as it has 
been since 2015, has adopted this model.)   
Further, the Scholarly Publishing Agreement may also stipulate that 
some of the costs of material production of the Research Monograph 
which have conventionally been the Scholarly Publisher’s responsibility 
could be passed on to the Academic Author. So, for instance, copy editing 
and proof reading costs could be transferred to the Academic Author, 
rather than shared. Scholarly Publishing Agreements stipulating that 
Academic Authors should provide a ‘camera-ready copy’ are far from 
uncommon. Again, this depends on the ethos of the Scholarly Publisher, 
but it makes perfect sense: the Academic Author can generally be trusted 
to be literate, conversant with academic norms, and desire high-quality 
production for her Research Monograph. It is standard practice now for 
Scholarly Publication Agreements to make the costs of indexing, permis-
sions, and sometimes image production the responsibility of Academic 
Authors.  
The possibility, touched upon above, that the Scholarly Publishing 
Agreement may not offer any return at all (no royalty or fee) for the 
Academic Author’s investment in authoring the Research Monograph, but 
instead stipulate direct investment from the Academic Author into the 
production, dissemination and marketing costs, is worth pausing on. This 
means that the Academic Author effectively takes on costs that define the 
Publisher’s role, and the Scholarly Publisher then becomes predominantly 
a service provider for the Academic Author – and is fronted mainly as gate 
keeper for the academic market. This is in the region of self-publishing, 
but could stop short of being regarded as vanity-publishing especially 
where reputable Scholarly Publishers are involved, who are known as 
academic gate keepers. Such Scholarly Publishers are in a position to offer 
the advantages of their brand, thereby suggesting that the Research Mono-
graphs ostensibly published by them are up to scratch. Such Scholarly 
Publishers also offer the advantages of their existing infrastructure for a 
coherent production and marketing process. The Scholarly Publishing 
Agreement may still ensure a (not insignificant) percentage of all proceeds 
from the sale of the Research Monograph for these services, though the 
Academic Author who paid the costs may now expect some return from 
investment (not in authoring the Research Monograph but in bearing the 
costs of publication). Such direct investment into the production and 
marketing costs of the Research Monograph by an Academic Author may 
be (is usually) underwritten by the University or Ministry. It could take the 
form of a subvention or a publication grant to the Academic Author, and 
in the Scholarly Publishing Agreement it is still likely to appear as the 
Academic Author’s investment – an investment additional to, or distinct 
from, her work in authoring the Research Monograph. 
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All these features of the Scholarly Publishing Agreement are subject to 
further modifications, to further enhance the Scholarly Publisher’s entre-
preneurial interests and correspondingly minimise (or erase) the Academic 
Author’s returns on investment in authoring, when what is now regarded 
as Open-Access Scholarly Publishing is considered. The prevailing idea of 
Open-Access Publishing is wonderful because it indubitably generates 
benefits for all and, at the same time, serves the profit making of the 
Scholarly Publisher and the University and Ministry, and so is indubitably 
for the public good. Here the Academic Author’s selflessness in working 
to incentivise the entrepreneurial interests of the Scholarly Publisher 
reaches an admirable pitch of altruism. 
Open-Access Scholarly Publishing deserves more sustained attention 
and I will discuss it separately soon.  
There are some implicit factors in the Scholarly Publishing Agreement 
which underpin the profit-making prospects of Scholarly Publishers by 
being tacit and unstated, by being placed outside discussion between Scholarly 
Publishers and Academic Authors. These unstated factors are then effec-
tively treated as not of concern to the Academic Author and entirely the 
prerogative of the Scholarly Publisher. These are, however, worth noting 
here as relevant to the Scholarly Publishing Agreement as absences, because 
they do in fact affect the Academic Author and silently call for her collab-
oration – another sort of investment. These unstated factors clarify a 
further dimension of the Academic Author’s selflessness in favour of the 
enterprise of the Scholarly Publisher, and are rather a critical part of the 
economic rationale of scholarly publishing.  
Apropos of such absences: the Scholarly Publishing Agreement makes 
no stipulation about the pricing of the Research Monograph in the market, 
the print run, or the means of publicity. These are understood as being of 
no concern to the Academic Author and the sole prerogative of the 
Scholarly Publisher.  
The natural tendency for any corporation investing in a product is to 
first recover costs and realise secure profits by limited production and 
narrowly targeted marketing to dependable customers. Once that is done 
to a satisfactory extent, the corporation may then try to maximise profits, 
particularly if there is some evidence of potential, by taking the risk of 
larger-scale production and wider marketing. If the secure profits from 
limited production and marketing are steady enough, and new products of 
the same type are constantly available so as to repeatedly realise such 
steady secure profits, then taking the risk of scaled-up production and 
marketing may seem unnecessary. That would be so even if the potential 
for greater profits do discernibly exist – at least, quite a lot of evidence of 
potential will be needed to motivate taking that risk for higher returns. 
The Scholarly Publisher has powerful entrepreneurial advantages in this 
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regard. The offer of publishable new Research Monographs from selfless 
Academic Authors is continuous. A narrow and well-defined market to 
recover costs and realise secure profits is always available – of two obvious 
sorts. First, the secure well-defined market is provided by the University 
and Ministry in the form of libraries with a mandate to stock up-to-date 
knowledge, i.e. the latest Research Monographs. Second, an outer rung of 
this secure well-defined market consists in other Academic Authors, 
especially those working in the same discipline as the one addressed in a 
Research Monograph. An Academic Author needs to stay in touch with 
the latest Research Monographs written by others to write her own.  
 The beauty of these narrow and well-defined markets is that they are 
dependable, especially so because they are guaranteed to a significant 
extent by public or at least not-for-profit money (which is to say, money 
that can become profits for the Scholarly Academic Publisher). This is 
very appropriate use of public money, following the principles I outlined 
in I.16, “Two Notes: Public Funding and the Entrepreneur.” To the extent 
that University- and Ministry-supported libraries receive such money – 
through government funding, grants from public-spirited foundations and 
trusts, etc. – they contribute to ensuring recovery of costs and secure 
margins of profits for Scholarly Publishers. The market of Academic 
Authors is also significantly based on such money, through salaries and 
grants. I would not hazard a guess at what percentage of any given pot of 
public or not-for-profit money finds its way into Scholarly Publishers’ 
profits from Research Monographs – some intrepid researcher can tease 
this out. This is all money well-spent and for the public good, i.e. to the 
purpose of generating profits so that benefits may be distributed from 
which further profits may be made so that further benefits may become 
possible … and so on.  
 So, it makes good market sense for the Scholarly Publisher to price 
each Research Monograph high (usually anything from 3-10 times the cost 
of an equivalent General Book), and have low print runs (as a rule, divide 
the average print run for the General Book by 5 or 10), and sharply 
targeted publicity through special catalogues and listings and mailings. 
Once in a while, a Research Monograph may show signs of being of larger 
interest than to the well-defined markets alone. If there is sufficient 
evidence of this, the Scholarly Publisher may push it towards their 
counterparts (or to specially-tasked units within themselves) to become a 
General Book – which would mean lower pricing, larger print runs, wider 
publicity, and a standard publishing Agreement for the no-longer-quite-
Academic Author of a no-longer-quite-Research Monograph. This move 
too is profitable for the Scholarly Publisher.   
  It is best to keep these market considerations outside the Scholarly 
Publishing Agreement – to maintain those absences – because these very 
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reasonable practices nevertheless pose some conundrums for the 
Academic Author. These do not trouble Academic Authors because finan-
cial returns on their investment in authoring are minimised for each 
author, though they remain satisfactory for the Scholarly Publisher – 
Academic Authors are already selfless in this regard. But these market 
practices of the Scholarly Publisher may trouble the Academic Author 
because they go against the grain of her public-spirited expectations and 
hoped-for material compensations from other directions, i.e. from the 
University and Ministry (the kind of compensations and expectations 
listed in the previous chapter). For one, if the Academic Author wants to 
distribute benefits to the largest possible part of the (reading) public 
through her Research Monograph at the expense of profits for herself, 
that ambition is a bit curtailed. For another, if the Academic Author hopes 
for financial and ‘cultural capital’ rewards from the University and Ministry 
– through appointments, promotions, increments, consultancies and the 
like – those too are affected. Since such rewards are determined by the 
University and Ministry through competitive processes, both qualitative 
and quantitative measures of impact and reach play their part. Small sales 
and circulation figures for a Research Monograph do not sound good, and 
yet those are the most easily accountable quantitative measures sought by 
the University and Ministry.  
 However, in this respect also the Academic Author collaborates self-
lessly for the entrepreneurial advantage of the Scholarly Publisher – in two 
somewhat contrary ways. First, she strives to concretise and harden the 
well-defined market that the Scholarly Publisher focuses on first (or 
focuses on exclusively) by making sure that the Research Monograph fits it 
well. She follows disciplinary conventions and discourses which delineate 
the well-defined market that the Scholarly Publisher will depend on for 
realising costs and making secure profits. The structure of this market is 
grounded as much in the University department and faculty as in the 
Scholarly Publisher’s book listings as in the University library’s catalogue 
(see the description of disciplines in I.14, “What Literary Researchers 
Actually Do”). The Scholarly Publisher and University, in distinct ways, 
design the circumstances of the Academic Author to encourage such 
concretisation, and the Academic Author generally meets them halfway. 
Second, at the same time the Academic Author is apt to do everything she 
is able to provide evidence to the Scholarly Publisher that her Research 
Monograph might be taken to more risky investment as a General Book, 
for a wider public. She tries to engineer the evidence that may convince 
the Scholarly Publisher to publish more copies and put a lower price on it. 
She tries to secure notice for her Research Monograph for readers who 
may not ordinarily be targeted by the Scholarly Publisher; she undertakes 
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active publicity efforts which are conventionally considered to be the 
publisher’s responsibility.  
In an interesting way, disciplinarity in academic research – the methods 
and practices and objectives that broadly convey disciplinary grounding 
(see I.14, “What Literary Researchers Actually Do”) – is now significantly 
clarified from this two-fold effort of the selfless Academic Author on 
behalf of the Scholarly Publisher’s enterprise. The literariness of literary 
research (to come back to that) is clarified by the efforts of literary 
researchers as Academic Authors to define and then redefine, author and 
then publicise, their Literary Research Monographs for the Scholarly 
Publisher’s entrepreneurial purposes. Various aspects of what literary 
researchers regard as their disciplinary forte – interpretation, close-reading, 
contextualizing, theorising, stylistic and narratological analysis – could be 
understood as grounded here. Observations related to these in Part II, 
“Knowledge Production: The University,” should be placed in this 
context.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 200 
 
46. Quibbles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suman Gupta 
 
In Alexander’s account of the Scholarly Publishing Agreement, I can see 
the economic logic that joins the Academic Author with the Scholarly 
Publisher, and (somewhat mysteriously) with the University and Ministry. I 
shall consider the logical coherence of this argument carefully, but I have a 
few quibbles to raise before that. 
There is an implicit time-line in Alexander’s argument, which suggests 
that the kind of Scholarly Publishing Agreement he is describing evolved 
over a specific period. He uses phrases that demarcate periods, such as 
‘conventionally,’ ‘that used to be or have been the responsibility of 
publishers,’ ‘recently,’ ‘now.’ I would like some markers to be put as to 
when a different sort of Scholarly Publishing Agreement existed and when 
particular modifications have taken place.  
Further, though Alexander’s account of the logic of particular clauses 
or calculations in the Scholarly Publishing Agreement seems sound, this 
does not mean that they are actually employed. Articulating the rationale 
does not mean that it is acted upon by any of the parties. Is there evidence 
of the actual use of the stipulations and calculations that Alexander 
mentions? For instance, are there records of such decisions being planned 
by a Scholarly Publisher, University or Ministry; reference to accounts 
which show that the patterns of investments and returns Alexander speaks 
of; etc.? 
Finally, Alexander’s reasoning is based on print publication of Research 
Monographs – he speaks of pricing, costs of material production, print-
runs and suchlike. But surely these are a bit in the past now, in the age of 
electronic and open-access publication?  
 
Alexander Search 
  
In response to Suman’s quibbles, let me say first of all that my observa-
tions are not inferences made in the researcher’s way. I have not collected 
evidence, organised and consulted it, and made inferences in a systematic 
fashion to come up with these observations. What I am presenting here is 
something like ‘insider knowledge.’ It is based on experience over a period 
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from roughly 1995 to 2015. The implicit past in my argument is broadly as 
things were in 1995; the present in focus here is as it has been since 2015. 
I cannot be more definite immediately in breaking down phases and 
demarcating shifts chronologically. This is largely because these changes 
have occurred unevenly, at different times in different parts of the 
Scholarly Publishing sector, with different lags in response to economic 
and technological developments and policy pushes, to different degrees in 
various contexts. But twenty years is a sufficiently compressed period for 
the rationale in question to be understood as unfolding coherently. It 
might be possible to break down phases by focusing on one or two 
significant publishing corporations, and homing in on particular policy 
records and accounts disclosures. This is easily done insofar as such 
evidence is in the public domain. Much of it is not and is not easily 
accessible to researchers. Often, and understandably, Academic Authors, 
Scholarly Publishing corporations, and others involved are reluctant to 
reveal what they consider market-sensitive information. 
These observations then are not meant to persuade by the weight of 
sources and evidence. However, they may be corroborated or refuted by 
other ‘insiders’ – those with experience of scholarly publishing in some 
capacity. These are offered for corroboration or refuting, not as definite 
truth claims for the uninitiated. As Academic Authors, Suman and Fabio 
may have a view on the extent to which these observations coincide with 
their experience.  
Finally, Suman is right that e-publication and the digital environment 
make a significant difference to the economic rationale, and I will address 
it next. It is significant, but does not, I think, transform the principles of 
the economic rationale in question as fundamentally as is often thought.  
 
Fabio Akcelrud Durão 
 
I find Alexander’s description of the Scholarly Publishing Agreement quite 
accurate. Even though concrete data would surely be welcome, it could 
take us to too far afield. It would either have to be acquired through qual-
itative research, focusing on a couple of presses, or quantitative research, 
presenting a broad overview of many presses. In either case, I believe, the 
result would only confirm the tendency Alexander has witnessed, and 
which I corroborate.  
Scholarly Publishers insert and accommodate themselves in the space 
occupied by something that Alexander has not dwelled upon here, under 
the name of ‘culture,’ ‘instruction,’ ‘knowledge,’ ‘cultivation,’ ‘pleasure,’ 
etc. These are all values attached to what the humanities should be 
promoting. In the applied sciences patents are directly related to profit 
making, but even in fields such as engineering the University provides 
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work that is incorporated for free into several industries, and not only 
publishing. For some time now, funding agencies have institutionalised 
this transfer. In Brazil, for instance, the São Paulo Research Foundation 
(FAPESP) has a specific line of funding that gives PhD scholarships and 
grants for University researchers to work on problems faced by industry. 
State money is then directly used to increase private profit, in the hope 
that profit will be reinvested or spent in the state of São Paulo. 
But to come back to the humanities, and to literary studies particularly, 
the Scholarly Publisher thrives on literature’s claim of being a civilizing 
force, of being something that will make people better. This humanist 
belief acts as a seal that allows the state to fund literary studies and parents 
to pay for their children’s education. In other words, it is culture’s claim of 
being something above and beyond the mere reproduction of everyday life 
that allows it to be swallowed in (very good) business. There is something 
of a cul-de-sac here, because if culture becomes totally devoid of this 
claim, it really has no reason to exist, since it does not fulfil any particular 
need. It makes no sense to spend so many hours reading books, if they are 
not supposed to offer one insights into the world, life, experience, etc. 
Deprived of that, literary studies become no more than a toing and froing 
of arguments. It is a tough choice between, on the one hand, believing in 
the exceptionality of culture and thereby allowing it to be exploited, and, 
on the other, demystifying it and draining it of any interest.  
It is possible that there is something structural about the view of 
culture as something transcending self-interest and sheer exchange. The 
valorisation of literature and the arts as activities transcending the mere 
reproduction of everyday life acts both as a counterforce and a compensa-
tion for the total rule of the market. This could explain why it is the case 
that in poor societies culture is very often invested with more intrinsic 
value than in rich countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 203 
 
47. Scholarly E-Publishing and Open Access 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alexander Search 
 
For the time being, I will largely stick to the Research Monograph as my 
focal point, though much of what follows is currently more settled for the 
Research Journal Paper – but the situation there can be summarised fairly 
quickly later. The Research Monograph poses particular pressures in 
publishing that clarify the situation for Research Journal Papers.  
The observations below remain anchored to the economic rationale of 
the relationship between the Academic Author and the Scholarly Publish-
er, University and Ministry; that is, to the Academic Author’s part within 
entrepreneurial calculations.   
In terms of this economic rationale, the considerations attached to e-
publishing are fairly straightforward. In digital formats books can be 
produced to market standards and replicated at low cost. Given the 
widening reach and waning costs of accessing the internet, books can be 
distributed and accessed widely with small outlays. The raison d’être for the 
publishing corporation’s apparatus for material production and dissemina-
tion (marketing) of books seems to be on the verge of disappearing. In 
fact, for a while in the early 2000s, these developments were regarded as a 
threat to the book publishing and retailing industries at large. Their immi-
nent doom was often pronounced.  
Since the Academic Author in particular, and to some extent the 
University and Ministry, claim a normative responsibility for disseminating 
the benefits of research as widely as possible, even at the expense of 
profits, the profit-making role of the Scholarly Publisher now seems 
dispensable. In principle, now the Academic Author, with the support of 
the University and Ministry, could maximise the public benefits of 
research efficiently and at low cost. For instance, e-published Research 
Monographs could be made openly accessible through internet platforms 
(i.e. Open-Access Publishing) maintained by Academic-Author collectives 
and the University, without any financial input being called for from the 
Scholarly Publisher. Such a step would not bring any returns on the 
Academic Author’s investment in authoring, but the Academic Author is 
already accustomed to that in the print environment. And such a move 
could be rendered sustainable with the support of the University and 
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Ministry – simply by their maintaining the circumstances (outlined in 
III.44, “The Financial Imprint of the Academic Author’s Work”) whereby 
the Academic Author is already motivated to be selfless in terms of 
financial expectations from authoring. Now, for instance, the University 
could make a small one-off investment in putting up an internet platform 
for open and publicly accessible Research Monographs, and Academic- 
Author collectives (e.g. disciplinary associations, learned societies) could 
undertake gatekeeping, i.e. ensuring academic quality – all of which could 
be resourced cheaply from human resources within the University. So, the 
raison d’être of the Scholarly Publisher’s existence becomes particularly 
questionable, and the idea of Open-Access Publishing seems in the first 
instance to be counter to its survival. Indeed, in the early 2000s it was 
observed that Open-Access Publication was proving popular with the 
Academic Author and the University, and the death-knell of the Scholarly 
Publisher appeared to be ringing.   
However, the entrepreneurial interests of the Scholarly Publisher are 
understandably largely shared by the University and Ministry and by the 
selfless Academic Author. Despite the latter’s desire for maximising bene-
fits through Open-Access Publishing, they know that the public good 
cannot be served merely by generating benefits without also enabling 
profits (as observed in I.6, “Research for the Public Good”). It becomes 
apparent that the idea of Open-Access Publishing and its benefit genera-
tion need to be designed so that the profit-making motivations of the 
Scholarly Publisher, and indeed those of the University and Ministry, can 
be maintained and preferably enhanced.  
This means adjusting the economic relationship between the Academic 
Author and Scholarly Publisher through really quite significant modifica-
tions in the Scholarly e-Publishing Agreement relative to the Scholarly 
Publishing Agreement (delineated in III.45 above). Such modifications are 
necessarily attended by some changes within the infrastructure of the 
Scholarly Publisher. The process can be conceived as taking place in three 
steps.  
 
Step One 
It is first necessary for the Scholarly Publisher to delink the pragmatics of 
e-publishing from any necessary association with Open-Access Publishing 
(in fact, this is in the interest of the publishing sector generally). The e-
published Research Monograph, in the first instance, has to be made to 
behave like the print Research Monograph. Then the e-published Research 
Monograph could remain subject to the same kind of Scholarly Publishing 
Agreement as the print-published. The principal behavioural difference 
between e-publication and print-publication which disadvantages the 
Scholarly Publisher’s enterprise is that the former allows easy replication 
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and therefore uncontrolled access. The main material difference between 
e-publication and print-publication which could be advantageous for the 
Scholarly Publisher is the low production and distribution cost of the 
former. If the e-published Research Monograph could be made to behave 
like a print-published Research Monograph in terms of replication and 
control of access, and if at the same time its low production and 
distribution costs could be capitalised on, then the Scholarly Publisher’s 
profit margin can be raised higher for e-publication than for print.  
 This means that Scholarly Publishers need to make an infrastructural 
investment in securing e-published copies of Research Monographs 
against replication: for instance, by inserting locks in existing e-publication 
products, designing new and controlled e-publishing programmes and 
platforms, making e-publication products accessible on specific devices. 
Then, substantially the same Scholarly Publishing Agreement and market-
ing practices could be maintained for e-published Research Monographs 
as for print. Given the lower material production and distribution costs 
(print-runs are now immaterial), and given continuing high-pricing of e-
published Research Monographs and low or no returns for the Academic 
Author’s investment in authoring, profit margins for the Scholarly 
Publisher could be expected to rise.   
 The main vulnerability in this step for the Scholarly Publisher is that 
the checks introduced on reproduction and control of access of the e-
published Research Monograph might become less effective, so that a 
pirate e-market of books (or ‘pirate cooperatives’ of books, if that can be 
conceived) may emerge which is more efficient that the traditional pirate 
print-market. One of the ways to address this is for the Scholarly Publisher 
to collaborate with the Ministry to introduce stronger policing of and 
stiffer penalties for pirating in the electronic environment, in the interests 
of enterprise.  
 
Step Two 
Once Step One is accomplished to a necessary degree, so that e-publishing 
becomes delinked from any necessary association with Open-Access 
Publishing, it is possible for the Scholarly Publisher to then call upon the 
technology of e-publishing to offer controlled Open-Access Publishing.  
That would only make entrepreneurial sense if the Scholarly Publisher’s 
usual profit-margin is maintained (if not bettered) for production which is 
Open Access. To this end, a key modification is necessary in the Scholarly 
e-Publishing Agreement relative to the Scholarly Publishing Agreement: 
the Academic Author now must become the sole financial investor in the production 
process of the Research Monograph insofar as it is put to Open-Access Publishing. This 
financial investment must take place on the understanding that there will be no returns 
(royalty or fee) from the Academic Author’s investment in authoring because there will 
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be no accountable profits; however, the Scholarly Publisher will now act as a pure service 
provider whose profits are made from the Academic Author’s financial investment. The 
economic rationale of the relationship between the Academic Author and 
Scholarly Publisher is now thus: the Academic Author is a consumer of 
the Scholarly Publisher’s services, guaranteeing the latter’s profits in 
advance of production. The Academic Author and Scholarly Publisher are 
no longer sharing investments and returns from the publication of the 
Research Monograph in any ratio, as they conventionally used to for the 
print Research Monograph. So, with regard to Open-Access Publishing, 
the Academic Author is no longer a more or less selfless investor 
supporting the Scholarly Publisher’s entrepreneurial interests but a 
customer from whom the Scholarly Publisher realises profits. This is a 
very sensible arrangement since the Academic Author, of her own accord 
and with the encouragement of the University and Ministry, has the 
strongest stake in her Research Monograph generating benefits.  
 
Step Three  
Several moves need to happen coincidentally with Step Two to render 
Open-Access Publishing in line with this model of the Scholarly e-
Publishing Agreement functional.  
 First, in principle the Academic Author may be held financially 
responsible as sole investor in Open-Access Publishing of her Research 
Monograph, but in practice she may simply not have the means or will to 
make this investment. So long as the principle of Academic Author as sole 
investor is maintained, the practice can be managed with the support of 
the University and Ministry – which, in any case, provide the compensa-
tions that enable the selfless contribution of Academic Authors to the 
Scholarly Publisher’s entrepreneurial interests. The University and Ministry 
can now help the Academic Author to make this financial investment for 
Open-Access Publishing in the form of selective allocation of grants for 
the purpose, for which the Academic Author would need to bid (another 
level of investment). In offering these grants the University and Ministry 
can depend on public or not-for-profit funding to the advantage of the 
enterprise of the Scholarly Publisher; the University and Ministry can also 
offset those against savings from library infrastructure costs that e-
publishing enables. By keeping the Academic Author as the financially 
responsible party in the Scholarly e-Publishing Agreement even if the 
money actually comes from the University or Ministry, the latter can dis-
avow any direct responsibility or liability for the consequences of the 
investment. They may also withdraw the option of offering grants from 
Academic Authors when necessary (e.g. when Scholarly Publishers feel it 
is not needed for their enterprise).  
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 Two, since the Scholarly Publisher’s financial investment in material 
costs are reduced in e-publishing, and the Academic Author’s investment 
appears now as a customer’s to a service provider, some renewed clarifica-
tion and validation of the Scholarly Publisher’s role becomes necessary. 
This typically involves the Scholarly Publisher making an infrastructural 
investment in high-visibility platforms for Open-Access Publications (i.e. 
offering a publicity and benefit-distribution advantage), and upping its 
brand-conferred claim of gatekeeping in the service of academic quality. In 
strengthening the Scholarly Publisher’s gatekeeping claim, the University 
and Ministry may again be called upon via the Academic Author. They 
could formally validate and officially promote this brand-led claim of 
academic quality in various ways.    
In brief, the Academic Author whose Research Monograph is 
published Open Access by a Scholarly Publisher thus becomes more 
central than ever to the entrepreneurial interests of the latter, as direct 
financial investor and consumer. This arrangement is easily aligned with 
the corporate interests of the University and Ministry. Some details of 
cost-implications and policies in this regard could clarify the above obser-
vations further. I will attempt clarification of that sort next, principally 
with developments in the UK in view. The UK context is not particularly 
different from others. It is useful to have a specific context in view since 
this is a developing area of enterprise, with as yet fluid contours.   
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48. The Enterprise of Open Access Research 
Monographs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alexander Search 
 
The main difference between the Research Monograph and the Research 
Journal Paper, apart from length, is that the latter comes with a negligible 
sense of pre-contractual ownership by the Academic Author. For the 
Research Monograph, however, the Academic Author’s conviction in pre-
contractual ownership is strong. So, the Scholarly Publisher has to take it 
into account in the Scholarly Publishing Agreement. For the Research 
Journal Paper, the Academic Author’s sense of pre-contractual ownership 
is weak enough to render the relevant Scholarly Publishing Agreement 
more or less perfunctory.  
There are several obvious reasons for this. Research Journals were 
generally historically established with secure subsidies from the University 
and from professional and scholarly bodies, with clearly articulated bene-
fits and without profit-making considerations. From their inception, 
therefore, Academic Authors have foregone any expectation of returns on 
investment in authoring. So, no historical memory of returns (royalties or 
fees) for Academic Authors needed to be taken on board when those 
subsidies were withdrawn and necessary measures for making Research 
Journals profitable were undertaken. This usually involved aligning 
Research Journals with the entrepreneurial arrangements of the Scholarly 
Publisher. Where the Scholarly Publisher was a subsidiary of the Univer-
sity and professional bodies, through and since the 1990s the Scholarly 
Publisher was increasingly liberated from the direct financial control of the 
University and professional bodies (became autonomous and self-
funding). They then had to find ways of making Research Journals 
profitable, and it was useful that Academic Authors already had no 
expectation of returns from authoring. In other instances, the Scholarly 
Publisher was already established as a private corporation, with robust 
profit-making systems in place, and was therefore equipped to move into 
profitable Research Journal publishing (now freed of any inconvenient 
benefits-centred subsidies). Academic Authors understood that this move 
is necessary since benefits and profits work jointly towards the public 
good.  
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An Academic Author’s ownership of a specific Research Journal Paper 
is also considerably diluted by the character of the Research Journal. The 
editors, reviewers and other contributors play a shared and substantial part 
in its design and contents. That correspondingly diminishes any individual 
Academic Author’s claim to ownership. For some disciplines, especially 
those where research is a group endeavour, each Research Journal Paper is 
itself a collaborative (co-authored) exercise reflecting group work. Again, 
this circumstance dilutes any individual Academic Author’s sense of 
ownership. Moreover, to enhance the profit-making potential of post-
subsidy Research Journal publishing, the University and Ministry have 
tended to put growing weight on the salience of the Research Journal 
Paper at the expense of the Research Monograph. Despite the Research 
Journal Paper’s brevity, and the collective input that characterises its 
publication, individual Academic Authors increasingly find that being 
recognised formally as sole or part author of such a publication serves 
their careers well. For an Academic Author a Research Journal Paper 
could be more rewarding career-wise for less individual investment in 
authoring then a Research Monograph. 
All this has meant that for the Scholarly Publisher, University and 
Ministry, entrepreneurial strategies centred on the Research Journal Paper 
have been easy to manage vis-à-vis Academic Authors. In production and 
as product the Research Journal Paper is intrinsically corporate in nature 
and less grounded in authorship. So, when it comes to capitalising on the 
advantages and negotiating the disadvantages of e-publication and Open-
Access Publishing, Scholarly Publishers have a greater degree of flexibility 
with regard to Research Journal Papers. In fact, in the e-publishing envi-
ronment Research Journals are particularly profitable for the Scholarly 
Publisher, and their Academic Authors are especially selflessly entrepre-
neurial, while continuing to offer clearly articulated benefits.  
But the distinct mechanics of publishing the Research Journal Paper 
calls for separate consideration (see below, III.54, “The End of the 
Research Monograph”). Let me get back to the Research Monograph. 
That brief digression on the Research Journal Paper has a point. The place 
of the Academic Author in the economic rationale of Scholarly Publishing 
there is not entirely wiped out, but it is very much less germane than with 
regard to the Research Monograph. The Academic Author of the Research 
Monograph as an entrepreneurial entity in the economic rationale of 
Scholarly Publishing, as an investing or consuming party to Scholarly 
Publishing Agreements, is more determinate. From an entrepreneurial 
literary researcher’s perspective, both the practice of authoring Research 
Monographs and the concept of authoring involved in being an Academic 
Author are of particular interest (on this, see III.50, “Literary Author and 
Academic Author,” below).  
ENTREPRENEURIAL LITERARY THEORY 
210 
 
With regard to the Research Journal Paper, the calculations of profit 
making and benefit generation via Open-Access Publishing have already 
been collaboratively worked out by the Scholarly Publisher, University and 
Ministry. However, that is still being worked out with regard to the 
Research Monograph. Roughly since 2010, policy directives concerning 
Open-Access Publishing of Research Journal Papers by the Ministry – 
following ‘consultations’ – indicate the arrangements for benefits and 
profits that are now in place. These enjoin various levels of compulsion on 
the Academic Author to publish Research Journal Papers arising from 
publicly-funded research for Open Access. In principle (in legal terms), the 
Academic Author makes the financial investment for Open-Access 
Publishing where that involves the Scholarly Publisher, usually backed in 
practice by grants from the University, Ministry and other funders. 
Accordingly, in Britain the recommendations of the Finch Report (2012), 
Accessibility, Sustainability, Excellence, have largely been implemented. In the 
USA the Holdren Memo (2013), Increasing Access to the Results of Federally 
Funded Scientific Research, also went through several phases of implementa-
tion under the Barack Obama presidency. Similar policies have been 
adopted and are being implemented in most European Union countries, 
Australia and elsewhere.   
Policy directives and collaboration designed to release the entrepre-
neurial energies of Open-Access Publication are thus easily extended to 
Research Journal Papers but have to be more circumspect about being 
extended to Research Monographs. This is principally because the sense of 
pre-contractual ownership by the Academic Author is stronger, and 
consequently the status of the Academic Author as a financial agent in the 
economic rationale of scholarly publishing needs to be thought through. 
For instance, in the UK compulsion towards Open-Access Publishing of 
research outputs has been operated through the periodic national-level 
assessments of research production in the University (the so-called 
Research Excellence Framework or REF exercise): for the 2021 REF 
exercise Open-Access Publishing of Research Journal Papers has been 
made compulsory, but that is not the case for Research Monographs.    
But the possibility of bringing compulsion to bear on the Academic 
Author to put the Research Monograph to Open-Access Publishing, and 
moreover to bear formal financial liability for doing so, is being energeti-
cally thought through. The idea now is to work out how the Research 
Monograph can be brought to Open-Access Publishing in a way that 
realises profits for concerned corporations – especially the Scholarly 
Publisher and University – without disturbing the obvious benefits for all 
via the Academic Author. Insofar as the situation in the UK goes, the 
direction of thinking here is laid out in investigative reports on this issue, 
such as Geoffrey Crossick’s (2015) report for HEFCE, Monographs and 
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Open Access, and the OAPEN-UK (2016) final report, A Five-Year Study into 
Open Access Monograph Publishing in the Humanities and Social Sciences. These 
reports indicate how the profits and benefits of Open-Access Publishing 
of Research Monographs may be systematised and rendered compulsory 
for publicly-funded research. The indications they offer are limited by the 
evidence cited. Regretfully they do not give financial data or detail financial 
models, though those are mentioned. But they do draw upon a range of 
evidence from key stakeholders, including Academic Authors and Schol-
arly Publishers – in essence, attitude and opinion surveys (gathered through 
focus groups, questionnaires, workshops, etc.). In following the form of 
Corporate Research Reports (cf. II.20, “Corporate Research and Academic 
Research”) these are then more for the purpose of managing public,  
especially academic, perceptions and trying to ensure compliance than for 
informing their commissioning parties (the University, Ministry, Scholarly 
Publisher, etc.). 
Crossick’s (2015) HEFCE report implicitly wonders whether Research 
Monographs are needed any longer at all, and finds that Academic 
Authors in the Humanities and Social Sciences do find them valuable 
(often more so than Research Journal Papers). Of especial interest here, 
what comes through in both these reports is a profile of the attitudes of 
Academic Authors as, ultimately, the producers of Research Monographs 
and parties to the Scholarly Publishing Agreement. It is usefully confirmed 
that they are not only selfless entrepreneurs for their Scholarly Publisher 
and University, but are amenable to becoming in-principle financial 
investors and consumers to aid profit making along with benefit genera-
tion. This is very good news, clearly revealing the entrepreneurial potential 
of the Academic Author in an e-publishing and Open-Access Publishing 
environment. So, the OAPEN-UK (2016) final report presents the profile 
of the Academic Author thus:  
 
Placing a book is not a decision that most authors take lightly. Their prior-
ities when selecting a publisher relate to quality assurance, dissemination and 
standing in their field. 
 Researchers expect publishers to share their concern for their book. They 
have high expectations of their publisher and those expectations are usually 
met. Often researchers feel their books are improved by going through the 
publishing process. But there are also areas of disappointment, especially 
around marketing and promotion of books and reaching important 
audiences, including reviewers, and sometimes believe their publishers 
underperform here. This is important, as most authors do not want to take 
on marketing and promotion themselves. They are also keen to understand 
the performance of their books, and see better usage information as a possi-
ble advantage of open access. Across the board, researchers want to see core 
publisher functions protected in an open access world, they are often 
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sympathetic to publishers who are seeking to maintain excellent service in 
the face of reducing profitability of books, especially where they participate 
in publishing as reviewers or editors.  
In most of our initial focus groups and throughout the project royalties 
appear as an important issue, but attitudes are not clear cut. Our survey work 
suggests that most authors do not prioritise royalties but the author inter-
views, although small in number, present a more nuanced view. Many 
researchers have a realistic understanding of the likely performance of their 
book. Royalties will not be important for a niche monograph but for a work 
with potential to become a core reading list text or to cross over into the 
trade market they are a bigger issue. Researchers seem happy to give up their 
royalties in the pursuit of open access as long as publishers will do the same 
with their profits – this probably aligns with the view, expressed by a major-
ity of respondents to our 2012 survey, that publisher profits should go back 
to supporting their disciplines. Publishers and authors recognise that open 
access may not be appropriate for every monograph publication. (OAPEN-
UK 2016: 17-9)  
 
The quotation is a bit long but covers a lot of ground. In brief, the 
OAPEN-UK (2016) report presents the Scholarly Publisher as a service 
provider, the Academic Author as generally selfless in economic terms, 
and therefore friendly consumers of the Scholarly Publisher’s services, 
amenable towards being nudged to invest in Open-Access Publishing. 
These are consumer-survey reports, which both describe the consumers 
and persuade them to become investors.  
With the kind of support from the University and Ministry that these 
reports represent, Scholarly Publishers have naturally already started 
capitalising on the entrepreneurial possibilities of Open-Access Publishing 
for Research Monographs. They provide services for Academic Authors 
to have their Research Monographs published under their brands with the 
kind of Scholarly e-Publishing Agreement outlined above (in Steps Two 
and Three of III.47, “Scholarly E-Publishing and Open Access”). The 
Academic Author’s selfless entrepreneurialism is converted in such agree-
ments to featuring as a financial investor putting in the monies for Open-
Access Publishing. Irrespective of where the monies come from, the 
Academic Author is liable for providing this in the agreement.  
The cost implications for the Academic Author as signatories of such 
agreements might be of interest here. In 2016, the following figures (not 
including taxes) were available from some UK- and US-based publishers 
for Research Monographs to be published as Open Access (some prefer 
not to name costs, which they regard as conditional on the Academic 
Author’s means and the proportions of the Research Monograph) – the 
website details appear at the end of this chapter:  
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 Cambridge University Press: £6500 ($10,000 or €9000) for a work of 
up to 120,000 words, and £1600 per additional 30,000 words. Illustra-
ted works incur a charge of £25 per figure. 
 Manchester University Press: £9850 for up to 120,000 words, includ-
ing 20 images.  
 Palgrave-Macmillan (Springer Nature): £11,000 / $17,000. 
 Open Books (specialist non-commercial Open-Access Publishers): ‘It 
typically costs £3,500 to produce and market a book. […].We provide 
information on possible sources of publishing grants for Open 
Access books and support our authors throughout the application 
process.’ 
 Routledge: £10,000.  
 Ubiquity Press (specialist Open-Access Publishers): Core service with 
typesetting and copy-editing £3210 for up to 30,000 words, £5050 for 
100,000 words, £7550 for 200,000 words.  
 University of California Press (Luminos): ‘The baseline Title Publica-
tion Fee is $15,000. A significant portion of these costs will be 
covered by UC Press, library partners who participate in this program, 
and print sales. […] The author will be asked to secure funding to 
cover $7,500 of the Title Publication Fee.’  
Scholarly Publishers also give explanations for how they calculate costs. 
Palgrave-Macmillan/Springer Nature explains:  
 
The level of the publication charge, which in many cases we envisage being 
met by funders, has been calculated by looking at all costs involved in our 
publishing process, from editorial to production, marketing, dissemination, 
and supporting discoverability. It reflects the fact that content published via 
Palgrave Open will be subject to the same rigorous professional process as 
all other Palgrave Macmillan publications. It also reflects our use of the CC 
BY license (Creative Commons Attribution v4.0 International License) as the 
default for our open access books.  
 
Routledge explains:   
 
We have calculated the figure based on our own experience of the normal 
costs involved in the publishing process including editorial, production, 
marketing, sales, IT and distribution as well as taking account of the revenue 
that we would forego by making the book available open access. 
  
All include therein the costs of academic gatekeeping through rigorous 
peer review, so that effectively Academic Authors pay the costs of gate-
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keeping by other Academic Authors with the mediation of Scholarly 
Publishers.   
Scholarly Publishers in the UK anticipate that this business will pick up 
as the Ministry will make Open-Access Publication of Research Mono-
graphs compulsory too for future REF exercises. In the OAPEN-UK 
(2016) project mentioned above, some Scholarly Publishers participated by 
making a random selection of their existing Research Monographs Open 
Access for a given period and tracking reading figures. Some did this 
without obtaining the permission of the relevant Academic Author to do 
so, and sought such permission retrospectively (presumably because 
unreasonable Academic Authors might feel that possible royalties 
according to their existing Scholarly Publication Agreements were thereby 
adversely affected). In seeking this permission retrospectively from one 
such Academic Author, a Scholarly Publisher observed:  
 
Open Access has, as I am sure you are aware, become more commonplace 
and from this year on will be mandated for journal articles submitted to the 
REF. Where research has been funded by either UK or European public 
research money outputs will also be required to be made Open Access. 
Although the mandate does not extend to books for the REF in this round, 
it is expected to do so in the one following 2020/21. Obviously your book 
above is not subject to these mandates, but I am mentioning this only to 
illustrate that there is a strong movement towards making scholarly works 
free at the point of use […]. Going forward [we are] working with a number 
of research funders as we sort out the technical issues around Open Access. 
It’s still a difficult landscape to navigate, but with usage figures like those for 
your book and increasing threats to our sales models from declining library 
budgets and mass piracy, there is no question that high-quality research will 
increasingly be published Open Access as a matter of course.   
 
It seems likely that Scholarly Publishers are lobbying the University and 
Ministry for a move towards greater compulsion on Academic Authors 
towards Open-Access Scholarly e-Publication of their Research Mono-
graphs along the lines outlined above (in Steps Two and Three of III.47, 
“Scholarly E-Publishing and Open Access”). The profits and benefits of 
doing so for the Scholarly Publisher, and of course for the public good, 
are becoming clear.       
 
 
Websites referred  
 
Cambridge University Press 
http://www.cambridge.org/gb/academic/cambridge-open-
access/gold-open-access-books     
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Manchester University Press 
http://www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk/openmonographs/ 
 
Palgrave-Macmillan (Springer Nature) 
http://www.nature.com/openresearch/publishing-with-palgrave-
macmillan/publication-charges/   
 
Open Books 
http://www.openbookpublishers.com/section/6/1/information-for-
authors/f5623e05cf55ae089dffc8ad76c9c457 
 
Routledge  
https://www.routledge.com/info/open_access/faq#charges 
 
Ubiquity Press  
http://www.ubiquitypress.com/site/publish/ 
 
University of California Press (Luminos): 
http://www.luminosoa.org/site/faqs/ 
 
 
Suman Gupta 
 
A small point: I paused on Alexander’s description of the reports here, of 
Crossick (2015) and OAPEN-UK (2016) – his description of the kind of 
evidence they present. He says they do not give economic data or detail 
financial models, they mainly use ‘attitude and opinion surveys.’ That 
means, if I understand this correctly, that they actually do not draw 
attention to the kind of economic rationale Alexander is talking about; on 
the contrary, they try to distract attention from that by withholding infor-
mation. These reports fudge the economic rationale. Instead, they focus 
on opinions and attitudes: some kind of gauging of majority perspectives, 
however ill-informed or misinformed those perspectives might be. Their 
thrust is: ‘we have to take account of the opinions and attitudes of majori-
ties, but without informing them of the financial considerations clearly; 
then we can present or phrase the financial model we want so that it 
doesn’t seem to contradict those majority views.’ This seems to be a 
typical confidence trick, a spin; it is a standard manoeuvre of publicists in 
majoritarian democracy. These documents then are not really ‘reports’ in 
the sense of presenting a disinterested picture, these are really attitude-
management strategies disguised as ‘reports’ (calling them ‘reports’ is part 
of the attitude-management strategy).  
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49. On Retailers and Other Issues  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fabio Akcelrud Durão 
 
Let me begin with three points in Alexander’s account of e-publication 
and Open-Access Publication which I would like to comment on. 
The first one Alexander has already suggested, but I think it deserves 
emphasis: namely, how the selflessly entrepreneurial Academic Author 
may see herself as a one-person quasi-corporation. Perhaps if Alexander 
had focused on her point of view the argument would become more 
compelling. Her investment (of time, energy and resources) without 
apparent direct return can be justified from what she will receive in terms 
of employment, self-gratification and the like; there is an underlying (bad) 
rationality to submitting oneself to such exploitation.  
The second point relates to the role of competition in the University. 
Outsiders might find it difficult to understand why professors (especially 
with tenure) still publish e-books through for-profit Scholarly Publishers, 
as opposed to free self-publication. (As a rule now, paper and e-book are 
published together.) There is a group-logic at work here: because nobody 
wants to be the first to relinquish Scholarly Publishers for fear of losing 
prestige. But since prestige is conferred by the community itself, what this 
situation reveals is the isolation and competitiveness of academics.  
Finally, the third point concerns the decreasing importance of the 
University in society and even in the self-representation of professors. The 
fact that in the digital world the University should relinquish its role of 
gatekeeping in favour of for-profit Scholarly Publishers would sound 
absurd to earlier generations of intellectuals. Presses had their raison d’être 
in the expertise they brought to the production of the book as a physical 
object; when this knowhow is no longer necessary, there is no justification 
for the University to get involved in supporting profit-making publication 
by the Scholarly Publisher. 
The picture of Scholarly Publishing of the Research Monograph that 
Alexander has drawn above could be developed further by inserting the 
role played by wholesale retailers, who take the lion’s share of profits 
(Amazon’s rate may reach 50% of a book’s cover price). The incorpora-
tion of self-publishing within their systems is worthy of mention. Here’s a 
quotation from an editorial of the magazine n+1 (2013) on this:  
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We’ve reached the point at which the CEO of Amazon, a giant corporation, 
in his attempt to integrate bookselling and book production, has perfectly 
adapted the language of a critique of the cultural sphere that views any claim 
to ‘expertise’ as a mere mask of prejudice, class, and cultural privilege. 
Writing in praise of his self-publishing initiative, Jeff Bezos notes that ‘even 
well-meaning gatekeepers slow innovation. . . . Authors that might have been 
rejected by establishment publishing channels now get their chance in the 
marketplace. Take a look at the Kindle bestseller list and compare it to the 
New York Times bestseller list – which is more diverse?’ Bezos isn’t talking 
about Samuel Delany; he’s adopting the sociological analysis of cultural 
capital and appeals to diversity to validate the commercial success of books 
like Fifty Shades of Grey, a badly written fantasy of a young woman liberated 
from her modern freedom through erotic domination by a rich, powerful 
male. Publishers have responded by reducing the number of their own ‘well-
meaning gatekeepers,’ actual editors actually editing books, since quality or 
standards are deemed less important than a work’s potential appeal to 
various communities of readers. 
 
On a different note, it is interesting to see how Research Journals and 
Monographs compete with each other. If a researcher publishes several 
articles on a certain topic, she will have difficulty turning them into a 
book, because they will be economically not so profitable. Also, the 
article-form is favoured by scientists and administrators generally, because 
they are easier to measure. There is much to say about these developments 
in formal terms, in relation to how it facilitates the salamization of 
arguments, how it adapts better to theoretical fashions, etc. It is worth 
considering whether Research Monographs are intrinsically more adequate 
to the field of literary studies than Research Papers. I feel they are, while at 
the same time noticing that, at least here in Brazil, the full-blown 200+ 
page long Research Monograph is disappearing. It is being replaced by 
collections of articles from one Academic Author or by edited works 
comprising contributions from several Academic Authors. 
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50. Literary Author and Academic Author  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suman Gupta 
 
I do not have ‘academic publishing’ listed under Research Interests in my 
CV; I do not know whether Alexander’s account of the economic relation-
ship between the Scholarly Publisher and Academic Author is accurate. 
Insofar as my own experience goes, much of the rationale Alexander lays 
out rings true. And, I must admit, I fit the profile of the Academic Author 
quoted from the OAPEN-UK (2016) final report in III.48, “The Enter-
prise of Open Access Research Monographs,” uncomfortably closely.   
But I will not try to verify Alexander’s account here. Instead, I make 
some conceptual inferences on the assumption that it is accurate, from the 
perspective of a literary researcher (this is in my CV). Literary researchers 
think about the nuances of authorship quite a lot, and not just of author-
ship for so-called literary texts. Various concepts of authorship in general 
are familiar territory for us. From that vantage point the construction of 
the Academic Author in terms of the entrepreneurial rationale of Scholarly 
Publishing, in Alexander’s terms, presents some fascinating conundrums.  
Within this rationale, the selfless entrepreneurialism of the Academic 
Author of the Research Monograph is a kind of chimera. The Academic 
Author can be turned into any kind of economic agent: a worker/inventor 
authoring monographs; an entrepreneurial partner partaking of returns 
from publishing; a publicist and type-setter; a fund raiser and financial 
investor in the Open-Access Publishing cycle; a consumer of the services 
of Scholarly Publishers; an altruist for the public good; a legal person with 
liability for that which is not her property. She is sometimes owned by the 
University and Ministry and sometimes by the Scholarly Publisher, in a 
coherent and yet disjunctive pattern. And yet, all this is only possible 
because she is nothing in entrepreneurial terms, an empty signifier to be 
deployed according to the convenience of corporations and the state.  
‘Selfless entrepreneurialism’ is a very interesting phrase. Can any ‘self’ be 
recognised in entrepreneurial discourse – within the economic rationality 
of enterprise – which is not homo economicus, a self-interested economic 
person? To be a ‘selfless entrepreneur’ on behalf of corporations is to be, 
within entrepreneurial discourse, a dependable sucker or a happy fool 
(with formal status, so the Fool). A dependable sucker is the opposite of 
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homo economicus: the empty signifier that can be adjusted or stretched or 
bent to smooth over whatever contradiction appears in entrepreneurial 
rationales and that nevertheless appears to be something or someone.    
As I was working through Alexander’s account of the entrepreneurial 
rationale of Scholarly Publishing, I was trying to find my feet in terms of 
concepts of authorship which are familiar to literary researchers. There is a 
certain similarity in drift between the Academic Author in entrepreneurial 
discourse and the Author (generally) in literary critical theory. Much 
discussion of the latter has revolved around the chimerical character of the 
Author. Several obvious nodes of literary debate come to mind, and they 
are mostly about interrogating significations of the Author, of authorship.  
The received concept of the Author, which is going strong, is as 
follows: the finished text (to whatever extent finished) originates in the 
Author, represents the effort (work) of the Author, and expresses the 
insights and sensibility of the Author. The New Critical turn in the mid 
twentieth century briefly displaced this concept of the Author by focusing 
on the text-in-itself, by studiedly discounting the presumption that an 
authorial intent is discernible in the text – most clearly announced in W.K. 
Wimsatt and M.C. Beardsley’s (1946) ‘intentional fallacy.’ A distinct move 
in decentring the received idea of the Author involved drawing attention 
away from texts as finished artefacts and focusing instead on the in-
process aspects of textualizing. Roland Barthes’s (1977 [1968]) declaration 
of the ‘death of the author’ effectively understood texts as sites of writing, 
or rather of: ‘multiple writings, drawn from many cultures and entering 
into mutual relations of dialogue, parody, contestation’ (148). Michel 
Foucault’s description of the ‘author function’ (1979, from a 1969 lecture) 
centred writing too, but noted that the construction of the Author as 
originator has a relatively recent history and is underpinned by ideological 
control. However, as Sean Burke (1994) observed, those who undermined 
the centrality of the Author in this manner also continued to tacitly centre 
the Author, unavoidably, because the construction of the Author is 
engrained in the practice of reading. A volume by Martha Woodmansee 
and Peter Jaszi eds. (1994) took yet another turn in that direction, arguing 
that the received concept of the Author has been hardened relatively 
recently (since the eighteenth century) with the development of intellectual 
property regimes: the Author was more or less invented as a Romantic 
concept of originator and genius, and has served to regulate intellectual 
property policing. The argument about the Romantic concept of the 
Author has been unpacked by Zachary Leader (1999), and the Author in 
relation to intellectual property regimes examined by Lior Zemer (2007). 
Meanwhile, further diffusion of the received notion of the Author was 
underway in the light of material changes in the text, especially as digital 
technologies of text production and access released the possibilities of 
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interactive or participatory writing and reading (from Bolter 1991, Gaggi 
1997 and onwards). Also, analysis of the part that readers play in receiving 
texts had variously countered the determinations of Authorial guidance in 
reader-response and reception studies (from the 1960s onwards); how 
readers collectively construct an Author to structure their reading of texts 
rather than referring to real-world authoring of texts has also been 
examined (Kindt and Müller 2006, Claassen 2012). 
There is then a substantial literary critical track-record of conceptualis-
ing the Author in a general and interrogative way. Much of these reflec-
tions have tended to regard the received notion of the Author as chimeri-
cal: as ideological personifications in the Romantic imagination; as a 
discourse-feature embedded in the reading strategies of critics and general 
readers; as a regulatory mechanism of intellectual property regimes; as a 
construction premised on print technology. 
Literary critical approaches to the Author in terms of economic ration-
ales are found mainly apropos of intellectual property regimes. In reading 
Alexander’s observations on the Academic Author in the entrepreneurial 
rationale, I had initially thought these are really to do with intellectual 
property. On reflection though, it occurs to me that in fact intellectual 
property is irrelevant to the picture Alexander has laid out: the standard 
Agreement between Publisher and Author (even for the General Book) 
supersedes the latter’s control of intellectual property. Publisher and 
Author share their interest in maintaining control of intellectual property 
for the published product, so that does not play between them. The Author 
and Publisher in fact control intellectual property prerogatives with regard to the exter-
nal environment where the published product is circulated; the intellectual property 
regime offers regulatory mechanisms for the market rather than bearing on the relations 
amongst or between the (joint) producers. In fact, policing of intellectual property 
is usually more actively undertaken by the Publisher than the Author, 
though it is usually undertaken in the name of the Author. So, intellectual 
property principles have no bearing on the economic relationship between 
Publisher and Author, which is solely determined by the Publishing 
Agreement.  
I am not aware of existing literary critical analysis of the economic 
rationale of publishing and the Author’s place in it. It seems to me that 
what Alexander says of the standard publishing Agreement for the 
General Book in III.43, “Research Work and Scholarly Publishing,” is 
consistent with what I call the received concept of the Author above. 
Though there appears to be some assonance between the chimerical 
character of the Author in interrogative literary theory and the Academic 
Author in the entrepreneurial rationale (as outlined by Alexander), there is 
a crucial difference.  
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In literary theory, interrogations of the received concept of the Author 
are premised on the understanding that the Author signifies a concrete 
position of power (has a close relationship to ‘Author-ity,’ as numerous 
post-modernist theorists have put it). The signification of the Author, it is 
argued, is used to exert control of how public or published texts are read. 
The Author persona concentrates prerogatives on itself which ground the 
power of the intellectual property regime (that is, of the justice system and 
the state on behalf of corporations) and organises the reading market, the 
education system, the publishing and media and entertainment industries 
accordingly. Interrogations of the Author therefore come with an air of 
radical or oppositional political commitment, and open analytical spaces 
which may subvert the determinations of power.  
The Academic Author in the entrepreneurial rationale of Scholarly 
Publishing, as Alexander has outlined this, is a signification of powerless-
ness (the Fool, the dependable sucker). The Author in interrogative literary 
theory and the Academic Author in the entrepreneurial rationale of 
Scholarly Publishing just do not gel.  
I am trying to find alternative handles to conceptualise the Academic 
Author in the entrepreneurial rationale in a literary critical fashion.  
Perhaps we can think of the Academic Author in the entrepreneurial 
rationale as the polar opposite of the Romantic concept of the Author – 
an anti-Romantic concept of the Author. In the entrepreneurial rationale, the 
Academic Author is such a slight and fluid signifier that it flickers 
constantly without quite going out, and each flicker has a different hue. It 
is a signifier which can be constantly rearticulated somewhat differently, 
depending on where and when it appears and to what purpose. However, 
the literary researchers who author Research Monographs, and find them-
selves attached to this signifier, are real enough.        
Or, perhaps the Academic Author in the entrepreneurial rationale 
could be thought of as a prototype of the intelligent machine (a first gesture 
towards AI as author of the Research Monograph, see II.42, “The 
Shrinking Teacher and Pedagogical AI”). This sounds wacky even to me at 
present, but it makes a kind of sense. The Academic Author signifies then 
as part of the automated infrastructure of entrepreneurial corporations 
that can use it. The investments made by the corporate establishment 
around the Academic Author are for this machine’s energy intake (a salary 
and costs of raw research material), upgrading (encouraging through 
occasional career boosts and public recognition), and programming 
(directives on preferred areas of research production, conditions to set 
limits to what can be produced). The product though, such as the 
published Research Monograph, is constantly dissociated from the 
machine as soon as it emerges, and is capitalised as commodity by the 
corporate establishment. The intelligence of this machine is manifested in 
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being able to continuously come up with potentially profitable products 
which are not replicative. Each Research Monograph is unique and yet 
coherent, and only intelligence can produce that. This is not a machine 
used for piece-work or mass manufacture. This machine is a happy 
machine, so long as regularly lubricated with the oil of respect, pleasure, 
and a higher-than-economic purpose.  
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51. University, Ministry and Critical Research  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suman Gupta 
 
A peculiarly shadowy part is played by what Alexander calls the University 
(i.e. any organisation that produces research) and the Ministry (i.e. relevant 
state agencies) in his account of the entrepreneurial rationale of Scholarly 
Publishing. The relationship between the Academic Author and the 
Scholarly Publisher can be understood by contemplating the Scholarly 
Publishing Agreement in its various forms for print, electronic and Open-
Access Publishing – and Alexander does this. It is evident that the entre-
preneurial rationale depends, variously, on the tacit or active collaboration 
of the University, Ministry and Scholarly Publisher. Evidently, this occurs 
because the University and Ministry seemingly wish to facilitate profit 
making generally for the public good, but in Alexander’s account it is 
mainly the profit making of the Scholarly Publisher which is clarified. It 
remains unclear whether the University and Ministry have specific interests 
of their own in such collaboration. Perhaps Alexander does not wish to 
clarify those. 
Very briefly, there are two main areas of collaboration. (1) For print and 
customer-access Research e-Publications: the Scholarly Publisher can minimise or 
erase returns for the Academic Author’s work because that is arguably 
compensated by the University. The University encourages or pressures 
the Academic Authors it employs to produce publications without regard 
for returns, by tying that in with employment and career progression and 
covering some of the infrastructural costs of research. (2) For Open-Access 
Scholarly Publication: the Scholarly Publisher can assume the role of service 
provider and look to the Academic Author as consumer and financial 
investor. This is facilitated by the University and Ministry by offering 
grants which Academic Authors can apply for and then bring on their own 
behalf, to invest in and consume services offered by Scholarly Publishers. 
The Ministry plays a decisive role in both areas of collaboration then, 
in two ways. First, since the Ministry has a regulatory function over the 
University sector as a whole, it can make legislation and issue directives 
which systematise and validate both areas (the part played by the British 
REF system of research assessment is a good illustration of this). Second, 
since the Ministry disburses some public funding to the University sector, 
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that public funding could be used by the University, with the Ministry’s 
sanction, to aid both areas – especially the second. Other sources of not-
for-profit funding can be called upon in this manner too. 
Thus, the Academic Author’s selfless entrepreneurialism on behalf of 
the profit-making entrepreneurialism of the Scholarly Publisher is under-
pinned by the collaboration of the University and Ministry. In making 
these arrangements the latter’s interest could be, as they often claim, the 
same as the Academic Author’s: to maximise the generation of benefits for 
all from research, while additionally tying that in with profit making 
generally (in this instance via the Scholarly Publisher) so that benefits are 
enhanced – all for the public good. That would suggest that the University 
and Ministry are themselves selflessly entrepreneurial, much like the 
Academic Author. But is that the case? 
It is arguable that the economic interests of the University and Ministry 
are not as self-effacing as the Academic Author’s in relation to scholarly 
publishing. Collaboration with the Scholarly Publisher, as outlined above, 
gives the University and Ministry a not-too-emphatic but quite definite 
control over research production by the Academic Author. The University 
and Ministry can thereby design the professional conditions of the 
Academic Author’s research work so that some directions of research are 
encouraged over others. The Ministry can disburse funding for research 
through the University by emphasising some strategic directions of 
research. Since the compensations of researching, authoring and publish-
ing are principally from the University and Ministry, and have negligible 
returns from the Scholarly Publisher, it makes sense for the Academic 
Author to follow research agendas set by the former. Those agendas can 
be set such that the Scholarly Publisher’s entrepreneurial interests are not 
disturbed. In other words, the University and Ministry are thus in a 
position to control research production through the process of research. 
The emerging arrangements described by Alexander for Open-Access 
Scholarly Publishing give the University and Ministry further scope for 
controlling research production, more directly at the point of publication. Since 
the Academic Author would usually have to take recourse to the Univer-
sity and Ministry to meet the costs of the Scholarly Publisher’s services, 
decisions on what is desirable or otherwise for Open-Access Publishing 
can be taken by the University and Ministry to a significant degree. Thus 
also they can guide research production according to their strategic 
priorities. 
Therefore, to serve their purposes the University and Ministry can, 
with the support of the Scholarly Publisher, influence what sort of 
research the Academic Author should engage in. Certain directions of 
what were discussed in Part I, “Panoptic,” as ‘applied’ or ‘basic’ research 
could be pushed, specific themes could be focused, particular problems 
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could be foregrounded for research. In that way, the University and 
Ministry would be able to design the kind of research and publication that 
would serve their interests as, also, entrepreneurial corporations them-
selves – not so much by diktat as by economic rationalising. At this 
juncture I will not try to work out what precise sorts of entrepreneurial 
interests the University and Ministry might entertain, what sorts of profit 
making they may undertake on their own behalf.  
On a somewhat different note: recalling Alexander and my earlier and 
contrary accounts of ‘applied’ and ‘basic’ research (I.7, “Joycean Lessons: 
Applied and Basic Research,” and I.11, “Disinterestedness and Academic 
Freedom”), I now feel that we have not quite covered the ground. In fact, 
at that juncture I too had unwittingly bought into Alexander’s suggestion 
that all research is or should be entrepreneurial – though actually arguing 
against that suggestion. There is, it now occurs to me, another kind of 
research which could perhaps be either ‘basic’ or ‘applied’ by my earlier 
understanding of the matter, but which has a more complex relationship 
with entrepreneurial objectives. The University and Ministry may well not 
be keen for this sort of research to be pursued and use their control of the 
Academic Author’s work to curtail such research. Apropos of basic 
research earlier, I had made out that it needs to be free and disinterested 
so that it can provide an open resource for purposive applied research as 
and when necessary; this need cannot be predicted, and this need cannot 
be engaged when it appears unless there is strong basic research to draw 
upon. In saying this, I had tacitly gone along with the idea that applied 
research serves entrepreneurial interests best. But applied research and its 
recourse to basic research need not be so: applied research could be for the 
purpose of holding entrepreneurial activity to account where it goes against the public 
good. The kind of basic research that tries to clarify, for instance, the 
fundamental principles and limits of social equity and justice may take an 
applied turn when addressed to a particular political juncture: such as, 
privatising state healthcare provisions or evidence of social discrimination 
of minorities. I think of this sort of basic-applied research as critical research 
which does not serve entrepreneurial ends but holds the appearance of 
injustice, prejudice, coercion, inequity, etc. in entrepreneurial and other 
organisations to account. 
If the entrepreneurial University and Ministry find their interests ques-
tioned by critical research, they would be inclined to use their influence to 
discourage the undertaking and publication of such research.  
 
Alexander Search 
  
When Suman speaks of ‘Critical research,’ I see a marketing ploy. This 
ploy appears wherever the word ‘critical’ appears appended to an academic 
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pursuit. It announces the defiant, oppositional, radical spirit of itself for 
defiant, oppositional, radical spirits to consume. It designates an academic 
consent of some interest, moving from the neutrality of careful sifting 
and/or disapproving judgment towards a political attitude – a valorous 
political attitude. It is a well-worn path now, though a jump beyond 
Raymond Williams’s ‘criticism’ in Keywords (1983). So, for instance, in 
linguistics there was Discourse Analysis and then there was Critical 
Discourse Analysis (radical), and there was Applied Linguistics and then 
Critical Applied Linguistics (radical) – the critical turn was the announce-
ment of a non-compliant attitude. That was undergirded by Critical 
Theory, Critical Sociology, Critical Anthropology, Critical Humanities … 
‘Critical’ has some of the same rhetorical appeal as New-something (New 
Criticism, New Historicism, New Philology) or post-something (I hardly 
need to exemplify). The ‘Critical’ opens entrepreneurial possibilities for a 
given target market by holding entrepreneurial activity to account.  
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52. Saints, Fools, Robots, and Employees  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dismal Scientist 
 
I was initially puzzled as to the point of Alexander’s lengthy analysis of the 
poor financial returns to academic authorship. It seemed to go against the 
grain of his argument for the centrality of entrepreneurship in literary 
scholarship to contend that the returns to the Academic Author are 
limited to the non-market benefits of personal satisfaction, academic pres-
tige, public or non-profit employment, etc. It then occurred to me to think 
about this question in terms of market structure.  
The business model of the specifically Scholarly Publisher is to publish 
a large number of academic publications. Each one brings in a compara-
tively small amount of revenue, but this is profitable if the costs are also 
small. Fortunately, the number of academic content suppliers is much 
larger than the capacity of the comparatively small numbers of publishers. 
As a consequence, the potential financial reward of content supply is 
partially appropriated as rent by the oligopolistic publishers and the rest is 
competed away by the multiplicity of suppliers. What are left are the non-
pecuniary rewards. The Academic Author is not ‘selfless’ in Alexander’s 
terms. They are as self-interested as any other market participant. It is 
simply that the scholarly publication market is structured in such a way 
that the specifically pecuniary rewards are competed away, leaving the 
non-pecuniary income and creating an illusion of selflessness.  
Alexander here betrays his own academic perspective. This illusion is 
one of academic self-flattery. From the perspective of the Scholarly 
Publisher, the academic content appears as a freely available resource 
which can be appropriated and then privatised through the acquisition of 
copyright. Perhaps this perception of the publisher is in all respects in fact 
accurate. The Academic Author only exists insofar as her signature legally 
transfers ownership of the resource to the Scholarly Publisher and thus 
creates a saleable item of private property. Alexander’s characterisation of 
these academic entrepreneurs as selfless is inaccurate, unnecessary and 
ultimately undermines his interesting argument.  
Similarly, Suman’s alternative characterisation of these actors as des-
cribed by Alexander as ‘Fools’ is also off the mark. They are making the 
best of an unfavourable market structure. The criticism that could be 
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levelled is that the suppliers have so far failed to organise an effective 
effort to change this market structure to one which is more favourable to 
their interests. This could conceivably be done through collectively 
bargaining with publishers. This would, however, demand discipline and a 
sense of solidarity among the academic suppliers.  
That is unlikely precisely because the academic suppliers are in fact the 
entrepreneurs that Alexander contends they are. These days, the term 
‘entrepreneur’ has a heroic ambiance which, perhaps contradictorily, 
anyone investing money or effort has become entitled to claim. The owner 
of every corner shop is calling herself an entrepreneur. This, however, 
loses the specific meaning of the word. An entrepreneur is properly 
someone who brings something substantially new to the market and builds 
a business through overcoming inertia and resistance to the new. Each 
published academic product is supposed to be a unique academic con-
tribution. Producers are only producers to the extent that they stand out 
from their compatriots undermining potential solidarity. Holding back 
publication is also to undertake a significant risk as replication or near 
replication of the contribution deprives it of all value including those 
which are non-pecuniary. 
Suman’s alternative characterisation of these actors as akin to machines 
under the dominance of today’s academic managerialism is unhelpfully 
rhetorical and moralistic. The discussion in Part II above on how the 
entrepreneurial University is morphing with the Corporate Research 
Provider (starting from II.18, “Away From the Monopolistic University”) 
is relevant here, as is Fabio’s disquiet about using the name of ‘University’ 
for this new entity, the entrepreneurial University. The linguistic root of 
university is ‘a community of scholars.’ The entrepreneurial University of 
today is more aptly thought of as the Research and Training Institute. 
These institutes are not communities of scholars but rather largely profit-
making corporations which employ researchers and trainers. So Academic 
Authors are not fools or machines, they are simply employees.  
Like all employees they produce outputs intended to ultimately gener-
ate revenue. And like all employees they do so under the direction of their 
employers and do not own the product of their work. The decision by the 
British Ministry to require Open-Access Publication is a decision well 
within their rights as grantors to the Research and Training Institute, 
which they judge to serve their own entrepreneurial ends (in Alexander’s 
terms). The employees are not selfless or foolish. They are simply making 
a living in a capitalist economy. The entrepreneurial impulse has, however, 
shifted to those who employ them. 
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53. Employees?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suman Gupta 
 
My understanding of what Alexander is at is much the same as Dismal 
Scientist’s: a demonstration of how ‘the academic publication market is 
structured in such a way that the specifically pecuniary rewards are 
competed away’ from Academic Authors. However, Dismal Scientist then 
goes on to say that both Alexander and I have been misguided in our 
characterisation of the Academic Author in this market structure. 
According to him, Alexander has tended to depict the Academic Author 
as good (selfless entrepreneurs, business-friendly saints), whereas I have 
tended to present the Academic Author as bad (not self-interested enough 
to have any meaningful business standing, business-oblivious fools). All 
this seems too moralistic or polemical to Dismal Scientist, who prefers an 
un-moralistic (or is it demoralizing?) characterisation of ‘employee’ with 
functions and functioning defined by employers: an entity neutrally under-
stood in terms of its economic relationship with an employer, and 
accordingly or conditionally self-interested.  
Since Dismal Scientist has evinced an interest in word origins here, I 
looked up ‘employee’ in the OED: ‘A person who works for an employer; 
spec. a person employed for wages or a salary under an employment 
contract, esp. at non-executive level,’ with examples of usage in English 
charted from 1814 and onwards. It has a nice historical grounding in the 
wage-form in accounting by old-fashioned manufacturing or industrial 
firms that helped raise margins in realising surplus value for employers.  
As such, Dismal Scientist’s neutered characterisation of the Academic 
Author as ‘employee’ in the entrepreneurial rationale of Scholarly Publish-
ing seems to slip at two levels. (1) The relationship of the Academic 
Author to the University might be of employee to employer, but the 
relationship of Academic Author to the Scholarly Publisher is not so. It 
could be thought of as a one-off partnership or perhaps in terms of an 
occasional co-production agreement. The thing of interest is that the 
Academic Author’s employee relation to the University is nevertheless 
brought to bear upon the relationship with the Scholarly Publisher, though 
the University and the Scholarly Publisher are seemingly unrelated corpo-
rations. (2) In the e-Publishing and Open-Access Publishing scenario, the 
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employee-like characterisation seems even less plausible. The Scholarly 
Publisher is now not akin at all to an industrial producer, and is almost 
purely a service provider. The relationship between the Academic Author 
and Scholarly Publisher is diffuse: who is using whose services? The 
Academic Author is certainly not getting a wage (or anything) from the 
Scholarly Publisher; on the contrary, the Academic Author is actually 
paying (in legal terms).  
Even if we did go along with the characterisation of Academic Authors 
as simply employees, I do not see why that renders ethical considerations 
inappropriate. Wage-earning employees in a factory would worry about 
their self-interests and economic dues for the work they do: this is a moral 
issue. If they feel they are getting lower wages than they should, they will 
and should protest and mobilise. From the factory owner’s point of view, 
if they do not they are saints; from the working employee’s point of view, 
if they do not they are fools. What about Academic Authors in relation to 
the University and the Scholarly Publisher?  
 
Dismal Scientist 
 
Suman’s comment confuses the two separate situations in which the 
Academic Author finds herself. No doubt this confusion arises because I 
did not go out of my way to distinguish these situations. And the reason I 
did not is because Academic Authors at the moment are occupying both 
positions simultaneously. 
I agree that when Academic Authors deal with Scholarly Publishers 
directly they do not do so as employees. They are entrepreneurial suppliers 
of intermediate goods (known in digital circles as ‘content’) to be added to 
other goods and so worked up into a publication by the publisher. This is 
not a co-production agreement as the sale of the content to the publisher 
takes place prior to the publication which is the sole property (output) of 
the publisher.  
This situation changes under the Open-Access Publishing scenario. 
The fact that the ‘University’ and/or the Ministry can dictate Open-Access 
publishing is an indication that the relationship between the Academic 
Author and the ‘University’ or Ministry is one of employment for wage or 
salary. The product of the Academic Author’s effort belongs to the 
employer who is in control of the disposition of the product. This is 
simply an ordinary labour contract. It would be unfair to require the 
employee to pay the Scholarly Publisher’s fee for Open-Access Publication 
and hence a grant of some sort is usually provided. In this scenario the 
relationship is really between the ‘University’ and/or the Ministry and the 
Scholarly Publisher. The Academic Author is, again, simply the employee 
of the ‘University.’ 
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I have put the University above in quotation marks because this 
relationship is incompatible with the traditional community of scholars. 
The Academic Author is dealing with a different kind of institution, as I 
said: the Research and Training Institute. The Academic Author was often 
hired when the institution was a University in an understandable sense, 
and is either uncomfortable with or in denial about the transition. Hence 
there is a lot of superfluous resentment. New contracts which make this 
explicit would solve a lot of problems. 
Suman recommends that Academic Authors should organise them-
selves to demand higher wages from the ‘University.’ This elegantly 
confirms my point that the actors involved are employees. However, I 
would, on the contrary, recommend that the employees bargain with their 
employer on an individual basis. Under this arrangement, competition for 
productive employees would guarantee that each received a return 
commensurate with their individual productivity (as judged by the 
employer of course). They would then be fairly compensated for their 
contribution to the employer’s enterprise and would recover a dignity 
appropriate to their new situation – individual actors making a free labour 
contract with the individual employer.  
Perhaps Suman’s reference to Academic Authors producing surplus 
labour also underlines my point about employees, though I, like all real 
economists, profess no knowledge of Marx. I prefer the literary post-
modernist’s view of a relentless decentring of all social identities so that 
attention is constantly returned to the unique individual, so that the post-
modernist may carry on with methodological individualism. 
 
Alexander Search 
   
I was desisting from replying to Suman’s observations because I find his 
endless promises of fire and brimstone tiring, and am totally at one with 
the spirit in which Dismal Scientist proposes ‘employee’ as the role that 
the Academic Author plays. However, I did not suggest there is anything 
saintly about selfless entrepreneurialism, it is a necessary feature of market 
arrangements – we do not really need to normativise self-interest, do we?  
I do have a few doubts about ‘employee’ as applicable here though, 
and a few quibbles with Dismal Scientist’s response to Suman. Insofar as 
royalties are conventional, the agreement between Author and Publisher 
is, it seems to me, more in the nature of a co-production agreement rather 
than an agreement for the supply of intermediate goods. But that is a 
minor matter.  
For the Open-Access Publication arrangement, Dismal Scientist is 
assuming that the University and Ministry will always offer financial 
support to the Academic Author (however conditional that support might 
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be) – so each Open-Access publication will always be merely a confirma-
tion of an ongoing employer-employee relationship. My own feeling is that 
this is only an interim situation. That is why the Academic Author has 
been so firmly foregrounded as legally liable for finances in Scholarly 
Publishing Agreements. The University and Ministry could have made 
direct payment arrangements with Scholarly Publishers, as long as the 
latter do the gatekeeping and production – but that has not happened. 
Instead, legally the Academic Author remains responsible to the Scholarly 
Publisher, even if the money is really coming from the University and 
Ministry. I suspect that once these Open-Access Publication arrangements 
settle and become normalised, the University and Ministry will withdraw 
that financial support (perhaps except for STEM subjects). Then it will be 
entirely clear that the Academic Author is the investor in publication 
(using some of the salary she is provided by the University to that end), 
and the Scholarly Publisher is the service-provider.  
 
Dismal Scientist 
 
Royalties are a payment for intellectual property. In this case the property 
(once transferred) is an input into the final good, the publication. 
If the employer instructs the employee to pay for a service which bene-
fits the employer – for instance, patronise the company shop at inflated 
prices – this is simply a claw-back and hence a reduction of wages.  
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54. End of the Research Monograph 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alexander Search 
 
I have always wanted to announce the end of something. In my salad days, 
the end or death of the author, the novel, communism, class, ideology, 
politics, theory, certainty, history, and the end of the end were variously 
announced, and many other ends have been debated since. The obituary 
of any abstraction has, it seems, a ready market.   
Contemplating the end of the Research Monograph is more material 
and less abstract, and less to be bemoaned than ends usually are (of 
course, Francis Fukuyama 1992 was far from bemoaning the end of 
history). To be clear: the kind of published Research Monograph I have 
been considering above is what I am proclaiming the end of, the sort that 
could be a PhD dissertation turned into a published academic book – i.e. 
most academic books, irrespective of whether they start life as a PhD 
dissertation. The Research Monograph with broad commercial potential as 
a general interest more-than-Research Monograph, especially with an 
established more-than-Academic Author, and especially with some cross-
over potential as a reference book or textbook, is in no mortal danger.  
Some of the points touched upon earlier in going through the entre-
preneurial rationale of Scholarly e-Publishing and Scholarly Open-Access 
Publishing are worth recalling. I had mentioned (in III.48, “The Enterprise 
of Open-Access Scholarly Publishing”) that the Geoffrey Crossick (2015) 
report for UK HEFCE implicitly wondered whether the Research Mono-
graph is really a necessary form of scholarly output any longer, and found 
that in the Humanities and Social Sciences it is still valued. The Academic 
Author’s strong sense of pre-contractual ownership interferes with the 
management of Research Monographs in an e-Publishing and Open-
Access Publishing environment with entrepreneurial considerations in 
mind. Comparatively, I had observed in III.48, the Journal Research Paper 
has an implicitly corporate character and weaker investments of pre-
contractual ownership by the Academic Author. This is therefore easier to 
manage (to market and distribute flexibly), and it is easier to get the 
Academic Author to pay for Open Access (via University and Ministry). If 
the Research Monograph can be treated or made to work like Research 
Journal Papers, and yield the same kind of profits and benefits as the latter 
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do, the entrepreneurial rationale of Scholarly Publishing would be much 
easier to realise.   
Indeed, as also observed above, the University and Ministry increas-
ingly encourage the production of the Research Journal Paper at the 
expense of the Research Monograph. That is a move in the right direction 
for the entrepreneurial rationale of Scholarly Publishing. Further, perhaps 
more indicatively, the flexibility of e-publication enables a step that some 
Scholarly Publishers and online retailers are beginning to take: selling not 
only the Research Monograph as an e-book but also chapter by chapter. 
This effectively dismantles the integrity of the Research Monograph from 
within, and allows it to be usefully treated as a number of Research Journal 
Papers. This can be done effortlessly for edited volumes of papers, where 
chapters work in the same way as Research Journal Papers, but is now also 
done for Research Monographs.   
These are slight indications of a larger drift in Scholarly Publishing, 
which makes sense in every way, not only for the entrepreneurial interests 
of the corporations involved (Scholarly Publisher, University, Ministry), 
but also for the profession of doing academic research and authoring. The 
internal logic of the profession of research, and not just within the Univer-
sity and at the behest of the Ministry, makes this direction necessary. Quite 
understandably, the logic of the profession in its current phase gels with 
current entrepreneurial rationales, and therein it seems evident that the 
Research Monograph is a dying form of Scholarly Publication. Several 
factors play here. 
First, research in all fields evince growing complexity, which means 
that increasingly all fields have to be engaged with by narrowly focused 
specialists working together rather than by individual and wide-ranging 
researchers. The specialist published outputs from this field are then of 
interest only to those who are engaged in investigating some aspect 
thereof, for whom new insights and findings might be of interest for their 
own work. These specialists who read each other’s outputs share enough 
common knowledge of concepts, sources, and background not to need 
these to be constantly reiterated and summarised; each new intervention 
can be quickly and economically communicated. It is in the nature of all 
research areas that specialist outputs will become increasingly less 
voluminous insofar as they are simply communications within an in-group 
of specialists. The specialist Research Monograph was a symptom of an 
atomised research environment which called for extensive interventions by 
a few leading researchers in emerging fields; the Research Paper is the 
appropriate form of intervention within a continuum of collaborative 
communication that now allows complex fields of professional enquiry to 
be pushed forward. This gels with the idea in Scholarly Publishing that 
each Academic Author works anyway to market her research publication 
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to other Academic Authors and thereby sharpens the disciplinary remit of 
her research.  
Second, it is mainly a kind of inertia of academic culture and cultural 
capital in some areas (especially in the Humanities, particularly in literary 
research) that explains the persistence of the notion that the Research 
Monograph is valuable per se. A former Arts and Humanities Research 
Council (AHRC) UK Director, Shearer West, had complained in 2013 that 
the prevailing ‘lone-wolf culture’ in this area needs to be discouraged. 
Perhaps because the observation was greeted with some derision at the 
time, online traces of it have almost been wiped out (check Smith 2014 for 
a mention) – but it was a prescient observation. The more politic 
statement in AHRC’s (2013) strategy document for 2013-2018, The Human 
World, that, ‘The AHRC recognises that research produced by individuals 
and that produced collaboratively have equal value’ (15), was therefore 
understandably underpinned by several pushes towards less individuality 
and more collectivity. One of its core principles was stated thus: ‘there will 
be continuing need to bring arts and humanities researchers together to 
influence the context in which they work; to build consortia, cross-
disciplinary networks and multi-funder partnerships; and to support 
individual researchers to forge stronger relationships with academics 
overseas’ (8). It was evident that much funding would be directed towards 
collaborations and collective work. Moreover, individuality in research 
referred there, it was indicated, to three kinds of persons: ‘postgraduate 
researchers,’ ‘early-career researchers,’ and ‘leaders’ (18-9). In brief, it 
referred to those who are entering the profession and those who are in 
fact administering collectives. This document is a small gesture towards a 
direction that can be evidenced through numerous policy documents in 
numerous countries, indicating a move by the Ministry and University to 
engineer consolidation of specialist teams by funding mechanisms which 
discourage individual researchers from being lone wolves. The published 
output of the former is most appropriately the Research Paper (or a 
collection of chapters or a multi-authored report), just as that of the latter 
had been the Research Monograph.  
Third, the same AHRC (2013) strategy document 2013-2018 also 
holds it as leading principles that:  
 
 at a time of great pressure on public finances, and when the UK Govern-
ment continues to invest substantially, researchers are increasingly asked 
that the benefits of that investment be realised and made specific;  
 as the ‘knowledge economy’ advances, more organisations – public and 
private – are part of the creation of knowledge and more people are inter-
ested in its outcomes; as a corollary there is increasing demand for the 
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freer circulation of ideas through, for example, open access to publications 
(8)  
 
In brief, while collaborating in a specialist way with each other, academic 
researchers are also expected to make an effort to explain their findings 
for lay persons and non-specialist end-users – especially through Open-
Access Publishing. The Research Paper has, as we have seen, a less 
awkward purchase in the Open-Access Publishing environment than the 
Research Monograph. Insofar as that leaves some scope for book-length 
publication, that is most likely to be of a reference book or textbook or 
general reader variety which has clear benefits for all, and not inconsidera-
ble profit-making potential too.  
Fourth, the main purpose of the conventional Research Monograph is 
now as a qualification: for instance, in the form of a PhD dissertation. It 
demonstrates when an apprentice researcher has acquired a sufficient 
depth and breadth of knowledge in an area (the shared pool of knowledge 
about concepts, sources, background between specialist in an area) to be 
admitted to the profession of being a specialist researcher. Once that 
demonstration is recognised (by the award of a degree) and the researcher 
becomes a professional specialist, she need not make any further demon-
strations of being broad-ranging thinkers but should join the collaboration 
of specialists through small-scale interventions which genuinely push 
knowledge forward now. So the PhD dissertation becomes a final point of 
Research Monograph production which does not need to pass into publi-
cation as a book any longer. That can always be put Open Access online as 
such, especially since the Academic Author has already paid for it as a 
PhD student (or her sponsors have). Otherwise, the professional specialist 
should focus on Research Papers and, if so inclined, reference books and 
textbooks and general-interest accounts of her research.   
These four points seem to me to present compelling and reasonable 
arguments for weeding out the conventional Research Monograph, with 
its strongly centred notion of Academic Authorship, from Scholarly 
Publishing.   
A few final points on why the Research Journal Paper is particularly 
appropriate for generating benefits for all and profits for the Scholarly 
Publisher, University and Ministry in the e-Publishing and Open-Access 
Publishing environment remain to be made.    
First, insofar as taken directly to Open-Access Publishing, publication 
costs for Research Journal Papers are low and it is therefore easier to 
persuade Academic Authors – supported by the University and Ministry – 
to arrange to pay those costs. Since Academic Authors have a weak sense 
of pre-contractual ownership of the Research Journal Paper they have a 
less self-interested stake in its publication. So suitable profit making for 
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the Scholarly Publisher can be guaranteed while the benefits of Open 
Access are fully availed.  
Second, insofar as first made available as an e-publication for closed-
market access, there are two good reasons for expecting some immediate 
profit generation for the Scholarly Publisher from Research Journal 
Papers, while extending benefits to relevant researchers in the University. 
Thus, the Research Journal Paper can be packaged and sold to consumers 
in various ways: as an affordable short text-in-itself; within subscriptions 
to specific journal titles; within various scales of subscriptions to a range 
of journal titles and other scholarly resources (according to subject area, 
publisher or retailer, indexing and search platforms, etc.). The University 
can then subscribe to the last by investing a substantial part of the (often 
public or not-for-profit) funding that used to be earmarked for library 
acquisitions. Further, being interventions at the cutting edge of different 
research areas, researchers engaged in those areas demand immediate 
access to new Research Journal Papers to maintain their academic 
competitiveness. The University naturally has an interest in helping 
researchers in their employ to do so. Consequently, for a critical period 
after publication there is immediate and high demand for Research Journal 
Papers within a limited scholarly market which can be capitalised on by e-
publication for closed-market access.  
Third, since the period of high demand is as short as it takes to reach 
the limited market with immediate demand (mainly of researchers in the 
subscribing University), and given that the profits from that phase can be 
high, it becomes possible for the Scholarly Publisher to offer Open-Access 
Publication of Research Journal Papers at a later stage if they wish to. 
They can always withhold that possibility for Research Journal Papers 
which seem to have longer term commercial viability. Thus, a slightly 
belated but unarguable maximisation of benefits can be afforded after 
calculable profits have been made.   
  
Fabio Akcelrud Durão 
 
Alexander’s texts in this Part touch on an important topic. Reading them, I 
came to realise that they are proportionally strong to the existing degree of 
commodification of academic practices. The closer to the market a given 
part of academic life is, the more cogent his arguments seem to be. His 
contributions, then, could be divided into two main groups: those which 
have a prospective bent and those with a more descriptive character. The 
latter seems to be the case in this Part. It had already occurred to me that 
big books are disappearing and that for many academics I know their 
magnum opus was their PhD dissertation. Alexander’s final arguments above 
make sense, but it is bad sense. What he is doing (and governments 
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everywhere as well) is basically to transpose on literary studies the modus 
operandi of the natural sciences. This is a questionable combination. I can 
think of the following counterarguments, which also may help characterise 
the specificity of literature in contradistinction to other fields.  
First, in literary studies, there is no sharp separation between the object 
and its configuration; one’s approach to a strong work interferes in it. This 
is valid not only for that which the critic says the text is, but also for the 
writing style itself (it is worth discussing whether bad composition renders 
good arguments false). Second, the Research Monograph is still necessary 
for literary studies, because questions are not pre-established. A scholar 
can form her horizon of interpretation in the way she wants to and some 
problems are naturally big, requiring lengthy exposition. Some approaches, 
such as the comparative, need more space. Third, Alexander’s description 
is presentist and deals with knowledge as waves succeeding in quick 
progression, but that is not the way time works in the humanities, 
especially in literary studies. Here the relationship with the past is not one 
of supplanting cycles of oblivion, but of accumulation. Erudition has a 
hard time adapting to 5,000-word papers. Fourth, as I have observed 
elsewhere, the idea of ‘fields’ do not sit comfortably in literary studies. 
Works do not exist as a priori entities in the way our lungs or butterflies do. 
They have no social function now, given that ‘culture’ as a transcendent 
sphere has ceased to exist and nationhood is defined by other means. The 
heavier, the more self-confident and self-believing, notions of ‘research’ 
and ‘field’ become, the more they must rely on the fixity and firmness of 
an object that does not exist. Indeed, endowing literature with all this 
scientific armour may turn out to be an efficient way of doing away with it. 
This is because the disparity between the ever-increasing specificity de-
manded by the concept of ‘field’ and the precariousness of literature as an 
object will become too ludicrous. Perhaps all this boils down to the fact 
that literature cannot just point to itself, but must rather include some sort 
of exteriority without which it shrinks into absurdity – call it life, society, 
experience, pleasure or something else. 
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55. Leadership Education and that 
‘Shakespeherian Rag’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Alexander Search 
 
I will not try to describe what leadership consists in, not even in the 
contained sense of ‘academic leadership.’ Numerous scholarly-looking 
publications on the typologies and styles of leadership (traditional/legal-
rational/charismatic; transactional/transformational; etc.) fixate on the 
content of leadership: What does leadership consist in? Who is a leader? 
What does she do? Mystifications, sweeping assertions and aphoristic 
pronouncements unfortunately abound in these publications. But they are 
testament to the enormous importance of the issue, not to be dismissed 
lightly. Also, these publications are consistently underpinned by certain 
dominant or common understandings in conceptualising leadership now – 
usually tacitly, so that they are understood without necessarily being 
discussed. Let me try to state some of those baldly as received assump-
tions, and you can decide for yourself how familiar and acceptable they 
are. They do, at any rate, help us consider the bearing of leadership, if any, 
on literary research.    
 (1) At present, the only way of gauging leadership in relation to an 
organisation or collective is in terms of outcomes by some measure. Those 
are foremost in terms of the sustainable generation of profits, with all 
other outcomes understood as facilitating (e.g., trust, creativity, efficiency, 
inspiration) or consequent (e.g., benefits for all or enrichment according to 
desserts) factors. The profit-led outcomes may then be characterised in 
broader and loose terms as growth, expansion, consolidation, stability, 
change, transformation, etc. The most significant performance measure in 
all that is related to the generation of profits, expressed in a graded and 
precise monetary form. In that sense, the role of all leadership is under-
stood now as being principally an entrepreneurial one.    
 (2) However, there is no robust way of showing precisely how and to 
what degree leadership does lead to profitable or unprofitable outcomes 
for an organisation or collective. The consequential relationship between 
leadership and outcome can only be more or less habitually or instinctively 
claimed, assumed, accepted. Several factors interfere with rendering this 
relationship clear and tractable. First, leadership is usually a distributed 
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role, being delegated across several actors in an organisation or collective. 
However efficiently hierarchical the organisation or collective might be, its 
structure will contain variations of input and influence. Second, it is easier 
to peg specific profitable outcomes to the roles played by workers, the 
hands-on producers – let us say, the followers rather than the leaders. 
Third, factors circumstantial or extrinsic to the organisation or collective 
in question, outside the determinations of leadership, usually play a 
significant part: larger economic environments, cultural behaviours, acts of 
god, etc. Fourth, even if someone holding a leadership role makes some 
definite input with profitable outcomes, it is difficult to tell whether the 
outcome was due to leadership prerogatives or due to some sort of skill or 
knowledge which would have worked irrespective of those prerogatives.  
 (3) At the same time, the leadership role comes with a powerful 
prerogative to represent and explain outcomes both to and on behalf of 
the organisation or collective in question. The leader, therefore, has first 
say in claiming or disowning responsibility for outcomes. Naturally, the 
leader always firmly claims responsibility for profitable outcomes and 
often disowns responsibility for unprofitable or otherwise deleterious out-
comes. Equally, the organisation or collective in question, which has, for 
whatever reason and however conditionally, accepted the legitimacy of the 
leadership role, is inclined to attribute clear responsibility for outcomes to 
leadership. That attribution of responsibility may differ from the leader’s 
own claims, but it still endows leadership with an apparently clear relation-
ship to outcomes. In brief, the leadership role is apt to be over-determined 
in terms of understanding its relation to outcomes, even though there is 
no way of clarifying a consequential relationship between leadership and 
outcomes.  
 (4) Given that leadership’s relation to outcomes is over-determined, 
unsurprisingly an impression comes to prevail that by educating and 
moulding the appropriate sort of leaders it should be possible to obtain 
the desired outcomes for an organisation or collective – especially, profit-
able outcomes. A great industry of leadership education and training is 
therefore now in place, founded on this shaky idea. Contemplating what 
this education should offer and cover poses certain conundrums and ways 
of dealing with them. First, with all the above observations in view, it is 
difficult to pin down what specific skills or knowledge, such as can be 
systematically articulated and rigorously examined, bear upon leadership. 
Leadership roles at every juncture seem to involve abilities which are 
somewhat less than being skilled or evincing knowledge. Leaders seem-
ingly recruit and deploy skilled workers and knowledgeable experts, which 
calls for an ability to recognise skilfulness without being skilled or to take 
advantage of expertise without being expert. Leadership education has 
consequently tended to make a virtue of being semi-skilled and semi-
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knowledgeable in a number of different areas, rather than being skilled or 
knowledgeable in any. However, that contributes to the fuzziness or 
intractability of the relationship between leadership and profitable 
outcomes. Second, as being skilled or knowledgeable then does not qualify 
persons for being educators for leaders, the question arises as to who 
could be the educators and by what authority? Further, since success in 
leadership is only gauged by outcomes and yet leadership putatively takes 
place before those outcomes, the only recognisable authority that seems 
relevant is that of experience of having been a successful leader. Experi-
ence therefore has a significant authority-conferring part for leadership 
educators, which is to say that leadership education consists in an auto-
perpetuating and auto-confirming process which is difficult to validate 
objectively. The measures of external validation that apply elsewhere in 
education seem not to apply here, and the role of the instructor is often 
less a matter of following a curriculum than being a role-model. Third, 
being semi-skilled and semi-knowledgeable, even across several areas, is a 
doubtful basis for seeking legitimacy within most organisations and 
collectives. To claim experience of success is to have become a leader 
already, so in no need of education though good for becoming an educa-
tor. The usual answer to this circularity in leadership education is to assert 
that leadership ultimately rests neither in knowledge nor skills and nor 
wholly in experience but in deeper factors. Such deeper factors usually 
converge on inborn abilities which can be honed (IQ, physical appearance, 
temperament, etc. – genes) and inherited privileges which can be capital-
ised (affluent or powerful family connections, elite socialisation, etc.). It is 
therefore arguable that leadership education tends to incline would-be 
leaders towards fascist and/or elitist subscriptions.    
 The situation outlined in the four points above appears to present 
some entrepreneurial opportunities for all Academic Researchers, even 
literary researchers. On the one hand, it is unclear what sort of skills and 
knowledge leadership education should impart, so putatively some 
understanding of various areas of skills and knowledge could be useful, 
across various disciplines – including literature. On the other hand, there is 
this large, well-endowed, and seemingly profitable leadership education 
industry in place. Literary researchers may be able to have some input 
there.   
 The idea has naturally occurred to various leadership educators with 
literary interests already. Literary studies have been brought to bear on 
leadership education at times. To what degree entrepreneurial literary 
researchers have taken up or could take up such opportunities is worth 
pausing on here.  
 To bolster the thought let me quickly outline one direction from which 
literary study seems to have fed into leadership education. The study of 
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Shakespeare’s plays has obviously proved accommodative in all sorts of 
contexts, and now comes with pre-confirmed literary and economic value 
which could extend in unexpected directions – a circumstance that has not 
escaped University leaders (Kirp’s 2003 account of the development of 
entrepreneurial US universities notes short-lived courses on Shakespeare 
without having to read the plays, ‘Shakespeare Lite’, 121). So, unsurpris-
ingly, Shakespeare’s plays have been ploughed for leadership education 
too, and several books devoted only to them are available for the purpose: 
Norman Augustine and Kenneth Adelman’s Shakespeare in Charge: The 
Bard's Guide to Leading and Succeeding on the Business Stage (1999); Paul 
Corrigan’s Shakespeare on Management: Leadership Lessons for Today's Managers 
(1999); John Whitney and Tina Packer’s Power Plays: Shakespeare's Lessons in 
Leadership and Management (2000); Richard Olivier’s Inspirational Leadership: 
Henry V and the Muse of Fire – Timeless Insights from Shakespeare's Greatest 
Leader (2001); Eric de Haan’s The Consulting Process as Drama: Learning from 
King Lear (2003). There are also Shakespearean chapters and illustrations in 
numerous management and leadership guidebooks. These are all cognisant 
of the fact that leaders do not need to be knowledgeable of Shakespeare, 
do not need to really read (let alone read closely and interpret) 
Shakespeare’s plays, but can still benefit from contemplating them. They 
are still a few notches more demanding than Shakespeare for Dummies 
(Doyle and Lischner 1999). To be precise, these do not (to use terms 
explained in II.29, “Professional Interpretation”) encourage critical 
purposing of Shakespeare’s plays; these are pre-purposed texts which 
answer would-be leaders’ questions using Shakespeare’s plays as an 
obviously authority-bearing vehicle.   
 This might be an approach to Shakespeare that most literary research-
ers are at present not accustomed to taking. With our entrepreneurial age 
in view, literary researchers working on Shakespeare’s works have 
occasionally produced scholarly monographs which seem to have some 
potential interest for entrepreneurial leaders (there is no other kind of 
leader, of course), and might putatively inform leadership education. In 
fact, they mostly do not. These are actually more weightily knowledgeable 
than leadership education calls for. For the really keen Shakespeare 
devotee among would-be leaders, Frederick Turner’s Shakespeare’s Twenty-
First Century Economics (1999), with its nuanced melding of language and 
form in Shakespeare’s work with economic concepts, might possibly 
prove absorbing. However, dense historicist scholarship, such as David 
Hawkes’s Shakespeare and Economic Theory (2015) or Dominic Shellard and 
Siobhan Keenan’s edited volume Shakespeare’s Cultural Capital: His Economic 
Impact from the Eighteenth to the Twenty-First Century (2016) offer little for 
leaderly ambitions. All too often, literary scholarship in our time tends to 
be unnecessarily discouraging for leaders. For instance, Sophie Ward’s 
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Using Shakespeare’s Plays to Explore Education Policy Today: Neoliberalism through 
the Lens of Renaissance Humanism (2017), offers a reading of Hamlet to reflect 
on “entrepreneurial heroes” of today (Ch.1): 
 
Hamlet’s tortuous soul-searching provided the template for Romantic depic-
tions of social misfits, such as Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s, The Sorrows of 
Young Werther, and established the literary trope of the sensitive thinker 
struggling to cope in a world of phlegmatic doers. At first glance, Hamlet 
appears an unlikely blueprint for the neoliberal ‘go-getter,’ yet it paved the 
way for both Romantic mysticism and the rejection of this route of travel in 
the form of Rand’s Market-Romantic philosophy, and the play’s depiction of 
rationality and tradition arguably provides a useful lens through which to 
scrutinise neoliberal theory on volition and entrepreneurialism. (Ward 2017: 
14)      
 
It is perhaps not difficult to understand and even to sympathise with 
would-be leaders feeling put off by this kind of scholarship.  
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56. The Invisible Literary Researcher 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Alexander Search 
 
As observed above, some effort has been made to bring literature, and 
more broadly the humanities, into leadership education. The possibilities 
have been considered occasionally in a scholarly register (e.g. Steyaert, 
Beyes and Parker eds. 2016, Chs.4, 5, 37; Wren, Riggio and Genovese eds. 
2009; in a 2007 special issue of The Leadership Quarterly; Gagliardi and 
Czarniawska eds. 2006). These include wishful interventions by entrepre-
neurial humanities scholars. More importantly, leadership gurus have 
occasionally produced guidebooks and textbooks which can be used in 
teaching programmes. An indicative list would include: Robert Brawer, The 
Fictions of Business: Insights on Management from Great Literature (1998); James 
March and Thierry Weil, On Leadership (2005 [2003]); Joseph Badaracco Jr., 
Questions of Character: Illuminating the Heart of Leadership Through Literature 
(2006); Sandra Sucher, Teaching The Moral Leader: A Literature-Based Leader-
ship Course: A Guide for Instructors (2007); Edward W. Younkins, Exploring 
Capitalist Fiction: Business through Literature and Film (2014); Robert McManus 
and Gama Perruci, Understanding Leadership: An Arts and Humanities 
Perspective (2015). These authors’ credentials as leadership educators are 
impeccable. Brawer was CEO of Maidenform Worldwide (women’s 
underwear manufacturer) and a Professor at New York University’s 
School of Professional Studies; March is Professor of International 
Management at Stanford Business School, and Weil is Professor of 
Innovation Management at Mines ParisTech; Badaracco is Professor of 
Business Ethics at Harvard Business School; Sucher is Professor of 
Management Practice in Harvard Business School; Younkins is Professor 
of Accountancy and Business Administration at the Wheeling Jesuit 
University; McManus and Perucci are both professors at the McDonough 
Leadership Center at Marietta College in Ohio. None of the authors are 
bread-and-butter literary researchers. They are perfectly placed to offer 
what such publications are designed for, as IV.1 suggests (there with 
Shakespeare in view): pre-purposed texts which answer would-be leaders’ 
questions using great literature as vehicles. These books are tried and 
tested in leadership education programmes.  
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 They also share a vision of literature which entrepreneurial literary 
researchers contemplating a foothold in leadership education should take 
note of. Their vision can be summarised in three uncomplicated points.    
 (1) Engagement with literature, though seemingly distant from entre-
preneurial leadership, offers something that directly relevant courses on 
business accounting, organisation management, human resources, public 
relations and marketing, group psychology, etc. do not.   
 (2) This extra something can be accessed only through obviously great 
or serious literature, widely acknowledged as such (no ‘Canon Wars’ here). 
None insist on choosing literary texts depicting business matters (Brawer 
and Younkis put some emphasis on this). They all insist that the texts in 
question should be serious, great, classic. To some extent, they do so 
because great literary texts endow would-be leaders with cultural capital; 
evincing awareness of such texts gives a leaderly edge. This is particularly 
the case where greatness is universally acknowledged, as for Shakespeare’s 
plays. More importantly, for the above-named authors greatness (or 
seriousness) is a confirmation of the real-world relevance of these texts. 
These texts are great because people across time and in different places 
have found something meaningful to their lives in them. This suggests that 
they carry something which could resonate with all sorts of organisations 
and collectives and the widest range of markets, which naturally the leader 
should try to extricate and use entrepreneurially when possible.  
 (3) Taking advantage of this quality of greatness involves reading such 
texts as if they are reports of real-world situations, preferably featuring a 
protagonist who can be identified as playing a leadership role. This is the 
extra something that can be obtained from literature: experience analogous 
to engaging with mock judicial trials, surgery simulations, or business-
school case studies; experience of the complex interpersonal situations 
which leaders may encounter in real life. Literary texts could be purposed 
for leadership education if treated as straightforward mimesis, without 
being complicated by stylistic, formalistic, aesthetic, historicist or inter-
textual considerations. This is the key point of using literature for 
leadership education, and the above-named guidebooks emphasise this 
variously. The general approach is put succinctly by Badaracco (2006), 
thus: 
 
How does serious fiction help us understand leadership? The answer is 
simple but extraordinarily powerful: serious fiction gives us a unique, inside 
view of leadership. In real life, most people see the leaders of their organiza-
tions only occasionally and get only fleeting glimpses of what these leaders 
are thinking and feeling. Even interviews with executives have their limits. 
Executives say only so much, even when they want to be candid: sensitivities 
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have to be observed, memory fades and sometimes distorts and successes 
crowd out failures.  
 In contrast, serious literature offers a view from the inside. It opens doors 
to a world rarely seen – except, on occasion, by leaders’ spouses and closest 
friends. It lets us watch leaders as they think, worry, hope, hesitate, commit, 
exult, regret, and reflect. We see their characters tested, reshaped, strength-
ened, or weakened. These books draw us into leaders’ worlds, put us in their 
shows, and at times let us share their experiences. (3)   
 
It may be inferred that the serious fiction in question always feature 
leader-like characters; in any given situation, someone is always a leader. 
 This three-point approach might seem discouraging to entrepreneurial 
literary researchers hoping for entry into leadership education. Serious 
literary research usually begins by stepping beyond the assumption that 
literary texts are merely simulations of real-world situations and should be 
read in terms of identifying or empathising with protagonists. The above-
named authors are well aware of literary researchers’ penchant for compli-
cating matters. Therefore, they all insist on, and offer, direct encounters 
between literary texts and would-be leaders, unmediated by literary research. They are 
clear about this, and entrepreneurial literary researchers with interest in 
leadership education should bear it in mind. None of them refer to literary 
research about the great texts which they discuss. Badaracco (2006) is 
forthright about keeping literary research well out of sight. He suggests 
bringing literary texts into leadership education by a ‘sleight of hand,’ that 
is, by treating them as business-school case studies, and observes: ‘The 
sleight of hand was important because many people associate literature 
with abstruse academic talk about Freudian imagery or deconstruction; 
case studies, on the other hand, are familiar tools for management 
education’ (2). Others are more tactful in removing the mediation of 
literary research. March and Weil (2005), who have a sentimental attach-
ment to the greatness of classical scholarly traditions, simply admit that 
their approach to literary texts is but one approach – a worthy one for 
leaders – which neither competes with nor considers those explored by 
literary researchers:  
 
Reading great books is an end and a pleasure in itself. Reading them in a 
particular light makes it possible to escape from the tradition of analyses that 
focus on other aspects of a work, as one of the characteristics of great 
literature is that it gives rise to a host of interpretations, but can never be 
reduced to these. (6)  
 
In effect, they politely put literary research aside – live and let live. Sucher 
(2007) quickly cites some authorities to justify taking this approach, so that 
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Wayne Booth comes up briefly, before continuing without further fiddling 
with literary research. Others simply do not mention it.  
 For the entrepreneurial literary researcher seeking a foothold in leader-
ship education then, the following problematic situation arises. To be able 
to do so they have to become invisible as literary researchers; they should 
not let literary research interfere with would-be leaders’ direct encounters 
with great literary texts. They should not question the assumptions under 
which this encounter is understood to be most effective (the three points 
above), though they have been trained to do so as literary researchers. 
However, since they cannot claim pedagogic authority in terms of 
specialism in (or experience of) business management, as the above-named 
authors can, they do have to find their place as literary researchers. In 
brief, they have to deal with a somewhat paradoxical strategy so as to 
contribute to leadership education: they have to become invisible as literary 
researchers while making authoritative (and authorizing) use of their knowledge as 
literary researchers.   
 But entrepreneurial literary researchers should not give up. In the 1993 
film Jurassic Park, the following exchange occurs between a CEO (John) 
and a couple of scientists: 
 
Ian Malcolm: John, the kind of control you’re attempting simply is… it’s not 
possible. If there is one thing the history of evolution has taught us it’s 
that life will not be contained. Life breaks free, it expands to new 
territories and crashes through barriers, painfully, maybe even danger-
ously, but… well, there it is. 
John Hammond: [unconvinced] There it is. 
Henry Wu: You’re implying that a group composed entirely of female animals 
will… breed? 
Ian Malcolm: No. I’m, I’m simply saying that life… finds a way. 
 
Entrepreneurial literary researchers should have a similar conviction in 
enterprise – enterprise finds a way, often despite leaders.    
 In this context, it is worth contemplating an encouraging performance 
by a literature professor who is also an experienced academic leader, Rick 
Rylance. Rylance is a professor of English Literature. He has been Head of 
School in Exeter University and is now the Director of London 
University’s Institute of English Studies. He has also been a leading policy 
maker as chief executive of the Arts and Humanities Research Council 
(AHRC) and chair of the Research Councils UK executive group. His 
admirable little book, Literature and the Public Good (2016), is instructive for 
all entrepreneurial literary researchers. It presents a case for regarding 
literature as a public good, understanding the ‘public good’ in terms which 
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resonate with mine (see I.6, “Research for the Public Good”), though 
more inclusively expressed. According to Rylance:  
 
The word ‘good’ can mean several things in this context. It can be a positive 
evaluative category when used adjectively (‘a good book’ for example); it can 
mean a public benefit (‘the public good’ itself is an example); and it can be a 
commodity, as in ‘sale of goods’ or those signs that read ‘inward goods’ for 
delivery drivers. (Rylance 2016: 131) 
 
And further: 
 
Literature […] is something that unites the three senses of ‘good’ in modern 
societies […]. A ‘good book’ – esteemed, valued, worth recommending or 
studying – feeds into a ‘public good’ – creating and transmitting a shared 
culture and stimulating thought, ideas, and exchange – by way of being an 
accessible ‘good’ acquired through the various outlets by which our society 
circulates its material things. (135) 
 
Thus, ingeniously, the different senses of ‘good’ are brought together in 
contemplating literature by the circumstance of shared signification and 
yet without erasing their difference. [I wonder whether this works in 
languages other than English.]  
 The book performs (rather than rigidly reason through) its argument to 
persuade different constituencies of this happy conjunction of the mean-
ings of ‘good’ in literature. The different constituencies involve: literary 
researchers, cultural industry entrepreneurs, government policy makers 
and academic leaders. To make his case for each, separately and together, 
he performs a weaving together of different authority-bearing voices. To 
convince literary researchers he speaks as one them, establishing his status 
by closely reading a W.B. Yeats poem, interpreting some novels and talk-
ing suavely of literary history – and thus vouches for the benefits to be had 
from literature. To persuade policy makers and academic leaders and 
cultural entrepreneurs he speaks as one of them: evincing a firm grasp of 
the economic advantages that literary products offer, and citing the data 
and reports to back that up – and thus vouches for literature’s profit-
making record. To persuade the lay public (and this is particularly pleasing 
for leaders since it chimes with the three-fold approach of leadership 
education to literary texts), he gives them confident specialist backing for 
the importance of empathy in reading literature – he thus vouches for the 
benefits that all may elicit from literature.   
 The most instructive aspect of Rylance’s book is that it is, apart from a 
brief mention of student recruitment to literature departments, uninter-
ested in academia. He simply does not pause on the existence of the 
University, of institutions employing literary researchers and teachers, of 
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professional structures for literary scholarship. Academia is evidently irr-
elevant to professing literature and being an academic leader and policy 
maker. Rylance mediates directly between literature and the constituencies 
he addresses, as a professor and as a leader and yet – where and of what? 
The University is invisible in this argument-performance.  
 There is a lesson to be learned by entrepreneurial literary researchers 
seeking an edge in leadership education from this brilliant performance. 
Somewhere in Rylance’s book there are clues about how to become 
entrepreneurially invisible as a literary researcher and yet exert authority as 
such. It has something to do with making the University and its structur-
ing assumptions invisible when necessary, for a given constituency. 
However, I have not fully worked this out yet – I am still thinking about it.           
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57.  Freed and Leaderless 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Suman Gupta 
 
Alexander’s observations on leaders and leadership education reveal a 
sceptical disposition which I would not have suspected in a neoliberal 
thinker. But, on reflection, it also makes sense. Do neoliberals really take 
the claims now made everywhere on behalf of leadership seriously? 
Neoliberals make the claims, use the claims, but that does not mean they 
take them seriously. Alexander has himself been making these claims often 
enough above: how leaders in the University and Ministry have far-
sightedly organised matters so that the entrepreneurial public good is 
served. He has often assumed an upbeat tone when he talked of leaders. 
But, looking back, he has also courted a slight irony at times (difficult to 
tell whether intended) in various observations on leadership – for instance, 
in relation to the ‘universalisation of leadership’ (see I.10, “Changes and 
Futures”), and especially in this part. There is some difference between 
making, using and cheering for the claims of leadership and actually taking 
them seriously. Perhaps real power is exercised where assertions of leader-
ship are not needed; leadership education might well be an entrepreneurial 
con. 
  Claims of the salience of leadership are, possibly, used to incentivise 
and instrumentalise certain needy persons to work for entrepreneurial 
ends within well-defined constraints, as cogs in the machine. That makes 
sense when I consider the steady proliferation of ‘leadership roles’ and 
‘senior management positions’ in the University, marked by titles with 
words like ‘Director,’ ‘Executive,’ ‘Chief,’ ‘Manager,’ ‘Head,’ etc. in them. 
If they all think of themselves as leaders then there might well be more 
leaders than followers in the University now. This means that they are 
probably all obedient followers, whose obedience is secured by making 
them believe that they are leaders.  
 Alexander’s observations do not delve the real power that super-
senior-top leaders in any organisation do exercise. Even if the relationship 
between what they do and the profit making of organisations is actually 
always unclear (as Alexander notes), what they do does have tractable 
effects on lives and livelihoods within organisations. There may well be 
other quieter machinations of power working on the leaders themselves 
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(perhaps from boards of trustees, executive boardrooms, ministries), but 
their own voluble exercise of coercive power in organisations is usually 
material enough. It should be possible to set up leadership-coercion 
indexes by following Alexander’s metrics and modelling methods. To what 
extent do super-senior-top leaders constrain freedom of productive activ-
ity? Or, institute strangling accounting practices and form-filling exercises? 
Or, impose pointless restructurings and transformations in the name of 
‘embracing change’? Or, contribute to anxiety and insecurity? Or, extend 
unnecessary surveillance mechanisms? Or, cultivate a sucking-up and 
petty-bullying culture? Or, fire off threatening tweets at midnight?  
 In fact, a rigorous leadership-coercion index might encourage all – the 
public, low to middle level workers in organisations, boards of trustees 
and executive bodies of organisations, the University and Ministry – to 
reduce the role of super-senior-top leaders. The project of liberating the 
leaders could start with, say, CEOs. That is to say, following my argument 
in II.42, “The Shrinking Teacher and Pedagogical AI,” replacing super-
senior-top leaders to a necessary extent with AI might be a reasonable way 
forward, helping them towards joining the ranks of freed human beings.   
 There are very good reasons for pursuing a project of replacing super-
senior-top leaders with AI as far as possible. (1) These leaders are the most 
expensive part of the employment market, so any savings made there are 
likely to be substantial. (2) Any misstep made by a leader has large-scale 
and adverse economic consequences for a given organisation (and often 
beyond organisations), so using AI resources to minimise the risk of mis-
steps will have a salutary economic impact. (3) The human proclivity to 
wilfully coerce and exert irrational power, and tendency towards 
corruption, could be significantly reduced; leadership AI can always be 
programmed and reset accordingly. (4) Through leadership education texts 
and programmes there have emerged a steady set of routinized initiatives, 
responses and behaviours in given organisational systems (according 
to specific variables) which describe most leadership functions – it should 
be possible to model these. (5) A great deal of effective leadership 
functions depend on having sufficiently broad information processing and 
assimilation abilities, which could be bettered by integrating AI with 
leadership. (5) In the liberal justice system there is already a model of 
governance by primary adherence to objective principles and only condi-
tionally to subjective judgments (rule of law) – this can be automatized to 
a significant extent and rendered effective in all organisational spheres. 
 Eventually the entrepreneurial rationale of AI may erase the differences 
between leaders and followers among us, and realise the potential of freed 
and leaderless human beings. Perhaps the full scope of literary research can 
only be conceptualised with the horizon of freed and leaderless human 
beings before us.   
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Appendix 
Suman Gupta, ‘Seven Phases’ (May 2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
Here I try to articulate seven broad and consecutive phases in engineering 
the relationship between academic work and conditions for that work in 
the context of liberal economies. These phases rationalise academic work 
in cost-benefit accounting terms. Arguably such phases are being – have 
been – unrolled in some such order very widely in different countries, 
increasingly globally. Though some are perhaps further along the line of 
such phases than others, almost all are converging on their direction. 
A significant part of academic work is by nature introspective and 
relatively intractable in terms of time/resources/outlay: such as preparing 
for teaching, consulting research sources and conducting experiments, 
reading and writing, engaging in conversations, etc. Tractability typically 
attaches to what is externalised after the introspective process: lectures and 
tutorials, conference presentations, consultancies, publications, data-sets, 
patents, employable graduates, etc. 
Setting the conditions of academic work involves making calculations 
of tractability, which in turn depend on various ideological subscriptions 
within the liberal fold. Other kinds of ideological subscriptions may have 
actuated different calculations (sometimes intrusions) in various contexts, 
especially in the past, but (shifting) liberal subscriptions along the line of 
the phases below are now globally discernible. 
With these very general propositions in mind, the following phases in 
engineering the relationship between academic work and the conditions 
thereof can be outlined. 
 
Phase 1: Academic work as a whole – both introspective process and exter-
nalised product – in all its dimensions is regarded as a public good, and is 
conducted accordingly in all academic institutions (however funded, but 
thereby particularly justifying state or public funding). It is held that the 
precise character of the public benefit cannot necessarily be accounted 
strictly in terms of specific externalised products at any given time: it is 
impossible to predict when and where the benefit of some product will 
become apparent (if it exists it may come to be useful in expected and 
unexpected ways). But a long view of the contribution of academic work 
to social development shows a salutary, indeed inextricable, relationship. 
Further, an intractable (that is, free and open) introspective process is 
ENTREPRENEURIAL LITERARY THEORY 
254 
 
considerd necessary for the realisation of the externalised product, and 
those engaging in academic work are best placed to manage the conditions 
for such work – so, a high degree of academic self-determination in 
managing the conditions of academic work is desirable. Typically, this 
means that the intractable introspective process is allowed reasonable free 
play and kept outside strict accounting; the latter is confined to even-
handed distribution of the more tractable externalised production among 
workers (especially teaching and administration). To regulate productivity, 
systems for informing academic workers of expectations, incentives to 
encourage effort and productivity (promotions, increments, etc.), peer-
reviewing and external-peer-assessing at every stage, and disincentives for 
poor work (appeals procedures and disciplinary procedures, etc.) suffice. 
 
Phase 2: It is soon argued (to begin with by those administering govern-
ment budgets) that academic work should not be considered a public good 
without accountable evidence thereof: i.e. every investment made by a 
putative public (whether through states or other entities, including private) 
in academic work should be tractably accounted in terms of benefits to the 
public. Academic self-determination of the conditions of academic work is 
not questioned; but academies are now required to become ‘professional’ 
and tractable in ways that can be recorded by, for instance, auditors and 
bureaucrats and ministers. In the first instance, this means creating more 
disaggregated and stable measurements of the relatively tractable exterior-
ised products – i.e. measurements which comply with existing, albeit so far 
loose and unsystematised, academic values and norms. Thus, specific 
exteriorised products begin to be subjected regularly to certain strict 
evaluative measures, effectively withdrawing the notion that their public 
benefits are impossible to affix firmly at any given point of time. So, firm 
measures of scholarly importance, influence, esteem, impact and so on for 
activities like teaching and research (measures of ‘quality’) are instituted, 
such as can ostensibly be immediately gauged through some regular 
bureaucratic procedure. The principle of academic self-determination is 
maintained by keeping such disaggregated measuring and accounting of 
exteriorised products at the behest of ‘peer-reviewing,’ which is given the 
character of a bureaucratic accounting procedure. 
 
Phase 3: Once the value of the exteriorised product is thus disaggregated 
according to firm ‘quality’ measures, the introspective process preceding it 
becomes open to tracking too. The introspective process is then broken 
down into parts, and each part is given a value in accordance with the 
value attributed to the exteriorised products that putatively derive from it. 
So, the cost of time for teaching preparation is considered as measurable 
against the measured quality of the tractable teaching done (affixed by 
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consulting peers and students, from recruitment figures, etc.); the cost of 
time for reading, writing, experimenting, discussing, etc. is considered as 
measurable against the measured quality of publications produced (affixed 
by consulting peers, checking ‘bibliometrics,’ creating indexes of ‘prestige,’ 
etc.); and so on. Gradually, therefore, the conditions for academic work 
are revised. Now, instead of allowing free play for introspection and even-
handed distribution of tractable exteriorised products, the apparently 
disaggregated parts of the introspective process are themselves made 
subject to accounting. That, in turn, allows for calculations and trade-offs 
in terms of the ‘quality’ of the exteriorised product that is likely to follow 
at any given time. That what is ‘likely to follow’ is itself an intractable 
variant is too obvious a weakness in this accounting process: so, measures 
of probability of performance according to each worker’s record are 
generated and factored in to make this shaky variant appear measurable. It 
makes for a more atomised academic sector as workers and institutions 
bargain with and calculate against each other to obtain the most advanta-
geous performance records and trade-offs. 
 
Phase 4: The disaggregation of both the exteriorised product and intro-
spective process of academic work, and the generation of performance 
records, is then brought to bear upon the further fashioning of conditions 
for academic work through two crucial steps. Step one: it is deemed that the 
accounting practices invented through Phases 2 and 3 are an area of 
specialisation which demands too much time and effort, interferes too 
deeply into the core of academic work (teaching and research), to be left in 
the hands of academics as self-managers of their working conditions. So, a 
professional management stratum is inserted into academia, partly by co-
optation from within and partly by recruitment from without. It comes 
under the guise of ‘academic leadership’ as a specialised and discrete role. 
The job of this management stratum is no longer justified by its under-
standing of the relation between introspection and exteriorisation in 
academic work. Instead, its role consists in taking charge of the accounting 
practices invented through Phases 2 and 3, and it is soon given (or wrests) 
the power to engineer all aspects of academic work so that such book-
keeping could be conducted to optimise the use of investments (costs of 
time, resources, outlay, etc.). The measures of performance put in place 
for this stratum itself has no relation to academic work. These managerial 
performance measures derive from comparisons (typically of institutions 
and sectors) of success in optimising use of investments, and in ensuring 
the compliance of academic workers and manipulation of academic work 
for that purpose. The obvious way of doing the latter is by upping the 
pressure of atomisation and competitiveness mentioned at the end of 
Phase 3: introducing targets for exteriorised production and accordingly 
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rationalising the distribution of parts of the introspective process – and 
thereby, trying to influence the record of predictable performance (which 
easily translates into behaviour profiles for workers). 
 
Phase 5: Step two, which follows on the heels of step one in Phase 4, 
involves taking the measurements of value put in place in Phases 2 and 3 
largely out of the hands of academic self-assessment (peer assessment) and 
passing it on to external representatives of the so-called public, which is 
often now the same as agents of private interests (‘stakeholders’ in short – 
employers, industrialists, community leaders, political bosses, bureaucrats, 
etc.). This is aided, indeed motivated, by step one: the management 
stratum, isolated from academic workers and with license to act upon 
them, often has aligned interests (in cost-benefit accounting terms) with 
such non-academic stakeholders and find them useful for pressuring and 
extracting compliance from academic workers. The management stratum 
is able to argue that the public benefits of academic work can only be 
attested disinterestedly from outside academia by such stakeholders: e.g. 
employers can testify whether the teaching done is useful in producing a 
workforce outside academia; community leaders can testify whether 
teaching and research is producing social stability and development; 
corporations can bear witness to the contribution of teaching and research 
to business development. By this stage, almost all of the justification for 
public – i.e. state – funding of academic work has evaporated. Academic 
workers come to be regarded as a part of the ‘human resources’ (a small 
part of the gross resources) and as ‘service-providers’ of institutions, and 
students along with other ‘stakeholders’ become ‘clients’ or ‘consumers.’ 
 
Phase 6: The next move is inevitable: the disaggregated measures invented 
to render exteriorised product and introspective process tractable in 
Phases 2 and 3, initially in keeping with academic values and norms, are 
modified to align with these ‘stakeholder’ interests. So, incremental 
adjustments in those measures can now be used to not merely keep track 
of the exteriorised product and the introspective process but to change 
and direct those. So, for instance, now teaching has to be designed to 
produce skilled workers for particular sectors of employment, research has 
to be undertaken to produce innovation in industry or encourage political 
harmony. The thrust of academic work is now not considered in the 
service of a public good in the broad sense, but as an instrument of 
dominant and conservative (i.e. determined to preserve themselves) align-
ments which claim to represent and embody and dictate the public good 
(that they are able to do so make them dominant). Typically, this phase 
involves a culling of academic workers who continue to adhere to what 
they consider key to an academic identity (freedom of introspection 
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followed by exteriorisation), and increased recruitment of workers who are 
able to accommodate their academic instrumentality with those dominant 
and conservative alignments. These moves are presented as progressive 
and inevitable, and managed under the guise of ‘strategic management,’ 
‘forward planning,’ ‘restructuring,’  ‘efficiency measures,’ etc. Gradually, 
the introspective process which is the starting point of academic work and 
the academic worker’s raison d’être is itself taken over and directed from 
without; a kind of thought-control seems to be exercised which annuls the 
impetus of what was understood as academic work in Phase 1. 
 
Phase 7: The identity of academia -- academic workers’ understanding of 
academic life -- begins to fragment; so that ‘what is a university?’ and ‘what 
is an academic?’ appear to be increasingly rhetorical and old-fashioned 
questions. Academic institutions and workers are gradually replaced by 
large or small organisations peopled with service providers, under the 
control of various split management strata, sometimes as a federation 
under a super-management stratum for a large so-called ‘university.’ All 
these organisations and service providers that constitute the so-called 
‘university’ are now geared up for training personnel and utility-based 
knowledge production to serve different dominant interest groups of 
society (not really the ‘public’ in general any longer, but social alignments 
like corporations, state-policing-and-publicity units, community groups, 
consumer associations and the like). Some elite parts in this so-called 
‘university’ (which still appear to bear a resemblance to academic institu-
tions of Phase 1) also generate knowledge and instruction for scholarly 
hobbyists who can pay for their intellectual pleasures. At this point, any 
pretence of academic work being regarded as a public good can gradually 
be withdrawn, and former commitments to public investment (especially 
direct state funding) reduced to a mote. Academic institutions are now 
fragmented bodies, parts of which are outsourced, and parts of which 
remain as self-funding and profit-making components of a range of estab-
lishment interest groups (government, corporate, non-government, which 
are represented by ‘stakeholders’ in academic boardrooms) which finance 
them according to their own needs. The ultimate aim of such federations, 
each controlled by a complex management stratum in synch with their 
‘stakeholders’, is to offer a flexible and obedient means for generating 
economic growth and social stability to serve dominant interests.                   
 
In the UK, I think, we are somewhere between Phases 6 and 7; in a few 
so-called ‘modernizing’ contexts academia is still at Phases 2 or 3, or is 
leaping ahead eagerly towards Phase 4. 
Akin to the rationale sketched above, the broad outlines of contempo-
rary liberal cost-benefit accounting was laid out, with unusual prescience, 
ENTREPRENEURIAL LITERARY THEORY 
258 
 
in Michel Foucault’s 1979 Collège de France lectures published as The Birth 
of Biopolitics (2004/in English 2008). The lectures referred to a much 
broader field, which Foucault dubbed ‘biopolitics,’ wherein such cost-
benefit accounting practices have become a naturalised and pervasive 
grounding for liberal ‘governmentality’ – within conjugal partnerships, 
conceiving and raising children, property and employment relations, the 
penal system, etc. Under the sway of liberal governmentality, Foucault 
observed, individuals become entrepreneurs of themselves, constantly 
realising themselves and advancing their interests and confirming their 
existence through cost-benefit accounting. As far as the academy goes, 
anxiety spreads because the academic self that academic workers seek to 
realise, promote, sustain and confirm is slipping away – is ceasing to be 
recognised, seems to be falling unnoticed into a black hole. The core of 
the academic self – grounded in the freedom of introspection and 
consequent exteriorisation – is slipping away; or rather, introspection is 
gripped by extrinsic thought-control and exteriorisation squeezed by 
constraints of permissibility. Even on the superficial surface of academic 
life, markers of value and integrity in thinking and practice, communal 
rites of mutual recognition and acknowledgement, gauges of effort and 
aspiration have been redefined out of existence. All these have been 
redefined into something that the academic worker is unable to identify 
with.  
 
From the posting ‘The Busyness of Academics,’ May 2015, Comment and Debate page of 
the project website Framing Financial Crisis and Protest: North-West and South-East Europe. 
http://www.open.ac.uk/arts/research/finance-crisis-protest/comment-and-debate/ 
busyness-academics 
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